1. Moneys due by a defendant in a suit in the federal district
court to certain bondholders whose whereabouts were unknown were by
direction of the court paid into its registry. Unclaimed for more
than five years, the fund was deposited in the U.S. Treasury, as
required by R.S. § 996. Under that section, the money remains
subject to the order of the district court to be paid to the
persons entitled to it upon full proof of their right. In the
exercise of a jurisdiction conferred by state statute, a state
court subsequently decreed escheat of the fund, and directed the
state escheator to apply to the district court for an order that
the money be paid to him. There was no contention on behalf of the
United States of actual or possible escheat to the United States,
or that it had any interest in the money adverse to the unknown
bondholders.
Held, that the decree of the state court was
not an unconstitutional interference with the federal court, nor an
invasion of the sovereignty of the United States. Pp.
303 U. S. 280,
303 U. S.
282.
2. While a federal court which has taken possession of property
in the exercise of the judicial power conferred by the Constitution
and laws of the United States is said to acquire exclusive
jurisdiction, the jurisdiction is exclusive only insofar as
restriction of the power of other courts is necessary for
appropriate control and disposition of the property by the federal
court. P.
303 U. S.
281.
326 Pa. 260, 192 A. 256, affirmed.
Appeal from a decree affirming a decree declaring an escheat of
certain moneys, theretofore deposited in the federal Treasury
pursuant to R.S. § 996, and authorizing the state escheator to
prosecute the State's claim to them. The United States appeared in
opposition to the proceedings below, asserting jurisdictional
objections.
Page 303 U. S. 277
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for decision is whether statutes of the
Pennsylvania, Purdon's Penn.Statutes, tit. 27, §§ 41, 45, 282, 334,
are unconstitutional because they authorize interference with a
federal court and an invasion of the sovereignty of the United
States insofar as they purport to confer jurisdiction on a state
tribunal to declare the escheat of moneys deposited in the registry
of the federal court and later covered into the Treasury of the
United States.
In a suit brought by secured bondholders in the District Court
for Eastern Pennsylvania to compel payment of the bonds by a
defendant on the ground that it had appropriated the security to
itself, a decree was entered in favor of the plaintiffs and other
bondholders similarly situated, with provision for notice to the
latter that they file their claims in the suit.
Brown v.
Pennsylvania Canal Co., 229 F. 444;
Pennsylvania Canal Co.
v. Brown, 235 F. 669;
Brown v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
250 F. 513. It appearing that certain of the bondholders had not
filed their claims, and could not be found, the defendant was
directed by the court to pay into its registry the money due to
such bondholders, which was then placed in a designated depositary
of the United States, in the name and to the credit of the court,
pursuant to R.S. § 995, 28 U.S.C. § 851. On June 30, 1926, the fund
was deposited in the Treasury of the United States, as required by
R.S. § 996, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 852, in the case of funds paid
into court and unclaimed for more than five years.
In 1934, the present appellee, as Escheator of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, proceeding under the Pennsylvania
Page 303 U. S. 278
statutes which authorize the escheat of moneys paid into court
where the persons entitled to them have remained unknown for seven
years, petitioned the District Court to declare an escheat of the
fund. The court dismissed the petition, without prejudice, on the
grounds that appellee had not yet procured a declaration of
escheat, which was deemed necessary in order to perfect the
Commonwealth's title, and that the court was without jurisdiction
to make such a declaration. Thereupon, the Pennsylvania escheat
statutes were amended, Acts of May 16, 1935, p.L.195, June 28,
1935, p.L. 475, to confer upon the court of common pleas
jurisdiction to decree an escheat of moneys deposited in the
custody or under the control of any court of the United States
within the Commonwealth. [
Footnote
1]
Page 303 U. S. 279
The present suit was brought by appellee in the court of common
pleas, No. 5, of Philadelphia county, upon a petition setting out
the facts already detailed and praying a declaration that the fund
had escheated to the Commonwealth. The United States appeared in
the suit and moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the
state court was without jurisdiction to escheat moneys in the
custody of the United States or of its courts. The order of the
court of common pleas granting the motion was reversed by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which held that the statutes
relating to escheat of funds in the custody of federal courts
conferred jurisdiction on the court to declare the escheat, and was
subject to no constitutional infirmity, since exercise of that
jurisdiction involved no interference with the federal court and no
attempted control over funds in its custody. 322 Pa. 481, 186 A.
600.
The United States then filed an answer, and, upon a trial of the
issues, the court of common pleas gave its decree declaring that
the fund had escheated to the Commonwealth and that appellee had
authority to claim it, and directing him to apply to the District
Court for an order that the moneys be paid to him as Escheator. The
state Supreme Court affirmed so much of the decree as declared the
escheat, and authorized appellee to prosecute the claim of the
Commonwealth to the moneys. 326 Pa. 260, 192 A. 256. From its
decree of affirmance, the case comes here on appeal under § 237 of
the Judicial Code.
Section 996 of the Revised Statutes directs that, when the right
to moneys paid into federal courts has been adjudicated
Page 303 U. S. 280
and they are unclaimed for more than five years, they shall be
deposited in the Treasury of the United States in the name of the
United States. It further provides:
"Any person or persons or any corporation or company entitled to
any such money may, on petition to the court from which the money
was received . . . and upon notice to the United States attorney
and full proof of right thereto, obtain an order of court directing
the payment of such money to the claimant, and the money deposited
as aforesaid shall constitute and be a permanent appropriation for
payments in obedience to such orders. [
Footnote 2]"
The Government does not, in pleading or argument, set up any
right, title, or interest in the present fund adverse to the
unknown bondholders. It does not contend that the fund has been or
can be escheated to the United States. It agrees with the
contention of appellee, which we accept as correctly interpreting
the applicable federal statutes, that the fund remains subject to
the order of the District Court to be paid to the persons lawfully
entitled to it upon proof of their ownership. But it insists here,
as in the state courts, that the decree declaring the escheat is an
unconstitutional interference with a court of the United States, an
invasion of its sovereignty, and is an attempt, void under the
Fourteenth Amendment, to exercise jurisdiction over the absent
bondholders and
Page 303 U. S. 281
the moneys, neither of which are shown to be within the
state.
While a federal court which has taken possession of property in
the exercise of the judicial power conferred upon it by the
Constitution and laws of the United States is said to acquire
exclusive jurisdiction, the jurisdiction is exclusive only insofar
as restriction of the power of other courts is necessary for the
federal court's appropriate control and disposition of the
property.
Penn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania ex rel.
Schnader, 294 U. S. 189;
see Leadville Coal Co. v. McCreery, 141 U.
S. 475,
141 U. S. 477.
Other courts having jurisdiction to adjudicate rights in the
property do not, because the property is possessed by a federal
court, lose power to render any judgment not in conflict with that
court's authority to decide questions within its jurisdiction and
to make effective such decisions by its control of the property.
Penn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader,
supra; see Heidritter v. Elizabeth Oil-Cloth Co., 112 U.
S. 294,
112 U. S. 304;
cf. 70 U. S.
Colbath, 3 Wall. 334,
70 U. S. 342;
Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.
S. 218. Similarly a federal court may make a like
adjudication with respect to property in the possession of a state
court.
Yonley v.
Lavender, 21 Wall. 276;
Byers v. McAuley,
149 U. S. 608,
149 U. S. 620;
Security Trust Co. v. Black River National Bank,
187 U. S. 211,
187 U. S. 227;
Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co.,
215 U. S. 33,
215 U. S. 43-46;
Commonwealth Trust Company v. Bradford, 297 U.
S. 613,
297 U. S. 619;
General Baking Co. v. Harr, 300 U.
S. 433.
In this case, jurisdiction was acquired by the District Court,
by reason of diversity of citizenship, to adjudicate the rights of
the parties. That function performed, it now retains jurisdiction
for the sole purpose of making disposition of the fund under its
control by ordering payment of it to the persons entitled as
directed by the federal statute. Beyond whatever is needful and
appropriate
Page 303 U. S. 282
to the accomplishment of that end, the jurisdiction and
possession of the federal District Court does not operate to
curtail the power which the state may constitutionally exercise
over persons and property within its territory.
The present decree for escheat of the fund is not founded on
possession, and does not disturb or purport to affect the
Treasury's possession of the fund or the District Court's authority
over it. Nor could it do so.
Penn General Casualty Co. v.
Pennsylvania, supra; United States v. Bank of New York & Trust
Co., 296 U. S. 463,
296 U. S. 478.
At most, the decree of the state court purports to be an
adjudication upon the title of the unknown claimants in the fund by
a proceeding in the nature of an inquest of office as in the case
of escheated lands,
compare Security Savings Bank v.
California, 263 U. S. 282,
263 U. S. 287,
with Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256,
161 U. S. 263,
and to confirm the authority of appellee to make claim to the
moneys. It is subordinate to every right asserted and decreed in
the federal suit, and effective only so far as it establishes
rights derived from them. Neither the nature of the suit in the
District Court nor the federal statutes preclude transfer of, or
change in, the interest of the unknown claimants, either by
judicial proceedings in the state court or otherwise, pending final
disposition of the fund by the federal court. Section 996 of the
Revised Statutes contemplates that changes in ownership of the fund
may occur, since it provides that, after the right to the fund has
been finally adjudicated and it has been covered into the Treasury,
it shall be paid over to any person entitled upon full proof of his
right to receive it.
Since the Government has not set up, and does not assert, any
claim or interest in the fund apart from the possession acquired
under the decree of the District Court and the statutes of the
United States, it is unnecessary to consider now the effect on the
decree of the state court of the fund's absence from the state, and
the absence or
Page 303 U. S. 283
nonresidence of the unknown claimants, if such is the case. All
such questions will be open, and may be raised and decided whenever
application is made to the District Court for payment over of the
fund.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO and MR. JUSTICE REED took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
As amended, the statutes provide:
"Sec. 41. . . . Whenever an escheat has occurred, or shall
occur, of any money or property deposited in the custody of, or
under the control of, any court of the United States in and for any
district within this Commonwealth or in the custody of any
depository, clerk, or other officer of such court, the court of
common pleas of the county in which such court of the United States
sits shall have jurisdiction to ascertain if an escheat has
occurred and to enter a judgment or decree of escheat in favor of
the Commonwealth."
"Sec. 282. . . . After the owner, beneficial owner, or person
entitled to any of the following named moneys or property shall be
and remain unknown, or the whereabouts thereof shall have been
unknown, for the period of seven successive years, such moneys or
property shall be escheatable to the Commonwealth, and shall be
escheated in the manner hereinafter provided, with interest
actually accrued thereon to the date of the decree for the escheat
of the same, namely:"
"
* * * *"
"(b) Any moneys, estate, or effects paid into or deposited in
any court of this Commonwealth, or in any Federal court in and for
any district within the Commonwealth, or in the custody of any
officer of any such court."
"Sec. 334. That, whensoever any money, estate, or effects, shall
have been or shall hereafter be paid into or deposited in the
custody or be under the control of any court of this Commonwealth,
or of any court of the United States in and for any district within
this Commonwealth, or shall be in the custody of any depository,
registry, or of any receiver, clerk or other officer of any of said
courts, and the rightful owner or owners thereof shall have been or
shall be unknown for the space of seven years, the same shall
escheat to the Commonwealth, subject to all legal demands on the
same."
[
Footnote 2]
The Permanent Appropriation Repeal Act, June 26, 1934, c. 756,
48 Stat. 1224, 1230, § 17, declares that appropriation accounts
appearing on the books of the government, including
"[u]nclaimed moneys of individuals whose whereabouts are unknown
(Justice), . . . are abolished, and any unobligated balances under
such accounts as of June 30, 1935, shall be covered into a trust
fund receipt account in the Treasury to be designated 'Unclaimed
Moneys of Individuals Whose Whereabouts Are Unknown.' . . . There
are authorized to be appropriated annually from such account such
sums as may be necessary to meet any expenditures of the character
now chargeable to the appropriation accounts abolished by this
section."