1. In § 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, giving to "any
seaman" injured in the course of his employment a cause of action
for damages similar to that given by the statutes of the United
States to railway employees, the term "any seaman" includes the
master of the vessel. P.
293 U. S.
156.
2. This provision should be construed liberally; "seaman," in
this particular context, should be interpreted in its broad sense,
not in the narrower sense distinguishing the crew from the master,
found in other statutes, and this accords with the purpose of the
Act as revealed by its history and by other legislation
in pari
materia. Pp.
293 U. S.
157-159.
3. Section 713, c. 18, of Title 46 of the U.S.Code, purporting
to define master and seaman, must be confined to the sections in
chapter 18 which were derived from the same earlier legislation as
§ 713; it is inapplicable to § 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of
1920, placed in the same chapter 18 by the compilers of the Code.
P.
293 U. S.
160.
4. The compilers of the U.S.Code were not authorized by Congress
to amend existing law. P.
293 U. S.
161.
334 Mo. 396, 67 S.W.2d 47, reversed.
Certiorari, 292 U.S. 617, to review the affirmance of a judgment
dismissing the complaint in an action for damages for the death of
the master of a vessel. The action was brought by the
administratrix of the master against the owner of the vessel.
Page 293 U. S. 156
MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO delivered the opinion of the Court.
The master of a tugboat met his death on the waters of the Ohio
river through the negligence of a pilot employed to navigate the
tug. The personal representative brought suit against the owner
under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, § 33 (41 Stat. 1007, 46
U.S.C. § 688) for the recovery of damages. The trial court
sustained a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that a "master"
is not a "seaman" within the meaning of the statute. The Supreme
Court of Missouri affirmed the judgment for the owner. 334 Mo. 396,
67 S.W.2d 47. The case is here on certiorari. 292 U.S. 617.
The statute is set forth at large in opinions of this Court.
Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.
S. 375,
264 U. S. 383;
Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.
S. 367,
287 U. S. 371.
It gives to "any seaman" injured in the course of his employment
and, in case of the death of such seaman, to his personal
representatives, a cause of action similar to that given by the
statutes of the United States to railway employees. In the
enforcement of the statute, a policy of liberal construction
announced at the beginning has been steadily maintained. Early in
the history of the act, the question came up whether it gave a
remedy to stevedores. We decided that it did. "It is true that for
most purposes, as the word is commonly used, stevedores are not
seamen.'" International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty,
272 U. S. 50,
272 U. S. 52.
Nonetheless, verbal niceties were bent to the overmastering purpose
of the act to give protection to workers injured upon ships.
"Words," we said, "are
Page 293 U. S. 157
flexible."
International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty,
supra at p.
272 U. S. 52. Later
decisions of this Court have been conceived in a like spirit
(
Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U. S. 635;
Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 282 U. S. 234;
Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, supra at p.
287 U. S.
375), and other courts have followed suit. [
Footnote 1]
The problem for solution here stands out upon this
background.
There are contexts in which the word seaman is held to exclude
the master, or even any officer.
See, e.g., R.S. § 4530,
as amended by § 31 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (46 U.S.C. §
597);
also 46 U.S.C. §§ 564, 568, 570, 592, 594, 658,
reenacting R.S. §§ 4511, 4515, 4517, 4525, 4527 4561, as from time
to time amended. There are other contexts in which it takes them
in. 28 U.S.C. § 837;
also R.S. § 2174;
In re
Scott, 250 F. 647, 648;
The Balsa, 10 F.2d 408;
The Burns Bros., No. 31, 29 F.2d 855. The respondent
points to statutes that develop the antithesis between a seaman and
those over him.
See citations,
supra. They do not
carry us very far, any more than the contrast that exists for many
purposes between a seaman and a stevedore. In a broad sense, a
seaman is a mariner of any degree, one who lives his life upon the
sea. It is enough that what he does affects "the operation and
welfare of the ship when she is upon a voyage."
The Buena
Ventura, 243 F. 797, 799, where a wireless operator was
brought within the term. In a narrow sense, the term is
Page 293 U. S. 158
limited to one who is an ordinary seaman and nothing more, a
seaman, as opposed to the master or an officer. One can find a like
range of variation in the use of the word "crew."
"It is sometimes used to comprehend all persons composing the
ship's company, including the master; sometimes to comprehend the
officers and common seamen, excluding the master, and sometimes to
comprehend the common seamen only, excluding the master and
officers."
United States v. Winn, 3 Sumn. 209, 213-214, Fed.Cas.
No. 16,740 (Story, J.);
cf. The Buena Ventura, supra, 243
F. 799 (Hough, J.);
The Bound Brook, 146 F. 160, 164;
United States v. Huff, 13 F. 630. What concerns us here
and now is not the scope of the class of seamen at other times and
in other contexts. Our concern is to define the meaning for the
purpose of a particular statute which must be read in the light of
the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained. Congress
knew that men employed upon a ship were without a remedy in damages
for negligence beyond their cure and maintenance, unless the injury
was a consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship or a defect in
her equipment.
Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co.,
247 U. S. 372,
247 U. S. 384;
Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, supra. This restriction
upon remedies was applicable to ordinary seamen, but applicable
also to officers and even to the master.
The George, 1
Sumn. 151, Fed.Cas. No. 5,329 (Story, J.);
The Balsa,
supra.
"It is said that the allowance by the maritime law belongs to
the seamen only, and cannot be claimed by the master of the ship. .
. . No authority is cited for this position, and I am not aware
that any exists."
Story, J., in
The George, supra, at p. 155.
Cf. the rule in Great Britain under the Merchant Shipping
Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7, No. 48, § 34). The old measure of recovery was
the same for all aboard, the highest and the lowest. The new
measure was not designed to narrow the protected class while
broadening the damages. We
Page 293 U. S. 159
stick too closely to the letter if we say that Congress had the
will to give damages for wounds or death to the crew at large or
their dependents and to leave the master and his dependents out. An
ancient evil was to be uprooted, and uprooted altogether. It was
not to be left with fibers still clinging to the soil.
The purpose of the lawmakers, clear enough, we believe, upon the
surface of the act, takes on an added clearness when the act is
viewed in the setting of its history. Section 33 of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1920 is derived from § 20 of the Act of 1915, 38
Stat. 1185. The parent section was aimed at the fellow servant rule
in its application to torts upon navigable waters.
Chelentis v.
Luckenbach S.S. Co., supra. It provided that,
"in any suit to recover damages for any injury sustained on
board vessel or in its service, seamen having command shall not be
held to be fellow servants with those under their authority."
Masters were thus recognized as within the genus seamen, though
they were seamen having command. The decision of this Court in the
Chelentis case gave warning that the change, if any, thus
effected did not avail to increase the damages beyond the cost of
cure and maintenance. Thus warned, the lawmakers amended § 20 of
the Act of 1915 by substituting § 33 of the Act of 1920. We cannot
believe that, in this process of amendment, the word "seamen" lost
the broad meaning that it had in the law to be amended, and was
narrowed by the exclusion of a particular species of seamen --
i.e., seamen having command. The change is too sudden to
be accepted as intended unless unmistakably declared.
The scheme of legislation becomes symmetrical and consistent
when the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 is read in the light of
another act
in pari materia -- the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, § 1
et seq., adopted in
1927. This act expressly excludes from its "coverage" a "master or
member of a
Page 293 U. S. 160
crew of any vessel." Section 3. The exclusion was at the request
of seamen who notified the committee in charge that they preferred
the remedy for damages under the act of 1920 to the benefits that
would be theirs under a system of workmen's compensation.
See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 3170 at p. 17;
Cong.Rec. 69th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 68, part 5, p. 5908;
Nogueira v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 281 U.
S. 128,
281 U. S.
134-136. The bill was accordingly amended in its
progress through the House by declaring the exception. There can be
little doubt that Congress did this in the belief that, under the
statutes then in force, master and crew alike were already
adequately protected in case of injury or death. The belief had a
sound foundation in the act of 1920.
Cf. Nogueira v. New York,
N.H. & H. R. Co., supra at p.
281 U. S.
134.
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the Supreme Court of
Missouri rested its opinion on § 713 of Title 46, c. 18 of the
U.S.Code, which, for the purpose of construction, defines a master
and a seaman, as well as other terms. [
Footnote 2] With a few verbal changes, § 713 is a
reenactment of § 65 [
Footnote
3] of the Act of June 7, 1872 (17 Stat. 277), which was
Page 293 U. S. 161
then known as § 4612 of the Revised Statutes. In the compilation
of the Code, some of the provisions for the protection of seamen
contained in the Act of 1872 were placed in Title 46, which relates
to shipping, and particularly in Chapter 18 of that title, which
relates to "Merchant Seamen." They had previously been reenacted,
as parts of the Revised Statutes, along with § 65. The Acts of 1915
and 1920 were placed in the same chapter and title, and were thus
brought into contiguity with the sections carried over from the Act
of 1872. Very clearly, the change of location did not work a change
of meaning. The rule of construction laid down in § 713 must be
confined to those sections of the chapter which were contained in
the Act of 1872, or in the equivalent provisions of the Revised
Statutes, before the Code had rearranged them. The compilers of the
Code were not empowered by Congress to amend existing law, and
doubtless had no thought of doing so. As to that, the command of
Congress is too clear to be misread. 44 Stat. Part I, 1. [
Footnote 4] To this it must be added
that § 713, even in its relation to the sections fairly within its
range, is "directed to extension, not to restriction."
Uravic
v. F. Jarka Co., supra at
Page 293 U. S. 162
p.
282 U. S. 239.
It means that, "for the purposes of the chapter
seaman' shall
include persons who otherwise might be deemed not to be seamen." It
puts into the class some that might otherwise be excluded; it does
not take anyone out who would otherwise be there.
The case for the respondent reduces itself to this -- that, by
express or implied antithesis, the word "seaman" is used in many
statutes to designate a class of mariners exclusive of the master.
It is also true, however, that, in these same statutes, a seaman
excludes a stevedore. A goodly number of the statutes where the
antithesis is sharpest lay a duty upon the master to be performed
for the seamen under him. In laws so framed, there is no room for
construction. A goodly number in addition give a remedy to seamen
for wages wrongfully withheld, or define terms of payment that
agreement may not vary. In respect of dealings of that order, the
maritime law, by inveterate tradition, has made the ordinary seaman
a member of a favored class. He is a "ward of the admiralty," often
ignorant and helpless, and so in need of protection against himself
as well as others. The master, on the other hand, is able in most
instances to drive a bargain for himself, and then, when the
bargain is made, to stand upon his rights. Discrimination may thus
be rational in respect of remedies for wages.
The
Bethulia, 200 F. 876;
The Putnick, 291 F. 902. It is
neither rational nor just if extended to remedies for bodily
wounds. At such times, master and seaman are approximately equal.
Congress did not mean that the master, any more than the seaman,
should be left without a remedy if wounded in his body, or that his
dependents were to be helpless if the wounds resulted in his
death.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded to the Supreme
Court of Missouri for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
See Grimberg v. Admiral Oriental S.S. Line, 300 F. 619;
The Sea Lark, 14 F.2d
201;
Kuhlman v. W. & A. Fletcher Co., 20 F.2d 465;
Rogosich v. Union Dry Dock & Repair Co., 67 F.2d 377,
and cf. The Buena Ventura, 243 F. 797, 799:
"The word 'seaman' undoubtedly once meant a person who could
'hand, reef and steer,' a mariner in the true sense of the word.
But as the necessities of ships increased, so the word 'seaman'
enlarged its meaning."
[
Footnote 2]
"In the construction of this chapter, every person having the
command of any vessel belonging to any citizen of the United States
shall be deemed to be the 'master' thereof, and every person
(apprentices excepted) who shall be employed or engaged to serve in
any capacity on board the same shall be deemed and taken to be a
'seaman;' and the term 'vessel' shall be understood to comprehend
every description of vessel navigating on any sea or channel, lake
or river, to which the provisions of this chapter may be
applicable, and the term 'owner' shall be taken and understood to
comprehend all the several persons, if more than one, to whom the
vessel shall belong."
[
Footnote 3]
"That, to avoid doubt in the construction of this act, every
person having the command of any ship belonging to any citizen of
the United States shall, within the meaning and for the purposes of
this act, be deemed and taken to be the 'master' of such ship, and
that every person (apprentices excepted) who shall be employed or
engaged to serve in any capacity on board the same shall be deemed
and taken to be a 'seaman' within the meaning and for the purposes
of this act. . . ."
[
Footnote 4]
"The matter set forth in the Code . . . shall establish
prima facie the laws of the United States, general and
permanent in their nature in force on the 7th day of December,
1925, but nothing in this Act shall be construed as repealing or
amending any such law, or as enacting as new law any matter
contained in the Code. In case of any inconsistency arising through
omission or otherwise between the provisions of any section of this
Code and the corresponding portion of legislation heretofore
enacted, effect shall be given for all purposes whatsoever to such
enactments."