A state statute making the owner of an automobile liable for
personal injuries resulting from its negligent operation by another
to whom he has entrusted it is consistent with due process as
applied to a nonresident owner who was not in that state when the
accident occurred and who had merely lent his machine to one not
his agent or engaged on business for him, with express or implied
permission to take it there from the the owner's residence, where
the bailment occurred and whose laws did not impose such liability.
P.
289 U. S.
256.
109 N.J.L. 453 affirmed.
Appeal from a judgment affirming a recovery for personal
injuries.
Page 289 U. S. 255
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
A New York statute provides:
"Every owner of a motor vehicle or motor cycle operated upon a
public highway shall be liable and responsible for death or
injuries
Page 289 U. S. 256
to person or property resulting from negligence in the operation
of such motor vehicle or motorcycle, in the business of such owner
or otherwise, by any person legally using or operating the same
with the permission, express or implied, of such owner."
Laws N.Y. 1929, Vol. 1, p. 82, Vehicle and Traffic Law ยง 59.
Masci, a citizen and resident of New York, brought this action
in a court of New Jersey against Young, a citizen and resident of
the latter state, to enforce liability under the above statute. The
case was tried before a jury. It appeared that Young lent his
automobile to Michael Balbino for a day without restriction upon
its use, the contract of bailment and delivery of the car being
made in New Jersey; that Balbino took the car to New York, and
that, while driving there, negligently he struck Masci. There was
evidence to justify a finding that the car was taken to New York
with Young's permission, express or implied. Young moved for a
directed verdict on the ground that the bailment was made in New
Jersey; that he was not in New York at the time of the accident;
that Balbino was not his agent or engaged on business for him, and
that to apply the law of New York and so make the defendant
responsible for something done by Balbino in New York would deprive
the defendant of his property and his liberty without due process
of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The presiding
judge declined to direct the verdict; ruled that, if negligence was
proved, the law of New York was controlling on the question of
liability, and charged that the defendant was responsible if the
operator "was driving this automobile at the time of the accident
with the permission of the defendant, either express or implied."
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and the judgment
entered thereon was affirmed by the highest court of that state.
109 N.J.Law 453, 162 A. 623.
Young appealed to this Court on the ground, among others, that
the statute as applied violates the due process
Page 289 U. S. 257
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He does not challenge its
constitutionality on the broad ground that an owner cannot be made
liable for the driver's negligence unless the relation of master
and servant exists. The contrary had been held in New York in
respect to this statute.
Downing v. New York, 219 App.Div.
444, 446, 220 N.Y.S. 76,
aff'd, 245 N.Y. 597, 157 N.E.
873;
Dawley v. McKibbin, 245 N.Y. 557, 157 N.E. 856. And,
in
Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 465,
272 U. S. 467,
where it was held that the due process clause does not prevent a
state from forfeiting property of an innocent owner for the
unauthorized act of one to whom he has entrusted it, the Court
states that it is not
"uncommon, for the law to visit upon the owner of property the
unpleasant consequences of the unauthorized action of one to whom
he has entrusted it,"
and refers to the legislation of New York "imposing liability on
owners of vehicles for the negligent operation by those entrusted
with their use, regardless of a master-servant relation."
Compare Pizitz Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.
S. 112,
274 U. S.
115-116. Statutes of like character have been sustained
also by the highest courts of other states. [
Footnote 1]
Nor does Young question the state's power to regulate the use of
motor vehicles of nonresidents on its highways.
Compare
Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610;
Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160. He
challenges the
Page 289 U. S. 258
statute only as applied to a nonresident owner who made the
bailment outside the State of New York and who was not within it at
the time of the accident. The contention is that subjection of the
owner to liability under the New York law deprives him of immunity
from liability to third parties which he had acquired in New Jersey
by virtue of the contract of bailment made there, and that thus the
statute deprive him of his liberty to contract and his property
without due process of law. If such a contract can be found in the
case at bar, the statute does not purport to affect it. The statute
neither forbids the making nor alters the terms of any contract.
Compare Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.
S. 397. It does not purport to affect rights as between
owner and bailee. Moreover, the contract of bailment could not have
conferred upon the owner immunity from liability to third persons
for the driver's negligence. Liability for a tort depends upon the
law of the place of the injury, and (apart from the effect of the
full faith and credit clause, which is not here involved)
agreements made elsewhere cannot curtail the power of a state to
impose responsibility for injuries within its borders.
Compare
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.
S. 145,
286 U. S. 154.
Thus, the essential question is the power of New York to make the
absent owner liable personally for the injury inflicted within the
state by his machine.
When Young gave permission to drive his car to New York, he
subjected himself to the legal consequences imposed by that state
upon Balbino's negligent driving as fully as if he had stood in the
relation of master to servant. A person who sets in motion in one
state the means by which injury is inflicted in another may,
consistently with the due process clause, be made liable for that
injury whether the means employed be a responsible agent or an
irresponsible instrument. The cases are many
Page 289 U. S. 259
in which a person acting outside the state may be held
responsible according to the law of the state for injurious
consequences within it. Thus, liability is commonly imposed under
such circumstances for homicide,
Commonwealth v. Macloon,
101 Mass. 1; for maintenance of a nuisance,
State v. Lord,
16 N.H. 357, 359; for blasting operations,
Cameron v.
Vandergriff, 53 Ark. 381, 386, 13 S.W. 1092, and for negligent
manufacture,
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,
111 N.E. 1050.
The power of the state to protect itself and its inhabitants is
not limited by the scope of the doctrine of principal and agent.
The inadequacy of that doctrine to cope with the menacing problem
of practical responsibility for motor accidents has been widely
felt in cases where the injurious consequences are the immediate
result of an intervening negligent act of another. Some courts have
held, in actions against the owner for injuries resulting from the
driver's negligence, that a presumption of the employment
relationship arises from the fact of ownership, [
Footnote 2] or that, if the relationship is
proved, a presumption arises that the accident occurred within the
scope of the employment. [
Footnote
3] Many courts have extended responsibility, without the aid of
legislation, by imposing liability upon the owner for injuries
resulting from the negligent operation of the car by a member of
his family. [
Footnote 4]
Page 289 U. S. 260
In some states, including New York, the problem was left to the
legislature.
See Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N.Y. 111,
117, 115 N.E. 443. Its statute makes mere permission to use the car
the basis of liability in case of negligent injury. We have no
occasion to decide where the line is to be drawn generally between
conduct which may validly subject an absent party to the laws of a
state and that which may not. No good reason is suggested why,
where there is permission to take the automobile into a state for
use upon its highways, personal liability should not be imposed
upon the owner in case of injury inflicted there by the driver's
negligence, regardless of the fact that the owner is a citizen and
resident of another state.
Compare Thomas v. Matthiessen,
232 U. S. 221,
232 U. S.
234-235. [
Footnote
5]
The claim is made that the statute as applied violates the
equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because, in New Jersey,
under a contract of bailment made within the state, other citizens
are protected from liability
Page 289 U. S. 261
for the negligence of the bailee. Obviously there is no denial
of equal protection, since all who permit their cars to be driven
in New York are treated alike. A claim is also made that the
statute as applied violates the contract clause of the Federal
Constitution, because it impairs the obligation of the contract of
bailment made in New Jersey. As it does not appear that any claim
under the contract clause was made below, we need not consider the
answers to this contention.
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn.
333, 143 A. 163;
Seleine v. Wisner, 200 Iowa, 1389, 206
N.W. 130;
Stapleton v. Independent Brewing Co., 198 Mich.
170, 164 N.W. 520 (
compare Hawkins v. Ermatinger, 211
Mich. 578, 179 N.W. 249);
Kernan v. Webb, 50 R.I. 394, 148
A. 186. Statutes in South Carolina and Tennessee subject the
vehicles to a lien for damages resulting from negligent operation
under certain circumstances.
See Ex parte Maryland Motor Car
Ins. Co., 117 S.C. 100, 108 S.E. 260;
Parker-Harris Co. v.
Tate, 135 Tenn. 509, 188 S.W. 54. A California statute
imposes, in the case of negligent operation by a minor, liability
upon the parent or guardian who has signed the minor's application
for a license.
See Buelke v. Levenstadt, 190 Cal. 684, 214
P. 42.
[
Footnote 2]
Louis v. Johnson, 146 Md. 115, 118, 125 A. 895;
Tischler v. Steinholtz, 99 N.J.Law, 149, 152, 122 A. 880;
West v. Kern, 88 Or. 247, 171 P. 413, 1050;
Griffin v.
Smith, 132 Wash. 624, 232 P. 929;
compare Freeman v.
Dalton, 183 N.C. 538, 111 S.E. 863.
[
Footnote 3]
Benn v. Forrest, 213 F. 763;
Foundation Co. v.
Henderson, 264 F. 483;
Penticost v. Massey, 201 Ala.
261, 77 So. 675;
Wood v. Indianapolis Abattoir Co., 178
Ky. 188, 198 S.W. 732.
[
Footnote 4]
@Hutchins v. Haf
er,
63 Colo. 365, 167 P. 966; Stickney v. Epstein,
100 Conn. 170, 123 A. 1; Griffin v. Russell,
144 Ga.
275, 87 S.E. 10; Steele v. Age's Administratrix,
233 Ky.
714, 26 S.W.2d 563; Plasch v. Fass,
144 Minn. 44, 174 N.W.
438; Linch v. Dobson,
108 Neb. 632, 188 N.W. 227;
Boes v. Howell,
24 N.M. 142, 173 P. 966; Grier v.
Woodside,
200 N.C. 759, 158 S.E. 491; Ulman v. Lindeman,
44 N.D. 36, 176 N.W. 25; Davis v. Littlefield,
97 S.C.
171, 81 S.E. 487; Birch v. Abercrombie,
74 Wash. 486, 133
P. 1020; Jones v. Cook,@ 90 W.Va. 710, 111 S.E. 828.
Compare the liability for harm done by a "dangerous
instrumentality" entrusted by the defendant to an employee but not
used at the time of the injury, in the course of the employment.
Barmore v. Railway Co., 85 Miss. 426, 448, 38 So. 210;
Stewart v. Cary Lumber Co., 146 N.C. 47, 59 S.E. 545;
Railway Co. v. Shields, 47 Ohio St. 387, 392, 24 N.E. 658.
Compare also the liability of a contractee for harm caused
by an independent contractor in the performance of work "inherently
dangerous."
Norwalk Gaslight Co. v. Norwalk, 63 Conn. 495,
28 A. 32, 34;
Joliet v. Harwood, 86 Ill. 110;
Bonaparte v. Wiseman, 89 Md. 12, 21-22, 42 A. 918.
[
Footnote 5]
Compare the scope of the jurisdiction of the courts of
a state over nonresidents in actions based on the operation of
motor vehicles within the state.
Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U. S. 352;
Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160.