1. Within the meaning of the Criminal Appeals Act, an indictment
for conspiracy (Criminal Code, § 37) to commit a substantive
offense may be treated as founded on the statute defining the
substantive offense. P.
302 U. S.
216.
2. The District Court sustained a demurrer to an indictment for
conspiracy to violate the False Claims Act (§ 35 Criminal Code),
upon the ground that that Act does not apply to an attempt to
defraud the United States by obtaining approval of claims to
payments of money through false representations if the statute
authorizing such payments is invalid.
Held:
(1) A construction not of the indictment, but of the False
Claims Act. P.
302 U. S.
217.
(2) An inadmissible construction.
Id.
3. Those who attempt to obtain payments from the Government by
false representations are estopped to defend upon the ground that
the statute providing for such payments has been declared
unconstitutional. P.
302 U. S. 218.
Reversed.
Page 302 U. S. 215
Appeal from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to an indictment
and dismissing the cause.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case comes here under the Criminal Appeals Act. 18 U.S.C. §
682.
The second count of an indictment charged appellees with
conspiracy to defraud the United States by furnishing false
information and making false statements to the Secretary of
Agriculture in order to secure benefit payments under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12, 1933, c. 25, 48 Stat. 31;
Criminal Code, §§ 35, 37, 18 U.S.C. §§ 80, 88. The District Court
sustained a demurrer to this count and the government appeals.
The contention of the government is that the appellees conspired
to cheat the United States by selling hogs to the government at
premium prices through misrepresentation as to the identity of the
producers of the hogs sold and the continued ownership by such
producers. Appellees' demurrer went upon the ground, among others,
that the provisions of the statute and the regulations of the
Secretary of Agriculture to which the count referred are void
(
United States v. Butler, 297 U. S.
1) and that the acts set forth in the indictment do not
constitute an offense against the laws of the United States.
The false claims statute under which the prosecution was brought
penalizes one who,
"for the purpose and with the intent of cheating and swindling
or defrauding
Page 302 U. S. 216
the Government of the United States . . . , shall knowingly and
willfully falsify or conceal or cover up by any trick, scheme, or
device a material fact, or make or cause to be made any false or
fraudulent statements or representations."
(Criminal Code, § 35, 35 Stat. 1095, as amended, 40 Stat. 1015).
After referring to the statute, the District Judge said in his
opinion:
"The overt acts charged which would be material in this count
are that hogs were shipped under the representation by the
defendants that they were the hogs of various producers when, in
fact, the hogs belonged to one or more of the defendants."
"There is no contention that the hogs were not shipped, and that
the bills, which were made to Armour and Company and other
processors, were not correct bills, with the exception that the
hogs did not originate from the sources represented by the
defendants."
"This ceases to be a material fact if the provisions of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act are void. In other words, the
representations which are alleged to have been made cease to be
misrepresentations of material facts when the act itself
falls."
1. Appellees contend that, if any statute was construed, it was
not the statute on which the indictment is founded, and hence that
this Court has no jurisdiction. The point is that the indictment
charged a conspiracy under Criminal Code § 37. But the conspiracy
charged is one to violate the false claims statute, Criminal Code §
35. In similar cases, the jurisdiction of this Court has been
sustained. The statute at the violation of which the conspiracy is
aimed has been treated as the statute upon which the indictment is
founded within the meaning of the Criminal Appeals Act.
United
States v. Bowman, 260 U. S. 94,
260 U. S. 95;
United States v. Walter, 263 U. S. 15,
263 U. S. 16-17.
See also United States v. Keitel, 211 U.
S. 370,
211 U. S.
387.
Page 302 U. S. 217
2. Appellees contend that the court below construed the
indictment, and not the statute.
United States v. Colgate &
Co., 250 U. S. 300,
250 U. S. 306;
United States v. Hastings, 296 U.
S. 188,
296 U. S. 192.
The argument is that a conspiracy to violate § 35 must involve a
pecuniary fraud.
United States v. Cohn, 270 U.
S. 339,
270 U. S.
345-346. In that view, appellees urge that the court
below has simply ruled that there was no pecuniary loss under the
facts alleged. But the District Court found no flaw in the
indictment as a pleading. Nor does the court appear to have
considered the question of pecuniary loss. The court rested its
decision upon the point that the facts alleged in the indictment
with respect to the identity of the producers of the hogs, or the
sources from which the hogs originated, had ceased to be material
because of the unconstitutionality of the provisions of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act. This did not purport to be a
construction of the indictment, but a ruling that the indictment,
in view of the invalidity of that act, failed to state an offense.
The substance of the decision thus appears to be that the false
claims statute does not apply to an attempt to defraud the United
States by obtaining the approval of claims and benefit payments
through false representations if the statute providing for such
claims and payments is found to be invalid. That is clearly a
construction of the statute.
United States v. Patten,
226 U. S. 525,
226 U. S. 535;
United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.
S. 223,
233 U. S.
230.
3. Such a construction is inadmissible. It might as well be said
that one could embezzle moneys in the United States Treasury with
impunity if it turns out that they were collected in the course of
invalid transactions.
See Madden v. United States, 80 F.2d
672, 674. Appellees were not indicted for a conspiracy to violate
the Agricultural Adjustment Act, but for a conspiracy to violate
the statute protecting the United States against
Page 302 U. S. 218
frauds. It is cheating the government at which the statute aims
and Congress was entitled to protect the government against those
who would swindle it regardless of questions of constitutional
authority as to the operations that the government is conducting.
Such questions cannot be raised by those who make false claims
against the government.
See Langer v. United States, 76
F.2d 817, 824, 825;
Madden v. United States, supra; United
States v. Harding, 65 App.D.C. 161, 81 F.2d 563, 568;
United States v. MacDonald, 10 F. Supp. 948.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further
proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Reversed.