In a suit in the District Court to turn assets to account of all
creditors ratably, the receiver, by leave of court, sold all the
assets, taking in lieu the purchaser's agreement to pay a specified
percent of all proved claims, secured by his bond running to the
United States. The purchaser having defaulted, one of the
creditors,
Page 288 U. S. 486
who had proved his claim, obtained leave of the federal court to
sue the obligors on the bond for the agreed percentage of his
claim, in a state court, and brought suit accordingly in the name
of the United States and obtained an attachment of the obligor's
property, and ultimately a judgment. The receiver meanwhile, by an
ancillary bill in the federal court, sought to collect the entire
amount of the bond for the benefit of all the creditors.
Held:
1. That the bond took the place of and represented the estate
for distribution by the federal court. P.
288 U. S.
488.
2. By granting the single creditor leave to sue on the bond in
the state court, the federal court did not part with its
jurisdiction over him or the subject matter. P.
288 U. S.
489.
3. An order of the federal court restraining further prosecution
of the suit in the state court was a lawful exercise of its
jurisdiction. P.
288 U. S.
489.
60 F.2d 16 reversed.
Certiorari, 287 U.S. 591, to review the reversal of an order of
the federal court in a receivership proceeding which rescinded
permission previously granted a creditor to sue in a state court
and enjoined further prosecution of the suit.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In an equity suit in the United States District Court against
the Monroe Stores, Inc., the petitioner, Munroe, was appointed
receiver. One Dempsey made a written offer to purchase the entire
property, stipulating that he would pay the expenses of the
receivership and thirty percent of all claims which might be filed
by a certain date and allowed by the court, and, upon acceptance
give a bond in the penal sum of $100,000, with sureties,
conditioned
Page 288 U. S. 487
that he should perform the contract. The District Court
authorized a sale to Dempsey on the terms set forth in his offer;
the receiver conveyed all of the property in his possession and
took a bond which bound Dempsey as principal and two sureties to
the United States of America. It recited:
"The conditions of this obligation are such, that, whereas, in
Equity case No. 3293, now pending in this District Court of the
United States, District of Massachusetts, entitled J. B. Hirschfeld
& Co. Inc. et als. vs. The Monroe Stores, Inc., Harold A.
Dempsey made an offer in writing to purchase all of the assets of
every name, nature, character, and kind and wheresoever situated,
of George B. Munroe, Receiver of said The Monroe Stores, Inc., as
more fully set forth in said offer, and"
"Whereas, in connection with said offer, a bond guaranteeing the
performance of the conditions and terms of said offer is
required."
"Now therefore if the said Harold A. Dempsey shall comply with
all the conditions and items of said offer, then this obligation to
be void, otherwise to be and remain in full force and effect."
Raphael, within the time limited by order of the District Court,
proved his claim, and the court allowed it for $35,000. After he
had been paid $1,200, Dempsey defaulted, and Raphael applied for
and obtained leave of the District Court to sue Dempsey and his
sureties on the bond in the state court. An attachment suit was
brought in the name of the United States of America on the relation
of respondent and property of the defendants seized which is still
bound by the attachment. Shortly after this action was brought, the
petitioner, as receiver, instituted a suit on the bond by a
supplementary bill in the District Court in the name of the United
States, and a final decree was entered therein against Dempsey and
his sureties for $33,026, which was the amount due all
creditors,
Page 288 U. S. 488
including the respondent. An execution was returned unsatisfied.
The petitioner then instituted proceedings in contempt against
Dempsey and his sureties, and procured an order requiring them to
pay $1,000 a month until the amount awarded should be paid in full.
Thereafter the petitioner moved the District Court to rescind its
prior order granting respondent leave to sue in the state court and
to enjoin further proceedings therein, except the entry of
judgment. At the time of this motion, the suit in the state court
was ripe for judgment. The District Court allowed the motion and
granted the injunction. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
order, 60 F.2d 16. The case is here on certiorari.
The primary purpose of the receivership was to turn the Stores
Company's assets to account for the equal benefit of all creditors.
If the sale had been for cash, the consideration, after payment of
necessary expenses, would have been ratably distributed. In parting
with the property, the receiver, as the court's representative,
took a bond running not to the creditors, but to the United States.
Certainly no creditor could bring a suit in his own name on the
bond for his share of the purchase money. Nor could he institute
such an action without leave of the District Court. The course the
respondent pursued evidences his recognition of these limitations.
Nevertheless, the Circuit Court of Appeals held that the interest
of the United States was merely nominal; that the cause of action
on the bond belonged to the creditors as individuals; that, by
granting the respondent leave to sue in the state court, the
district court lost jurisdiction; that its order permitting such
suit was final, and could not be revoked after the expiration of
the term; and that the order of rescission and injunction violated
§ 265 of the Judicial Code (28 U.S.C. § 379), which forbids federal
courts to enjoin prosecution of suits in state courts.
The petitioner supports the action of the District Court on the
ground that the bond was to stand in place of
Page 288 U. S. 489
the property conveyed, and was taken to enable the court,
through its receiver, to insure the receipt and distribution of the
purchase money amongst the creditors without preference or
priority. He urges that, when leave to sue was given the
respondent, the court evidently considered that such a suit would
not interfere with ratable payment of all entitled to share in the
assets, but that the grant was discretionary, and subject to
revocation if the interests of the creditors should so require. He
says that the court never lost its jurisdiction over the estate,
and the bond represented the estate for distribution.
We think this is the correct view of the matter. The District
Court's order granting leave to respondent, a party in interest in
the receivership, to sue upon the bond in the name of the United
States was not a relinquishment of its jurisdiction over him or the
subject matter. The bond was given to an officer of the court for
faithful performance of a contract with that officer. If at any
time it was made to appear that the permitted suit by a single
creditor might work an injustice to the others, it was within the
court's power to revoke the permission.
The parties refer us to decisions as to the right of action on
statutory bonds given to the United States by contractors,
providing,
inter alia, for the payment of subcontractors
and materialmen (
U.S. Fidelity & G. Co. v.
Kenyon, 204 U. S. 349;
Illinois Surety Co. v. Peeler, 240 U.
S. 214,
240 U. S.
223), or official bonds required by law (
Howard v.
United States, 184 U. S. 676).
But these are not helpful in the present case. Here, the
outstanding fact is that the bond was taken by the court to protect
all creditors. Any suit upon it must be in furtherance, and not in
contravention, of that purpose.
Holding, as we do, that the manner of the enforcement of
Dempsey's obligation remained within the control of the District
Court, we conclude that the order which is the subject of the
controversy was neither beyond its jurisdiction (
compare
103 U. S.
Huidekoper, 103 U.S.
Page 288 U. S. 490
494,
103 U. S. 497;
Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U. S.
93,
193 U. S. 112;
Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.
S. 226,
260 U. S.
229), nor an unlawful interference with the prosecution
of a suit in a state court (
compare Riehle v. Margolies,
279 U. S. 218,
279 U. S.
223).
The judgment must be
Reversed.