1. The jurisdiction of the District Court is to be determined by
the allegations of the complaint. P.
291 U. S.
210.
2. The Federal Employers' Liability Act, in providing that the
employee shall not be held guilty of contributory negligence, nor
to have assumed the risk, in any case under it where violation by
the carrier of "any statute enacted for the safety of employees"
contributed to the injury or death, embraces the Federal Safety
Appliance Acts. P.
291 U. S.
210.
3. The Federal Employers' Liability Act and Safety Appliance
Acts are
in pari materia, and an action under the former
in connection with the latter may be brought in the federal court
of a district in which the carrier is doing business. P.
291 U. S.
211.
4. A state statute prescribing the liability of common carriers
for negligence causing injuries to employees while engaged in
intrastate commerce provided that no employee should be held guilty
of contributory negligence, or to have assumed the risk, in any
case where violation by the carrier "of any statute, state or
federal, enacted for the safety of employees" contributed to the
injury.
Held:
(1) That the provisions of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts for
the safety of employees are in effect read into the state law. P.
291 U. S.
212.
Page 291 U. S. 206
(2) An action under the state statute against an interstate
railroad for personal injuries suffered by an employee while
engaged in intrastate commerce and caused by a violation of the
Federal Safety Appliance Acts is not an action arising under the
laws of the United States, and, diversity of citizenship being
present, may be brought in the federal court in the district of the
plaintiff's residence. Jud.Code, § 51; 28 U.S.C. § 112. P.
291 U. S.
211.
5. The Federal Safety Appliance Acts embrace all locomotives,
cars, and similar vehicles used on any railroad which is a highway
of interstate commerce, and the duty to protect employees by the
appliances prescribed exists even where the vehicle and employee
are engaged, at the time of his injury, in intrastate commerce. P.
291 U. S.
213.
6. Questions relating to the scope or construction of the
Federal Safety Appliance Acts arising in actions in state courts
for injuries sustained by employees in intrastate commerce are
federal questions reviewable by this Court. P.
291 U. S.
214.
7. Where the Circuit Court of Appeals has erroneously reversed
judgment upon the ground that jurisdiction was wanting, the case
will be remanded to it for consideration of the other questions
presented. P.
291 U. S. 217.
64 F.2d 472 reversed.
Certiorari, 290 U.S. 613, to review the reversal of a judgment
for damages in an action for personal injuries.
Page 291 U. S. 207
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner brought this action in the District Court of the
United States for the Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne
Division, to recover for injuries which he sustained on November
29, 1930, in the course of his employment by respondent, an
interstate carrier, in its yard
Page 291 U. S. 208
at Russell, Kentucky. In his complaint, he set forth two
"paragraphs" or counts, both being for the same injuries. In the
first paragraph, petitioner alleged that, at the time of the
injuries, he was employed in interstate commerce, and that he
brought the action under the acts of Congress known as the Federal
Employers' Liability Act [
Footnote
1] and the Safety Appliance Acts, [
Footnote 2] and the rules and orders which the Interstate
Commerce Commission had promulgated under the latter. [
Footnote 3] In the second paragraph, he
alleged that, at the time of the injuries, he was employed in
intrastate commerce, and he invoked the Safety Appliance Acts
enacted by the Congress, and the rules and orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission thereunder, and the Employers' Liability Act of
Kentucky. The provisions of the laws of Kentucky which were alleged
to govern the rights of the parties at the time and place in
question were set forth. [
Footnote
4] In each count, petitioner stated that the injuries were
received while he was engaged as a switchman in attempting to
uncouple certain freight cars, and were due to a defective
uncoupling lever.
Objections to the jurisdiction of the District Court as to each
count were raised by plea in abatement. They were overruled, and
petitioner had a general verdict. The judgment, entered
accordingly, was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals upon the
ground that the District Court was without jurisdiction to
entertain the case upon
Page 291 U. S. 209
either count, 64 F.2d 472. This Court granted certiorari.
Distinct questions are presented with respect to each count, and
they will be considered separately.
First. By the first paragraph, the jurisdiction of the
federal court was rested upon the sole ground that the injury had
been sustained during petitioner's employment in interstate
commerce, and that the cause of action arose under the pertinent
federal legislation. To support the jurisdiction of the District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana, the complaint alleged
that respondent was engaged in business in that district at the
time of the commencement of the action. Respondent's challenge to
the jurisdiction was upon the grounds (1) that, at the time of the
injuries, petitioner was not employed in interstate commerce, and
hence the action would not lie under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, and (2) that respondent was a corporation organized
under the laws of Virginia and an inhabitant of the Eastern
District of Virginia, and hence, so far as the action rested upon
the Safety Appliance Acts of Congress and the rules and orders of
the Interstate Commerce Commission, it could not be brought in a
federal court in any district other than the Eastern District of
Virginia. Jud.Code § 51, 28 U.S.C. § 112.
Petitioner's demurrer to the plea in abatement as to the first
cause of action was sustained by the trial court. That court
pointed out that the plea did not deny that respondent was doing
business within the Northern District of Indiana, and that the
pleading, in substance, went to the merits. The Circuit Court of
Appeals took a different view, holding that, so far as petitioner
relied upon a violation of the Safety Appliance Acts, the action
must be brought in the district of respondent's residence. In
reversing the judgment, the Circuit Court of Appeals remanded
Page 291 U. S. 210
the cause with instructions to grant permission to petitioner to
amend his first paragraph to conform exclusively to the theory of a
violation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
This ruling of the appellate court cannot be sustained. The
jurisdiction of the District Court is to be determined by the
allegations of the complaint.
Mosher v. Phoenix,
287 U. S. 29,
287 U. S. 30;
Levering & Garrigues v. Morrin, 289 U.
S. 103,
289 U. S. 105.
These allegations clearly set forth, in the first paragraph, a
cause of action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Every
essential ingredient of such a cause of action was appropriately
alleged. The Federal Employers' Liability Act expressly recognized
that, in an action brought under its provisions, the question of a
violation of the Safety Appliance Acts might be presented and
determined. This is the unmistakable effect of the provisions that,
in such an action, the employee shall not be held "to have been
guilty of contributory negligence," or "to have assumed the risks
of his employment" in any case "where the violation by such common
carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees
contributed to the injury or death of such employee." Act of April
22, 1908, §§ 3, 4, 45 U.S.C. §§ 53, 54. By the phrase "any statute
enacted for the safety of employees," the Congress evidently
intended to embrace its Safety Appliance Acts.
Seaboard Air
Line Ry. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492,
233 U. S. 503.
This Court has said that the statutes are
in pari materia,
and that,
"where the Employers' Liability Act refers to 'any defect or
insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines,
appliances,' etc., it clearly is the legislative intent to treat a
violation of the Safety Appliance Act as 'negligence,' what is
sometimes called negligence
per se."
San Antonio & Aransas Pass Ry. Co. v. Wagner,
241 U. S. 476,
241 U. S. 484.
Where an employee of an interstate carrier sustains injuries while
employed in the interstate commerce of the carrier, his action
Page 291 U. S. 211
may thus be brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
in connection with the Safety Appliance Acts. [
Footnote 5]
Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, an action may be
brought
"in a District Court of the United States, in the district of
the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action
arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the
time of commencing such action."
45 U.S.C. § 56. It follows that, upon the allegations of the
complaint, the action on the claim set forth in the first paragraph
was properly brought in the District Court for the Northern
District of Indiana, where respondent was doing business when the
action was begun.
Second. In the second paragraph of the complaint, which
treated the injuries as received in intrastate commerce, diversity
of citizenship was alleged, that petitioner was a citizen of
Indiana, and a resident of the City of Fort Wayne in that state,
and that respondent was a citizen of Virginia doing business in
Indiana. The plea in abatement, admitting respondent's citizenship
in Virginia, denied that petitioner was a resident of Fort Wayne or
of the Northern District of Indiana, or was a citizen of that
state, and alleged that, as the cause of action set forth in the
second paragraph arose under the Federal Safety Appliance Acts, the
action could not be brought
Page 291 U. S. 212
in any district other than the Eastern District of Virginia. The
District Court took evidence on the issue of fact, found that the
petitioner was a citizen of Indiana and a resident of Fort Wayne,
and overruled the plea. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
District Court of the Northern District of Indiana was without
jurisdiction, in the view that the second count attempted to set
forth a cause of action "under the Federal Safety Appliance Act as
well as under the statutes of Kentucky," and hence that
jurisdiction did not rest solely on diversity of citizenship.
Jud.Code § 51, 28 U.S.C. § 112. In remanding the cause, the Circuit
Court of Appeals directed that petitioner be allowed to amend the
second paragraph of his complaint so as to conform exclusively to
the theory of a violation of the Kentucky statute.
While invoking, in the second count, the Safety Appliance Acts,
petitioner fully set forth and relied upon the laws of the State of
Kentucky, where the cause of action arose. In relation to injuries
received in that state in intrastate commerce, aside from the
particular bearing of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts, the
liability of respondent was determined by the laws of Kentucky.
Slater v. Mexican National R. Co., 194 U.
S. 120,
194 U. S. 126;
Cuba R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U. S. 473,
222 U. S. 478;
Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253,
289 U. S. 258;
Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U. S. 387. The
statute of Kentucky, in prescribing the liability of common
carriers for negligence causing injuries to employees while engaged
in intrastate commerce, reproduced in substance, and with almost
literal exactness, the corresponding provisions of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act as to injuries received in interstate
commerce. Ky.Acts 1918, c. 52, §§ 1-3, p. 153, Carroll's Ky.
Statutes 1930, §§ 820b-1, 820b-2, 820b-3. The Kentucky Act provided
that no employee should be held "to have been guilty of
contributory negligence" or "to have assumed the risk of his
employment" in any case
"where the violation by
Page 291 U. S. 213
such common carrier of any statute, state or federal, enacted
for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of
such employee."
Id. The Kentucky Legislature read into its statute the
provisions of statutes both state and federal which were enacted
for the safety of employees, and the Federal Safety Appliance Acts
were manifestly embraced in this description.
Louisville &
Nashville R. Co. v. Layton, 243 U. S. 617,
243 U. S. 619.
Thus, the second count of the complaint, in invoking the Federal
Safety Appliance Acts, while declaring on the Kentucky Employers'
Liability Act, cannot be regarded as setting up a claim which lay
outside the purview of the state statute. As in the analogous case
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, a violation of the acts
for the safety of employees was to constitute negligence
per
se in applying the state statute, and was to furnish the
ground for precluding the defense of contributory negligence as
well as that of assumption of risk.
The Circuit Court of Appeals took the view that, if it were
assumed that the second count was based exclusively upon the
Kentucky statute, that statute and the federal requirements could
not be considered as being
in pari materia, because the
latter applied only to interstate commerce, and that, if the
petitioner was permitted to establish the negligence required by
the state statute by showing the violation of the federal
requirements, the court would thereby be placed "in the anomalous
position of extending the benefits of the Safety Appliance Act to
intrastate commerce."
This is an erroneous view. The original Safety Appliance Act of
March 2, 1893, 27 Stat. 531, did not embrace all cars on the lines
of interstate carriers, but only those engaged in interstate
commerce.
Brinkmeier v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co.,
224 U. S. 268. By
the amending Act of March 2, 1903, 32 Stat. 943, the scope of the
statute was enlarged so as to include all cars "used on any
railroad
Page 291 U. S. 214
engaged in interstate commerce." The statute as amended was
intended to embrace all locomotives, cars, and similar vehicles
used on any railroad which is a highway of interstate commerce.
Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S.
20. With respect to such vehicles, the duty to protect
employees by the prescribed safety appliances exists even though
the vehicles and the employee injured through the failure to
provide such protection are at the time engaged in intrastate
commerce.
Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby,
241 U. S. 33;
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Layton, supra. The
federal Act, in its application to such a case, is thus
in pari
materia with the statute of Kentucky which prescribes the
liability of carriers for injuries to employees while employed in
intrastate commerce, and which, in effect, reads into the
provisions of the statute the requirements of the federal Act for
the safety of employees. There appears to be no anomaly in
enforcing the state law with this defined content.
The Federal Safety Appliance Acts prescribed duties, and injured
employees are entitled to recover for injuries sustained through
the breach of these duties.
Johnson v. Southern Pacific
Co., 196 U. S. 1;
St.
Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.
S. 281;
Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby,
supra. Questions arising in actions in state courts to recover
for injuries sustained by employees in intrastate commerce and
relating to the scope or construction of the Federal Safety
Appliance Acts are, of course, federal questions which may
appropriately be reviewed in this Court.
St. Louis, I.M. &
S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, supra; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v.
Layton, supra. But it does not follow that a suit brought
under the state statute which defines liability to employees who
are injured while engaged in intrastate commerce, and brings within
the purview of the statute a breach of the duty imposed by the
federal statute, should be regarded as a suit arising under the
laws of the United States and cognizable in the
Page 291 U. S. 215
federal court in the absence of diversity of citizenship. The
Federal Safety Appliance Acts, while prescribing absolute duties,
and thus creating correlative rights in favor of injured employees,
did not attempt to lay down rules governing actions for enforcing
these rights. The original Act of 1893 made no provision for suits,
except for penalties. That Act did impliedly recognize the
employee's right of action by providing in § 8 that he should not
be deemed to have assumed the risk of injury occasioned by the
breach of duty. But the Act made no provision as to the place of
suit or the time within which it should be brought, or as to the
right to recover, or as to those who should be the beneficiaries of
recovery, in case of the death of the employee. While dealing with
assumption of risk, the statute did not affect the defense of
contributory negligence, and hence that defense was still available
according to the applicable state law.
Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R.
& P. Ry. Co., 220 U. S. 590;
Minneapolis, St..P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co. v. Popplar,
237 U. S. 369,
237 U. S.
371-372. In these respects, the amended Act of 1903 made
no change, notwithstanding the enlargement of the scope of the
statutory requirements. The Act of 1910, by a proviso in § 4
relating to penalties, provided that nothing in that section should
"be construed to relieve such carrier from liability in any
remedial action for the death or injury of any railroad employee"
caused by the use of the prohibited equipment.
The Safety Appliance Acts having prescribed the duty in this
fashion, the right to recover damages sustained by the injured
employee through the breach of duty sprang from the principle of
the common law (
Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby,
supra at pp.
241 U. S. 39-40
[
Footnote 6]), and was left to
be enforced accordingly, or, in case of the death of
Page 291 U. S. 216
the injured employee, according to the applicable statute
[
Footnote 7] (
St. Louis,
I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, supra, at
210 U. S. 285;
Minneapolis, St.P. & S.S.M Ry. Co. v. Popplar, supra).
When the Federal Employers' Liability Act was enacted, it drew to
itself the right of action for injuries or death of the employees
within its purview who were engaged in interstate commerce,
including those cases in which injuries were due to a violation of
the Safety Appliance Acts. Such an action must be brought as
prescribed in the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and, if brought
in the state court, it cannot be removed to the federal court,
although violation of the Safety Appliance Acts is involved.
See St. Joseph & G.I. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 243 U.
S. 311. With respect to injuries sustained in intrastate
commerce, nothing in the Safety Appliance Acts precluded the state
from incorporating in its legislation applicable to local
transportation the paramount duty which the Safety Appliance Acts
imposed as to the equipment of cars used on interstate railroads.
As this Court said in
Minneapolis, St.P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co.
v. Popplar, supra, as to an action for injuries sustained in
intrastate commerce:
"The action fell within the familiar category of cases involving
the duty of a master to his servant. This duty is defined by the
common law, except as it may be modified by legislation. The
federal statute, in the present case, touched the duty of the
master at a single point, and, save as provided in the statute, the
right of the
Page 291 U. S. 217
plaintiff to recover was left to be determined by the law of the
state."
We are of the opinion that the second paragraph of the complaint
set forth a cause of action under the Kentucky statute, and, as to
this cause of action, the suit is not to be regarded as one arising
under the laws of the United States. In view of the diversity of
citizenship and the residence of petitioner, the District Court of
the Northern District of Indiana had jurisdiction.
As the Circuit Court of Appeals did not consider any questions
save those relating to the jurisdiction of the District Court, the
judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals will be reversed, and the
cause remanded to that court with directions to consider such other
questions as may be presented by the appeal.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65, 45 U.S.C. § 51
et seq.; Act of April 5, 1910, c. 143, 36 Stat. 291, 45
U.S.C. § 56.
[
Footnote 2]
Acts of March 2, 1893, c.196, 27 Stat. 531, 45 U.S.C. § 1
et
seq.; April 1, 1896, c. 87, 29 Stat. 85, 45 U.S.C. § 6; March
2, 1903, c. 976, 32 Stat. 943, 45 U.S.C. §§ 8, 9, 10; April 14,
1910, c. 160, 36 Stat. 298, 45 U.S.C. § 11
et seq..
[
Footnote 3]
Order of March 13, 1911; Roberts' Federal Liabilities of
Carriers, vol. 2, pp. 2010, 2016.
[
Footnote 4]
Ky.Acts, 1918, c. 52, §§ 1-3, p. 153; Carroll's Ky. Statutes, §§
820b-1, 820b-2, 820b-3.
[
Footnote 5]
See Southern Ry. Co. v. Crockett, 234 U.
S. 725,
234 U. S. 727;
St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. Conarty,
238 U. S. 243,
238 U. S. 248;
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Otos, 239 U.
S. 349,
239 U. S. 350;
San Antonio & Aransas Pass Ry. Co. v. Wagner,
241 U. S. 476,
241 U. S. 484;
Spokane & I.E. R. Co. v. Campbell, 241 U.
S. 497,
241 U. S. 498;
Atlantic City R. Co. v. Parker, 242 U. S.
56,
242 U. S. 58;
St. Joseph & G.I. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 243 U.
S. 311,
243 U. S. 312;
Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Gotschall,
244 U. S. 66;
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Donaldson, 246 U.
S. 121,
246 U. S. 124;
Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U. S. 239,
263 U. S. 240;
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Groeger, 266 U.
S. 521,
266 U. S. 528;
Chicago, Great Western R. Co. v. Schendel, 267 U.
S. 287,
267 U. S. 289;
Minneapolis, St.P, & S.S.M. Ry. Co. v. Goneau,
269 U. S. 406,
269 U. S.
407.
[
Footnote 6]
In
Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S.
33, the action was brought in the state court and was
removed to the federal court upon the ground that the defendant was
a federal corporation.
[
Footnote 7]
In
St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor,
210 U. S. 281,
210 U. S. 285,
the Court said:
"The accident by which the plaintiff's intestate lost his life
occurred in the Indian territory, where, contrary to the doctrine
of the common law, a right of action for death exists. The cause of
action arose under the laws of the territory, and was enforced in
the courts of Arkansas."
The question whether the action was triable in those courts was
held not to present a federal question, but the question as to the
interpretation of the Safety Appliance Act of 1893 did present the
federal question which was reviewed by this Court.