1. The Safety Appliance Act is liberally construed so as to give
a right of recovery for every injury the proximate cause of which
was a failure to comply with a requirement of the Act. P.
294 U. S.
531.
2. In an action against a railroad company under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act for injuries alleged to have been caused
by its failure to provide a car with a "secure grabiron or
handhold" as required by the Safety Appliance Acts, the railroad
defended on the ground that, at the time of the injury, the
plaintiff (a brakeman) was using the grabiron as a foot brace to
enable him to release a handbrake, a use for which, the railroad
contended, the device was not intended. There was evidence that the
grabiron in question was not sufficiently secure even for its
intended use (as a handhold), and also that the use to which it was
put by the plaintiff was customary.
Held, it was error to
direct a verdict for the defendant.
72 F.2d 649 reversed.
Certiorari, 293 U.S. 546, to review a judgment affirming a
judgment upon a directed verdict for the railroad company in an
action brought against it under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act to recover for personal injuries.
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Swinson, a freight brakeman in the employ of the Chicago, St.
Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway, brought this action under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act in the federal District Court
for Minnesota. The accident occurred while he was releasing a hand
brake at the end of a tank car. The brake was tightly set. To
release it required the application of considerable force to the
brake wheel. In order to exert such force, Swinson placed his left
foot on the running board, his right foot on a grabiron or
handhold, which consisted of a round iron bar bent at the ends,
attached horizontally to the underside of the running board, and
extending beyond it a few inches. As he exerted foot pressure on
the grabiron, the plank to which it was attached split, and one of
the bolts securing the grabiron pulled through. As a result, he
lost his balance, fell in front of the moving car, and was
seriously injured. The parties were engaged, and the car was used,
in interstate commerce.
Swinson claimed that the railway was liable, independently of
negligence on its part, because it had failed to provide the
"secure grab irons or handholds" required by the Safety Appliance
Act.
* The railway
contended that it was not liable because the grabiron had been used
by Swinson for a purpose for which it was not intended; since the
purpose of Congress in requiring "secure grab irons or handholds"
was to supply an appliance to grasp with the
Page 294 U. S. 531
hands, not to provide a foot brace or support to secure leverage
in releasing a hand brake. Although there was evidence that the
grabiron was inadequate and defective even for its so-called
"intended use" of being grasped by the hands, and also evidence
that the use which Swinson had made of the grabiron was customary,
the trial court sustained the railway's contention and directed a
verdict for it. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
entered upon the verdict, 72 F.2d 649. Certiorari was granted
because the precise question, which is of importance, had not been
decided by this Court.
The Safety Appliance Act has been liberally construed so as to
give a right of recovery for every injury the proximate cause of
which was a failure to comply with a requirement of the Act. Thus,
although the Act was intended primarily for the protection of
railroad employees, it was held in
Fairport, P. & E. R. Co.
v. Meredith, 292 U. S. 589,
that a traveler on the highway could recover for injury resulting
from failure to maintain in usable condition the power brake
required by the Safety Appliance Act. Although this section of the
Act was originally intended for "greater security to men in
coupling and uncoupling cars," it was held in
Davis v.
Wolfe, 263 U. S. 239,
263 U. S. 243,
that a freight train conductor could recover for an injury
resulting from failure of a grabiron, which he had grasped while
standing on the sill step and signaling the fireman. There, the
Court said that an employee
"can recover if the failure to comply with the requirements of
the Act is a proximate cause of the accident, resulting in injury
to him while in the discharge of his duty, although not engaged in
an operation in which the safety appliances are specifically
designed to furnish him protection."
As failure of the grabiron was the proximate cause of the
injury, it was error to direct a verdict for the defendant. There
was evidence on which the jury might have
Page 294 U. S. 532
found that the grabiron was not secure for use strictly as a
handhold, and that, if it had been, it would not have failed, since
the use made of it by Swinson did not subject it to appreciably
greater strain. There was evidence also that use as a foot brace
was a natural, and not unusual, one. For such a use of the
grabiron, Swinson was entitled to assume that it was secure.
Compare Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Howell, 6 F.2d 784;
Didinger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 39 F.2d 798.
Reversed.
* Section 4 of the Federal Safety Appliance Act, Act of March 2,
1893, c.196, ยง 4, 27 Stat. 531, provides that,
"until otherwise ordered by the Interstate Commerce Commission,
it shall be unlawful for any railroad company to use any car in
interstate commerce that is not provided with secure grab irons or
handholds in the ends and sides of each car for greater security to
men in coupling and uncoupling cars."