1. Under the Act of Congress authorizing the establishment of
Rock Creek Park in the District of Columbia, the lands taken for
the park by purchase and condemnation were " perpetually dedicated
and set apart as a public park or pleasure ground for the benefit
and enjoyment of the people of the United States." By Act of a
later Congress, the Commissioners of the District were directed to
erect a fire engine house at a designated location in the park.
Owners of neighboring land, claiming a right, in the nature of an
easement, to have the land used for park purposes and no other,
sought to enjoin the construction.
Held:
(1) The neighboring landowners derived no rights against the
Government from the dedication of the park alone, since this
constituted only a declaration of public policy by the particular
Congress, which was not binding on its successors. P.
287 U. S.
318.
(2) Assuming that the building of the engine house was a
diversion of the land from park uses, the change of use was within
the legislative power. P.
287 U. S.
320.
2. The existence of value alone does not generate interests
protected by the Constitution against diminution by the Government
especially where the value was both created and diminished as an
incident of the operation of government. P.
287 U. S.
319.
3. The Rock Creek Park Act directed that surrounding lands be
assessed to the extent that they were "specially benefited by
reason
Page 287 U. S. 316
of the location and improvement" of the park.
Held,
that inasmuch as the dedication of the park did not imply a promise
to neighboring landowners that it would be continue in perpetuity,
this was not one of the special benefits required to be assessed,
and the landowners therefore derived no right to perpetual
maintenance of the park by virtue of the assessment; the benefits
intended to be assessed must be taken to be those obvious
advantages which would accrue to lands in the vicinity of the park
because of their location, and which would be reflected in their
market value even though there were no guaranty that the park would
be continued for any particular length of time. P.
287 U. S.
321.
4. Statutes restricting the power of government by the creation
of private rights are to be strictly construed for the protection
of the public interest. P.
287 U. S. 321.
5. Zoning regulations for the District of Columbia are not
contracts by the government, and may be modified by Congress. P.
287 U. S.
323.
60 App.D.C. 325, 53 F.2d 1079, reversed.
Certiorari, 285 U.S. 535, to review a decree affirming a decree
enjoining the Commissioners of the District of Columbia from
constructing a fire engine house in Rock Creek Park.
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is here on certiorari, 285 U.S. 535, to review a
decree of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, 60
App.D.C. 325, 53 F.2d 1079. Following its earlier decision in
Quinn v. Dougherty, 58 App.D.C. 339, 30 F.2d 749, that
court affirmed a decree of the Supreme Court of the District,
enjoining the petitioners, the District Commissioners, from
erecting a fire engine house in Rock Creek Park at a point near
Page 287 U. S. 317
the property of some of the respondents, and adjoining that of
others.
The Commissioners are directed by act of Congress, 45 Stat. 667,
to build the engine house at the designated location within the
park. The presence of such a structure will, it is admitted,
diminish the attractiveness of respondents' lands for residence
purposes, and, in consequence, decrease their exchange value.
Respondents contend that they have a valuable right appurtenant to
their land, in the nature of an easement, to have the land used for
park purposes, and that the act of Congress, directing its use for
other purposes, is a taking of their property without just
compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
For present purposes we assume that the proposed building with
divert the land from park uses, and address ourselves to the
question upon which the other issues in the case depend -- whether
the respondents, plaintiffs in the trial court, are vested with the
right for which they invoke constitutional protection.
There is no contention that such a right arises as an incident
to the ownership of neighboring land, as does an easement of light
and air, under the law of some states.
See Muhlker v. Harlem R.
Co., 197 U. S. 544,
197 U. S. 564.
Compare Marchand v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 153 U.
S. 380. But it is argued that the right asserted,
whether it be regarded as arising from a contract with the
government or an interest in its lands, has a definite source in
the transaction by which the park was created.
The court below found this source in the first section of the
Rock Creek Park Act, 26 Stat. 492, by which the lands taken for the
park by purchase or condemnation were "perpetually dedicated and
set apart as a public park or pleasure ground for the benefit and
enjoyment of the people of the United States, . . . " and in the
assessment
Page 287 U. S. 318
under § 6, [
Footnote 1] of
surrounding lands, including those of respondents, to the extent
that they were "specially benefited by reason of the location and
improvement" of the park. The question is thus one of construction
of the statute; if it did not create the private rights asserted,
it is unnecessary to invoke the police power, as petitioners do, to
justify the construction of the engine house.
Cf. Jackman v.
Rosenbaum Co., 260 U. S. 22,
260 U. S.
31.
First. The respondents derived no rights against the
government from the dedication of the park alone. The park lands
purchased or condemned by authority of the Rock Creek Park Act were
vested in the United States in fee. Section 3 of the act twice
declares that "the title" and once that "the fee" of the condemned
lands shall vest in the United States. By dedicating the lands thus
acquired to a particular public use, Congress declared a public
policy, but did not purport to deprive itself of the power to
change that policy by devoting the lands to other uses. The
dedication expressed no more than the will of a particular Congress
which does not impose itself upon those to follow in succeeding
years.
See Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U.
S. 548,
100 U. S. 559;
Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.
S. 602,
172 U. S.
621.
It is true that the mere presence of the park may have conferred
a special benefit on neighboring owners and
Page 287 U. S. 319
enhanced the value of their property. But the existence of value
alone does not generate interests protected by the Constitution
against diminution by the government, however unreasonable its
action may be. The beneficial use, and hence the value of abutting
property, is decreased when a public street or canal is closed or
obstructed by public authority,
Meyer v. Richmond,
172 U. S. 82,
172 U. S. 95;
cf. Whitney v. New York, 96 N.Y. 240;
Fox v.
Cincinnati, 104 U. S. 783;
Kirk v. Maumee Valley Co., 279 U.
S. 797,
279 U. S.
802-803;
Smith v. Boston, 7 Cush. 254;
Stanwood v. Malden, 157 Mass. 17, 31 N.E. 702; or a street
grade is raised,
Smith v.
Washington, 20 How. 135;
see Mead v.
Portland, 200 U. S. 148,
200 U. S. 162;
or the location of a county seat,
Newton v. Commissioners,
supra, or of a railroad is changed,
Bryan v. Louisville
& N. R. Co., 244 F. 650, 659. But in such cases, no
private right is infringed. [
Footnote 2]
Beyond the traditional boundaries of the common law, only some
imperative justification in policy will lead the courts to
recognize in old values new property rights.
Compare
International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.
S. 215,
with Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp.,
35 F.2d 279. The case is clear where the question is not of private
rights alone, but the value was both created and diminished as an
incident of the operations of the government. For, if the enjoyment
of a benefit thus derived from the public acts of government were a
source of legal rights to have it perpetuated, the powers of
government would be exhausted by their exercise.
Page 287 U. S. 320
The case of a park is not unique, as the court below seems to
have thought. [
Footnote 3]
See Quinn v. Dougherty, 58 App.D.C. 339, 30 F.2d 749, 751.
It has often been decided that, when lands are acquired by a
governmental body in fee and dedicated by statute to park purposes,
it is within the legislative power to change the use,
Clark v.
Providence, 16 R.I. 337, 15 A. 763;
Mowry v.
Providence, 16 R.I. 422, 16 A. 511;
Seattle Land &
Improvement Co. v. Seattle, 37 Wash. 274, 79 P. 780;
Reichling v. Covington Lumber Co., 57 Wash. 225, 106 P.
777;
see Higginson v. Boston, 212 Mass. 583, 99 N.E. 523;
or to make other disposition of the land,
Wright v.
Walcott, 238 Mass. 432, 131 N.E. 291;
see Brooklyn Park
Commissioners v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234, 245;
compare East
Chicago Co. v. East Chicago, 171 Ind. 654, 87 N.E. 17;
Whitney v. New York, supra; Eldridge v. Binghamton, 120
N.Y. 309, 24 N.E. 462. The abutting owner cannot complain; the
damage suffered by him "though greater in degree than that of the
rest of the public, is the same in kind."
See United States v.
Welch, 217 U. S. 333,
217 U. S.
339.
Page 287 U. S. 321
Second. The fact that lands, including those now owned
by respondents, were assessed for benefits, as directed by the Rock
Creek Park Act, leads to no different conclusion. Respondents urge
that the special benefits required to be assessed included those
accruing from the perpetual maintenance of the park; that, by
virtue of the assessment, they have paid for the right to enjoy
those benefits in perpetuity. We may assume that the landowners
acquired rights commensurate with the assessments authorized. But
the statute does not purport to place restrictions on the park
lands in their favor, and the decision of this Court sustaining the
constitutionality of the assessment provision (
Wilson v.
Lambert, 168 U. S. 611),
gives no hint that among the benefits for which they were required
to pay was a right against the government to have the lands forever
used as a park.
All that the statute says is that the lands acquired shall be
perpetually dedicated as a park for the enjoyment of the people of
the United States (§ 1), and that benefits shall be assessed (§ 6).
Statutes said to restrict the power of government by the creation
of private rights are, like other public grants, to be strictly
construed for the protection of the public interest.
Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge, 11 Pet. 420,
36 U. S.
544-548;
Christ Church v. County of
Philadelphia, 24 How. 300;
Knoxville Water Co.
v. Knoxville, 200 U. S. 22,
200 U. S. 33;
Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U. S. 429.
Thus construed, the dedication of the park, a declaration of a
present purpose, does not imply a promise to neighboring landowners
that the park would be continued in perpetuity.
Cf. Newton v.
Commissioners, supra. The benefit of a governmental obligation
which the statute neither expresses nor implies obviously was not
to be assessed.
We think that the benefits intended must be taken to be those
obvious advantages which would accrue to lands in the vicinity of a
park, because of their location, and
Page 287 U. S. 322
which would be reflected in their market value, even though
there were no guaranty that the park would be continued for any
particular length of time. [
Footnote 4]
See Wilson v. Lambert, supra,
168 U. S. 617;
cf. Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax Comm'n,
283 U. S. 291,
283 U. S. 296;
Burbank v. Fay, 65 N.Y. 57, 64. So it was held in
Thayer v. Boston, 206 F. 969, where contentions very
similar to those made here were rejected.
See also Brooklyn
Park Commissioners v. Armstrong, supra, 245. The same result
has been reached with regard to the assessment of benefits arising
from other types of public improvements,
Whitney v. New York,
supra, 246;
Chicago v. Union Building Assn., 102 Ill.
379, 397;
Kean v. Elizabeth, 54 N.J.Law, 462, 24 A. 495,
aff'd, 55 N.J.Law, 337, 26 A. 939;
see Home for Aged
Women v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 422, 429, 430, 89 N.E. 124; 1
Nichols, Eminent Domain (2d ed.) § 116, and is implicit in the
statement, frequently made, that such assessments are an exercise
of the taxing power.
See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.
S. 548,
167 U. S. 588;
Wilson v. Lambert, supra, 168 U. S. 614;
Memphis & Charleston Ry. v. Pace, 282 U.
S. 241,
282 U. S.
245.
Page 287 U. S. 323
The possibility that the United States might, at some later
date, rightfully exercise its power to change the use of the park
lands, so far as it affected present value, was a proper subject
for consideration in valuing the benefits conferred.
Cf. United
States v. River Rouge Co., 269 U. S. 411;
Sears v. Street Commissioners, 180 Mass. 274, 282, 62 N.E.
397;
Whitney v. New York, supra; 1 Nichols, Eminent
Domain,
supra.
Property was not taken without just compensation by either the
Rock Creek Park Act or the statute authorizing the construction of
the fire house. The only taking occurred when the lands were
condemned for the park. Just compensation, the value at that time,
Vogelstein & Co. v. United States, 262 U.
S. 337;
United States v. New River Collieries
Co., 262 U. S. 341,
262 U. S. 344,
was awarded if the benefits resulting from the proximity of the
improvement, valued as the act prescribed, were, as respondents
assert, set off against the value of the property taken from the
same owners,
Bauman v. Ross, supra; Whitney v. New York, supra;
Eldridge v. Binghamton, supra. See Matter of New
York, 190 N.Y. 350, 357, 360, 83 N.E. 299.
We note, but do not discuss at length, the objection that the
statute authorizing the construction of the fire house is invalid
because inconsistent with regulations under the Zoning Act for the
District (41 Stat. 500), setting apart the area in the vicinity of
the park for residential properties of the highest class. It is
enough to say that the zoning regulations are not contracts by the
government and may be modified by Congress. The record and briefs
disclose no facts which require us to consider how far the exercise
of the power to modify may be subject to constitutional
limitations.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
"Sec. 6. That the commission having ascertained the cost of the
land, including expenses, shall assess such proportion of such cost
and expenses upon the lands, lots, and blocks situated in the
District of Columbia specially benefited by reason of the location
and improvement of said park, as nearly as may be, in proportion to
the benefits resulting to such real estate."
"If said commission shall find that the real estate in said
District directly benefited by reason of the location of the park
is not benefited to the full extent of the estimated cost and
expenses, then they shall assess each tract or parcel of land
specially benefited to the extent of such benefits as they shall
deem the said real estate specially benefited. . . ."
26 Stat. 493.
[
Footnote 2]
Compare the decisions holding that access to a water
line may be destroyed in the interest of navigation,
Gibson v.
United States, 166 U. S. 269;
Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141;
cf. Greenleaf Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.
S. 251; or a tract of land, unrelated to that taken,
incidentally damaged,
Sharp v. United States, 191 U.
S. 341;
cf. Richards v. Washington Terminal
Co., 233 U. S. 546,
233 U. S.
553-554, without payment of compensation.
[
Footnote 3]
A different question is presented in the cases relied on by the
court below which indicate that a dedication of land to the public,
by an individual, or a conveyance to a municipality, to be used as
a park, is subject to a condition or imposes a trust that the use
be continued, breach of which may be restrained.
Douglass v.
Montgomery, 118 Ala. 599, 24 So. 745.
Cf. 31 U.
S. White, 6 Pet. 431;
Sheffield & Tuscumbia
Street Ry. Co. v. Rand & Moore, 83 Ala. 294, 3 So. 686.
See also Riverside v. MacLain, 210 Ill. 308, 71 N.E. 408;
Price v. Thompson, 48 Mo. 361; 3 Dillon, Municipal
Corporations (5th ed.) § 1102. There rights in the land or against
the municipality were said to have been reserved in the grantor or
created in the owners of neighboring land by the terms of the
grant.
Equally distinguishable are the decisions which likewise deal
with the authority of a municipality, not the power of the
legislature, to divert park lands from park uses, but in which the
lands were acquired by unrestricted purchase or by eminent domain.
See 3 Dillon,
supra, §§ 991, 1023.
[
Footnote 4]
As originally introduced and reported, the bill authorizing and
establishing the park (S. No. 4, 51st Cong., 1st Sess.) had no
provision for the assessment of benefited property. 21 Cong.Rec.
96, 353, 902, 1109, 2371, 2578-2590. Such a method of financing was
suggested by Representative Payson,
id., 2580, who offered
an amendment embodying this plan,
Id., 3939, which, after
conference, was adopted, in substance, as § 6.
See id.,
3952, 3953, 5300-5303, 5673, 5902, 5903, 5988, 6163, 10417-10419,
10457, 10458, 10441-10444. In explaining the assessment provision
on the floor, Mr. Payson said:
"Suppose that a man owns a piece of property, distant, we will
suppose, a quarter of a mile from the park and that piece of
property is worth today $1,000. Now, if by reason of the
expenditure made by the Government in this great public improvement
this man's property should become, in the judgment of the
commission, worth $2,000, the direct benefit thus arising to the
property would be assessed against it to assist in paying for the
proposed improvement."
Ibid., 3940.