1. The owner of oil extracted by him from restricted Indian land
under leases approved by the Secretary of the Interior is not
immune from taxation of it under the general law of the state for
ad valorem taxation when it has been removed from the
restricted land and stored in the owner's tanks and the Indians
have no further interest in it. P.
288 U. S.
326.
2. There is a recognized distinction between a nondiscriminatory
tax upon the property of an agent of government, albeit the
property is used in, or has relation to, the business of the agency
-- where there is only a remote, if any, influence upon the
exercise of the function of government -- and a tax which is deemed
to impose a direct burden upon the exertion of governmental power.
P.
288 U. S.
327.
159 Okla. 15,
13 P.2d 585,
159 Okla. ff,
14 P.2d 929,
affirmed.
Page 288 U. S. 326
Certiorari, 287 U.S. 594, to review judgments sustaining state
taxes on stored oil which had been extracted under leases from
restricted Indian allotments.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases present the question of the validity of
ad
valorem taxes upon crude oil belonging to petitioner, Indian
Territory Illuminating Oil Company, and held by it in its storage
tanks in Tulsa County and Payne County, Oklahoma. In each case, the
tax was challenged upon the ground that the oil was exempt because,
in its production, petitioner was operating as an instrumentality
of the United states. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma sustained the
taxes,
159 Okla. 15,
13 P.2d 585;
14 P.2d 929,
and the cases come here on writs of certiorari.
The facts are shown by agreed statements. The oil in question
was assessed under the general laws of the state for annual
ad
valorem taxes as a part of the personal property of petitioner
within the respective counties. It constituted petitioner's share
of oil which petitioner had produced from restricted Indian lands
in Seminole County, Oklahoma, under leases which had been approved
by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Act of Congress of
May 27, 1908, 35 Stat. 312. In the
Tulsa County case (No.
356), the assessment was for the year
Page 288 U. S. 327
1929, and included 51,630 barrels of crude oil which had been
produced from the restricted lands above mentioned during the
period from March 31, 1927, to June 16, 1927. This oil, on
production, had been commingled with oil from petitioner's
"commercial" or unrestricted leasehold properties in Seminole
County, and had been immediately piped into petitioner's storage
tanks in Tulsa County, where it had remained. At the time of the
removal of the oil, petitioner paid to the Superintendent of the
Five Civilized Tribes for the lessors the agreed royalty of 12 1/2
percent of the gross proceeds, and the Indians owned no part of the
oil in storage on January 1, 1929, the date of assessment, nor will
they receive any part of the proceeds when the oil is sold by
petitioner. In the
Payne County case (No. 357), the
question concerns 383,307 barrels of crude oil produced from the
restricted lands prior to January 1, 1928 (the assessment date) and
piped, with other oil, into petitioner's storage tanks in Payne
County, and there held.
In
Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U.
S. 609, an
ad valorem tax upon ores mined under
a lease of restricted Indian land and in the bins on that land on
the assessment date was held to be invalid. The tax "was assessed
on the ores in mass, and the royalties or equitable interests of
the Indians had not been paid or segregated."
Id., p.
271 U. S. 612.
In these circumstances, the tax was regarded as an attempt to tax
an agency of the federal government. That decision is not
controlling in the instant case. Here, payment had been made for
the share of the Indian lessors, and they had no further interest
in the oil. It had been commingled with other oil, had been
transported from the restricted lands to petitioner's storage tanks
in the taxing counties, and was there held exclusively in the
interest and for the convenience of petitioner.
There is a recognized distinction between a nondiscriminatory
tax upon the property of an agent of government,
Page 288 U. S. 328
albeit the property is used in, or has relation to, the business
of the agency -- where there is only a remote, if any, influence
upon the exercise of the functions of government -- and a tax which
is deemed to impose a direct burden upon the exertion of
governmental powers.
McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
17 U. S. 436;
Thomson v. Union Pacific
Railroad, 9 Wall. 579,
76 U. S. 590;
Railroad Co. v.
Peniston, 18 Wall. 5,
85 U. S. 33,
85 U. S. 36;
Baltimore Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Baltimore,
195 U. S. 375,
195 U. S. 382;
Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Mackey, 256 U.
S. 531,
256 U. S. 536;
Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216,
282 U. S.
225-226;
Susquehanna Power Co. v. Tax Commission
(No. 1), 283 U. S. 291,
283 U. S. 294;
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal 286 U. S. 123,
286 U. S. 130;
Broad River Power Co. v. Query, ante, p.
288 U. S. 178. In
this instance, the tax is not on the oil leases (
Indian
Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U.
S. 522,
240 U. S.
530), or upon the privilege of extracting the oil or
upon the income derived therefrom.
Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co.
v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292,
235 U. S.
298-299;
Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.
S. 501,
257 U. S. 506.
See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.
S. 393,
285 U. S. 399.
Such immunity as petitioner enjoyed as a governmental
instrumentality inhered in its operations as such, and, being for
the protection of the Government in its function, extended no
further than was necessary for that purpose. The holding of the oil
in question, which had been segregated and withdrawn from the
restricted lands as petitioner's exclusive property, awaiting
disposition at petitioner's pleasure, was for its sole advantage
and cannot be said to be so identified with its operations as a
governmental instrumentality as to entitle it to exemption from the
general property taxes imposed by the state in return for the
protection the state afforded. With respect to these taxes, this
oil was in no different case from that of the other oil of
petitioner with which it was commingled.
Judgments affirmed.
* Together with No. 357,
Indian Territory Illuminating Oil
Co. v. Board of County Commissioners of Payne County.