A common enterprise, under a trust instrument, for acquisition
of an oil lease, drilling and operation of an oil well, sale of the
products, sale of the well, and distribution of income among the
beneficiaries
held taxable on income as an "association"
under the Revenue Act of 1926, upon the authority of
Morrissey
v. Commissioner, ante, p.
296 U. S. 344. P.
296 U. S.
368.
76 F.2d 682 reversed.
Page 296 U. S. 366
Certiorari to review a judgment affirming a decision of the
Board of Tax Appeals which overruled an assessment of income taxes
laid on a trust as an "association."
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
The trustees of E. E. Combs Well No. 2 contested the ruling of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the taxpayer was taxable
as an association, and not as a trust, on its income for the years
1925 and 1926. The Board of Tax Appeals sustained their contention
and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Board.
Commissioner v. Combs, 76 F.2d 682. A writ of certiorari
was issued in view of the conflict of decisions to which we have
referred in
Morrissey v. Commissioner, ante, p.
296 U. S. 344.
The trust was created "to finance and drill a well for
production and sale of oil and other hydrocarbon substances under
Oil and Gas Lease dated July 24, 1924." By the agreement, the Hub
Oil Company, a California corporation and owner of the oil and gas
lease, assigned to E. E. Combs and Edward Everett, as trustees, all
its rights under the lease, subject to a reservation of 6.5 percent
of all oil, gas, and other hydrocarbon substances which might be
produced and of a royalty interest in favor of one Smithson of 2
percent. The agreement described as beneficiaries "all persons who
may own or acquire portions of the whole beneficial interest" as
defined. The
Page 296 U. S. 367
assignor agreed to supply to the trustees certain equipment, and
one Bailes had already agreed to furnish other equipment and
materials and to superintend the operation of drilling the well in
consideration of 12 percent of the production. The trust was to pay
all labor claims and for materials not otherwise provided.
The "whole beneficial interest" in the trust was defined as
.71333 percent of gross production, and the beneficiaries were to
be paid their
pro rata shares, after deduction for the
payment of lawful trust obligations, as follows: (a) 25 percent of
gross production to the beneficiaries who provided money for the
trust purposes; (b) .44333 percent to E. E. Combs, and (c) 2
percent to Edward Everett. Certificates of beneficial interest were
to be issued in approved legal form, and were to be held in escrow
until a producing well was brought in. Thirteen persons were named
as beneficiaries, with the amounts contributed and the percentages
owned by each, these amounts aggregating $25,000 and the percentage
of ownership amounting to 25 percent. The "certificate of
beneficial interest" recited that the party named was the holder of
a beneficial interest under the trust agreement in the amount
stated, and that the same was transferable only upon the books of
the trustees, upon indorsement and surrender of the certificate.
The trustees were authorized to hold all property and property
rights, the legal title to which might vest in them under the
trust, to use the moneys deposited by beneficiaries to pay for
labor, casing, and other materials incident to drilling and
production, to manage and protect the trust property, to pay "trust
debts," to sell all products of the well, to borrow money upon the
credit of the trust, and to sell any "unsold beneficial interests"
as they might deem best for trust purposes. The trustees were not
to be individually liable except for willful misconduct. E. E.
Combs was to act as production manager at a stated salary after
the
Page 296 U. S. 368
well was in production. All proceeds "of sale of well products"
were to be paid into a designated bank, to be distributed as
agreed.
The provisions of the agreement were carried out. The thirteen
described beneficiaries contributed the amount above stated. A well
was drilled in 1925, and produced oil through the remainder of that
year and for a portion of the year 1926. In the latter year, the
trustees sold the lease. In both years, they currently distributed
to the beneficiaries the net proceeds from the sale of oil and from
the sale of the lease and, after the latter sale and distribution
of the moneys received, the trust was terminated.
The beneficiaries did not hold a meeting, and the trust had no
office or place of business, no seal, bylaws, or official name, and
the operations of the trustees were confined to the one lease they
acquired.
In considering whether an association was created, the fact that
the beneficiaries did not exercise control is not determinative.
Hecht v. Malley, 265 U. S. 144;
Morrissey v. Commissioner, supra. The parties joined in a
common enterprise for the transaction of business, and the
beneficiaries who contributed money for that purpose became
associated in the enterprise according to the terms of the
arrangement. The essential features of the enterprise were not
affected by the fact that the parties confined their operations to
one oil well.
See Swanson v. Commissioner, ante, p.
296 U. S. 362.
Parties may form an association for a small business as well as for
a large one. Here, through the medium of a trust, the parties
secured centralized management of their enterprise, and its
continuity during the trust term without termination or
interruption by death or changes in the ownership of interests, and
with limited liability and transferable beneficial interests
evidenced by certificates. Entering into a joint undertaking they
avoided the characteristic responsibilities
Page 296 U. S. 369
of partners and secured advantages analogous to those which
pertain to corporate organization. The fact that meetings were not
held or that particular forms of corporate procedure were absent is
not controlling.
Morrissey v. Commissioner, supra.
We think that the taxpayer was taxable as an association. The
judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further
proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
It is so ordered.