The Silver Purchase Act of June 19, 1934, imposed on transfers
of any interest in silver bullion a tax of 50% of the profits over
cost and allowed expenses, payable as to future transfers by
attaching stamps to the memoranda of sale. Transfers made on or
after May 15, 1934, and prior to the date of the Act were also
subjected to the tax, payable, however, in a different way.
Held:
1. That the tax is a special income tax. P.
299 U. S.
500.
2. Congress had power to impose this tax in addition to the tax
imposed on the same profits, with other gains, under the general
income tax law.
Id.
3. Making the tax provision retroactive for a period of 35 days,
to include profits from transactions consummated while the statute
was in course of enactment, was consistent with due process.
Id.
82 Ct.Cls. 15; 12 F. Supp. 620; 13 F. Supp. 640, reversed.
Certiorari to review a judgment sustaining a claim against the
United States for a tax refund.
Page 299 U. S. 499
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent bought on May 3, and sold on May 23 and 29, all in
1934, certain futures contracts for the delivery of 500,000 ounces
of silver, and realized therefrom, after deducting allowed
expenses, a profit of $8,621.96. He paid a tax of 50 percent of
this profit in obedience to the taxing provision of the Silver
Purchase Act of June 19, 1934, [
Footnote 1] duly but unsuccessfully sought to have the
amount of the tax refunded, and then brought suit in the Court of
Claims to recover the same. The court held the tax invalid, as
retroactively applied to respondent's sales, and gave judgment
accordingly. 12 F. Supp. 620; 13 F. Supp. 640. The case is here on
certiorari.
The Silver Purchase Act, in § 8, imposes on all transfers of any
interest in silver bullion, where the price for which such interest
is transferred exceeds the total cost and allowed expenses, a tax
of 50 percentum of such excess, and requires that the tax be paid
by affixing to a memorandum of the sale lawful stamps in the amount
of the tax. The section further provides that the tax, besides
reaching transfers thereafter made, shall be applicable to
transfers made on or after May 15, 1934, and prior to the date of
the act, with the qualification that, as to such act, with the
qualification that,
Page 299 U. S. 500
as to such prior transfers, the tax shall be paid in such manner
and at such time as the Commissioner, with the approval of the
Secretary of the Treasury, may by regulation prescribe.
The question presented for decision is whether, in view of the
restraints of the due process of law clause of the Constitution,
[
Footnote 2] the retroactive
provision under which the tax was exacted from the respondent is an
admissible exertion of the power to tax.
Examination of the taxing provision and of pertinent decisions
shows, as we think, that the answer must be in the affirmative.
The taxing provision does not impose a tax in respect of all
transfers, but only in respect of such as yield a profit over cost
and allowed expenses. If there be no profit, there is to be no tax.
If there be a profit, the tax is to be 50 percent of it. Thus, a
profit is made the occasion for the tax and also the measure of it.
Because of this, counsel for the government contend that the tax is
a special income tax, and we think the contention is sound.
It is not material that such profit is taxed, along with other
gains, under the general income tax law, for Congress has power to
impose an increased or additional tax if satisfied there is need
therefor.
Patton v. Brady, 184 U.
S. 608,
184 U. S.
620-622.
As respects income tax statutes, it long has been the practice
of Congress to make them retroactive for relatively short periods
so as to include profits from transactions consummated while the
statute was in process of enactment, or within so much of the
calendar year as preceded the enactment, and repeated decisions of
this Court have recognized this practice and sustained it as
consistent with the due process of law clause of the Constitution.
Stockdale v. Insurance
Cos., 20 Wall. 323,
87 U. S.
331,
Page 299 U. S. 501
87 U. S. 332,
87 U. S. 341;
Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U. S.
1,
240 U. S. 20;
Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339,
247 U. S. 343;
Cooper v. United States, 280 U. S. 409,
280 U. S. 411.
And see Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S.
15,
283 U. S. 21.
The cases on which the Court of Claims partly rested its decision
were both examined and distinguished in
Cooper v. United
States and
Milliken v. United States.
The period of retroactivity prescribed for this taxing provision
reaches backward from June 19, 1934, the date of the act, to and
including May 15, 1934 -- 35 days. For some months prior to this
period there was strong pressure for legislation requiring
increased acquisition and use of silver by the government, and
several bills providing therefor were presented in the Senate and
House of Representatives. On May 22, the President sent to Congress
a message [
Footnote 3]
recommending legislation for increasing the amount of silver in our
monetary stocks and further recommending the imposition of a tax of
at least 50 percent on profits accruing from private dealing in
silver. The bill which became the Silver Purchase Act was
introduced May 23 in response to this message. In these
circumstances, we think the period of retroactivity fixed in the
act is not unreasonable, but consistent with the practice sustained
by this Court in the cases already cited.
It results that the Court of Claims erred in holding the
retroactive provision invalid as applied to respondent's sales.
Judgment reversed.
MR. JUSTICE STONE took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
C. 674, § 8, 48 Stat. 1178.
[
Footnote 2]
The Fifth Amendment contains the due process of law clause
applicable to the United States.
[
Footnote 3]
Hearings on H.R. 9745, Silver Purchase Act of 1934, pp. 1 and
2.