1. In a case under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, as applied to employment in the District of
Columbia, the issue before the deputy commissioner was whether the
injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. This
turned on the general nature and scope of the employee's duties,
the particular instructions he had received, the practice that
obtained as to work in extra hours or on Sundays, and the purpose
of a journey in which he was injured.
Held:
Page 288 U. S. 163
(1) That Congress had power to invest the deputy commissioner
with authority to determine these question after proper hearing and
upon proper evidence, and
(2) That the findings of fact made by the deputy commissioner in
the course prescribed by the statute and upon sufficient evidence
are conclusive.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S.
22. P.
288 U. S.
166.
2. When, by agreement, either express or implied, in the course
of business, the service of an employee in extra hours or on
special errands begins when he leaves his home on the duty assigned
and continues until his return, the hazards of the journey may
properly be regarded as hazards of the service, and hence within
the Compensation Act. P.
288 U. S.
169.
61 App.D.C. 173, 58 F.2d 1074, reversed.
Supreme Court, D.C. affirmed.
Certiorari, 287 U.S. 592, to review the reversal of a decree
dismissing the bill in a suit to enjoin a deputy commissioner of
compensation from enforcing a compensation order. The suit was
brought by the Insurance Company, and the employee, petitioner
here, was permitted to intervene.
Page 288 U. S. 165
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
By the Act of Congress of May 17, 1928 (45 Stat. 600, D.C.Code,
Tit.19, §§ 11, 12), the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act (33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950) are made
applicable to employees, as stated, in the District of Columbia.
Petitioner, Karl F. Voehl, an employee of the National Electrical
Supply Company, which was engaged in business in the District,
filed a claim for compensation for an injury sustained through an
automobile accident while he was on his way to his employer's place
of business on Sunday, April 6, 1930, for the purpose, according to
his contention, of performing the duties assigned to him. The
employer was notified, and hearing was had before the Deputy
Commissioner. Respondent, the insurance carrier of the employer,
contested the claim. Admitting that the relationship of employer
and employee existed on the date of the injury and that the
employer was subject to the Compensation Act, respondent defended
upon the ground that the injury did not arise out of and in the
course of the employment. The Deputy Commissioner received the
evidence offered, which included the testimony of the employer's
manager with respect to the petitioner's duties, and made a
compensation order setting forth detailed findings of fact
supporting the claim and awarding compensation.
Respondent then filed a bill of complaint in the Supreme Court
of the District to obtain an injunction restraining the enforcement
of the compensation order, and annexed to the bill, as a part
thereof, the full record of
Page 288 U. S. 166
the proceedings and evidence before the Deputy Commissioner.
Respondent charged that the compensation order, findings, and award
were not in accordance with law and were not supported by the
evidence. Petitioner was permitted to intervene. Motion by the
Deputy Commissioner to dismiss the bill of complaint was granted,
and decree was entered accordingly. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
of the District, taking a different view of the evidence, reversed
the decree, 58 F.2d 1074, and the case comes here on
certiorari.
The relation of master and servant admittedly existed. The
business of the employer, carried on within the District, and the
nature of the petitioner's employment were such that both were
subject to the Compensation Act. D.C.Code, Tit.19, §§ 11, 12. By
the express provisions of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner was
authorized to entertain the claim of the employee and "to hear and
determine all questions in respect of such claim." 33 U.S.C. §
919(a). The proceedings of the Deputy Commissioner conformed to the
statute. The precise issue, whether the injury arose out of and in
the course of the employment, turned on the general nature and
scope of the employee's duties, the particular instructions he had
received, and the practice which obtained as to work in extra hours
or on Sundays, and the purpose of the journey in which he was
injured. We think that there can be no doubt of the power of the
Congress to invest the Deputy Commissioner, as it has invested him,
with authority to determine these questions after proper hearing
and upon sufficient evidence. And when the Deputy Commissioner,
following the course prescribed by the statute, makes such a
determination, his findings of fact, supported by evidence, must be
deemed to be conclusive.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S.
22,
285 U. S. 46-47;
L'Hote v. Crowell, 286 U.S. 528.
The Deputy Commissioner found that petitioner was injured while
on his way to the employer's warehouse for
Page 288 U. S. 167
the purpose of clearing it of debris in accordance with his
duties, and that, when so engaged on Sunday, the terms of his
employment covered the period of service from the time he left his
home until his return, his compensation for this service being at
an agreed rate per hour for the entire time, with an allowance for
his transportation. We think that these findings were supported by
the proof. From the testimony of the employer's manager who had
supervision of petitioner's work, it appeared that petitioner,
being employed in the "refrigeration division" of the supply
company, had charge of the maintenance and operation of the
company's warehouse and of the maintenance of service on
refrigerators in customers' homes. He was the "head of the products
division." With other matters, it was his duty to see that the
buildings and stock were kept in proper order, and that there was
compliance with the fire rules. He had strict instructions with
respect to the disposition of debris and its prompt removal. Voehl
was a trusted employee who had been with the company for sixteen
years, and the company relied upon him to attend to whatever was
necessary in the line of his work without specific or detailed
instructions. His regular hours at the company's building were from
7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. The manager testified that, in addition to
these hours, Voehl was
"on duty all of the time, on our call. That is to say, he was a
very willing employee, and we kept him purposely for taking care of
emergencies and seeing that all details were cleaned up
properly."
By reason of the 24-hour service which the company maintained,
Voehl was always subject to the calls of customers, responding
either personally or through one of the service men under his
direction. He had access to the warehouse at all times. Voehl used
his own automobile, and when he was at work for the company outside
of "office hours" and on Sundays, he was paid a mileage rate of
five cents a mile for the use of his car, and at the rate of 75
cents per
Page 288 U. S. 168
hour from the time he left his home until his return. As the one
in charge of the warehouse and service, Voehl submitted weekly a
memorandum of the overtime of the employees under him and his own.
The company had found him to be honest in his statements, and his
overtime account was never questioned.
Respondent's contention was that Voehl was going to the
warehouse for a purpose of his own -- to obtain ashes to place in
front of his house -- being accompanied by his brother-in-law to
assist him in their removal. The evidence showed that the company
did not object to the employees' taking ashes, but their removal
was not part of Voehl's work. Voehl's statement was that the
purpose of his Sunday trip was to remove an unusual accumulation of
trash, which it was his duty to remove, and that, under his orders,
it was necessary for him to do this on Sunday in order that the
building might be in proper condition on the following morning. He
said that he often had "to come down on Sundays to finish cleaning
up," that the manager inspected the warehouse "every Monday morning
to see that it was free of all trash," and that he (Voehl) did his
utmost "to have the building clean for inspection." While his
brother-in-law testified as to the intention to take the ashes, he
also said that Voehl "went there specifically to straighten up the
warehouse and bring the ashes back home when he came back." Voehl's
statement as to the necessity of his trip on the particular Sunday,
in the course of his duties, finds corroboration in the testimony
of the manager. The latter said that Voehl had authority to go to
the plant on the Sunday in question, and that he could have made a
charge for his service on that day and for his mileage. While the
manager did not himself know the condition of the plant on the day
of the accident or the day before, he did know that there had been
an unusual amount of unpacking of refrigerators during the
Page 288 U. S. 169
three days before the accident, and that such work was "always
attended by a large accumulation of trash and litter which must be
cleared up." He said that, "two or three days prior to the
accident," he had called Voehl's attention "to the necessity of
keeping it better cleared up;" he knew that the warehouse at that
time "was in a badly littered condition." The manager also had
information as to Voehl's work on previous Sundays, and, on
respondent's request, furnished a statement of what the manager
described as an "exactly parallel instance" for which Voehl had
been paid, and he believed that, if the records of the busy season
from April to August were available, they would show other similar
instances.
Upon this evidence and the findings of the Deputy Commissioner,
the compensation order did not violate any principle of law. The
general rule is that injuries sustained by employees when going to
or returning from their regular place of work are not deemed to
arise out of and in the course of their employment. [
Footnote 1] Ordinarily, the hazards they
encounter in such journeys are not incident to the employer's
business. But this general rule is subject to exceptions which
depend upon the nature and circumstances of the particular
employment. "No exact formula can be laid down which will
automatically solve every case."
Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Parramore, 263 U. S. 418,
263 U. S. 424.
See also Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.
S. 154,
276 U. S. 158.
While service on regular hours at a stated place generally begins
at that place, there is always room for agreement by which the
service may be taken to begin earlier or elsewhere. Service in
extra hours or on special
Page 288 U. S. 170
errands has an element of distinction which the employer may
recognize by agreeing that such service shall commence when the
employee leaves his home on the duty assigned to him, and shall
continue until his return. And agreement to that effect may be
either express or be shown by the course of business. In such case,
the hazards of the journey may properly be regarded as hazards of
the service, and hence within the purview of the Compensation Act.
[
Footnote 2]
The decree of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the
Supreme Court of the District is affirmed.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Podgorski v. Kerwin, 144 Minn. 313, 175 N.W. 694;
Nesbitt v. Twin City F. & F. Co., 145 Minn. 286, 177
N.W. 131;
De Voe v. New York State Railways, 218 N.Y. 318,
113 N.E. 256;
Grathwohl v. Nassau Point Club Properties,
216 App.Div. 107, 214 N.Y.S. 496; 243 N.Y. 567, 154 N.E. 608;
Gilmour v. Dorman, 105 L.T. (N.S.) 54.
[
Footnote 2]
Jett v. Turner, 215 Ala. 352, 110 So. 702;
State
Compensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial Accident Commission,
89 Cal. App. 197, 264 P. 514;
Swanson v. Latham, 92 Conn.
87, 101 A. 492;
Ohmen v. Adams Brothers, 109 Conn. 378,
146 A. 825;
Littlefield's Case, 126 Me. 159, 136 A. 724;
Vogel's Case, 257 Mass. 3, 153 N.E. 175;
State ex rel.
McCarthy Bros. Co. v. District Court, 141 Minn. 61, 169 N.W.
274;
Martin v. Henry Card & Co., 193 App.Div. 6, 183
N.Y.S. 88;
Gibbs v. R. H. Macy & Co., 214 App.Div.
335, 212 N.Y.S. 428; 242 N.Y. 551, 152 N.E. 423;
MacClelland v.
Dodge Brothers, 233 App.Div. 504, 253 N.Y.S. 773;
Messer
v. Mfrs. Light & Heat Co., 263 Pa. 5, 106 A. 85;
Cymbor v. Binder Coal Co., 285 Pa. 440, 132 A. 363;
Rock County v. Industrial Commission, 185 Wis. 134, 200
N.W. 657;
Consolidated Underwriters v. Breedlove, 114 Tex.
172, 265 S.W. 128.
See also McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497,
102 N.E. 697;
Marks' Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90, 167
N.E. 181.