Section 313(b) of the Federal Power Act, forbidding
dispositions, consolidations, acquisitions, etc. of public utility
facilities without prior authorization by order of the Federal
Power Commission, further provides that, if the Commission, after
notice and opportunity for hearing, finds that a proposed
disposition will be consistent with the public interest, it shall
approve the same.
Held:
1. That an order of the Commission denying an application of
Page 307 U. S. 157
two power companies for approval of a proposed transfer, upon
the ground that the applicants had failed to establish that the
transfer would be consistent with the public interest, was
reviewable on questions of law under § 313(b) of the Act, which
provides that any party to a proceeding under the Act aggrieved by
an order issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain
review of such order in the Circuit Court of Appeals. P.
307 U. S.
159.
2. The objection that review of the order presents no case or
controversy, because the court cannot itself approve the proposed
transfer, is rejected, since, without intruding upon the province
of the Commission, the court can adjudicate the legal principles
involved, and its judgment will be final and binding on the
Commission. P.
307 U. S.
159.
98 F.2d 83 affirmed.
Certiorari, 305 U.S. 593, to review an order of the court below
which denied a motion to dismiss a petition to review an order of
the Federal Power Commission.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The case is here on certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, granted because of the intrinsic importance
of the issue raised and of a conflict between the decision below,
98 F.2d 835, and that of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
Newport Electric Corp. v. Federal Power
Commission, 97 F.2d 580.
Page 307 U. S. 158
The sole issue before us is whether an order of the Federal
Power Commission denying an application under § 203(a)
* of the Federal
Power Act, as amended, is reviewable under § 313(b) of that
Act.
The Inland Power & Light Company, an Oregon corporation,
owns three hydroelectric projects in Oregon and Washington, two of
which are operated under license of the Federal Power Commission,
and the third under a permit issued by the Secretary of the
Interior. The Pacific Power & Light Company, a Maine
corporation, is engaged in generating and distributing electric
energy in Washington and Oregon, and owns and operates facilities
for interstate transmission of electricity. The Inland and Pacific
Companies filed a joint application with the Power Commission for
approval, under §§ 8 and 203 of the Act, of a proposed transfer of
all the assets, including licenses, of Inland to Pacific, and of
the termination of Inland's existence. Having found after due
hearing and consideration that
"applicants have failed to establish that said transfer will be
consistent with the public interest within the contemplation of §
203(a) of the Federal Power Act,"
the Commission ordered that "the application be, and the same
hereby is, denied."
Invoking § 313(b) of the Federal Power Act, the applicants
initiated the present proceedings in the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit to review the
Page 307 U. S. 159
order of the Commission as unwarranted in law and unsupported in
its findings. The exact scope of the prayer is postponed for later
consideration. The Power Commission challenged the jurisdiction of
the Circuit Court of Appeals by a motion to dismiss the petition on
the ground that the court was without jurisdiction under § 313(b),
since the order sought to be set aside was negative in character.
The denial of that motion brought the case here.
If the Federal Power Act had formally taken over the statutory
provisions of the Urgent Deficiencies Act pertaining to review of
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the decision in
Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, ante, p. 125,
would dispose of this case and sustain the assumption of
jurisdiction below. But the Power Act contains a distinctive
formulation of the conditions under which resort to the courts may
be made and Congress determines the scope of jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts. Section 313(b) provides that
"Any party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an
order issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a
review of such order in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United
States."
The denial by the Commission of approval of the application by
petitioners of the transfer of Inland to Pacific as not "consistent
with the public interest" was an "order," and the petitioners were
"aggrieved" by it, since, without such approval, the transfer was
forbidden. § 203(a). Thus, the statutory scheme of the Power Act
only reinforces the analysis made in the
Rochester
case.
But it is urged that review of the Power Commission's order does
not present a "case" or "controversy," because the court itself
cannot lift the prohibition of the statute by granting permission
for the transfer, nor order the Commission to grant such
permission. And so it is
Page 307 U. S. 160
claimed that any action of a court in setting aside the order of
the Commission would be an empty gesture, since, without
permission, a transfer would be unlawful. But this proves too much.
In none of the situations in which an action of the Interstate
Commerce Commission or of a similar federal regulatory body comes
for scrutiny before a federal court can judicial action supplant
the discretionary authority of a commission. A federal court cannot
fix rates, nor make divisions of joint rates, nor relieve from the
long-short haul clause, nor formulate car practices. So here it is
immaterial that the court itself cannot approve or disapprove the
transfer. The court has power to pass judgment upon challenged
principles of law insofar as they are relevant to the disposition
made by the Commission. " . . . [A] judgment rendered will be a
final and indisputable basis of action as between the Commission
and the defendant."
Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Baird, 194 U. S. 25,
194 U. S. 38. In
making such a judgment, the court does not intrude upon the
province of the Commission, while the constitutional requirements
of "Case" or "Controversy" are satisfied. For purposes of judicial
finality, there is no more reason for assuming that a Commission
will disregard the direction of a reviewing court than that a lower
court will do so.
Affirmed.
*
"No public utility shall sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of
the whole of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission, or any part thereof of a value in excess of $50,000, or
by any means whatsoever, directly or indirectly, merge or
consolidate such facilities or any part thereof with those of any
other person, or purchase, acquire, or take any security of any
other public utility, without first having secured an order of the
Commission authorizing it to do so. . . . After notice and
opportunity for hearing, if the Commission finds that the proposed
disposition, consolidation, acquisition, or control will be
consistent with the public interest, it shall approve the
same."