Stockholders of the "P" and "R" national banks brought bills in
equity to enjoin the receiver from enforcing assessments, ordered
by the Comptroller of the Currency pursuant to the statute
governing the additional liability of shareholders, on the grounds
that the action of the Comptroller in ordering the assessments was
in excess of his statutory power, arbitrary, capricious, and a
denial of due process of law. The bills alleged,
inter
alia, that the Comptroller erroneously disregarded agreements
theretofore entered into between the "P" and "R" and the "F" banks
whereby the first two conveyed all of their assets to the last,
which assumed all of their liabilities except liabilities to
stockholders, and out of which
Page 303 U. S. 533
agreements arose claims against the "F " bank sufficient to pay
the debts of the "P" and "R" banks without the necessity of
assessment of stockholders. Upon the allegations of the bills,
held:
1. The assessments were not subject to attack or frustration in
these proceedings upon the grounds set forth in the bills. P.
303 U. S.
538.
2. The agreements between the banks did not effect a
consolidation in conformity with the National Banking Act, and the
Comptroller was bound to deal with them, so far as their assets and
liabilities were concerned and in respect of stockholders'
liability, as three separate entities. P.
303 U. S.
538.
3. It was not a condition precedent to the validity of the
assessments that the Comptroller should have exhausted the assets
of the "P" and "R" banks. P.
303 U. S.
539.
4. The Comptroller's determination as to the necessity for the
assessments was made in the exercise of the discretionary power
vested in him, and was final and conclusive. P.
303 U. S.
540.
5. Collection of the assessments could not be made to await the
outcome of litigation challenging the correctness of the
Comptroller's decision to the effect of the agreements between the
banks. P.
303 U. S.
544.
88 F.2d 936 reversed.
Certiorari, 302 U.S. 665, to review a decree reversing orders of
the District Court dismissing the bills of complaint in two suits
brought by stockholders of two insolvent national banks to enjoin
the receiver from enforcing assessments ordered by the Comptroller
of the Currency. By order of the trial court, the cases were
consolidated for the purpose of appeal.
Page 303 U. S. 534
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
These are stockholders' suits to enjoin the receiver of two
national banks from enforcing assessments ordered by the
Comptroller of the Currency pursuant to the statute governing the
additional liability of shareholders. [
Footnote 1]
The respondents in No. 123 are stockholders of the Penn National
Bank & Trust Company of Reading, Pa.; those in No. 124 are
stockholders of the Reading National Bank & Trust Company of
the same city, and the petitioner is receiver of both banks. The
controversy has its origin in a transaction between the two banks
and the Farmers National Bank & Trust Company of Reading. The
causes of action are identical, and it will suffice to outline the
allegations of the bill in No. 123. These are:
On February 17, 1933, Penn and Reading were subjected to unusual
withdrawals which depleted their reserves and placed both on the
verge of insolvency. Due to this condition, the two banks on that
date entered into an agreement with the Farmers contemplating a
consolidation of the three in accordance with Title 12 U.S.C. §§ 33
and 34. The agreement called for a valuation of the assets of the
three banks with ensuing recapitalization, and for the
Comptroller's approval of the terms of consolidation as required by
law. It further provided for transfer by Penn and Reading of all
their assets to Farmers, with the right to hypothecate and
rehypothecate them, and for assumption by Farmers of the
liabilities of the transferring banks, except that to stockholders,
they reserving the right to enforce against their stockholders any
statutory excess liability. Farmers was to operate
Page 303 U. S. 535
their banking houses as its branches. On the same day, Penn and
Reading turned over their assets to Farmers, which mingled them
with its own and thereafter dealt with them as its own. There is no
assertion that, on February 17, the Comptroller knew, or approved,
of the agreement and transfer. It is alleged, however, that, by his
direction, a supplemental agreement was made February 20, 1933, by
which Penn and Reading guaranteed to Farmers that the assets of
each would exceed in value its liabilities assumed by Farmers under
the agreement of February 17, and that he acquiesced in the
continued administration of the affairs of Penn and Reading by
Farmers. On February 17 the assets of Penn which were transferred
to Farmers had a reasonable market net value of $5,400,000, as
against total liabilities of $5,100,000, and the assets of Farmers
were of the fair value of $8,000,000 (to which is to be added the
stockholders' liability for assessment in the amount of
$1,000,000), as against liability to creditors of $9,000,000.
[
Footnote 2] The claims of the
two banks against Farmers were, at the date of transfer, and still
are, more than sufficient, in the ordinary course of liquidation,
to pay all of their liabilities without the necessity of an
assessment of the stockholders.
Farmers continued to do business with the combined and
commingled assets from February 17 to March 18, 1933. Then the
Comptroller appointed a conservator who took possession of all of
the assets. October 10, 1933, the Comptroller, without notice to
Penn or Reading, their depositors, creditors, or stockholders, and
without a hearing, ruled that the agreements of February 17 and
February 20 were without legal effect, and directed that the
transfer and delivery of the assets, and the assumption of
liabilities thereunder, should be disregarded, and
Page 303 U. S. 536
he attempted to allocate among the three banks the assets
theretofore transferred and delivered to Farmers. He appointed the
same person he had previously named conservator for Farmers to be
conservator of the other two banks. October 20, 1933, the
Comptroller proposed a so-called plan of reorganization of the
three banks which provided for the organization of a new national
bank, the issue by it of stock and securities, the pledge of some
of its assets to secure a loan from Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, a sale of the assets in the possession of the
conservator of Farmers to the new national bank, and a division of
the proceeds on the basis of 35 percent to Farmers, 25 percent to
Penn, and 25 percent to Reading. It is charged that this division
was arbitrary, and was based on a classification adopted from the
report of national bank examiners dated April 24, 1933, and not on
the financial condition of the banks as of February 17, 1933, the
date of the execution of the agreement, transfer of assets, and
assumption of liabilities. The conservator of all three banks, in
furtherance of the plan, reconstructed the assets and liabilities
of each as of April 24, 1933, made a division thereof amongst the
banks, consummated the sale to the new bank, and apportioned the
proceeds according to the plan. In so doing, in conformity with the
Comptroller's ruling, he disregarded all rights and obligations
arising from the agreement of February 17, 1933, and disregarded
the claim of Penn, in the amount of $5,100,000, and the claim of
Reading, in the amount of $9,000,000, against Farmers. The bills
charge that this conduct was arbitrary, and that the Comptroller's
ruling respecting the two agreements was beyond the powers
conferred upon him by the National Bank Act or other statutory law,
was an unlawful assumption of judicial powers not delegated to him
by statute, or capable of being so delegated, was in violation of
the rights of Penn and Reading, their depositors, other
Page 303 U. S. 537
creditors, and stockholders, and deprived them of their property
without due process of law.
After consummation of the plan of reorganization, the
Comptroller certified that each of the three banks was insolvent,
and, in October and November, 1934, appointed a receiver for each
of them. January 15, 1935, he certified that, upon a proper
accounting by the receivers of Penn and Reading and a valuation of
the uncollected assets remaining in their hands, it appeared that a
100 percent assessment was necessary to pay their debts, and he
accordingly ordered such an assessment. The bills characterize his
conduct as a failure, neglect, and refusal to collect the claims of
Penn and Reading against Farmers, and a consequent failure to
comply with the conditions and provisions of the statute
authorizing assessments of stockholders, and as "in fraud of the
rights" of Penn and Reading, their creditors and stockholders. His
ignoring the claims is charged to have been "a grave error of law
based upon his unwarranted assumption of judicial power in
abrogating, cancelling, and waiving" the claims of Penn and Reading
against Farmers, and "adjudicating the private rights and
obligations of parties not subject to his power and control," which
invalidated the assessments.
The receiver interposed motions to dismiss which were sustained
by the District Court. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
[
Footnote 3] holding the bills
set forth a cause of action, since, if their allegations were true,
the Comptroller had exceeded his statutory power and acted
arbitrarily in ordering the assessments. The importance of the
question involved and asserted conflict of decision moved us to
grant certiorari.
The petitioner's position is that the agreement and transfer of
assets to the Farmers did not effect a statutory consolidation;
that the Comptroller was, therefore
Page 303 U. S. 538
at liberty to treat all three banks as separate entities for the
purpose of assessing stockholders' liability, and that stockholders
may not, by a proceeding in equity, challenge his official findings
as to insolvency and necessity for an assessment. The respondents
say the Comptroller's power of assessment is conditioned on a basic
or
quasi-jurisdiction fact that the ordinary resources of
a bank have been exhausted, and, if they have not been, or are
deficient only because of the Comptroller's unlawful abrogation of
and refusal to require collection of a valid claim sufficient to
pay the bank's debts, the assessment is subject to direct attack as
in excess of that officer's statutory power, as arbitrary,
capricious, and a denial of due process of law. We are of opinion
that the assessments were not subject to attack or frustration in
these proceedings upon the grounds set forth in the bills.
1. The agreements of February 17 and February 20 did not effect
a consolidation in conformity with the National Banking Act so as
to constitute the existing stockholders of Penn and Reading,
together with the stockholders of Farmers, stockholders of a
consolidated bank. The steps requisite to such consolidation were
never taken. [
Footnote 4]
2. When the Comptroller took charge of the banks in question, he
was bound to deal with them, so far as their assets and liabilities
were concerned and in respect of stockholders' liability, upon the
basis that they were three separate associations. This conclusion
is unaffected by the legality and effectiveness of the agreement of
February 17, 1933, upon which respondents insist. [
Footnote 5] At most, the agreement
substituted a new asset --
Page 303 U. S. 539
the promise of Farmers -- for the old assets. Respondents do not
claim that the contract and the transfer pursuant to it worked a
novation whereby the creditors of the transferring banks became
creditors of the transferee. So far as the Comptroller was
concerned, these creditors were still those of the former, and
entitled to look to their assets for payment.
3. Whether the Comptroller took the view that the contracts and
what was done under them were effective to commute the physical
assets of Penn and Reading into a chose in action against Farmers,
or that the transaction did not so operate, but left Penn and
Reading owners of their assets so far as they could be identified
and segregated, it was not, as respondents suggest, a condition
precedent to the validity of his assessment that he should have
exhausted the assets of Penn and Reading.
At the argument, the position was taken that the Comptroller was
without power to lay an assessment until he had gotten in the
avails of all the ordinary assets of the banks, and that the claims
of Penn and Reading against Farmers under the contract of February
17 were such ordinary assets. The conclusion is that, until the
receiver of Penn and Reading had recovered upon the contract and
distributed the proceeds, the Comptroller was without power to
order an assessment. No decision of any court was cited to support
this position, but it was sought to maintain it by reference to an
amendment of the National Bank Act of June 3, 1864, [
Footnote 6] offered and adopted in the
Senate. The purpose of this amendment was stated to be to
"enable the receiver, at any time, whenever it becomes
necessary, to enforce the individual liability, and, in case it is
not necessary, if the other assets are sufficient, he will not
enforce this contingent liability, which is intended as an ultimate
security of the
Page 303 U. S. 540
creditors of the bank."
We think the adoption of the amendment in the light of the
explanation is far from sustaining the respondents' contention. It
has always been recognized that, if the assets of a closed national
bank are sufficient to answer its liabilities, the Comptroller is
not to levy an assessment, but to him is confided the determination
of the sufficiency of the assets and, if he concludes they are
insufficient, it is not only his right, but his duty, immediately
to invoke the contingent liability of the stockholders. This has
been the invariable administrative practice, and any other would
tend to depreciate the availability and the value of stockholders'
liability.
4. The question remains whether, if the Comptroller's action
arose from mistake of fact or law, the remedy here invoked is
appropriate. In establishing the national banking system, Congress
has invested the Comptroller, an administrative officer, with
jurisdiction to appoint a receiver after investigation and a
finding that a bank has become insolvent, and to order an
assessment up to 100 percent of the par value of the stock against
the shareholders to pay creditors' claims if, upon an
investigation, he finds that the assets are insufficient to pay the
debts. Plainly, these are questions for the exercise of
administrative discretion. The necessity for vesting this power in
an administrative officer springs from the desirability of prompt
liquidation. It would be intolerable if the Comptroller's decision
could be attacked collaterally in every suit by a receiver against
the shareholders to collect the amount of the assessment. It is
settled this cannot be done. [
Footnote 7] It would be equally intolerable if
stockholders as a class could call upon a court to review the
Comptroller's exercise of his discretion. For a court to entertain
a suit for this purpose would be
Page 303 U. S. 541
to render nugatory the functions Congress has confided in the
Comptroller. It has often been decided this may not be done.
[
Footnote 8]
The respondents, however, urge, and the bill charges, that the
Comptroller, in ruling that the contract of February 17 should be
disregarded, and the receiver, in following this ruling, exceeded
their statutory powers and acted arbitrarily and may be enjoined
from enforcing an assessment based on the ruling. The contention
rests upon a statement in
United States v. Knox,
102 U. S. 422,
102 U. S.
425:
"Although assessments made by the comptroller, under the
circumstances of the first assessment in this case, and all other
assessments, successive or otherwise, not exceeding the par value
of all the stock of the bank, are conclusive upon the stockholders,
yet if he were to attempt to enforce one made clearly and palpably
contrary to the views we have expressed, it cannot be doubted that
a court of equity, if its aid were invoked, would promptly restrain
him by injunction."
This was said in a case where a creditor sought a mandamus to
compel the Comptroller to order an assessment, he having refused so
to do on the ground that the very terms of the statute forbade such
action. Relying on this expression, a number of the federal courts
have said that, while an assessment may not be collaterally
attacked, it may be voided by direct attack for "clear error of
law, fraud or mistake." [
Footnote
9] Respondents admit this statement is too broad. Other
courts
Page 303 U. S. 542
have said that the only ground of successful attack is fraud on
the part of the Comptroller. [
Footnote 10] This case presents no such basis for relief.
The bills do not charge bad faith or fraud on the part of the
Comptroller. The averment that his ruling with respect to the
contract of February 17 and the consequent action of the receiver
were "in fraud" of the rights of Penn and Reading and their
stockholders falls far short of any charge of actual fraud. Indeed,
no suggestion of such fraud was advanced by respondents either in
brief or in argument.
The respondents rely upon decisions holding that a bill in
equity or a writ of mandamus will lie to compel an executive
officer to comply with the plain mandate of a statute. These have
no application, for they deal with a situation wholly foreign to
that here presented. Where a statute vests no discretion in an
executive officer but to act under a given set of circumstances, or
forbids his acting except upon certain named conditions, a court
will compel him to act or to refrain from acting if he essays
wholly to disregard the statutory mandate; but if a discretion is
vested in him, and he is to act in the light of the facts he
ascertains and the judgment he forms, a court cannot restrain him
from acting on the ground that he has exceeded his jurisdiction by
reason of an error either of fact or law which induced his
conclusion. Plainly, therefore, the respondents are wrong in
asserting that, as the facts set forth in their bill charge the
Comptroller with an error of law, he exceeded his authority.
The respondents further insist that their allegation that the
Comptroller's action was "arbitrary," which is amplified and given
content by the facts alleged and admitted by the motion to dismiss,
requires a decree avoiding the assessment. The epithet "arbitrary,"
used in this
Page 303 U. S. 543
connection, can mean no more than do the other averments that
the Comptroller, in reaching his conclusion, "committed grave error
of law" in failing to regard the contract of February 17 as
effective. It would be arbitrary, in the proper sense of the term,
for an official to act in the teeth of a statute or stubbornly to
refuse to act at all where a statute commands action, but where he
essays to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon him, though his
errors may be subject to subsequent correction, they cannot be
enjoined as an arbitrary exercise of his authority. To hold
otherwise would render orderly administrative procedure
impossible.
A reference to the situation with which the Comptroller was
confronted when his receiver took charge of the banks will serve to
demonstrate that a case was presented calling for the exercise of
his discretion. The bill asserts that, over a substantial period
subsequent to the transfer of Penn's and Reading's assets to
Farmers, these were intermingled with Farmers' assets. It avers
that an attempted segregation of assets was made upon the basis of
a report of bank examiners dated April 24, 1933, more than two
months after the transfer; it alleges that, at the date of
transfer, Farmers owed $9,000,000 against which it had assets of
$8,000,000 and a possible recovery by way of stockholders'
liability of an additional million dollars; it fails to state what
the condition of Farmers was when a conservator was appointed for
it; what its condition was when a receiver was appointed for it;
what its financial status is today. The pleader contents himself
with the statement of a conclusion that the "claims" of Penn and
Reading against Farmers were, at the time of transfer of their
assets, and still are, sufficient in amount to pay all of those
banks' creditors. But, if the allegation is true, the only
conclusion to be drawn from it is that, in ordering the assessment,
the Comptroller erroneously estimated the value of the banks'
assets. Whatever may be
Page 303 U. S. 544
thought of the legality of the transfer of assets pursuant to
directors' action on the eve of insolvency, the creditors of Penn
and Reading were not bound to look to Farmers, and might prefer to
look to the assets transferred or to so much of them as could be
traced. And there well may have been reason for the Comptroller to
doubt the legal efficacy of the transfer in the face of creditors'
attack. These and other matters were to be considered by him in
arriving at an informed judgment as to the availability and value
of the assets of Penn and Reading to answer the claims of their
creditors. As an exercise of the discretionary power vested in him,
the Comptroller's action must be treated as final and conclusive as
to the necessity for an assessment.
5. If the Comptroller's decision with respect to the contract of
February 17 was erroneous as matter of law, the stockholders may or
may not have a remedy. But their remedy is not to attack, or seek
to evade payment of, the assessment. The collection of the
assessment cannot be be made to await the outcome of litigation of
that question. Moreover, if, as they assert, the Comptroller's
judgment is wrong, and the assets of Penn and Reading, consisting
of their claims under the contract, are sufficient to pay their
creditors, the amounts paid pursuant to the assessments will be
returned to stockholders in final liquidation. Meantime, however,
the creditors the protection of whose interests is the primary
object of the statute will have been paid and, as is right,
reimbursement of the stockholders will await possible realization
upon assets which the Comptroller believes insufficient to satisfy
the creditors.
The decrees are reversed, and the causes remanded with
instructions to dismiss the bills.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
* Together with No. 124,
Adams, Receiver v. Tobias et
al., also on writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.
[
Footnote 1]
R.S. § 5151, Act of Dec. 23, 1913, c. 6, § 23, 38 Stat. 273,
U.S.C. Tit. 12, §§ 63 and 64.
[
Footnote 2]
The bill in No. 124 alleges that, on the same day Reading's
assets exceeded in value its liabilities of approximately
$9,000,000.
[
Footnote 3]
Nagle v. O'Connor, 88 F.2d 936.
[
Footnote 4]
See U.S.C. Tit. 12, § 33.
[
Footnote 5]
Compare City National Bank v. Fuller, 52 F.2d 870;
Wannamaker v. Edisto National Bank, 62 F.2d 696, 699;
Emery & Co. v. Wilkinson, 72 F.2d 10, 12.
[
Footnote 6]
C. 106, 13 Stat. 99.
[
Footnote 7]
Kennedy v.
Gibson, 8 Wall. 498,
75 U. S. 505;
Casey v. Galli, 94 U. S. 673,
94 U. S. 681;
Bushnell v. Leland, 164 U. S. 684.
[
Footnote 8]
Liberty National Bank v. McIntosh, 16 F.2d 906;
Wannamaker v. Edisto National Bank, supra; Meeker v.
Baxter, 83 F.2d 183;
Davis Trust Co. v. Hardee, 66
App.D.C. 168, 85 F.2d 571;
Acker v. Hamilton, 66 App.D.C.
171, 85 F.2d 574;
Barbour v. Thomas, 86 F.2d 510;
Church v. Hubbard, 91 F.2d 406.
[
Footnote 9]
See, e.g., Deweese v. Smith, 106 F. 438, 445;
Emery
& Co. v. Wilkinson, 72 F.2d 10, 12;
Trustees v.
Picher, 90 F.2d 741, 743;
United States Nat. Bank v.
Pole, 2 F. Supp.
153, 157;
Angeny v. Kauper, 16 F. Supp. 542, 543.
[
Footnote 10]
O'Conner v. Watson, 81 F.2d 833, 836;
Meeker v.
Baxter, 83 F.2d 183, 186;
Davis Trust Co. v. Hardee,
66 App.D.C. 168, 85 F.2d 571, 573;
Dunn v. O'Connor, 67
App.D.C. 76, 89 F.2d 820, 827.