1. The provision in § 33 of the Merchant Marine Act that
jurisdiction (meaning venue) of actions by seamen for personal
injuries suffered in the course of their employment "shall be under
the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides
or in which his principal office is located" refers only to federal
courts. P.
287 U. S.
280.
2. Where such action is in a state court, venue is determined by
the state law.
Id.
3. U.S.C. Title 28, § 837, (c. 113, 40 Stat. 683) provides that
courts of the United States, "including appellate courts," shall be
open to seamen without payment of or security for fees or
Page 287 U. S. 279
costs in suits in their own name and behalf for wages or salvage
and "to enforce laws made for their health and safety."
Held that it applies to appellate proceedings in this
Court, in a suit by a seaman for personal injuries, under § 33 of
the Merchant Marine Act, which section is an amendment of the
Seamen's Act. P.
287 U. S.
281.
4. Statutes passed for the benefit of seamen should be liberally
construed in the light of the policy of Congress to deal with
seamen as a favored class. P.
287 U. S.
282.
306 Pa. 204 reversed.
Certiorari to review the affirmance of a judgment dismissing the
action for want of jurisdiction.
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner brought this action in the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, to recover damages for an injury
sustained by her as a member of the crew of a steamship operated by
respondent. The action was brought under the Jones Act, § 33 of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, U.S.C., Title 46, § 688, which
provides:
"Jurisdiction [
Footnote 1]
in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which
the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is
located."
Respondent, contending that the court in which the action was
brought was not of the proper district, since respondent's
principal office was in Baltimore, Maryland, moved to dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction. The motion
Page 287 U. S. 280
was sustained, and the action accordingly dismissed. The
judgment of dismissal was affirmed by the state supreme court. 306
Pa. 204, 159 A. 19.
The question presented for our determination is whether the
quoted provision in respect of jurisdiction applies to the state
courts, or is limited to the federal courts. The decisions are
conflicting, but we think the correct construction of the provision
limits it to the courts of the United States. The word "district"
is peculiarly apposite in that relation, but, in order to apply it
to a state court, whose territory for venue purposes may or may not
be designated as a "district," an elasticity of interpretation
would be required which it does not seem probable Congress had in
mind. Thus, in one instance, where an action had been brought in a
state court, it was found necessary, in order to hold the provision
applicable, to interpret the word "district" as meaning "county" in
which the defendant resides or has his principal office.
Wienbroer v. United States Shipping Board E.F. Corp., 299
F. 972. The contrary view limiting the provision to the federal
courts, which we approve, is expressed in
Lynott v. Great Lakes
Transit Corp., 202 App.Div. 613, 619, 195 N.Y.S. 13,
aff'd
without opinion, 234 N.Y. 626, 138 N.E. 473;
Patrone v. M.
P. Howlett, 237 N.Y. 394, 397, 143 N.E. 232;
Rodrigues v.
Transmarine Corporation, 216 App.Div. 337, 339, 215 N.Y.S.
123, and
State ex rel. Sullivan v. Tazwell, 123 Or. 326,
330, 262 P. 220.
Compare Panama R. Co. v. Johnson,
264 U. S. 375,
264 U. S. 384;
Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33,
271 U. S. 37-38.
If the question were more doubtful than we think it is, we should
be slow to impute to Congress an intention, if it has the power,
[
Footnote 2] to interfere with
the statutory provisions of the
Page 287 U. S. 281
various states fixing the venue of their own courts. It follows
that the venue should have been determined by the trial court in
accordance with the law of the state.
Another question has been raised which, however, affects only
the proceedings in this Court. The clerk was requested by counsel
for petitioner to docket the case here under c. 113, 40 Stat. 683,
U.S.C. Title 28, § 837, which provides:
"Courts of the United States, including appellate courts,
hereafter shall be open to seamen, without furnishing bonds or
prepayment of or making deposit to secure fees or costs, for the
purpose of entering and prosecuting suit or suits in their own name
and for their own benefit for wages or salvage and to enforce laws
made for their health and safety."
The clerk, being in doubt, required a deposit to secure his fees
and costs, and accordingly this was made by counsel for
petitioner.
In
Ex parte Abdu, 247 U. S. 27, it
was held that the corresponding provision then in force (ch., 40
Stat. 157) did not apply to appellate proceedings, but the words
which now appear, "including appellate courts," were not in the
provision as it then read. That case therefore is not in point.
With these words added, the provision now applies to appellate
proceedings.
A more serious question is whether suits under the Jones Act may
be regarded as suits by seamen "for wages or salvage" or "to
enforce laws made for their health and safety." Such a suit is not
for wages or salvage. Is it to enforce a law made for the health or
safety of seamen? In
The Bennington, 10 F.2d 799, the
question was answered
Page 287 U. S. 282
in the negative. In
Grant v. U.S. Shipping Board E.F.
Corp., 24 F.2d 812, it was answered in the affirmative. The
court in the latter case rejected the construction put upon the
provision by the decision in
The Bennington as too narrow,
and not in accord with the liberality Congress intended toward
seamen, holding that the Jones Act, being an addition to the
Seamen's Act, was intended to be consistent with the spirit of that
legislation, which was directed to promote the welfare of American
seamen. We agree with that view. The Jones Act is an amendment to §
20 of the Seamen's Act. The Jones Act has the effect of bringing
into the maritime law, for the benefit of seamen, all appropriate
statutes relating to employers' liability for the personal injury
or death of railway employees. Both acts are to be treated as part
of the maritime law.
Panama R. Co. v. Johnson,
264 U. S. 375,
264 U. S. 389.
Seamen have always been regarded as wards of the admiralty, and
their rights, wrongs, and injuries a special subject of the
admiralty jurisdiction. Benedict's Admiralty (4th ed.) §§ 182, 603.
The policy of Congress, as evidenced by its legislation, has been
to deal with them as a favored class.
Robertson v.
Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275,
165 U. S. 287.
In the light of and to effectuate that policy, statutes enacted for
their benefit should be liberally construed. The Seamen's Act,
which includes the Jones Act by amendment, is entitled in part "An
Act To promote the welfare of American seamen . . . and to promote
safety at sea." Chap. 153, 38 Stat. 1164. It requires little if any
aid from the doctrine of liberal construction to enable us to say
that the present suit is one to enforce a law made for the safety
of seamen. Petitioner will not be required to prepay or make
deposit to secure fees or costs, and the clerk will be directed to
refund the deposit already made.
The judgment below is reversed, and the cause remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Meaning venue.
Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.
S. 375,
264 U. S.
384-385.
[
Footnote 2]
See and compare Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.
Co., 207 U. S. 142,
207 U. S.
148-149;
Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v.
Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211,
241 U. S. 221;
Second Employers' Liability Case, 223 U. S.
1,
223 U. S. 56-57;
Douglas v. New York, New Haven R. Co., 279 U.
S. 377,
279 U. S.
387-388;
Calder v. Bull,
3 Dall. 386,
3 U. S. 387;
Ex parte Crandall, 52 F.2d 650, 654,
aff'd, 53
F.2d 969;
Southern R. Co. v. Cochran, 56 F.2d 1019, 1020;
First National Bank v. Morgan, 132 U.
S. 141,
132 U. S. 145;
Doll v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 159 Minn. 323,
324-325, 198 N.W. 1006.