1. At a waterfront terminal maintained by an interstate rail
carrier for freight interchanges, the carrier is bound by § 3(3) of
the Interstate Commerce Act to afford reasonable and proper
facilities to other carriers for that purpose, and, when towing
carfloats, must exercise reasonable care to avoid damage by
collision to carfloats of another carrier engaged in receiving and
delivering traffic. P.
288 U. S.
241.
2. This duty of reasonable care being one imposed by law in
respect of a service such as common carriers are bound to render in
the public interest, the carrier owing it cannot escape it by
notifying other carriers that it will not be responsible for future
damage to their floating equipment while lying at its terminal,
whether caused by negligence or otherwise. P.
288 U. S.
242.
3. A carrier receiving such a notice need not answer, and its
silence will not imply a contract. P.
288 U. S. 243.
4. Facilities furnished at a water terminal merely for
interchange of traffic from tracks to carfloats and vice versa
held not "terminal facilities" within the meaning of §
3(4) of the Interstate Commerce Act. P.
288 U. S.
242.
57 F.2d 144 reversed.
Certiorari, 287 U.S. 587, to review the reversal of a decree in
admiralty holding a tug liable for damage to a carfloat by
collision.
Page 288 U. S. 240
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit in admiralty brought by petitioner in the
Southern district of New York against the tug
Talisman, of
which respondent is the owner and claimant, to recover damages to
carfloat No. 37 belonging to petitioner. The case was submitted on
an agreed statement of facts.
Petitioner and respondent were common carriers engaged in
interstate commerce. The damages resulted from a collision October
29, 1926, between petitioner's carfloat No. 58 while in tow of the
Talisman and carfloat No. 37, which was moored in a
carfloat bridge of respondent's terminal at Long Island City. The
collision was occasioned solely by the negligence of the
Talisman and those in charge of her. Respondent received
No. 37 at the terminal named in connection with the transportation
in interstate commerce of freight cars and freight. Petitioner had
received by registered mail from respondent a notice dated July 31,
1920:
"We beg to inform you that it has become necessary to cease
being responsible for vessels lying at our terminals, Long Island
City and Bay Ridge, Brooklyn. On and after September 1, 1920, the
following conditions will apply to all floating equipment lying at
Long Island Railroad Company terminals, Long Island City and Bay
Ridge, Brooklyn: All vessels, floats, craft or any kind of floating
equipment, lying at the Long Island Railroad terminals, Long Island
City or Bay Ridge, Brooklyn, are at the risk of the vessel, float,
or craft. This company will not be responsible for any damage
received by said floating equipment while lying at the above
mentioned terminals, whether said damage arises through the
negligence of this company and/or its employees, or through other
causes. This notice applies to all floats, whether in charge of a
floatman or not, while lying moored at the Long
Page 288 U. S. 241
Island Railroad Company terminals, Long Island City, or Bay
Ridge, Brooklyn."
Petitioner had made no reply to the notice.
The district court held respondent liable. 52 F.2d 691. The
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 57 F.2d 144.
Petitioner and respondent were connecting carriers. As such,
each, in the discharge of its duties to the public, owed to
shippers of freight in its possession destined to points on or
routed over the railway of the other the duty to deliver to the
connecting line for further transportation, and each was
correspondingly bound to receive and carry.
Railroad
Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 16 Wall. 318,
83 U. S. 324;
Myrick v. Michigan Central R. Co., 107 U.
S. 102,
107 U. S. 106;
Dunham v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 70 Me. 164, 170;
Atchison, T. & S.F. Railroad v. Denver & N.O. R.
Co., 110 U. S. 667,
110 U. S. 683;
Andrus v. Columbia & Okanogan Steamboat Co., 47 Wash.
333, 338, 92 P. 128. Such carriers were not bound under the common
law to make track connections.
Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v.
Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287,
179 U. S. 296;
Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co. v. Denver & N.O. R. Co.,
supra. The Interstate Commerce Act empowered the Commission to
require such connections.
Alabama & V. Ry. Co. v. Jackson
& E. Ry. Co., 271 U. S. 244.
And § 3(3) provides that all carriers shall, according to their
respective powers, "afford all reasonable, proper, and equal
facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective
lines." Respondent's terminal and carfloat bridge constituted the
place and means long used for such interchange. It is not suggested
that, at the time of the collision, petitioner's carfloat was not
where respondent intended to have it brought, or that petitioner
could have selected any other place or means. It was not free
elsewhere to tender the traffic. In view of the
Page 288 U. S. 242
duty put upon respondent by the policy of the law, it was bound
to exercise reasonable care for the safety of petitioner's carfloat
while engaged in delivering and receiving traffic.
Bennett v.
Railroad Co., 102 U. S. 577;
Woodruff v. Painter & Eldridge, 150 Pa. 91, 96, 24 A.
621.
But respondent insists that, if dissatisfied with the terms of
the notice it sent, petitioner's remedy was to appeal to the
Interstate Commerce Commission for relief under paragraph (4) of §
3. That position is not tenable. The place and bridge furnished by
respondent for interchange are not terminal facilities within the
intention of that paragraph. The expression "terminal facilities,
including main-line track or tracks for a reasonable distance
outside of such terminal, of any carrier" does not include mere
interchange facilities. Petitioner's use of respondent's property
involved no taking requiring the ascertainment of just compensation
as provided in that paragraph.
Pennsylvania Co. v. United
States, 236 U. S. 351,
236 U. S. 368.
Moreover, the requirement in paragraph (3) that carriers shall
furnish "equal" facilities for interchange negatives the suggestion
that paragraph (4) applies.
For the better discharge of their duties, these public servants
were required by the Act to cooperate in effecting interchange of
traffic. Respondent could not, by its own act, relieve itself of
any duty imposed upon it by law or arising out of the nature of its
undertaking in respect of the required interchange. It was
powerless, by mere announcement, to fix the terms on which it would
participate with petitioner and other connecting carriers in
effecting such interchange. It cites
Sun Oil Co. v. Dalzell
Towing Co., 287 U. S. 291. But
the towage company was not bound to render the service there
involved, and was not a common carrier or liable as such. That
case, and the cases cited which arose under contracts for towage,
plainly have no application to the question under consideration.
Here,
Page 288 U. S. 243
the respondent's duty to petitioner arose out of the law
governing its occupation. Petitioner made no reply to the notice
sent it by respondent. In view of the character of respondent's
duties, no contract can be implied from petitioner's silence. That
quite as reasonably may be deemed to imply, if any implication is
to be drawn, that petitioner intended to stand on its rights and
not to surrender them. And, as respondent was not in position to
dictate terms, petitioner was under no obligation to repudiate
those proposed or to reply in any manner to the notice.
New Jersey Steam Navigation
Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344,
47 U. S. 383;
Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 234, 242, 246;
York Co. v. Illinois Central
Railroad, 3 Wall. 107,
70 U. S. 113;
Railroad Co. v. Manufacturing Co., supra, 83 U. S. 329;
Judson v. Western Railroad Corp., 6 Allen (Mass.) 487,
490, 491, 83 Am.Dec. 646;
Gott v. Dinsmore, 111 Mass. 45,
52.
Reversed.