Suit was brought in a state court to restrain the Governor and
other state officials from sending to the Secretary of the United
States a certified copy of a resolution enacted by the state
legislature purporting to ratify the proposed Child Labor
Amendment
Page 307 U. S. 475
to the Federal Constitution, it being alleged that such
attempted ratification was illegal and void.
Held:
That, although the state court had jurisdiction
in
limine, the act of the Governor in forwarding the
certification to the federal Secretary of State after the beginning
of the suit and after a restraining order and summons had been
issued, but before actual service and without knowledge of the
pendency of the proceeding, had left no controversy susceptible of
judicial determination, and that a writ of certiorari from this
Court to review the final judgment should therefore be
dismissed.
271 Ky. 252, 111 S.W.2d 633, dismissed.
Certiorari, 303 U.S. 634, to review the affirmance by the court
below of a judgment entered pursuant to its opinion on an earlier
review, 270 Ky. 1. The suit was brought by individuals -- citizens,
taxpayers, and voters in Kentucky -- to restrain the Governor and
officers of the General Assembly from sending to the Secretary of
the United States a certified copy of a resolution of the
legislature purporting to ratify the proposed Child Labor
Amendment, and for a judgment declaring the legislative Act to be
illegal and void because of a rejection of the same proposed
amendment by an earlier legislature of the State, as well as by
more than a majority of the legislatures of the several States, and
further because more than a reasonable time for ratification had
elapsed since the amendment was first proposed.
Page 307 U. S. 476
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
In January, 1937, the legislature of Kentucky adopted a
resolution purporting to ratify the constitutional amendment
proposed by the Congress in 1924 and known as the "Child Labor
Amendment."
*
Respondents, citizens, taxpayers, and voters in Kentucky brought
this suit in the state court to restrain the Governor of the
Commonwealth and the officers of the General Assembly from sending
certified copies of the resolution to the Secretary of the United
States and the presiding officers of the Senate and House of
Representatives, and for a judgment declaring the action of the
General Assembly to be illegal and void. The complaint stated that,
in 1926, the proposed amendment had been rejected by the General
Assembly of the Commonwealth and also by more than a majority of
the legislatures of the States, and that the General Assembly could
not thereafter legally reconsider and adopt the amendment; and,
further, that its action was not taken within a reasonable time
after the amendment was proposed.
Upon the filing of the petition, a restraining order was granted
and summons was issued. On the same day, but before the Governor
was actually served with a copy of the restraining order or
summons, he forwarded by mail a certified copy of the resolution to
the Secretary of State. It is not claimed that the Governor then
knew of the pendency of the proceeding.
Plaintiffs then filed an amended petition setting forth the
action taken by the Governor and sought a mandatory
Page 307 U. S. 477
injunction to require him to notify the Secretary of the
pendency of the suit and that the notice which he had sent was void
and should be disregarded. That action was not taken. Defendants
filed a general demurrer which was sustained in the Circuit Court,
but its judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals. 270 Ky. 1,
108 S.W.2d 1024.
The court gave opportunity on the remand to the Circuit Court,
with directions to overrule the demurrer, for such further
proceedings as were not inconsistent with its views. Upon that
remand, the defendants declined to plead further, and judgment was
entered in accordance with the opinion of the Court of Appeals. The
judgment so entered set forth (1) that an actual controversy
existed between the parties, that the plaintiffs had the right to
maintain the suit and the court had jurisdiction; (2) that the
resolution of the legislature purporting to ratify the proposed
amendment was void, not having been ratified according to the
provisions of the Constitution of the United States; (3) that the
notice given by the Governor to the Secretary of State was of no
effect; (4) that the clerk of the court should give official notice
to the Department of State that the resolution purporting to ratify
the amendment was invalid, that it had not been ratified according
to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and
that the notice given by the Governor was of no effect. The clerk
was further directed to send a duly authenticated copy of the
judgment to the Secretary of State by registered mail.
On appeal, that judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
We granted certiorari. 303 U.S. 634.
We think that, while the state court had jurisdiction
in
limine, the writ of certiorari should be dismissed upon the
ground that, after the Governor of Kentucky had forwarded the
certification of the ratification of the amendment to the Secretary
of the United States, there
Page 307 U. S. 478
was no longer a controversy susceptible of judicial
determination.
Dismissed.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS and MR. JUSTICE BUTLER think that the
judgment of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky should be affirmed on
the authority of
Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.
S. 368, and for the reasons stated in the dissenting
opinion in
Coleman v. Miller, ante, p.
307 U. S. 433.
* 43 Stat. 670.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.
For the reasons stated in concurring opinion in
Coleman v.
Miller, ante, p.
307 U. S. 433, we
do not believe that State or Federal courts have any jurisdiction
to interfere with the amending process.
We therefore concur in the dismissal.
