In a suit brought in a state court of Texas against public
contractors and a municipality for damages alleged to have been
caused by a street obstruction, the city, by a cross-action,
vouched in a surety company, which removed the cause to the federal
district court. That court dismissed the cross action and then
remanded the case to the state court.
Held:
Page 293 U. S. 141
1. The order dismissing the cross-action, if not reversed or set
aside, was conclusive against the city and was appealable. P.
293 U. S.
143.
2. While reversal cannot affect the order of remand, it will at
least remit the entire controversy to the state court. P.
293 U. S.
143.
67 F.2d 785 reversed.
Certiorari, 292 U.S. 618, to review a judgment dismissing an
appeal from a judgment of the District Court.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Curtis Boggs, a citizen of Texas, brought suit in a state court
against Combs & Glade, contractors, citizens of Texas, and the
City of Waco, Texas, for damages asserted to have been caused by
collision with a street obstruction. The City by cross-action
vouched in the Fidelity Company, respondent, a citizen of Maryland,
surety on a bond of Combs & Glade, alleging that company was
liable under the bond to pay whatever amount might be adjudged due
by the City by reason of the fault of the contractors. The City
prayed that, if, upon the trial, the plaintiff should recover
against it, judgment over should be rendered against the company
for a like amount. The company removed the cause to the federal
court on the ground that as to it a separable controversy
existed.
The plaintiff, after removal, presented a motion in the District
Court in which he asserted that no separable controversy existed,
since the Fidelity Company was not an original party, but was
brought into the case by cross-complaint; that the company was
improperly joined under state law, and such joinder could not give
the federal
Page 293 U. S. 142
court jurisdiction; that the cross-action and the removal
proceeding were collusively filed to deprive the state court of
jurisdiction; that no separable controversy was presented, as the
cause of action set up by the cross-complaint could not proceed to
trial separately from the main action, but was ancillary thereto,
judgment against Combs & Glade being a prerequisite to any
judgment against the company. The prayer was
"that this entire cause be remanded to the said State Court of
the Texas, and in the alternative that the suit of this plaintiff
against the defendants Combs and Glade and the City of Waco be
remanded to said court, and also in the alternative that the suit
as against the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company by the
City of Waco, as evidenced by the cross complaint of the City of
Waco, be dismissed and the balance of this action be remanded to
the said State Court."
The District Court entered a single decree embodying three
separate orders: first, being of the opinion that the record
presented a separable controversy between the City and the Fidelity
Company, it overruled the motion to remand. Secondly, reciting that
the motion to dismiss the cross-complaint had come on to be heard,
it found that, as to the plaintiff's cause of action, the Fidelity
Company was an unnecessary and improper party, and granted the
motion. Thirdly, since, upon that dismissal, there was no diversity
of citizenship of the remaining parties, the court held it lacked
jurisdiction, and remanded the cause to the state court.
The City appealed not from the order of remand, but from that
dismissing its action against the Fidelity Company, alleging this
was contrary to the law of Texas. The Circuit Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal, holding that, as no appeal lies from an order
of remand, the cause was irrevocably out of the District Court, the
action of that court in dismissing the city's cross-action was
Page 293 U. S. 143
moot, and its propriety could not be reviewed. The petitioner
complains that this action leaves it in an anomalous position, for,
whereas the Circuit Court in its opinion states, "the City by
cross-action, as permitted by the Texas practice," vouched in the
Fidelity Company, the order of dismissal of the cross-action is
outstanding, with the result that in the further proceedings in the
state court, the District Court's order will be treated as
conclusive upon the question of the City's right to maintain its
cross-action. Evidently this result was not intended by the Circuit
Court of Appeals. In its opinion, it says:
"all matters concerning the entire controversy, both those
presented by the cross bill and those presented by the main suit,
are now, because of the remand, pending in the State court and for
its action, unaffected by the attempt of the Federal court to
dismiss the City's cross-action. . . ."
The record contradicts this statement. If the District Court's
order stands, the cross-action will be no part of the case which is
remanded to the state court. Indeed, if the District Court was
right, the cause could not have been remanded except for the
exclusion of the Fidelity Company as a party. True, no appeal lies
from the order of remand; but, in logic and in fact, the decree of
dismissal preceded that of remand and was made by the District
Court while it had control of the cause. Indisputably this order is
the subject of an appeal, and, if not reversed or set aside, is
conclusive upon the petitioner.
We are of opinion that the petitioner was entitled to have the
Circuit Court of Appeals determine whether the dismissal of its
cross-action against the Fidelity Company was proper. If the
District Court erred on this point, which we do not decide, its
action should be reversed. A reversal cannot affect the order of
remand, but it will at least, if the dismissal of the petitioner's
complaint was erroneous, remit the entire controversy, with the
Fidelity
Page 293 U. S. 144
Company still a party, to the state court for such further
proceedings as may be in accordance with law.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the cause
remanded to that court with instructions to reinstate the appeal
and to proceed therein in conformity with law.
Reversed.