1. Mandamus does not lie to control the action of an
administrative agency in the exercise of its discretionary powers.
P.
294 U. S.
59.
Page 294 U. S. 51
2. A refusal by the Interstate Commerce Commission to act upon a
complaint, upon the ground that it has no statutory power to grant
the relief prayed, is equally a denial of jurisdiction, as
distinguished from a decision on the merits, whether the Commission
rejects the complaint on its face or dismisses it after a hearing.
P.
294 U. S.
60.
3. A refusal by the Commission to exercise jurisdiction on a
complaint is reviewable in mandamus if plainly erroneous, even
though the refusal came after a hearing; but if it was not plainly
erroneous, it is not reviewable by mandamus even though no other
remedy, by suit or action, be available to the complainant. P.
294 U. S.
61.
4. Railroads which, with other railroads, were co-proprietors of
city terminal and participated in its use under a terminal
agreement which required all to meet the fixed charges of interest
and taxes in equal proportions and to share the cost of maintenance
and operation in proportion to use, intervened in a proceeding by
which another railroad sought to gain the right to use the terminal
facilities, and to have the compensation fixed, under § 3(4) of the
Interstate Commerce Act. They alleged that the agreement was harsh
and inequitable to them, who used the terminal but little, and
unjustly advantageous to the other proprietors, who used it much
more, and they sought to have the burden readjusted on the basis of
use, invoking § 3(1), (3), and (4), and § 15(a) of the Act. The
Commission decided that the Act conferred no authority to grant
relief from the agreement.
Held that the decision was not
clearly erroneous, and that mandamus to compel the Commission to
take jurisdiction was rightly refused. P.
294 U. S.
61.
63 App.D.C. 215; 71 F.2d 33, affirmed.
Certiorari, 293 U.S. 545, to review the affirmance of a judgment
dismissing a petition for a writ of mandamus.
Page 294 U. S. 52
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This cause calls for the application of familiar principles
governing the issuance of the writ of mandamus. The petitioners
urge that the courts below erred in denying the writ. For an
understanding of the contention, the circumstances out of which the
litigation arose should be stated.
Prior to the year 1906, ten railroads entering Kansas City used
a union depot. Two others, the Chicago Great Western and the Kansas
City Southern (the petitioners),
Page 294 U. S. 53
used the station belonging to the latter. The union station was
inadequate, and there was agitation for better facilities. As a
consequence, the ten roads set about to acquire the necessary
property and rights and to construct a new union terminal. The
instrumentality created for the purpose was the respondent, the
Kansas City Terminal Railway Company, a corporation organized by
the railroads, for whose stock they subscribed in equal shares.
This company acquired from the constituent roads and from others
the property and franchises requisite to the construction of the
terminal. In addition to the moneys subscribed for stock, the
terminal company borrowed in excess of $50,000,000.
The financing and operation of the project was governed by an
operating agreement between the railroads, the terminal company,
and a trustee which provided, amongst other things, for the
construction, maintenance, and operation of the terminal and its
use by the proprietary companies throughout a term of two hundred
years; equal ownership of the terminal company's stock; the
admittance of other railroads on equal terms as to ownership of
stock and use of the property by consent of two-thirds of the
participants not in default under the agreement; issuance and sale
of the terminal company's bonds secured by mortgage on its
property; payment by each proprietary road of an equal share of
taxes and governmental charges of the company and of interest and
principal of its mortgage indebtedness; payment of a defaulting
railroad's share of these charges by the remaining proprietaries in
equal shares; exclusion of any defaulting road from the use of the
facilities; the sharing of expenses of maintenance and operation by
the using companies in proportion to each one's use. The stock of
the terminal company was deposited with a trustee, subject to a
voting trust, to prevent its transfer to any one not a party to the
operating agreement. The roads also assigned the operating
agreement to the mortgage trustee as additional
Page 294 U. S. 54
security. In 1910, the petitioners became parties to the
agreement pursuant to its provisions.
The appointment of receivers in 1915 for the Missouri, Kansas
& Texas Railway Company, one of the proprietary railroads, was
followed by foreclosure under its mortgages. The decree of sale in
foreclosure permitted the purchaser to adopt or reject any
executory contract of the debtor. The purchasers organized the
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railroad Company (hereinafter
designated M., K. & T.) to take title to the property, and that
company elected not to be bound by the operating agreement, with
the result that it was without terminal facilities in Kansas City.
Because of this lack, it applied to the Interstate Commerce
Commission, pursuant to § 3(4) of the Interstate Commerce Act,
[
Footnote 1] for an order
granting it the right to use the terminal, conditioned on payment
of compensation proportioned to use. A temporary order was issued,
and the matter set for final hearing. Prior to the hearing, all of
the eleven remaining railroads, parties to the operating agreement,
intervened. Those designated as the larger users of the terminal
opposed the granting of the petition. Those termed the smaller
users (including the petitioners in the present case) asked that,
if the prayer of the M., K. & T. should be granted, they be
afforded relief from the hardship and inequality of burden imposed
upon them by the agreement by revision of the existing arrangement
so that they might thereafter make use of the terminal upon terms
as favorable as might be granted the M., K. & T. They based
their request upon §§ 3(1)(3)(4) and 15a of the Act to regulate
commerce, as amended. A motion was made to strike the intervening
petitions of the small users on various grounds, amongst them that
the Commission had no power to make an order superseding,
modifying, nullifying, or reforming the operating contract.
Page 294 U. S. 55
The matter came on for hearing, evidence was presented, and the
petitioners showed that their use of the terminal over a period of
years had averaged less than 3 percent of the total use, while
their contribution to the interest and taxes amounted to 8 1/3
percent of the total. For example, in 1932, each of the twelve
proprietary railroads paid approximately $200,000 on account of
interest and taxes. If these charges had been divided on the basis
of actual use, some of the larger users would have paid
approximately $600,000 and the petitioners only a little more than
$50,000 each. The Commission's report indicates that the operating
agreement is inequitable, since it calls for payments by the
smaller lines in excess of benefits derived, and permits the larger
lines to enjoy the use of the facilities at an expense,
proportioned to use, much less than that imposed upon the smaller
users.
The Commission filed its report and order November 10, 1925.
[
Footnote 2] With respect to
the relief sought by the M., K. & T., it developed there was
pending in a federal court an action to determine the legality of
that road's election to denounce the operating agreement. The
Commission therefore withheld action, ordering that, if the
decision of the court should be that the new railroad had no right
of abandonment, the petition would, upon motion, be dismissed; but,
if the court should sustain the right of abrogation, the M., K.
& T. might then move for an order granting it the use of the
terminal upon an agreed compensation, and, if no agreement could be
reached, upon such terms as the Commission might fix. The
intervening petitions of the smaller users were dismissed. So
matters stood until the right of the M., K. & T. to reject the
agreement had been judicially affirmed. Thereupon, that company
applied to the Commission for the ascertainment of the compensation
it should pay for use of the terminal, and the small users,
including the present
Page 294 U. S. 56
petitioners, presented petitions for rehearing upon the order of
November, 1925, dismissing their interventions. These petitions
were denied June 1, 1933, and the Commission proceeded to hear the
case as one involving only the compensation to be paid by the M.,
K. & T. for use of the terminal. The petitioners then applied
to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for a writ of
mandamus directed to the Commission requiring it to vacate its
orders of November, 1925, and June, 1933, with respect to the
petitioners' interventions, and to hear and decide upon the merits
the issues thereby raised. A rule to show cause issued, the
Commission and certain interveners answered, the petitioners
demurred to the answers, the court overruled the demurrers, and, as
the petitioners elected to stand thereon, dismissed the petitions.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals of the District affirmed the
judgment. [
Footnote 3] We
granted a writ of certiorari. [
Footnote 4]
The petitioners rely principally upon paragraphs (1), (3), and
(4) of § 3 of the Act. The paragraphs are quoted in the margin.
[
Footnote 5] Their position is
that, if the M., K. & T.
Page 294 U. S. 57
is granted the use of the terminal pursuant to § 3(4) on a basis
more favorable than that available to its predecessor and to the
petitioners under the operating agreement, unlawful discrimination
forbidden by § 3 will result; and, further, that they are entitled
to petition for the grant of use upon compensation to be fixed by
the Commission under paragraph (4) although they are parties to the
agreement fixing their rights in the terminal. The respondents, by
their motion to dismiss, challenged the power of the Commission to
grant the relief asked. That body thus stated the problem
presented:
"Whether, then, Congress has or has not appropriately exerted
its plenary power directly or through us is a question at the
threshold of each case, and it remains here
Page 294 U. S. 58
to consider whether the particular power invoked by the
interveners has been conferred upon us."
After a discussion of paragraph (4), the Commission
concluded:
"The power and authority thus invoked are not conferred by the
quoted paragraph."
With respect to paragraph (3), it was held that, as the charges
in question were essentially capital charges, they have no
relation, direct or indirect, to the interchange of traffic between
the several lines using the terminal, as contemplated by this
paragraph, and the Commission was without authority thereunder to
make the requested order.
Referring to paragraph (1), which prohibits undue prejudice or
preference as between particular persons, firms, corporations, or
localities, or particular descriptions of traffic, the Commission
said:
"Assuming, without now deciding, that the provisions of
paragraph (1) are broad enough to embrace, as between the parties
thereto, a joint terminal agreement into which all the lines have
voluntarily entered and for which they are mutually responsible,
the distribution of the charges here in question is not shown to
fall within their condemnation. Those charges are distinctly
capital charges, based upon the terminal property itself, not upon
its use, in no sense assumed by or chargeable to the proprietary
lines as compensation for uses they either do or may make, and are
divided among the lines in the proportions of their equitable
titles to or interests in the property. For their respective uses
of the property, the lines severally assume maintenance and
operating expenses in corresponding proportions. This is not shown
to be undue prejudice or preference or unjust discrimination. Each
proprietary pays an equal share of the aggregate interest and taxes
upon its equal share in the aggregate property. "
Page 294 U. S. 59
A contention that the case came within the declaration of policy
of § 15a, with respect to the adjustment of rates so that the
carriers as a whole or by groups will under honest, efficient, and
economical management earn a fair return upon their railway
property used in transportation was answered by the Commission
thus:
"Neither expressly nor by implication does the provision embrace
a direct or indirect revision or reformation of any such contract,
lawful, in itself, as far as appears, as that here in question, and
we are unable to find the requisite power or authority in any other
provision of the Act."
The petitioners insist that, under the plain terms of the Act,
the Commission had jurisdiction of their complaints, but refused to
entertain them, and that mandamus is the appropriate remedy to
compel a hearing and determination upon the merits. The respondents
reply that the Act plainly confers no such jurisdiction, or at
least that the matter is not so clear as to warrant interference by
mandamus, and, in the alternative, that the Commission did take
jurisdiction of the complaints and decide the merits. The Court of
Appeals, without deciding whether the Act confers authority to
grant the relief, held that the Commission in fact took
jurisdiction, heard the cases, and decided as matter of law that it
was without power or authority in the premises; that this
constituted a decision which, whether right or wrong as matter of
law, was impregnable to the writ of mandamus. We concur in the
result reached, but for reasons differing somewhat from those
announced by that court.
1. The language used by the Commission with respect to the
application of paragraph (1) of § 3 of the Act lends color to the
respondents' argument that, upon consideration of the whole record,
the Commission reached the conclusion that the enforcement of the
operating agreement against the petitioners while exempting the new
applicant, the M., K. & T., from its terms, did not amount to
discrimination
Page 294 U. S. 60
as defined by the Act. If this is a proper characterization of
that body's action, no court can by mandamus compel it to alter its
decision. Where judgment or discretion is reposed in an
administrative agency and has by that agency been exercised, courts
are powerless by the use of the writ to compel a different
conclusion. [
Footnote 6] We
are, however, of opinion that, fairly considered, the report does
not bear the construction contended for, but shows the Commission,
upon analysis of the complaint and the evidence, found that the Act
did not confer authority to accord the relief demanded.
2. The petitioners insist that, as they stated a case alleged to
fall within the provisions of the Act, they were entitled to have
the Commission consider the case as stated, and this right they
were denied. They say the writ ought to issue to compel that body
to hear and decide their case. The Court of Appeals, answering the
contention, held that the Commission did in fact entertain the
complaint, decided the cause, and, even if it erred as matter of
law in respect of its statutory power, cannot be coerced by
mandamus to reverse its decision. The petitioners say that the
fallacy in this reasoning is that, whether the Commission refuses
to receive a complaint, or upon receiving it entertains and grants
a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, its action comes to
the same thing, namely, a refusal of jurisdiction. We think that
this is so. Whether an administrative tribunal refuses to hear, or
upon a hearing determines that, as a matter of law, it lacks power
to act, it is either correct in its conclusion or incorrect, and
the question is whether, if it errs in refusing to act, it is
compellable be mandamus to proceed.
Page 294 U. S. 61
3. If beyond peradventure the Act does not confer upon the
Commission the power invoked by a complainant, the writ will not be
granted. [
Footnote 7] If, on
the other hand, power and authority are plainly found in the Act,
and the Commission erroneously refuses to exercise such power and
authority, mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel that body
to proceed and to hear the case upon the merits. The fact that the
complaint has been heard and, after hearing, the Commission has
refused to enter an order because in its opinion no authority for
such action is conferred by the statute, will not avail with the
courts to prevent mandamus to correct a plain error of the
Commission in renouncing jurisdiction. [
Footnote 8]
4. The ultimate question, then, upon the answer to which the
decision of this case must turn, is whether, in holding that the
statute granted it no authority to act in the premises, the
Commission was so plainly and palpably wrong as matter of law that
the writ should issue. It is to be noted that the solution of this
question does not depend upon whether, in a proper case, this Court
would reach the same conclusion as that of the Commission. If that
body had taken jurisdiction and granted relief, a remedy would have
been available to the respondents by the filing of a bill in equity
to set aside the order and to enjoin its enforcement. [
Footnote 9] Had the matter been thus
presented, it would have been incumbent upon the courts, however
doubtful the question, to decide it. But the order here made was
negative in form and substance -- the refusal of relief -- and the
remedy by suit in equity
Page 294 U. S. 62
was therefore not available to the petitioners. [
Footnote 10] The absence of a remedy by
suit or action to redress alleged error of an administrative body
is not, in itself, sufficient to invoke the power of mandamus. Not
only must there be no such remedy, but it must appear that the
administrative tribunal was plainly and palpably wrong in refusing
to take jurisdiction. Is this shown in the present instance? We
think not. The Commission, in a careful and painstaking review of
the legislation defining its powers, professed itself unable to
find a grant of authority to set aside commitments in the nature of
capital charges for property owned and used by the carriers. It
adverted to the fact that paragraph (1) of § 3 of the Act was
directed to discriminations, preference, and prejudice in the
performance of the duties of the carrier towards the public which
dealt with them as carriers, and related particularly to rates,
fares, and charges, and that paragraph (3) was adopted to prevent
discriminations and unfair practices as between carriers in
interchange of freight and traffic. The language now found in these
paragraphs has remained without amendment since the adoption of the
original act in 1887. It concluded that petitioners could not
invoke the new paragraph (4) added to § 3 by the Transportation Act
1920, because it was intended to give a right of use to one then
having no such right in a terminal owned by another line, and was
inapplicable to a case like the present, where the petitioners, by
their own voluntary agreement, were entitled, and for many years
had been entitled, to the use of a terminal of which they were in
effect part owners. The Commission found itself unable to hold that
the broad policy declared by § 15a so altered the meaning of § 3 as
to change the nature of the discriminations and practices denounced
by that section. Its decision was not unanimous, certain of the
members being of the opinion that power to grant the
Page 294 U. S. 63
relief demanded could be spelled out of the Act reading it as a
whole and as amended by the Transportation Act 1920. This statement
of the views of the Commission indicates that its conclusion was
not so clearly erroneous as to call for the exercise of the
extraordinary power involved in the issuance of mandamus. Where the
matter is not beyond peradventure clear, we have invariably refused
the writ, even though the question were one of law as to the extent
of the statutory power of an administrative officer or body.
[
Footnote 11] We think this
principle applicable in the present case, and that the courts below
were right in refusing the writ.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
49 U.S.C. § 3(4).
[
Footnote 2]
104 I.C.C. 203.
[
Footnote 3]
71 F.2d 336.
[
Footnote 4]
293 U.S. 545.
[
Footnote 5]
"(1) It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the
provisions of this chapter to make or give any undue or
unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person,
company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular
description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or to subject
any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or
any particular description of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable
prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."
"
* * * *"
"(3) All carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or
property, subject to the provisions of this chapter shall,
according to their respective powers, afford all reasonable,
proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between
their respective lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and
delivering of passengers or property to and from their several
lines and those connecting therewith, and shall not discriminate in
their rates, fares, and charges between such connecting lines, or
unduly prejudice any such connecting line in the distribution of
traffic that is not specifically routed by the shipper."
"(4) If the commission finds it to be in the public interest and
to be practicable, without substantially impairing the ability of a
carrier owning or entitled to the enjoyment of terminal facilities
to handle its own business, it shall have power to require the use
of any such terminal facilities, including main line track or
tracks for a reasonable distance outside of such terminal, of any
carrier, by another carrier or other carriers, on such terms and
for such compensation as the carriers affected may agree upon, or,
in the event of a failure to agree, as the commission may fix as
just and reasonable for the use so required, to be ascertained on
the principle controlling compensation in condemnation proceedings.
Such compensation shall be paid or adequately secured before the
enjoyment of the use may be commenced. If under this paragraph the
use of such terminal facilities of any carrier is required to be
given to another carrier or other carriers, and the carrier whose
terminal facilities are required to be so used is not satisfied
with the terms fixed for such use, or if the amount of compensation
so fixed is not duly and promptly paid, the carrier whose terminal
facilities have thus been required to be given to another carrier
or other carriers shall be entitled to recover, by suit or action
against such other carrier or carriers, proper damages for any
injuries sustained by it as the result of compliance with such
requirement, or just compensation for such use, or both, as the
case may be."
49 U.S.C. § 3(1), (3), (4).
[
Footnote 6]
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. United States ex rel. Waste
Merchants' Assn., 260 U. S. 32;
Interstate Commerce Commission v. United States,
289 U. S. 385,
289 U. S. 394.
Compare Wilbur v. United States, 281 U.
S. 206,
281 U. S.
218.
[
Footnote 7]
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Los Angeles, 280 U. S.
52.
[
Footnote 8]
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. United States of America,
224 U. S. 474,
224 U. S. 484;
Louisville Cement Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n,
246 U. S. 638,
246 U. S. 642;
Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 252 U. S. 178,
252 U. S. 187.
Compare Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. United States,
289 U. S. 385,
289 U. S.
393.
[
Footnote 9]
U.S.C. Tit. 28, § 41(28); §§ 43-47, inclusive.
[
Footnote 10]
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. United States,
289 U. S. 385,
289 U. S.
388.
[
Footnote 11]
Reeside v.
Walker, 11 How. 272,
52 U. S. 289;
International Contracting Co. v. Lamont, 155 U.
S. 303,
155 U. S. 308;
Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U.
S. 316,
190 U. S. 323;
Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.
S. 106,
194 U. S. 108;
Ness v. Fisher, 223 U. S. 683,
223 U. S. 691;
Hall v. Payne, 254 U. S. 343,
254 U. S. 347;
Wilbur v. United States, 281 U. S. 206,
281 U. S. 219;
United States v. Wilbur, 283 U. S. 414,
283 U. S. 420;
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. New York, N.H. & H. R.
Co., 287 U. S. 178,
287 U. S. 191,
287 U. S.
203.