1. A reentry permit does not entitle an alien to remain in the
country if of a prohibited class. P.
291 U. S.
561.
2. An alien of a prohibited class is liable to deportation
within five years of entry or reentry. Act of February 5, 1917, §
19; 8 U.S.C. § 155. P.
291 U. S.
561.
3. In § 3, Act of February 5, 1917, prohibiting entry to any
person coming into the country "for the purpose of prostitution or
for any other immoral purpose," the words "any other immoral
purpose"
Page 291 U. S. 560
are limited by the principle of
ejusdem generis to
objectives of the same character as prostitution. P.
291 U. S.
562.
4. An alien woman who, on her return to this country from a trip
abroad, is attended by a man with whom she has had, and still
intends to continue, illicit sex relations, but whose paramount
object in entering is to resume her former residence here and
pursue a legitimate occupation, is not a person coming into the
United States for an immoral purpose within the meaning of § 3 of
the Act. P.
291 U. S.
562.
65 F.2d 94 reversed.
Certiorari, 290 U.S. 615, to review the affirmance of an order
denying a writ of habeas corpus in the case of a woman held for
deportation under the Immigration Act.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
By § 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917, [
Footnote 1] Congress ordained that
"The following classes of aliens shall be excluded from
admission into the United States: . . . Prostitutes, or persons
coming into the United States for the purpose of prostitution or
for any other immoral purpose."
In reliance upon this mandate the petitioner was ordered
deported, and the question is whether she is within the proscribed
class.
She is a citizen of Denmark, and first came here in 1922, making
her home in Los Angeles, California, where she was employed as a
domestic servant. In 1924, she became acquainted with a married
man, and in 1925, commenced
Page 291 U. S. 561
having illicit relations with him; she did not live with him and
was not supported by him, but resided where she was employed and
supported herself from her own earnings, although he gave her money
and clothing from time to time. In 1926, she made a trip to Denmark
to visit her parents, and returned to Los Angeles in 1928, where
she again took service as a domestic. In May, 1931, she made a
second visit to Denmark to see her relatives. On this occasion, she
was accompanied by the man with whom she had been intimate, who
paid part of her expenses. He went to Europe to attend a convention
in Vienna. For a portion of the time, they traveled together in
Europe, having illicit relations. They returned together through
Canada, coming from Vancouver to Seattle, where they entered the
United States, she being admitted by the authorities as a returning
resident. They went to a hotel in Seattle where they registered as
man and wife. Upon her arrest by immigration officers, she admitted
her purpose to continue the relationship of husband and wife with
the man until they should arrive in Los Angeles, but denied that it
was her intention to continue it after arrival in that city.
Upon these facts, developed at the hearing before a board of
inspectors, the Secretary of Labor ordered the petitioner deported.
She petitioned the District Court for a writ of habeas corpus, an
order to show cause was issued, and, after hearing, the writ was
denied. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. [
Footnote 2] The case is here on
certiorari.
The petitioner's previous residence here and her possession of a
reentry permit do not entitle her to remain in this country.
Lapina v. Williams, 232 U. S. 78;
Lewis v. Frick, 233 U. S. 291. She
was liable to deportation at
Page 291 U. S. 562
any time within five years of her entry at the port of Seattle
if she was a member of one of the prohibited classes of aliens.
[
Footnote 3]
Was she a prostitute, or person coming into the country "for the
purpose of prostitution or for any other immoral purpose" within
the intent of § 3 of the Act of 1917? The respondent does not
contend that she is a prostitute or that her purpose in entering
the United States was to practice prostitution, but he affirms that
she did come for an immoral purpose as defined by the statute. We
cannot adopt this conclusion.
The principle of
ejusdem generis limits the connotation
of the words "any other immoral purpose" to such as are of like
character with prostitution,
United States v. Bitty,
208 U. S. 393,
208 U. S. 401,
and extramarital relations, short of concubinage, fall short of
that description.
Moreover, it cannot be said that the petitioner's entry was for
the purpose of having such relations. The respondent argues that,
as she had indulged in misconduct before leaving, had continued
that misconduct while on her trip abroad, and intended to continue
it at least until she should arrive in Los Angeles, the Secretary
of Labor was justified in disbelieving her statement that the
relations would cease when she took up her residence in that city.
This may be conceded, but it does not follow that her purpose in
returning to the United States was to continue her irregular and
improper conduct. The fact is that she was returning to her former
residence, and nothing is disclosed to indicate that she did not
intend, as she claimed, to resume her employment as a domestic. Her
entry cannot be said to be with the purpose "only that she might
live in a state of concubinage."
United States v. Bitty,
supra, 208 U. S. 403.
People not of good moral character,
Page 291 U. S. 563
like others, travel from place to place and change their
residence. But to say that, because they indulge in illegal or
immoral acts, they travel for that purpose is to emphasize that
which is incidental and ignore what is of primary significance.
Compare Ex parte Rocha, 30 F.2d
823.
The Mann Act [
Footnote 4]
creates the offense of transporting in interstate commerce a woman
or girl "for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any
other immoral purpose. . . ." Section 6. This Court has said that
act
"seeks to reach and punish the movement in interstate commerce
of women and girls with a view to the accomplishment of the
unlawful purposes prohibited."
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.
S. 470,
242 U. S. 491.
Accordingly, it has been held that the transportation denounced
must have for its object or be a means of effecting of facilitating
the sexual intercourse of the participants. If the purpose of the
journey is not sexual intercourse, though that be contemplated, the
statute is not violated.
Welsch v. United States, 220 F.
764;
Fisher v. United States, 226 F. 667;
Sloan v.
United States, 287 F. 91;
Alpert v. United States, 12
F.2d 352;
Hunter v. United States, 45 F.2d 55. So here, by
the language of the act, the purpose of the entry is made
controlling. And we think it plain that in no proper sense may the
entry of the petitioner be said to have been for the purpose of
immoral sexual relations.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Act of February 5, 1917, c. 29, 39 Stat. 874, U.S.C. Title 8, §
136.
[
Footnote 2]
65 F.2d 94.
[
Footnote 3]
Act of February 5, 1917, c. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 889, U.S.C. Title
8, § 155.
[
Footnote 4]
Act of June 25, 1910, c. 395, 36 Stat. 825, U.S.C. Title 18, §§
397-400.
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER (dissenting).
The statute forbids admission of "persons coming into the United
States for the purpose of prostitution or for any other immoral
purpose." The doctrine of this decision is that "extramarital
relations" of an unmarried
Page 291 U. S. 564
woman that fall short of concubinage are not within the
condemnation of the statute. But there is no ground for the
assumption that petitioner is not the concubine of a married man.
Since 1924, she has continued illicit relations with him. They
cohabited as, and held themselves out to be, husband and wife
abroad and in this country while not in the vicinity of his home.
Admittedly, these relations were to continue until again they
reached that neighborhood. There is abundant warrant for the
Secretary's conclusion that petitioner returned to this country as,
and intending to continue to be, that man's concubine. The findings
quote Webster's definition -- "a woman who cohabits with a man
without being his wife." The Secretary found her to be such a
person. He relied upon, and I think rightly applied the opinion in,
United States v. Bitty, 208 U. S. 393.
Bitty was indicted under a provision of the Act of February 20,
1907, 34 Stat. 898, 899, § 3, forbidding "the importation into the
United States of any alien woman . . . for the purpose of
prostitution, or for any other immoral purpose." The indictment
alleged importation of a woman for an "immoral purpose" -- namely,
"that she should live with him as his [Bitty's] concubine." The
circuit court dismissed the indictment on the ground that the facts
alleged did not constitute a violation of the statute. This Court
reversed. The phrase there construed is in the same words as that
now under consideration. They undoubtedly have the same meaning. In
that case, defendant's counsel maintained that Congress did not, by
that act, intend to legislate against "those isolated cases where
certain individuals come into this country with their mistresses."
But, repelling that construction, this Court said (p.
208 U. S. 401)
that:
"In forbidding the importation of alien women 'for any other
immoral purpose,' Congress evidently thought that there were
purposes in connection with the importations of alien women which,
as in the
Page 291 U. S. 565
case of importations for prostitution, were to be deemed
immoral."
After reference to the rule of
ejusdem generis relied
on by the defendant, the Court said (p.
208 U. S.
402):
"But that rule cannot avail the accused in this case, for the
immoral purpose charged in the indictment is of the same general
class or kind as the one that controls in the importation of an
alien woman for the purpose strictly of prostitution. The
prostitute may, in the popular sense, be more degraded in character
than the concubine, but the latter nonetheless must be held to lead
an immoral life, if any regard whatever be had to the views that
are almost universally held in this country as to the relations
which may rightfully, from the standpoint of morality, exist
between man and woman in the matter of sexual intercourse. . . .
[P.
208 U. S. 403.] The statute
in question, it must be remembered, was intended to keep out of
this country immigrants whose permanent residence here would not be
desirable or for the common good, and we cannot suppose either that
Congress intended to exempt from the operation of the statute the
importation of an alien woman brought here only that she might live
in a state of concubinage with the man importing her, or that it
did not regard such an importation as being for an immoral
purpose."
Moreover, the statute is not limited to prostitution and
concubinage. While the Secretary regarded her as a concubine, his
decision may not fairly be held to depend upon that
characterization. Plainly it rests upon the ground there stated,
"that she entered for an immoral purpose" condemned by the statute.
The law does not require him more definitely to classify.
Refinements of nomenclature adopted for the sake of decency in
speech may not be used to conjure up doubts and distinctions that
obscure the real substance of the statute. The meaning of the
findings is that petitioner's doings and course of living
constitute a kind of immorality that bars admission. The
Page 291 U. S. 566
Secretary rightly may have deemed that her admitted intention
temporarily to continue, when coupled with environment,
opportunity, and temptation under which habitual transgression had
developed and for years persisted, amounted to a fixed purpose
indefinitely to remain in concubinage. That is enough.
And there is nothing in the opinion in
United States v.
Bitty, supra, or elsewhere to support the idea that Congress
intended to keep out only those coming exclusively for the purposes
referred to and to admit prostitutes, concubines, and the like
intending to follow legitimate occupation while practicing,
incidentally or otherwise, any of the immoralities covered by the
statute. Indeed, the court's opinion implies that, if concubinage
were her principal or primary purpose, she ought to be excluded
even though she intended regularly to pursue her work as a
domestic. The making of exclusion to depend upon the determination
whether the immoral purpose is dominant or subordinate goes far to
strike down the statute by making its enforcement difficult, and in
many cases practically impossible. Congress undoubtedly intended to
exclude those who entertain a purpose here to practice prostitution
or immorality of that sort. That is the construction adopted by the
Secretary, the District Court, and the Circuit Court of Appeals.
They are right. Petitioner's application for a writ of habeas
corpus was properly denied.