1. Whether an offense against a temporary Act may be punished
after the Act has expired depends upon the legislative purpose. P.
307 U. S.
216.
2. An Act of Congress, designed to protect interstate and
foreign commerce from "contraband" oil and to encourage oil
conservation and containing administrative and punitive provisions
for its effectuation, provided that it should "cease to be in
effect on June 16, 1937." It was amended June 14, 1937, by an Act
which declared its purpose to continue the earlier Act until June
30, 1939, and which merely changed the date of expiration
accordingly.
Held, a clear indication of purpose to treat the entire
Act as if, by its original terms, it was to expire on the day to
which it was so extended, and that violations of the Act committed
prior to the original date of expiration were indictable
thereafter. P.
307 U. S.
217.
3. Article I, § 9, cl. 3 of the Federal Constitution,
proscribing
ex post facto laws, does not bar such
prosecution. P.
307 U. S.
218.
4. A statute susceptible of more than one interpretation should
be given that which will make it effective. P.
307 U. S.
217.
Reversed
Appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act and § 238 Jud.Code, from a
judgment sustaining demurrers to an indictment and motions to quash
it.
Page 307 U. S. 215
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal, under the Criminal Appeals Act of March 2,
1907, 18 U.S.C. § 682, and § 238 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §
345, from a judgment of a district court sustaining demurrers and
motions of the appellees to quash an indictment.
The indictment, filed September 17, 1938, charges appellees with
violations of the Connally (Hot Oil) Act of February 22, 1935, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 715
et seq., and with conspiracy to
violate such Act, 18 U.S.C. § 88. The various substantive counts
charge that appellees, in violation of the Act, as amended,
transported in interstate commerce from the Conroe Oil Field in
Montgomery County, Texas, to Marcus Hook, Pa. certain petroleum
products in excess of the amounts permitted to be produced,
transported, and withdrawn from storage under the laws of Texas and
the regulations and orders prescribed by the Railroad Commission of
Texas. These transportations are alleged to have been made on
various dates from November 4, 1935, to March 20, 1936. The
conspiracy count charges a conspiracy by appellees to violate the
Act, as amended, by producing, transporting, and withdrawing from
storage petroleum in excess of the amounts permitted to be
produced, transported, and withdrawn from storage under the laws of
Texas and the regulations and orders promulgated thereunder. These
transportations are alleged to have been made between the same
places alleged in the substantive counts, on various dates from on
or about September 4, 1935, to on or about March 15, 1937.
Sec. 13 of the Act of February 22, 1935, 49 Stat. 33, provided
that "This Act shall cease to be in effect on June 16, 1937." This
section was amended by the Act of June 14, 1937,
Page 307 U. S. 216
"by striking out
June 16, 1937' and inserting in lieu
thereof `June 30, 1939.'" 50 Stat. 257. No other amendments to the
Act were made.
The single question before us is whether violations of this Act
alleged to have been committed prior to June 16, 1937, may be
prosecuted under an indictment returned subsequent thereto. The
district court, by sustaining the demurrers and motions to quash,
answered that question in the negative. We think it erred.
The Congress alone may declare whether those who, before June
16, 1937, violated the Act may be prosecuted thereafter. The
question is one of the purpose of Congress. Explicit provisions in
the amendment preserving the right of prosecution after the date
originally set for expiry of the Act would have made that purpose
clear beyond question. But the surrounding circumstances here make
this purpose as clear and as unequivocal as an explicit provision.
This is an Act designed to protect interstate and foreign commerce
from the diversion and obstruction of, and the burden and harmful
effect upon, such commerce caused by contraband oil (as defined in
the Act), and to encourage the conservation of deposits of crude
oil within the United States. Administrative machinery is provided
for the control of shipment or transportation of contraband oil in
interstate commerce. §§ 4, 5, and 9. Such shipment or
transportation is prohibited unless, on appropriate findings, the
President, by proclamation, lifts the prohibition. §§ 3 and 4.
Penalties are provided for violations of the Act or any regulations
prescribed thereunder. §§ 6 and 7. And § 10 implements the Act with
civil and criminal procedures to enforce its sanctions. The Act is
thus a self-sustained and organic whole, equipped to effectuate a
declared policy of the Congress. By its original terms, it would
have expired June 16, 1937. B ut it never expired, for, on June 14,
1937,
Page 307 U. S. 217
the whole Act was continued in effect until June 30, 1939. Its
substantive phases were not altered one whit or tittle; its
sanctions were neither reduced nor increased. Precisely the same
acts continue to be prohibited after the amendment as before. The
amendment merely perpetuated the entire Act for another term.
In view of these circumstances, it seems clear beyond question
that it was the purpose of Congress, expressed in the amendment of
June 14, 1937, to treat this Act precisely in the same way as if,
by its original terms, it was to expire on June 30, 1939. Due to
the amendment, the Act has never ceased to be in effect. No new law
was created; no old one was repealed. Without hiatus of any kind,
the original Act was given extended life. There was no First
Connally Act followed by a Second Connally Act. During the periods
in question, there was but one Act. No evidence has been brought to
our attention, and we have found none, that Congress proposed to
waive or to pardon violations which occurred prior to June 16,
1937, but which were not prosecuted until subsequent thereto.
There is a secondary consideration which points to the same
conclusion. If the appellees are right in their contention, a
temporary act such as this one would lose, as a practical matter,
some of its sanctions. Violations could occur with impunity months
before its expiry, for, in practice, there frequently is an
unavoidably substantial lag between violation and prosecution. The
statute should not be so construed if another interpretation will
make it effective. As this Court said in
Bird v. United
States, 187 U. S. 118,
187 U. S.
124,
"There is a presumption against a construction which would
render a statute ineffective or inefficient, or which would cause
grave public injury or even inconvenience."
We are unwilling to conclude that, although the same acts
continue to be prohibited
Page 307 U. S. 218
after June 16, 1937, as before, violations committed prior to
that date are not punishable thereafter.
In view of this conclusion, we do not reach the nub of
appellees' argument based on Chief Justice Marshall's statement in
The
Irresistible, 7 Wheat. 551,
20 U. S.
552,
"that an offense against a temporary act cannot be punished
after the expiration of the act unless a particular provision be
made by law for the purpose."
For, in this case, as we have said, the Act of February 22,
1935, did not expire on June 16, 1937.
But, even if we assume the validity of that statement, it seems
to us clear that, though the Act be treated as having expired or
terminated on June 16, 1937, the result is the same. For, in this
case, "particular provision" has been made "by law for the purpose"
of extending the enforcement machinery with reference to prior
criminal violations. The "particular provision" was the amendment
of June 14, 1937, extending the effective period of the Act. That
amendment was passed prior to the original expiration date. When
read in light of the title of the amendatory statute,
viz., "An Act To continue in effect until June 30, 1939,
the Act . . . approved February 22, 1935," 50 Stat. 257, the
statement of purpose becomes plain and unambiguous. If the
amendment of June 14, 1937, had merely "extended" the duration, or
postponed the expiration, of § 10 of the Act, dealing with criminal
penalties, "particular provision" for subsequent prosecutions would
have been indubitably clear. The fact that all sections, including
§ 10, were extended makes it nonetheless plain. The whole, though
larger than any of its parts, does not necessarily obscure their
separate identities.
In view of these various considerations, we hold that this
prosecution does not offend the prohibition in Article I § 9, cl. 3
of the Constitution against
ex post facto laws.
Judgment reversed.