1. A bill by a state seeking to enjoin five other states from
enforcing their statutes against open market sale of products of
prison labor, upon the ground that such statutes, and an Act of
Congress purporting to divest such products of their interstate
character, operate unconstitutionally to deprive the complainant of
its interstate markets for goods produced in its prison farms and
factories,
held multifarious.
Bitterman v. Louisville
& N. R. Co., 207 U. S. 205. P.
291 U. S.
290.
2. This Court may not be called on to give advisory opinions or
to pronounce declaratory judgments. P.
291 U. S.
291.
3. Application by a state for leave to file a bill to enjoin
other states from enforcing their laws will not be granted unless
the facts alleged
Page 291 U. S. 287
are clearly sufficient to call for decree in it favor and the
threatened injury is clearly shown to be serious and imminent. P.
291 U. S.
291.
4. In the absence of specific showing to the contrary, it will
be presumed that no state will attempt to enforce an
unconstitutional enactment to the detriment of another. P. 292.
5. In a suit by a state to prevent other states from enforcing
their statutes, the burden upon the plaintiff to establish fully
and clearly all essential elements of is case is greater than that
generally required to be borne by one seeking an injunction in a
suit between private parties. P.
291 U. S.
292.
Leave to file denied.
Application by the State of Alabama for leave to file a bill for
an injunction against five other states.
Page 291 U. S. 288
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
For the purpose of invoking original jurisdiction as "to
Controversies between two or more States" (Const., Art. III, ยง 2),
Alabama lodged with the clerk and applied for leave to file a
complaint against 19 states praying that the court adjudge invalid,
because in violation of the commerce clause of the Federal
Constitution, statutes by them respectively enacted to regulate or
prohibit sales of articles produced by convict labor and an Act of
Congress approved January 19, 1929, 45 Stat. 1084, effective
January 19, 1934, to divest in certain cases such products of their
interstate character. Responding to our orders to show cause why
leave should not be granted, 17 of the states submitted returns
suggesting that the complaint is multifarious and fails to allege
facts sufficient to entitle Alabama to any relief. At the hearing
upon the questions so raised, counsel for Alabama obtained leave
to, and on a later day did, submit an amendment eliminating 14
states, including those that merely regulate and some that
prohibit, sales of convict-made goods, leaving only Arizona, Idaho,
Montana, New York, and Pennsylvania.
Each of the assailed state statutes, while not in all respects
the same as the others, forbids the sale upon the open market of
any goods produced wholly or in part by convicts of other states,
and prescribes penalties for violation. The Act of Congress
declares that, with exceptions which need not be specified here,
goods produced by convict labor and transported into any state
shall be subject to the laws of that state to the same extent and
in the same manner as if there produced.
Page 291 U. S. 289
The substance of the complaint follows. Alabama's prison
population averages about 5,500, and, in connection with its
prisons, it has agricultural lands, cotton mills, and a shirt
factory. About 1,050 inmates do farm work for the production of
cotton and potatoes, and about 1,250 operate spindles and make
shirts. In 1927, the state entered into a contract with a
manufacturing company pursuant to which it sold the latter cotton
goods made in its mills and, for hire at the rate of 75 cents per
dozen shirts made, furnished convict labor to be employed in the
prison factory. The contract expired March 31, 1933, and, the
company having declined to renew or extend it, the parties agreed
that, during the ensuing quarter, the state would sell the company
prison-made goods for 5 cents a yard and furnish the convict labor
for 54 cents per dozen shirts.
While the contract was in force, the company sold some of the
convict-made products in each of the 19 states originally named as
defendants. In round figures, sales amounted annually to $347,000,
of which it received for the goods sold in Arizona $1,000, Idaho
$10,000, Montana $10,000, New York $30,000, Pennsylvania $25,000.
For the material and labor furnished by it, Alabama received the
equivalent of 30 percent of the amounts for which the company sold
the goods. Because of the Act of Congress and state statutes in
question, Alabama is unable to make any "firm agreement" for the
sale of its prison-made cotton goods or for the employment of its
convicts. In the second quarter of 1933, it received for labor
$11,500 less than was paid it in the preceding quarter. The lower
rate of compensation will continue during the rest of 1933. And
enforcement of the statutes in question will prevent Alabama from
selling in defendant states potatoes produced by the labor of its
convicts.
Alabama's investment in the cotton mills and shirt factory
exceeds $300,000, and will be valueless as a result of
Page 291 U. S. 290
its inability to find an employer for its convict labor and a
market for its prison-made goods. The cost of maintaining
unemployed convicts will be about $550,000 annually. Without
employment, convicts cannot be treated appropriately for their
rehabilitation and the promotion of the good order and welfare of
the state. The very existence of the assailed enactments is
sufficient to bring about the unemployment which will continue
unless their enforcement is enjoined.
If Alabama is compelled to provide other employment, it will
have to expend about $1,000,000 for the construction of plants for
the manufacture of things to be used by the inmates of its
eleemosynary institutions and in and about other state activities.
As presently employed, its prisoners are divided into night and day
shifts so as to avoid overcrowding of the prisons. And, if the
state does not provide other industrial activities, it will have to
expend about $100,000 for additional space to house its
convicts.
1. There is no test or rule of general application by which to
determine whether a complaint in equity is multifarious. That
question is to be decided by the court in the exercise of sound
discretion having regard to the facts alleged, circumstances
disclosed, and the character of the relief sought.
Oliver v.
Piatt, 3 How. 333,
44 U. S. 411;
Nelson v.
Hill, 5 How. 127,
46 U. S. 132;
Shields v.
Thomas, 18 How. 253,
59 U. S. 259;
Fitch v.
Creighton, 24 How. 159,
65 U. S.
163-164;
Brown v. Guarantee Trust & Safe-Deposit
Co., 128 U. S. 403,
128 U. S. 410.
Unless necessary for the prompt, convenient, and effective
administration of justice, a suit by one state against several
states to set aside a statute of each is properly to be regarded as
multifarious. There has been suggested no reason to sustain
Alabama's complaint, as it stood before amendment, against the
objection of misjoinder of parties defendant and of causes of
action.
Cf. Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S.
56,
188 U. S.
74.
Page 291 U. S. 291
The amendment of the bill serves merely to obviate objections
that are based on dissimilarity of the state enactments. It is not
shown that the joinder of five states is necessary to avoid a
multiplicity of suits, or that it will substantially serve the
convenience of Alabama or of the court. Alabama does not claim
concert of action on the part of the defendants, or that they are
jointly liable in respect of any matter referred to in the bill.
The enforcement of the statutes attacked would prohibit the sale of
Alabama's prison products in the five states named. If one is
repugnant to the commerce clause, all transgress. Alabama cites
Bitterman v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,
207 U. S. 205,.
Considerations of convenience that in suits between private parties
reasonably may justify exercise of discretion in support of such
joinders have no bearing in a case such as this. If, in a suit
brought by Alabama against one of these states, this Court should
hold the assailed statute invalid and enjoin its enforcement, the
decision would be authoritative and controlling as a precedent in
all courts, state and federal. Presumably no other state would
attempt on similar facts to enforce a like measure, and Alabama
would have no occasion to invoke our jurisdiction further. The
amended bill is multifarious.
2. This Court may not be called on to give advisory opinions or
to pronounce declaratory judgments.
Muskrat v. United
states, 219 U. S. 346;
Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Assn., 277 U.
S. 274,
277 U. S. 288,
and cases cited.
Nashville, C. & St.L. Ry. v. Wallace,
288 U. S. 249,
288 U. S.
261-262. Its jurisdiction in respect of controversies
between states will not be exerted in the absence of absolute
necessity.
Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S.
1,
176 U. S. 15. A
state asking leave to sue another to prevent the enforcement of
laws must allege, in the complaint offered for filing, facts that
are clearly sufficient to call for a decree in its favor.
Page 291 U. S. 292
Our decisions definitely establish that not every matter of
sufficient moment to warrant resort to equity by one person against
another would justify an interference by this Court with the action
of a state.
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.
S. 496,
200 U. S.
520-521;
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.
S. 296,
256 U. S. 309;
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.
S. 365,
263 U. S. 374.
Leave will not be granted unless the threatened injury is clearly
shown to be of serious magnitude and imminent.
Missouri v.
Illinois, supra, 200 U. S. 521.
In the absence of specific showing to the contrary, it will be
presumed that no state will attempt to enforce an unconstitutional
enactment to the detriment of another.
Cf. Ex parte La
Prade, 289 U. S. 444,
289 U. S. 458.
The burden upon the plaintiff state fully and clearly to establish
all essential elements of its case is greater than that generally
required to be borne by one seeking an injunction in a suit between
private parties.
Connecticut v. Massachusetts,
282 U. S. 660,
282 U. S.
669.
Plainly the amended bill does not meet the requirements that
reasonably should be imposed upon the applicant. It fails to show
that Alabama has any agreement with any defendant, or that there is
any direct issue between them, or that the validity of the statutes
in question and Alabama's assertion of right may not, or indeed
will not, speedily and conveniently be tested by the contracting
company, that apparently is directly concerned, or by a seller of
such goods.
Cf. Louisiana v. Texas, supra, 176 U. S. 18,
176 U. S. 22.
There is no allegation that an adequate market for the goods in
question may not be found outside the five states named. The facts
alleged are not sufficient to warrant a finding that the
enforcement of the statutes of any defendant would cause Alabama to
suffer great loss or any serious injury. If filed, the bill would
have to be dismissed for want of equity.
Florida v.
Mellon, 273 U. S. 12.
Leave denied.
MR. JUSTICE STONE concurs in the result.