1. The District Court has jurisdiction under the Tucker Act of a
claim to an annuity founded on § 8(a) of the Civil Service
Retirement Act of June 30, 1933. P.
297 U. S.
169.
2. The declaration of that section that annuities shall be
payable from the retirement fund, which, by an earlier Act is
"appropriated for the payment of annuities," amounts to no more
than a direction that they shall be charged on the books of the
Treasury to the appropriation made for their payment. It does not
impair or restrict the obligation to pay.
Id.
3. Claims for annuities payable under the Retirement Act are not
claims for pensions or for salary or for compensation for services,
within the meaning of the prohibition of the Tucker Act excluding
claims of those descriptions from the jurisdiction it confers upon
the District Courts. P.
297 U. S.
170.
4. An administrative decision rejecting, on a pure question of
law, a claim for an annuity under § 8(a) of the Retirement Act,
supra, held open to review by the District Court in a suit
by the claimant under the Tucker Act. P.
297 U. S.
171.
5. In creating claims against itself, the United States may
limit claimants to an administrative remedy; but, in the absence of
compelling language, resort to the courts to assert the right
created will be deemed to be curtailed only so far as authority to
decide is given to the administrative officer, and, in the absence
of plain command, the power of the officer will not be deemed to
extend to the denial of that which the statute allows as a right
and to which, upon the facts found or admitted by such officer, the
claimant is entitled. P.
297 U. S.
172.
6. A field deputy United States marshal, during the period
1895-1902, was not an employee of the United States within the
meaning of the Retirement Act,
supra. P.
297 U. S.
173.
76 F.2d 715 affirmed.
Certiorari, 296 U.S. 554, to review the reversal of a judgment
recovered by Dismuke in the District Court in a suit under the
Tucker Act.
Page 297 U. S. 168
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
About June 30, 1933, petitioner filed a claim with the
Administration of Veterans' Affairs for allowance of an annuity
under the provisions of § 8(a) of the Civil Service Retirement Act
of June 16, 1933, 48 Stat. 283, 305, 5 U.S.C. § 692d, which
authorizes payment of annuities at a specified rate, under
circumstances not now material, to retired government employees in
the classified civil service who have rendered at least thirty
years' service. His claim was rejected by the director of insurance
on the ground that his employment as a field deputy United States
marshal from December 16, 1895, to April 30, 1902, which he had
counted as a part of his thirty years' service, could not be so
included because field deputy marshals during that time were
employees of the marshal appointing them, and not of the United
States. Deducting this period, his total service was twenty-four
years, which, if established in accordance with the provisions of
the Act, would entitle him to an annuity at a lower rate, under § 7
of the Act of May 29, 1930, 46 Stat. 468, 474, 5 U.S.C. § 697a. On
appeal, the Board of Veterans' Appeals denied petitioner's
application for the same reason.
In the present suit, brought in the District Court under the
Tucker Act, to recover accrued installments of the annuity based on
the thirty-year period of service, and
Page 297 U. S. 169
for a declaratory judgment establishing petitioner's right to
such annuity, the court gave judgment for petitioner. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, 76 F.2d 715, holding that
the District Court was without jurisdiction because the Retirement
Act must be construed as committing the adjudication of claims
under it solely to administrative officers, to the exclusion of the
courts. This Court granted certiorari in view of the public
importance of the questions involved.
(1) The government urges that the District Court was without
jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The Tucker Act of March 3,
1887, 24 Stat. 505, as amended by § 24(20) of the Judicial Code, 36
Stat. 1087, 1093, c. 231, 28 U.S.C. § 41(20), permitting suits
against the United States, confers on the District Courts
jurisdiction
"concurrent with the Court of Claims, of all claims not
exceeding $10,000 founded upon . . . any law of Congress, or upon
any regulation of an executive department, or upon any contract,
express or implied, with the Government of the United States."
Section 8(a) of the Retirement Act declares that, under
conditions specified, the employee "shall be entitled to an annuity
. . . payable from the civil service retirement and disability
fund." The provision is mandatory, expressed in terms of the right
of the employee, which is inseparable from the correlative
obligation of the employer, the United States. The present suit to
recover the annuity is thus upon a claim "founded upon a law of
Congress," and is within the jurisdiction conferred upon District
Courts, as are suits to recover sums of money which administrative
officers are directed by Act of Congress to "pay" or "repay."
Medbury v. United States, 173 U.
S. 492;
McLean v. United States, 226 U.
S. 374;
United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U. S.
1,
and see United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 166 U. S. 468. The
declaration that the annuities are payable from the retirement
Page 297 U. S. 170
fund, which, by § 8 of the Act of May 22, 1920, 41 Stat. 618, is
"appropriated for the payment of annuities," amounts to no more
than a direction that they shall be charged on the books of the
Treasury to the appropriation made for their payment. It does not
impair or restrict the obligation to pay.
The Tucker Act declares that it shall not be construed as giving
jurisdiction of "claims for pensions" or "of cases brought to
recover fees, salary, or compensation for official services of
officers of the United States." The government argues that the
present suit must be either the one or the other. It does not press
the contention that the annuities are "salary or compensation,"
which we think without merit,
see Retirement Board v.
McGovern, 316 Pa. 161, 174 A. 400, but it insists that the
suit is brought to recover a pension. The proviso withholding
jurisdiction of suits on claims for pensions was a part of the
original Tucker Act, which became law March 3, 1887, long before
the enactment of the Retirement Act of May 22, 1920, and at a time
when the term "pensions" commonly referred to the gratuities paid
by the government in recognition of past services in the Army or
Navy. The annuities payable under the Retirement Act are not
gratuities in that sense. The annuitant contributes to them by
deductions from his salary or by actual payments into the fund, as
in the present case, and the scheme of the act is to provide for
payment of annuities, in part at least from contributions by
employees, in recognition both of their past services and of
services to be performed.
The Act itself, in contradistinction to the numerous pension
acts,
see 38 U.S.C., does not refer to the annuities as
pensions, and expressly excludes from the service to be counted, in
determining the class to which the annuitant is to be assigned, the
period for which the employee "elects to receive a pension under
any law." § 3, Act of May 22, 1920, 41 Stat. 615, 5 U.S.C.
Page 297 U. S. 171
§ 707. We conclude that annuities payable under the Retirement
Act are not pensions within the meaning of the Tucker Act, and that
suits against the government to recover them are within the
jurisdiction of District Courts, if not precluded, as the court
below held they are, by the administrative provisions of the
Retirement Act.
(2) Although the Retirement Act does not, in terms, forbid
employees to assert in the courts rights acquired under it, the
government insists that such restriction is to be implied from the
administrative provisions of the act. It points to the authority
given the Commissioner of Pensions,
*
under direction of the Secretary of the Interior, to make rules and
regulations for carrying the act into effect, § 17 of the Act May
29, 1930, 46 Stat. 478, 5 U.S.C. § 707a, and to § 13 of the same
act, 5 U.S.C. § 703a, which prescribes the form of application for
the annuity, the character of evidence to be presented in its
support, and declares that, "upon receipt of satisfactory evidence,
the Commissioner of Pensions
* shall forthwith
adjudicate the claim of the applicant," and finally to the
administrative appeals authorized by § 17. From this it is argued
that the prescribed application to the Commissioner, his
adjudication, and the appeal from his decision to departmental
officials, afford an exclusive remedy which precludes any resort to
the courts for the recovery of the annuity.
The United States is not, by the creation of claims against
itself, bound to provide a remedy in the courts.
Page 297 U. S. 172
It may withhold all remedy, or it may provide an administrative
remedy and make it exclusive, however mistaken its exercise.
See United States v. Babcock, 250 U.
S. 328. But, in the absence of compelling language,
resort to the courts to assert a right which the statute creates
will be deemed to be curtailed only so far as authority to decide
is given to the administrative officer. If the statutory benefit is
to be allowed only in his discretion, the courts will not
substitute their discretion for his.
Williamsport Wire Rope Co.
v. United States, 277 U. S. 551;
United States v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co.,
249 U. S. 451,
249 U. S. 454;
Ness v. Fisher, 223 U. S. 683. If
he is authorized to determine questions of fact, his decision must
be accepted unless he exceeds his authority by making a
determination which is arbitrary or capricious or unsupported by
evidence,
see Silberschein v. United States, 266 U.
S. 221,
266 U. S. 225;
United States v. Williams, 278 U.
S. 255,
278 U. S.
257-258;
Meadows v. United States, 281 U.
S. 271,
281 U. S. 274;
Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U. S. 162,
229 U. S. 171;
or by failing to follow a procedure which satisfies elementary
standards of fairness and reasonableness essential to the due
conduct of the proceeding which Congress has authorized,
Lloyd
Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U. S. 329,
287 U. S.
330-331. But the power of the administrative officer
will not, in the absence of a plain command, be deemed to extend to
the denial of a right which the statute creates, and to which the
claimant, upon facts found or admitted by the administrative
officer, is entitled.
United States v. Laughlin,
249 U. S. 440,
249 U. S. 443;
United States v. Hvoslef, supra; McLean v. United States,
supra, 226 U. S. 378;
Parish v. MacVeagh, 214 U. S. 124;
Medbury v. United States, supra, 173 U. S.
497-498;
see Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne,
194 U. S. 106,
194 U. S.
109-110.
The Commissioner is required by § 13, "upon receipt of
satisfactory evidence" of the character specified "to adjudicate
the claim." This does not authorize denial of
Page 297 U. S. 173
a claim if the undisputed facts establish its validity as a
matter of law, or preclude the courts from ascertaining whether the
conceded facts do so establish it. The decisions of the Director of
Insurance and the Board of Veterans' Appeals, and the stipulation
of facts upon which the case was tried, show that the petitioner's
claim for an annuity based on thirty years' service was rejected on
the sole ground that his employment as a field deputy United States
marshal could not be counted as service as an employee of the
United States. The administrative decision thus turned upon a
question of law -- whether a field deputy marshal during the period
from December 16, 1895, to December 30, 1902, was an employee of
the United States. The administrative determination of that
question is open to review in the present suit, and should have
been considered and decided by the court below.
(3) We are of the opinion that a field deputy United States
marshal from 1895 to 1902 was not an employee of the United States
within the meaning of the Retirement Act. Before the Act of May 28,
1896, c. 252, 29 Stat. 140, 181, United States marshals were
authorized to appoint deputy marshals, removable from office by the
district judge or by the circuit court, R.S. § 780, who were to be
paid a "proper" allowance not to exceed three-fourths of the fees
earned by them. R.S. § 841. Sections 9 and 10 of the Act of 1896
placed the marshal and office deputy marshals upon a salary basis,
but § 11 authorized the marshal to appoint field deputy marshals to
hold office during his pleasure unless sooner removed by the
District Courts, who should receive as compensation three-fourths
of the fees, including mileage, earned by them. The status of a
field deputy marshal under this legislation was therefore the same
as that of all deputy marshals under the earlier act. We regard the
question whether such a field deputy marshal was an
Page 297 U. S. 174
employee of the government or of the marshal as settled by the
decision and reasoning of this Court in
Douglas v.
Wallace, 161 U. S. 346,
which held that, in view of the manner of a deputy marshal's
appointment and payment, his claim for compensation had the status
of that of a claim of an employee of the marshal, not of the
government, and so was not affected by R.S., § 3477, declaring void
any assignment of any interest in a claim against the United
States. To the same effect are
United States v. McDonald,
72 F. 898, 900;
Powell v. United States, 60 F. 687;
Wintermute v. Smith, 30 Fed.Cas. No. 17,897. This has been
the administrative ruling since 1920,
see Claim of George
Taylor Larkin, recorded in 21 P.&R.D. 42. A construction of
such long standing is not lightly to be overturned.
See United
States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760,
95 U. S. 763;
Logan v. Davis, 233 U. S. 613,
233 U. S. 627;
Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U. S. 273;
Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327,
280 U. S. 336;
Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U.
S. 375;
Interstate Commerce Commission v. New York,
N.H. & H. R. Co., 287 U. S. 178;
Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States,
288 U. S. 294,
288 U. S. 315.
Later legislation providing for payment of annuities to employees
of the United States must be taken to have been adopted in the
light of it.
Since the record does not disclose any administrative
determination of petitioner's right to an annuity computed on the
basis of twenty-four years' service, the sole issue now presented
is whether the decision that he was not entitled to the annuity
calculated on the basis of thirty years' service was erroneous. The
judgment of the court below must therefore be affirmed, but for
reasons stated in this opinion, and not those stated in the opinion
of the court below.
Affirmed.
* By Executive Order dated July 21, 1930, under § 1 of Act of
July 3, 1930, 46 Stat. 1016, the functions of the Bureau of
Pensions were transferred to the Veterans' Administration. By
Executive Orders Nos. 6670, and 6731, dated respectively April 7,
1934, and June 5, 1934, under § 16 of Act of March 3, 1933, 47
Stat. 1517, and Order of the Civil Service Commission dated August
24, 1934, the administration of the Civil Service Retirement Act
was transferred from the Veterans' Administration to the Civil
Service Commission, effective as of September 1, 1934.