Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Commissioner
Annotate this Case
298 U.S. 553 (1936)
U.S. Supreme Court
Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 298 U.S. 553 (1936)
Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Commissioner of
Corporations and Taxation of Massachusetts
Argued April 2, 1936
Decided May 25, 1936
298 U.S. 553
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS
1. A corporation, organized under the laws of Delaware and engaged in the wholesale lumber business, had its principal office in Massachusetts. The corporate books and records were kept in Massachusetts; there also the treasurer of the company was located, directors' meetings were held, and dividends declared. It maintained within the State a sales office, which was used as a headquarters for its salesmen, who solicited orders both within and outside of the State. No stocks of lumber were kept within the State, the only tangible property there being office equipment and salesmen's automobiles. Orders received at the Massachusetts office were filled from a distributing yard or a mill of a subsidiary, both located outside of the State. Remittances from its customers were made to the Massachusetts office. Of several bank accounts, the one which it maintained within the State was the most active, and such dividends as had been paid were paid out of that account. The company owned practically all the stock of three subsidiaries, two of which were engaged in cutting timber and manufacturing lumber in other States, and the third merely holding title to timber lands in another State. Held, an excise tax imposed by Massachusetts for the privilege of carrying on business within the State, measured by a percentage of such proportion of the fair value of the capital stock of the corporation as the value of the assets employed within the State bore to the value of its total assets, did not impose an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce. Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 147, followed; Ozark Pipe Line Co. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555, distinguished. P. 298 U. S. 556.
2. The burden of the tax, if any, on interstate commerce is not immediate and direct, but remote and incidental -- a distinction which, in respect of the class of legislation here involved, marks the line between a tax which is valid and one which is not. P. 298 U. S. 557.
197 N.E. 525 affirmed.
Appeal from a judgment sustaining a decision of the state board of tax appeals and upholding the validity of a corporation privilege tax.
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
A Massachusetts statute (Gen.Laws, Ter.Ed., c. 63, §§ 39-43) imposes upon a foreign corporation, with respect to the carrying on or doing of business by it within the commonwealth, an excise in a sum to be ascertained as the statute provides. So far as the present case is concerned, the amount of the excise is a specified percentage of the value of the corporate excess employed by the corporation within the commonwealth. Such corporate excess (§ 30, par. 4) means, in the case of a foreign corporation, such proportion of the fair value of its capital stock as the value of the assets employed in the commonwealth bears to the value of its total assets, less certain deductions. Under this statute, appellant's tax was fixed at approximately $1,500. We find nothing in the record to justify the conclusion that the amount of the tax was not fairly arrived at under the provisions of the statute as construed by the court below, or that it was so allocated as to result in imposing a tax upon property outside the state, and the only question is whether the tax constitutes an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce. The court below, sustaining the action of the state board of tax appeals, held that the exaction was an excise for the privilege of having a place for the transaction of intrastate business in the state with the protection of state law and the appertaining advantages,
and that the effect upon interstate commerce was, at most, incidental and remote. 197 N.E. 525.
Appellant is a corporation engaged in the wholesale lumber business, and is organized under the laws of Delaware. Its principal office is in Massachusetts, where it also maintains a sales office. Its Massachusetts office is used as headquarters for salesmen who solicit orders in Massachusetts and other states. In that office, it carries on correspondence and other business activities in connection with orders for and shipments of goods for the designated territory. Orders are accepted at the Massachusetts office and are filled from the distributing yard of the company or the mill of a subsidiary outside the state. Remittances from its customers are made to the Massachusetts office. No stocks of lumber are kept in that state, and the only tangible property in the state is office furniture and equipment and salesmen's automobiles. Appellant has bank accounts in Boston, New York City, Buffalo, Brooklyn, and Toronto, Canada, the Boston account being the most active. The corporate books and records are kept in Massachusetts, where its treasurer is located, its directors' meetings are held, and dividends are declared. Dividends, so far as declared, have been paid out of the Boston account.
Appellant owns practically all the stock of three subsidiaries. Two of them are engaged in cutting timber and manufacturing lumber -- one in Tennessee, Arkansas, and Louisiana, and the other in South Carolina. The third subsidiary simply holds title to timber lands in Louisiana.
If appellant did nothing but transact interstate business, the tax would constitute a burden upon that commerce, and could not stand under the commerce clause of the Constitution. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, 45 S.Ct; Cheney Brothers Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 147, 246 U. S. 153; Ozark Pipe Line Co. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555, 266 U. S. 562 et seq.
But such is not the case. Although organized in Delaware, so far as the record shows, appellant does not function there, but in Massachusetts, to which state the exercise of its corporate powers was transferred and is confined. In the Champion Copper Company case, decided by this Court in Cheney Brothers Co. v. Massachusetts, supra, p. 246 U. S. 155, a Michigan corporation maintained an office in Boston, pursuant to a provision in its articles of association. The proceeds of its business in Michigan were deposited in Boston banks, which, after paying salaries and expenses, were distributed as dividends from the Boston office. Directors' meetings were held frequently during each year at the Boston office, at which meetings reports from the treasurer and general manager were received, dividends were voted, officers were elected, and other corporate duties were discharged. This Court held: "These corporate activities in Massachusetts are not interstate commerce, and may be made the basis of an excise tax by that state."
The same decision involved a similar tax imposed upon another Michigan corporation, the Copper Range Company. That company also maintained an office in Boston. It was, like the appellant here, a holding company. In Massachusetts, it held stockholders' and directors' meetings, kept corporate records and books of account, received dividends from its stock holdings, deposited the money in Boston banks, and paid the same out, after deducting salaries and expenses, in dividends to its stockholders. We held: "The exaction of a tax for the exercise of such corporate faculties is within the power of the state. Interstate commerce is not affected."
The decision in respect of those companies covers the present case, and, since that decision has never been overruled or qualified, it would be unnecessary to go further except for Ozark Pipe Line v. Monier, supra, upon which appellant confidently leans. The situation there,
however, was quite different from that presented in the present case or in the cases of the two Michigan corporations just mentioned -- a difference plainly recognized by the opinion in the Ozark case. There, a Maryland corporation owned and operated a pipeline extending from Oklahoma through Missouri to Illinois by which crude petroleum was carried from Oklahoma to Illinois. No oil was received or delivered in Missouri. The license issued by the state was to engage "exclusively in the business of transporting crude petroleum by pipeline." The company, it is true, maintained its principal office in Missouri, and there kept its books and bank accounts, paid its employees, purchased supplies, employed labor, maintained telephone and telegraph lines, and carried on various other activities, but all were linked exclusively to the pipeline, and operated only to further the flow of oil in interstate commerce. Neither property nor activities were anything more than aids to the operation of the pipeline, and, together with that line, they combined to constitute in practical effect an instrumentality of that commerce. Thus, the burden of the tax which the state imposed fell upon interstate transportation immediately and directly, while here the effect upon interstate commerce, so far as there is any, is remote and incidental -- a distinction which, in respect of such legislation as we are now considering, marks the line between a tax which is valid and one which is not.
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