A corporation, having suffered great losses but still highly
solvent, determined to scale down its debenture indebtedness. By
its directors, it defaulted on the debenture interest, though fully
able to pay, and arranged the formation of a committee which
solicited and secured the deposit of 95% of the debentures, to be
exchanged, pursuant to a proposed Plan of Reorganization, for
debentures greatly reduced in amount and security in a transferee
corporation to be formed. Minority debenture holders having brought
suit to collect their interest and threatened to levy on corporate
assets, the Committee brought this creditors' bill for the
appointment of a receiver, to the allegations and prayer of which
the defendant corporation assented. An order of sale of the assets
was made, fixing an upset price based on so-called "scrap" value.
The purchasers at the sale transferred the corporate assets to the
newly formed corporation, and, on the joint petition of the
purchasers and the new corporation, the Plan of Reorganization was
found fair, and the sale confirmed.
Held:
1. That, assuming that there was equity jurisdiction, there was
no equity in the bill to support the appointment of a receiver or
the interference with and discharge of creditors' rights. P.
290 U. S.
515.
Page 290 U. S. 505
2. That, where a corporation is solvent, the fact that there
have been and may continue to be heavy losses which may result in
financial embarrassment in the future affords no basis for a
receivership. P.
290 U. S.
516.
3. The judicial sale effecting the transfer of all the corporate
property to the new corporation and relieving both the old and the
new corporation from the payment of the former's debts, all for the
purpose of consummating the Plan of Reorganization, was, as to
nonassenting creditors, a fraudulent conveyance. P.
290 U. S.
518.
4. The fact that the trustee for the debenture holders, after
the filing of the bill, and at the behest of the plaintiffs,
declared the entire principal due and secured judgment therefor,
thus creating a condition of insolvency, did not cure the lack of
equity in the bill when filed.
Pusey Jones Co. v.
Hanessen, 261 U. S. 491. P.
290 U. S.
519.
5. Non-assenting debenture holders, who were prevented by the
order appointing receivers from asserting their rights at law, are
entitled to prove their claims in the equity suit and to be paid in
full, either out of the funds in the receivers' hands or by levy on
the corporate property, it appearing that the assets fraudulently
conveyed far exceeded the claims of all nonassenting creditors. P.
290 U. S.
520.
6. If the right of these debenture holders to sue at law was
impaired by the action of the trustee in declaring the principal
due and securing judgment therefor, equity will grant relief
because that action, as to them, was fraudulent in law. P.
290 U. S.
520.
7. The debenture holders who, by assenting to the Plan,
cooperated with the corporation and the committee are in no
position to complain that those who did not assent will fare better
than they. P.
290 U. S.
521.
8. A bill of review will not lie to review the interlocutory
order appointing receivers. P.
290 U. S.
522.
9. A nonassenting debenture holder who, by bill in the nature of
a bill of review, attacked the receivership for want of
jurisdiction and prayed that it be vacated was entitled to have
that bill dismissed without prejudice and to prosecute the claim by
intervention. P.
290 U. S.
522.
10. Debenture holders and other creditors who intervened in
subordination to the main proceeding but without assent to the Plan
of Reorganization, and objected to confirmation of the sale,
Page 290 U. S. 506
are entitled to that sum in cash which they would have received
if the property had been sold at a proper price. Pp.
290 U. S. 523,
290 U. S.
526.
11. In receivership proceedings, as was held in
National
Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U. S. 426,
289 U. S. 436,
every important determination by the court calls for an informed,
independent judgment, and special reasons exist for requiring
adequate, trustworthy information where the jurisdiction rests
wholly upon the consent of the defendant who joins in the prayers
for relief. P.
290 U. S.
525.
12. Failure of dissenting creditors to produce evidence of the
value of the property did not justify its sale as an entirety. P.
290 U. S.
525.
13. The upset price for the corporate property as an entirety
and the sale price which was paid on behalf of the Committee was
based on its so-called "scrap" value, the assumption being that the
dissenting debenture holders for whose protection the price was
supposed to be fixed were, by opposing the reorganization,
insisting that all the properties, consisting of separate and
widely scattered manufacturing plants, be dismantled. The
inadequacy of the price was due to the mistaken belief that it was
the duty of the court to aid in effectuating the Plan of
Reorganization since a very large majority of the debenture holders
had consented to it. Pp.
290 U. S.
523-525.
14. A manufacturing company composed of separate plants capable
of independent operation need not, as may be necessary with a
railroad, be sold as an entirety, and, in determining the proper
price, the court should acquire information not only as to the
value of each parcel, but as to the possibility of reconstituting
one or more of the separate plants as independent operating units
and finding markets for them; in making the determination, it is
proper to take into account the willingness of the Reorganization
Committee to purchase the properties as a going concern. P.
290 U. S. 526
et seq.
15. The Plan of Reorganization, in providing that debts for
merchandise and services shall be paid in full by the new
corporation, does not include debts owing by the old company on a
purchase of shares in another corporation, and it cannot be amended
by the court, in this proceeding, to include them. P.
290 U. S.
529.
64 F.2d 847 reversed as to Nos. 62, 63 and 64 and affirmed, with
modification, as to No. 65.
Certiorari, 289 U.S. 722, to review the affirmance of decrees in
a receivership case.
Page 290 U. S. 507
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases, which are here on certiorari to the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit (289 U.S. 722), were argued
together. They arise out of the plan of reorganization of the
National Radiator Corporation of Delaware dated February 11, 1931.
The reorganization committee sought to effectuate its plan through
securing, in a suit filed in the Western district of Pennsylvania,
the appointment of receivers, and a judicial sale of the property.
In that suit, the federal jurisdiction was invoked on the ground of
diversity of citizenship, the original plaintiffs being citizens of
states other than Delaware and one of them a citizen of the
district in which the suit was brought. The corporation, a citizen
of Delaware, was the sole defendant. The District Court appointed
receivers and entered decrees ordering the sale, confirming it,
approving the plan, and directing the receivers to convey and
deliver to the purchaser the entire property. The Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the decrees. 64 F.2d 847. The petitioners in No.
64 urge that the final decrees should be reversed as to them on the
ground that the court lacked equity jurisdiction or that the bill
lacked equity.
Page 290 U. S. 508
The petitioners in Nos. 62 and 63 urge that the decrees should
be reversed as to them mainly because the property was sold at a
grossly inadequate price. The petitioner in No. 65 is the plaintiff
in a bill of review, brought in the same court, praying that the
order appointing receivers be vacated. Its dismissal, which was
affirmed on appeal, is alleged to have been erroneous.
In August, 1927, National Radiator Corporation was organized to
effect a merger of six independent manufacturers of radiators and
boilers for heating purposes. The net assets of the consolidated
corporation, which included ten manufacturing plants located in
five states and warehouses in four others, were valued at
$26,192,261.72. The capital was represented by 270,000 shares of no
par common stock, 60,000 shares of $7 cumulative convertible no par
preferred stock, and $12,000,000 twenty-year 6 1/2 percent sinking
fund gold debentures. These had been underwritten, and were
marketed, by J. & W. Seligman & Co. and Bankers' Trust
Company of New York. The terms governing the issue of the
debentures and the rights and remedies of the holders thereof were
fixed by an indenture between the corporation and the Bankers'
Trust Company, as trustee.
In January, 1931, the management of the corporation concluded,
after months of consideration and conference with the bankers, that
a revision of its capital structure was desirable in order to
effect a drastic reduction of the debenture liability and the
elimination of all fixed charges, and that, to this end, default
should be made in the payment of the February 1, 1931, interest on
the debentures. Before the merger, the constituent concerns had
operated successfully for many years. After the merger, the
business ceased to prosper. By the end of 1931, all but three of
the ten manufacturing plants had been closed; the outlook for the
immediate future was
Page 290 U. S. 509
obscure, and there was no definite promise of an early recovery
in earning power. [
Footnote
1]
A meeting of the board of directors was called for the purpose
of taking formal action in respect to the payment of the February
1, 1931, interest. Although the corporation had suffered (including
depreciation and sinking fund charges) large losses in each of the
years 1928, 1929, and 1930, its financial condition was still
excellent. On December 31, 1930, the ratio of current assets to all
current liabilities was more than 10 to 1; the current assets,
including raw material and stock in process and manufactured, being
$5,054,007.30. The ratio of cash on hand to all current liabilities
was then 3 1/2 to 1. It had $1,701,899.94 cash, and $1,132,563.17
in good accounts receivable, whereas its debts presently payable
were only $46,787.60 (besides $293,339.58 for semiannual interest
accrued on the debentures but not payable until February 1, 1931,
$151,768.54 of accrued taxes and like items, and $60,000 in notes
payable in one, two, and three years). The twenty-year debentures
outstanding had been reduced from $12,000,000 to $10,716,000.
[
Footnote 2]
After presenting to the board the December 31, 1930, financial
statement, the chairman said:
"That although the working capital of the Company as shown by
the balance sheet was reasonably ample, it
Page 290 U. S. 510
was evident that, if the Company were to do an increasing volume
of business, it would require the use of all or a substantial part
of this cash to carry larger inventories and receivables, and that
it would also be necessary to make large expenditures for the
design of new products and for equipment necessary in their
manufacture. Otherwise, the Chairman pointed out, it might well
prove to be impossible to maintain the Company's competitive
business as against other enterprises in the industry. The Chairman
then referred to the fact that the management had considered the
advisability of a reorganization, and had requested Messrs. Rudolph
B. Flershem [the Chairman of its Executive Committee], Charles O.
Cornell [a member of a firm specializing in reorganizations], and
John H. Waters [the corporation's President] to act as a Committee
to consider the matter and to formulate a Plan of Reorganization
which might be submitted to the security holders of the Company.
The Chairman reported that this Committee was now considering the
matter of reorganization, and had formed the opinion that a
reorganization was advisable."
The recommendations of the management were adopted by the board
of directors. It was voted to default in the payment of the
February 1 interest; the holders of the debentures were notified
that the default was deemed advisable in order to conserve the
corporation's cash resources, and, under date of February 11, 1931,
an elaborate "Plan and Agreement of Reorganization" was submitted
to the security holders for acceptance.
The plan did not provide for raising additional capital. It was
directed solely to reducing the liability on the debentures and
eliminating all fixed charges. It provided that a new corporation
be organized which would take over all the assets of the existing
one, continue the business, and pay in cash all the current debts
for merchandise and services; that the debenture indebtedness
be
Page 290 U. S. 511
scaled by giving for each $1,000 of the 6 1/2 percent
twenty-year sinking fund debentures, $500 of the new corporation's
5 percent fifteen-year income debentures (without sinking fund
provision), [
Footnote 3] 5
shares of its $7 preferred stock (entitled to $100 a share on
involuntary liquidation and $115 a share on voluntary liquidation),
and 20 shares of its common stock. Holders of the preferred stock
in the existing company were to receive therefor, share for share,
common stock in the new, and holders of the common stock of the
existing company might (upon payment of $1), receive for every
three shares a stock warrant, entitling the holder to purchase on
or before July 1, 1941, one share of common stock in the new
company upon payment of $20 per share. The plan made no provision
for dissenting debenture holders.
The reorganization committee proceeded to solicit deposits of
securities under the plan. Before September 15, 1931, it had
secured the deposit of about 81 percent of the debentures and a
large part of the preferred and common stocks. On that day, it
declared the plan operative. On the same day, it made a settlement
with an opposing bondholders' protective committee [
Footnote 4] whereby it secured additional
deposits of about 9 percent of the debentures. Later, other
deposits were received, so that ultimately more than 95 percent of
all outstanding debentures were deposited under the plan.
Some holders of nonassenting debentures demanded payment of
their overdue coupons, including those for the
Page 290 U. S. 512
August 1, 1931, interest. When payment was refused, the holders
of $24,000 of the debentures brought an action therefor, and
counsel gave notice of intention to bring a further action on
coupons attached to others. In order to frustrate these attempts to
collect the interest, and in order to compel the minority debenture
holders to acquiesce in the plan of reorganization, the committee
commenced, on October 5, 1931, this suit praying for the
appointment of receivers with power to continue the business, for a
sale of the properties as an entirety, and that meanwhile all
creditors be enjoined from enforcing their claims. The bill set
forth the existing capital structure, the defaults in the payment
of interest, and the plan of reorganization. It did not allege that
the corporation was unable to pay the interest, or that it was
insolvent, or that its assets, while ample, were not then available
for payment of its debts. The bill alleged merely that:
"The defendant has no means at hand with which to meet, pay, or
satisfy the interest charges on the Debentures overdue as aforesaid
without seriously jeopardizing the ability of the defendant to
continue its business and without making it difficult or impossible
for the defendant to secure the necessary supplies, materials, and
labor to continue the operation of its plants and the sale of its
products."
"[That] certain holders of the debentures not deposited with the
complainants have threatened to bring suits in respect of interest
due on their coupons, and may levy execution upon the property of
the defendant. . . . [That,] unless the Court will take
jurisdiction in this cause for the protection of every interest in
the property and assets of the defendant, the result will be a
multiplicity of suits, a race of diligence, wasteful strife and
controversy;"
and dismemberment of the properties, and that
"It is to the best interests of the defendant and the
complainants and other creditors of the defendant that
Page 290 U. S. 513
the going concern value of the defendant's business and
properties should be maintained,"
etc.
On October 9, 1931, the corporation entered its appearance,
filed an answer admitting the truth of the allegations contained in
the bill, joined in the prayers thereof, and consented to the
appointment of receivers. On the same day, receivers were appointed
with power to continue the business, and creditors were restrained
from enforcing their claims against the property. One of the
receivers was Robert S. Waters, a vice-president and general
manager of the corporation and the son of John H. Waters, its
president, chairman of its board of directors, and member of the
reorganization committee. The other receiver was William G. Heiner,
a Pittsburgh lawyer. With like consent, ancillary receivers were
appointed in ten other jurisdictions in which the corporation had
property, and also in Delaware, where it had none.
When the bill was filed, and when the receivers were appointed,
the corporation could have paid from the cash on hand all overdue
debenture interest, as well as all its other current liabilities,
without impairing its ability to continue the business. The cash on
hand was.$1,257,381.59. [
Footnote
5] The overdue interest amounted then to $709,395.69. [
Footnote 6] That $547,985.90, the
difference between these two amounts, was more than the amount
required for working capital, is demonstrated by action of the
receivers. Two weeks after their appointment, they applied
Page 290 U. S. 514
for and obtained from the court leave to invest
"such amount or amounts of cash of the receivership estate as in
the judgment of the receivers is not needed at the time for
expenses and working capital."
Thereupon, they invested $1,030,000 of the cash in United States
Treasury certificates of indebtedness and in bank certificates of
deposit.
The Bankers' Trust Company, as trustee for the debenture
holders, cooperated in all respects with the reorganization
committee; served as depositary under the plan; made formal demand
for payment of the overdue interest, and brought, with leave of
court, suit for the amount of the overdue interest on all
outstanding debentures and recovered judgment therefor; thereupon
declared the principal of the debentures immediately payable;
recovered judgment therefor on December 30, 1931, and then
intervened in the receivership suit as plaintiff.
In due course, application was made for an order of sale. The
District Court did not make an appraisal by independent experts. In
fixing the upset price and in confirming the sale, it relied
practically upon the evidence given, or introduced, by officers of
the corporation and the members of the reorganization committee. On
May 31, 1932, the decree ordering a sale was entered; the upset
price was fixed at $2,500,000, and a date after the sale was set
for a hearing on its confirmation and on the fairness of the plan.
An appeal from this decree was taken forthwith. At the sale, held
August 8, 1932, the property was purchased in behalf of the
committee for $2,550,000 cash. The purchasers assigned their rights
to the new company, National Radiator Corporation of Maryland,
which agreed to enter an appearance in this cause; and, upon the
petition of the purchasers and the new company, a decree was
entered finding the plan fair, confirming the sale, and directing
that the property be transferred to the new corporation free and
clear of all obligations to creditors of
Page 290 U. S. 515
the old. Thereupon the assets were conveyed to the new company
over the objection of some of the petitioners that the appeal
already filed rendered the court powerless to take or approve
further action. The same counsel acted for the reorganization
committee, the receivers, and the new company.
While all the petitioners refused assent to the plan and all
appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals from action of the
District Court, the differences in their several positions and
contentions are such as to require separate consideration of their
legal rights.
First. Amy Arzt and Josephine Ramsey, the petitioners
in No. 64, hold $121,000 of the debentures. They appeared specially
at the hearing on the confirmation of the sale, objected, among
other things, on the ground that the court lacked equity
jurisdiction of the subject matter, appealed to the Circuit Court
of Appeals from the decree affirming the sale, and contended there
and here that, since they refused assent to the plan, the decree
should, as to them, be declared void and reversed. Whether strictly
there was lack of equity jurisdiction we need not decide.
Compare Burnrite Coal Briquette Co. v. Riggs, 274 U.
S. 208;
Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v.
Karatz, 262 U. S. 640;
Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanessen, 261 U.
S. 491. For the suit is clearly without equity. The
court's power was invoked for a purpose for which it may not be
exercised.
We have no occasion to consider under what circumstances a court
of equity may, through appointment of receivers and judicial sale,
lend aid to protect the interests of creditors and effect a
reorganization of an insolvent corporation. [
Footnote 7] Nor need we consider under what
circumstances
Page 290 U. S. 516
a court of equity may, because the assets of a corporation are
ample to meet all liabilities but cannot then be immediately
converted into cash, properly appoint receivers in order to
preserve values and prevent unequal treatment of creditors.
[
Footnote 8] The case before us
is of a different character. The possibility of insolvency was not
mentioned when the board of directors voted to make default in the
payment of the semiannual interest on its funded indebtedness and
approved the plan of reorganization. While defaulting on its
debentures, the corporation continued its business operations and
paid promptly its merchandise and other unfunded indebtedness.
Page 290 U. S. 517
Insolvency was not present or imminent. The debentures were not
to mature until 1947. Insolvency even in the remote future was not
certain. This company defaulted when it was both solvent and
liquid. It defaulted, although it had cash in bank equal to three
and a half times its total current liabilities, including this
interest. It defaulted, although the amount of the cash on hand was
so large that, even if the interest had been paid, the surplus of
cash remaining would have been more than was then required for
working capital.
This deliberate disregard by the corporation of the legal rights
of the debenture holders is sought to be justified on the ground
that the management, looking to the long future, concluded that the
course taken would inure to the benefit of the business and all
concerned -- would benefit bondholders as well as stockholders. The
default was the first step in a proposed revision of the capital
structure by which the funded indebtedness would be cut in half and
all fixed charges eliminated. The management, whose competency had
been challenged, functioned as members of the reorganization
committee. Having failed to obtain the assent of all the security
holders to its plan, the committee sought the aid of a court of
equity to compel the minority's acquiescence, and the corporation
joined as defendant in the prayers of the bill. Reorganization was
the primary relief sought. The appointment of the receivers and the
judicial sale were the device employed to effect a transfer of the
assets of the existing corporation to a new one, thereby relieving
both from the payment of the former's debts. [
Footnote 9] By these means,
Page 290 U. S. 518
it was hoped to subject all dissenting creditors to the
condition of impotency so frequently occupied by minority
stockholders.
The substantive law affords no warrant for so abridging the
rights of individual creditors. There is no contention that the
corporation laws of Delaware conferred such power upon the board of
directors and the majority of the debenture holders. The purpose of
the transaction was to hinder and delay certain creditors. If,
acting upon purported authorizations from the board of directors
and all stockholders, the Radiator Corporation had sought to
achieve the purpose of the reorganization committee by a voluntary
transfer of all of the assets to a new corporation, the conveyance
would have been fraudulent in law as to dissenting debenture
holders. It would have been a fraudulent conveyance even if the
transaction had been entered upon solely in the interest of the
debenture holders, in a well founded belief that it would prove to
their advantage, and although full payment of the indebtedness had
been contemplated.
Means v. Dowd, 128 U.
S. 273. [
Footnote
10] The illegality would not have been avoided by coupling the
transfer later with the appointment of a receiver.
Shapiro v.
Wilgus, 287 U. S. 348,
287 U. S.
354-355. Nor could the illegality be avoided by first
securing the appointment of
Page 290 U. S. 519
receivers and then effecting the transfer through a receiver's
sale. Since the purpose was fraudulent in law, the rights of the
nonassenting creditors cannot be impaired by the corporation's
admission of the self-serving allegations of the bill.
Compare
Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36.
The power of the District Court was invoked, not to enforce
rights of creditors, but to defeat them. The fact that the means
employed to effect the fraudulent conveyance was the judgment of a
court, and not a voluntary transfer, does not remove the taint of
illegality. [
Footnote 11]
Jackson v.
Ludeling, 21 Wall. 616.
Compare 73 U.
S. Railroad Co., 6 Wall. 752;
Northern Pacific
R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482,
228 U. S. 507.
Nor is it material that the corporation became insolvent later,
long before entry of the order of sale, and that, but for the
appointment of receivers, some nonassenting debenture holders would
have obtained a preference. The lack of equity in the bill when
filed is not cured by the insolvency later occurring.
Compare
Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanessen, 261 U.
S. 491. Moreover, the insolvency which supervened was
precipitated by the reorganization committee, then the only
plaintiffs in this suit. It was at their request that the Bankers'
Trust Company, as trustee, declared the principal of the debentures
due, recovered judgment thereon for $10,673,000, and intervened
Page 290 U. S. 520
as party plaintiff. These acts were steps in carrying out the
plan in which the corporation, the committee, and the trust company
cooperated.
The sale and reorganization being in law fraudulent as to the
petitioners in No. 64, it remains to consider the relief to which
they are entitled. If, as in
Shapiro v. Wilgus,
287 U. S. 348,
287 U. S. 357,
the reorganization had been effected by a voluntary transfer, and
thereafter receivers had been appointed by the federal court, these
creditors would, upon recovery of judgment, have been
"entitled to an order in the alternative either for the payment
of his judgment out of the assets in the hands of the receivers or
in default thereof for leave to issue execution."
The relief and the procedure should be the same here, although
these petitioners are not judgment creditors, and the transfer
followed the appointment of receivers. They should be paid in full
upon establishing their claims in this case, because they were
prevented by the interlocutory order appointing receivers from
proceeding against the assets, fraudulently transferred, and
thereby securing a lien, which would have yielded them full
payment.
Compare Metcalf v. Barker, 187 U.
S. 165,
187 U. S. 174;
Freedman's Savings & T. Co. v. Earle, 110 U.
S. 710;
Chittenden v.
Brewster, 2 Wall. 191. [
Footnote 12]
Nothing in the indenture with the Bankers' Trust Company, or in
its action as trustee thereunder, interferes with affording them
this relief. That instrument expressly reserves to the individual
debenture holders the right to collect interest and principal in an
action at law. If that right was impaired by the acts of the trust
company in declaring the principal of the debentures due and
securing judgment thereon, equity will grant relief because those
acts, done at the request of the reorganization committee,
Page 290 U. S. 521
were incidents of the plan which we hold was fraudulent in law
as to these petitioners. [
Footnote 13] The debenture holders who, by assenting to
the plan, cooperated with the corporation and the reorganization
committee, are in no position to complain that these petitioners
will fare better than they.
Compare Davis v. Virginia Ry. &
Power Co., 229 F. 633, 642. [
Footnote 14] Since the assets fraudulently conveyed far
exceed the amount of the claims of all nonassenting creditors, none
of these could have occasion to object to the payment to these
petitioners in full.
Second. Lily Clapier, the petitioner in No. 65, is the
holder of $11,000 of the debentures. She refused to assent to the
plan of reorganization, but did not seek to intervene in the
receivership suit. Instead, she brought in the
Page 290 U. S. 522
same court a separate suit against the corporation and the
receivers in the nature of a bill of review. Suing on behalf of
herself and all other creditors who had refused to accept the plan,
she charged that the court was without jurisdiction in equity to
appoint receivers, and prayed that the decree appointing them be
vacated and no further proceedings be had. The receivers and the
corporation moved to dismiss the Clapier suit on the ground that
the bill failed to set forth a cause of action. These motions were
granted without passing upon the question whether, in view of the
fact that two of the defendants were citizens of the same state as
the plaintiff, there was lack of federal jurisdiction. From the
decree of dismissal she appealed to the Circuit Court of
Appeals.
"A bill of review is called for only after a final decree -- one
that finally adjudicates upon the entire merits, leaving nothing
further to be done except the execution of it."
John Simmons Co. v. Grier Bros. Co., 258 U. S.
82,
258 U. S. 88.
For this reason, a bill of review will not lie to review an
interlocutory order appointing a receiver. The dismissal of the
Clapier suit was therefore proper. But that decree should have been
without prejudice to her right to prosecute her claim against the
corporation, the assets in the hands of the receivers, and the new
company. To this end, she should be given leave to intervene in the
receivership suit and there present her claim for such relief as
may appear to be appropriate. As the new corporation became party
to the suit when it applied for confirmation of the sale, there is
here no obstacle to this procedure.
Compare National Surety Co.
v. Coriell, 289 U. S. 426,
289 U. S. 438;
Kneeland v. American Loan & Trust Co., 136 U. S.
89.
Third. The First National Bank, one of the two
petitioners in Nos. 62 and 63, is the holder of $68,000 of the
debentures. It filed, before the hearing on ordering the sale, a
petition for leave to intervene, and was permitted
Page 290 U. S. 523
to do so as party defendant, but only "in subordination to and
recognition of the propriety of the main proceeding." In the
hearings on ordering the sale, on approving the plan, and on
confirming the sale, it took part by cross-examination of witnesses
and by argument, but it did not introduce any evidence. I t
appealed from both the interlocutory and the final decree.
The bank does not claim that the District Court was without
equity jurisdiction or that the bill lacked equity. It concedes
that the court could properly lend its aid to effectuate the
proposed reorganization and, to this end, might sell the assets as
an entirety. Its contention is that the property held in
receivership was a trust fund to be administered for the benefit of
each and every creditor, and, since some of the debenture holders
had refused to assent to the plan of reorganization, the court was
under the duty to make the sale on such terms and under such
conditions as would insure to them, as their distributive share of
the assets, the largest amount in cash which could be realized
therefrom, and that the court, basing its action upon estimates
offered in support of the plan, fixed a grossly inadequate upset
price and erred in confirming the sale. The respondents insist that
the nonassenting debenture holders were entitled only to their
distributive share of the sum for which the property could have
been sold if scrapped, and that they would, under the price paid,
receive that much.
It is clear from the evidence introduced by the reorganization
committee and the receivers that the upset price and the sale price
were far below even the scrap value. The upset price fixed was
$2,500,000. The entire property was sold to the reorganization
committee for $2,550,000. At that time, the cash and assets
equivalent to cash alone aggregated $2,192,804.95. There was cash
$1,551,615.78, and notes and accounts receivable (after deducting
ample reserve for doubtful accounts) $641,189.17.
Page 290 U. S. 524
Besides, there were $1,671,605.91 in raw material, goods in
process and manufactured; bonds, stocks, and like items valued at
$88,873.41; manufacturing plants, and the warehouses in the several
cities theretofore valued at $6,388,318.83; goodwill, trademarks,
and patents theretofore valued at $6,634,501.90, and other assets
valued at $166,475.65. Moreover, the existence of the plan of
reorganization, assented to by a vast majority of the security
holders, gave assurance of at least one bidder for the entire
property who had confidence that the business, if sold as an
entirety as a going concern, possessed a value greater than its
liquidating value, and would, if necessary to effectuate the plan,
bid for the assets in cash more than the estimated liquidating
value. The upset price and the sale price were grossly inadequate.
[
Footnote 15]
Page 290 U. S. 525
In justifying the action taken, the Court of Appeals called
attention to the fact that the nonassenting creditors had not
introduced any evidence to prove their contention that the sale
should not be confirmed. In view of the undisputed facts stated
above, the introduction of such evidence was not indispensable. The
failure to secure an adequate price seems to have been due not to
lack of opposing evidence, but to the mistaken belief that it was
the duty of the court to aid in effectuating the plan of
reorganization, since a very large majority of the debenture
holders had assented to it. Moreover, the court stood in a position
different from that which it occupies in ordinary litigation, where
issues are to be determined solely upon such evidence as the
contending parties choose to introduce. In receivership
proceedings, as was held in
National Surety Co. v.
Coriell, 289 U. S. 426,
289 U. S. 436,
every important determination by the court calls for an informed,
independent judgment, and special reasons exist for requiring
adequate, trustworthy information where the jurisdiction rests
wholly upon the consent of the defendant who joins in the prayers
for relief. It would be
Page 290 U. S. 526
unreasonable to impose upon a few dissenting creditors the heavy
financial burden of making an adequate appraisal supported by the
testimony of competent experts where, as here, the assets include
extensive plants and equipment located in nine states.
The relief which the bank seeks is that sum in cash which it
would have received if the property had been sold at a proper
price. To this relief it is clearly entitled. The cause is remanded
to the District Court for the purpose of ascertaining the sum. In
making their determination, it must be borne in mind that the
problem which was presented to the trial court upon the application
for the receiver's sale of the assets of this manufacturing
company, with its many far-flung plants and warehouses, was a very
different one from that with which courts have been confronted upon
applications for sale on foreclosure of railroad systems. In such
cases, it is ordinarily necessary that the property be sold as an
entirety. The unity of the system must be preserved in both the
public and the private interest, and the large amount of cash
required by the upset price renders the reorganization committee,
which ordinarily controls a large majority of the outstanding
securities, practically the only bidder. [
Footnote 16]
Compare 271 U.
S. Co. v. Central Union Trust
Page 290 U. S. 527
Co., 271 U. S. 445,
271 U. S.
453-454. In the case at bar, preservation of the unity
of the property was not essential. The sale of the assets in many
parcels was possible, and perhaps desirable in the interest of all
concerned.
A detailed appraisal must now be made of the corporation's
assets as of the date of the sale, based upon then values and the
possibility of disposing of them in parcels, as well as an
entirety. The appraisal of the current assets will present little
difficulty, and the experience gained since the sale in collecting
the receivables and in disposing of the inventory will be of aid.
The appraisal of the property other than the current assets will
require careful preparation and consideration. The inadequacy of
the upset price seems to have resulted mainly from the assumption
that the only alternatives were to continue to operate the
properties as an entirety or to scrap all, and from a determination
that the properties should not be scrapped. So far as appears, no
consideration was then given to the possibility of selling the
properties in such parcels as would permit of reconstituting as
separate units some of the original independent concerns, or to the
fact that a detailed valuation of the many items of which the
assets, tangible and intangible, were composed was essential to
intelligent bidding for the property in such parcels or as scrap,
or to the fact that, if the sale was not made as an entirety, the
appropriate markets for some of the parcels or lots might not be
New Castle, Pennsylvania, where the sale was held. Moreover, no
attempt appears to have been made then to secure bids from buyers
of scrapped properties.
The history of the enterprise lends no support to the view that,
unless all the property was to be scrapped, all had to be sold as
an entirety. The losses of the corporation appear to have been due
largely to the fundamental mistake of judgment committed in merging
the several independent concerns. Before the consolidation, each
of
Page 290 U. S. 528
the six independent concerns earned large profits. Their
aggregate profits for each of the last three years before the
merger had averaged $3,455,642 a year. A few months after the
merger, the corporation entered upon a period of heavy losses which
continued unbroken up to the time of the receivers' sale. The
abrupt change from profit to loss was not the result of the general
business depression. Although 1928 and 1929 were years of general
business prosperity, [
Footnote
17] the loss of the corporation (before payment of debenture
interest) was $587,123 in 1928 and $490,371 in 1929. [
Footnote 18] The heavy losses during
1928, 1929, and later years (including the period of the
receivership) appear to have been due in large measure to the cost
of carrying unused properties. During the receivership, only the
Pennsylvania plants were in operation. [
Footnote 19] For them, there was still substantial
business, and that business might then have been profitable if not
burdened with the cost of carrying the many unused properties.
[
Footnote 20] In valuing the
assets, the appraisers should also bear in mind that, even if part
of the properties should have been sold as scrap, the
reorganization committee was a willing purchaser for the rest.
Fourth. The International Heater Company, the other
petitioner in Nos. 62 and 63, holds three promissory notes of the
corporation of $20,000 each, maturing, respectively,
Page 290 U. S. 529
on the last days of 1931, 1932, and 1933. It refused assent to
the plan, but it does not question either that the District Court
had equity jurisdiction of the cause or that there was equity in
the bill. It expressly concedes that the court could properly lend
its aid to enable security holders of an unsuccessful corporation
to find, through reorganization, a practical method of continuing
the business. Its main objection is that, under the decree entered,
it is denied payment in cash of the amount to which it is entitled.
The heater company did not learn of the application for the order
of sale until after the hearing thereon had closed. Then it filed a
petition to intervene, was permitted to intervene as defendant, but
only "in subordination to, and recognition of, the propriety of the
proceeding," and it appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals from
both the decree ordering the sale and from that confirming it and
approving the plan. It seeks reversal of the decree on two entirely
distinct and alternative grounds.
1. The heater company asks that, pursuant to the plan, these
notes be paid in full by the new corporation. The plan provides
that debts for merchandise or services shall be paid by the new
corporation in full. These notes were part of the purchase price
paid, in the latter part of 1927, for a minority interest in the
stock of the Lincoln Radiator Company, the majority interest of
which the corporation had previously acquired. The heater company
contends that the notes, being a part of the current indebtedness
of the old company, and having been given for personal property,
are to be deemed merchandise debts within the meaning of the plan,
but that, if the plan as drawn does not include them, it should be
amended by the court so as to provide for the payment of the notes
in full. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention. We think it
was right substantially for the reasons stated by it.
Page 290 U. S. 530
2. The heater company contends that, if the notes are not to be
paid in full, it should receive a sum much larger than its
distributive share of the purchase price paid by the new
corporation. Unlike the bank, it does not argue that the court was
obliged to make an independent investigation into the value of the
assets before fixing the upset price. Its contentions are that the
heater company should not be prejudiced by its own failure to
introduce evidence on that issue, since it had no notice or
knowledge of the hearing; that, moreover, the gross inadequacy of
the price paid was due to the fact that, instead of aiming to
secure for nonassenting creditors the largest possible sum in cash,
the court treated the receiver's sale as merely a necessary step in
effectuating the plan of reorganization, and hence adopted a method
of selling which excluded all bidders except the reorganization
committee. We have no occasion to discuss this argument in detail.
For the reasons stated in connection with the bank's claim, we
think that the sale was made at a grossly inadequate price, and
that it was invalid also as to the heater company. Like the bank,
the heater company is entitled to receive in cash its distributive
share of the amount which, upon the new appraisal, shall be found
to have been the fair selling value of the assets.
In Nos. 62, 63, and 64, decree reversed as to
petitioners.
In No. 65, decree modified, and, as modified,
affirmed.
* Together with No. 64,
Arzt et al. v. Flershem et al.,
and No. 65,
Clapier v. Flershem et al., certiorari to the
Circuit Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit.
[
Footnote 1]
The corporation acquired by the merger ten plants. Two at
Johnstown, Pa.; two at New Castle, Pa.; one at Framingham, Mass.;
one at Trenton, N.J.; one at Chicago, Ill., and one each at Utica,
Dunkirk, and North Tonawanda, N.Y. One plant had been sold in 1927,
and one was shut down. Two were closed early in 1929. In 1930, one
plant was shut down because of the decline in business, and one in
1931 before the receivers were appointed.
[
Footnote 2]
On December 30, 1931, at which time Bankers' Trust Company,
trustee for the debenture holders, recovered judgment for the
entire principal outstanding, the amount had been further reduced
to $10,673,000.
[
Footnote 3]
[
Footnote 4]
The opposition committee were to receive $35,000 for fees and
expenses of the members and counsel, and one of its members, to be
designated by the reorganization committee, was to become a member
of the latter and of the board of directors of the new company.
[
Footnote 5]
On the day of their appointment, the receivers had also
$1,494,327.22 in sound receivables and at least $34,534.40 in
securities convertible in cash.
[
Footnote 6]
The aggregate of other current liabilities (including amounts
not then payable) was only $157,511.89. There was, besides, the
August 1, 1931, requirement for the sinking fund. But the
debentures held by the corporation applicable for this purpose
reduced the requirement of cash to $43,918.50.
[
Footnote 7]
All the cases in which this Court appears to have exercised this
power in aid of reorganization upon the ground of insolvency dealt
with railroads or other public utilities where continued operation
of the property and preservation of its unity seemed to be required
in the public interest.
Milwaukee & Minnesota R.
Co. v. Soutter, 2 Wall. 510;
Davis v.
Gray, 16 Wall. 203;
Union Trust Co. v. Illinois
Midland R. Co., 117 U. S. 434;
Wallace v. Loomis, 97 U. S. 146;
Wood v. Guarantee Trust Co., 128 U.
S. 416;
Quincy, Missouri & Pacific R. Co. v.
Humphreys, 145 U. S. 82;
Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co.,
174 U. S. 674;
In re Metropolitan Ry. Receivership, 208 U. S.
90;
Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central Union
Trust Co., 271 U. S. 445;
compare Sage v. Central R. Co., 99 U. S.
334;
Shaw v. Railroad Co., 100 U.
S. 605. Moreover, in all those cases, the sale was made
upon foreclosure. In
Brown, B. & Co. v. Lake Superior Iron
Co., 134 U. S. 530, and
Leadville Coal Co. v. McCreery, 141 U.
S. 475, where the defendant corporation had allowed the
receivership of a rolling mill to proceed nine months without
answering and creditors did not object until after the decree of
sale, this Court refused to decide whether originally the suit
should have been allowed to proceed.
The Act of March 3, 1933, c. 204, ยง 77, 47 Stat. 1474, amending
the Bankruptcy Act, provides:
"Reorganization of railroads engaged in interstate commerce. (a)
Any railroad corporation may file a petition stating that the
railroad corporation is insolvent or unable to meet its debts as
they mature and that it desires to effect a plan of
reorganization."
[
Footnote 8]
In
National Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U.
S. 426,
289 U. S. 435,
the question before this Court was not the equity of the bill, but
the propriety of the procedure pursued by the District Court when
approving the plan of reorganization.
Compare Michigan v.
Michigan Trust Co., 286 U. S. 334,
286 U. S. 343;
Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U. S. 348,
287 U. S. 356;
Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U.
S. 597;
Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.
S. 218;
Munroe v. Raphael, 288 U.
S. 485.
[
Footnote 9]
Unless all debenture holders assented to the plan, it could not
be effectuated except through the medium of a judicial sale, for
the indenture with the Bankers' Trust Company, trustee, provided
that the property of the Radiator Corporation should not be sold as
an entirety unless,
"as a part of the purchase price for the sale of the property of
the company as an entirety, [the purchaser] expressly assumes in
writing the due and punctual payment of the principal and interest
of all the debentures,"
whereas the main purpose of the plan was to cut in half the
amount of the debenture liability and to eliminate all fixed
charges through transferring the entire property to a new
company.
[
Footnote 10]
Similarly, it has been held that an assignment made for the
benefit of creditors, by one who is solvent, to avoid temporary
embarrassment and sacrifice of assets, is a fraudulent conveyance
as to those who have not consented, and that the conveyance will be
set aside to the extent necessary to permit nonassenting creditors
to levy execution.
Burt v. McKinstry, 4 Minn. 204;
Gardner v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 95 Ill. 298.
[
Footnote 11]
"An execution sale under a consent judgment, where the consent
is, in effect, not the act of the defendant, but that of the
plaintiff prosecuting the action, is in reality merely a voluntary
transfer. To give it any better standing would be the grossest
sacrifice of substance to form."
Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. California Development
Co., 171 Cal. 173, 210, 152 P. 542, 558.
See also Metcalf
v. Moses, 35 App.Div. 596, 55 N.Y.S. 179; 161 N.Y. 587, 56
N.E. 67;
Mechanics Bank v. Burnet, 33 N.J.Eq. 486;
Atwater v. American Exchange Bank, 152 Ill. 605, 38 N.E.
1017;
Skinner v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 94 Ind.App.
651, 182 N.E. 99;
Hill v. Pioneer Lumber Co., 113 N.C.
173, 18 S.E. 107.
[
Footnote 12]
See also Metcalf v. Moses, 35 App.Div. 596, 55 N.Y.S.
179; 161 N.Y. 587, 56 N.E. 67;
Johnston v. Straus, 26 F.
57.
[
Footnote 13]
The record does not show that all the debentures would not have
been paid in due course under proper management in the absence of
the voluntary default made to effect the desired reorganization,
and other proceedings to that end.
[
Footnote 14]
There, in a case of reorganization, the court said:
"The holders of the bonds secured by the senior mortgages and
the other debenture bondholders of the Richmond Company had the
opportunity to join the petitioner in his effort to recover
property which he alleged had been taken from that, on which they
all relied for security. They refused to enter the contest, and
accepted as full payment and satisfaction of their bonds the
settlement offered in the reorganization. Thus, the petitioner was
left as the only bondholder who chose to avail himself of the
reservation and make the contest, and it follows that he alone is
entitled to receive the fruit of his effort. . . . All other
creditors waived their rights, and were in the position of saying
either that there was no merit in petitioner's contention or that
they were unwilling to make any effort to bring under the security
the property alleged to have been diverted. Evidently, under such
conditions, the property which may be recovered or brought back as
a part of the assets of the Richmond Company by petitioner's
efforts and expense would be applicable to his bonds. The principle
is well settled by authority.
Freedman's S. & T. Co. v.
Earle, 110 U. S. 710."
See also In re American Candy Mfg. Co., 256 F. 87, 88;
George v. St. Louis Cable & Western R. Co., 44 F. 117,
120-124.
[
Footnote 15]
It seems to have been the aim of the reorganization committee to
have the upset price fixed at a sum which would yield to
nonassenting debenture holders not more than the then market value
of their bonds. At one time, it has made at one of its meetings a
tentative suggestion of $3,600,000. The gross inadequacy of the
upset price is illustrated by the division of the $2,500,000, as
applied to the ten separate parcels in which, as a formality, the
property was offered before selling it as an entirety to the
reorganization committee. Parcel A for which the upset price of
$2,392,000 was set included, besides the plants and other real
estate in Pennsylvania, all the personal property except that used
in connection with the plants and other real estate located in the
other eight states. Parcel B embraced the plant and appurtenant
real and personal property in New Jersey (including 11 1/2 acres
near Trenton and 14 dwelling houses), carried on the books at
$861,179.12. The upset price on this parcel was fixed at $28,000.
Parcel C embraced the plant and appurtenant real and personal
property in Massachusetts (including 23 acres at Framingham),
carried on the books at $592,452,64. The upset price for this
parcel was fixed at $17,500. Parcel D embraced the plant and
appurtenant real and personal property at North Tonawanda
(including 10 acres) and Dunkirk, N.Y., valued on the books at
$1,318,373.60. The upset price for this parcel was fixed at
$37,500. Parcel E included 10 acres of land, the plants and
appurtenant real and personal property and a warehouse at Chicago,
Ill., carried on the books at $605,149.43, and also the Edgewood
Apartment Hotel at Chicago, carried on the books at $51,172.31. The
upset price fixed for this parcel was $17,500. Parcel F included
the warehouse at Baltimore, Md., and the usual equipment, which was
carried on the books at $33,477.93. The upset price on this parcel
was fixed at $1,000. Parcel G included the warehouse equipment at
Cincinnati, Ohio, which was carried on the books at $48,632.84. The
upset price on this parcel was fixed at $2,250. Parcel H included
the warehouse at Richmond, Va. which was carried on the books at
$26,045.42. The upset price on this parcel was fixed at $1,000.
Parcel I included two warehouses at Hempstead, N.Y. which was
carried on the books at $30,093.81. The upset price on this parcel
was fixed at $1,000. Parcel J included the warehouse at Washington,
which was carried on the books at $58,536.53. The upset price on
this parcel was fixed at $1,000.
[
Footnote 16]
By the decree, the purchaser was required to pay only $300,000
in cash, presumably to cover the expenses and fees of the
reorganization committee, the receivers, and counsel. The decree
provided that, on the balance of the purchase price,
"The Purchaser shall be credited on account of his purchase
price for Debentures and coupons and assigned claims finally
established and allowed, turned over in part payment of the
purchase price, with such sum as would be paid in respect of such
Debentures, coupons and assigned claims out of the proceeds of
sale, if the whole amount of the purchase price had been paid in
cash."
By this provision, customary in decrees for sales of railroad
systems on foreclosure, the reorganization committee was relieved
of the necessity of raising a large sum in cash -- a necessity
which naturally would deter bidders not so situated.
[
Footnote 17]
The losses were doubtless due in part to the fact that, already
at the end of 1927, the very lucrative "direct to the consumer"
business theretofore carried on by two of the theretofore
independent concerns had to be discontinued because incompatible
with the selling methods of the other plants of the consolidated
company.
[
Footnote 18]
The greater part of the products of these plants was used in the
new buildings. In the year 1928, the new construction in America
was said to have reached its all-time record.
[
Footnote 19]
See note 1
supra.
[
Footnote 20]
During the first four months of the receivership, the gross
sales were $1,300,000. For the first fifty days of the
receivership, an operating gain of $31,917.77 was turned into a
loss of $14,630.44 by reason of maintenance expense of the
nonoperating plants of $46,548.21.