1. One who would attack a state statute as obnoxious to the
Federal Constitution must show that the alleged unconstitutional
feature injures him. P.
298 U. S.
227.
2. The question whether a Pennsylvania law licensing the sale of
beer in that State discriminates unconstitutionally against those
who sell beer imported from without by requiring of them a higher
license fee and a bond of higher penal sum than are required for
sale of beer made locally,
held a question that could not
be raised by a corporation which was disqualified to sell any beer
in the State because its officers, directors, and a majority of its
shareholders were not local residents, as required by the state
law. P.
298 U. S.
227.
3. A license to sell beer in a State may be revoked by the
State. P
298 U. S.
228.
12 F.
Supp. 970 affirmed.
Appeal from a decree of the three-judge District Court
dismissing a bill to enjoin enforcement of a state law regulating
the sale of beer.
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Premier-Pabst Sales Company, a Delaware corporation, is a
distributor of beer made in Illinois and Wisconsin. Having secured
a license issued under a statute
Page 298 U. S. 227
of Pennsylvania enacted and amended in 1933, it engaged in
business there. That statute was again amended by Act No. 398,
approved July 18, 1935, which changed the licensing law so as to
discriminate between distributors who sold beer made within the
state and those who sold imported beer. The annual license fee of
the former was made $400, and the penalty of the bond required of
them was set at $1,000; the license fee of the latter was made
$900, and the penalty of the bond to be given by them was set at
$2,000.
The company did not apply for a license under the 1935 Act.
Instead, it filed, in the federal court for Eastern Pennsylvania,
this suit against the Liquor Control Board and other state
officials. Claiming that the act violated the commerce clause and
the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution, the bill
prayed for a judgment declaring the act void and for an injunction
restraining its enforcement. The case was heard before three judges
upon application for a preliminary injunction. The facts were
stipulated, and it was agreed that the hearing should be deemed
also a final hearing upon the application for a permanent
injunction. The court denied the injunctions and dismissed the bill
as wanting in equity because the discrimination complained of was
authorized by the Twenty-First Amendment.
12 F.
Supp. 970. An appeal was allowed.
We have no occasion to consider the constitutional question,
because it appears that the plaintiff is without standing to
present it. One who would strike down a state statute as obnoxious
to the Federal Constitution must show that the alleged
unconstitutional feature injures him.
Heald v. District of
Columbia, 259 U. S. 114,
259 U. S. 123.
Under the Act of 1935, no one may sell beer in Pennsylvania unless
duly licensed, and no license may issue to a corporation unless all
its officers and directors and 51 percent of its stockholders have
been residents
Page 298 U. S. 228
of the state for the period of at least two years prior to the
application for a license. The constitutional validity of that
provision is conceded, and it was agreed that all the officers and
directors are, and were when the suit was begun, nonresidents of
Pennsylvania, and that all of its stock was, and is, held by
another foreign corporation. As no license could legally issue to
the company is any event, it cannot be injured by the alleged
unconstitutional discrimination, and hence has no standing to
challenge provisions of the act.
The company urges that it has a standing because, if the 1935
Act is invalid, the license issued under the Act of 1933, as
amended, is still in force. The 1933 Act also prohibited the issue
of a license to a corporation whose officers and directors are
nonresidents. The commonwealth insists that the company's officers
and directors were nonresidents when it secured its license. The
stipulation as to the facts is silent on the subject, and the
company argues that we must assume, in favor of the validity of the
license, that it was then qualified to receive one. We need not
discuss the validity of that contention. For even if the license
was valid when issued, the state had the power to terminate it.
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623.
And, as we construe the Act of 1935, it did so.
Affirmed.