1. In actions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
assumption of risk is a defense. P.
284 U. S.
462.
2. A railway company employed an experienced guard to help
protect its freight trains against anticipated depredations by
murderous gangs of robbers. He was fully armed and fully apprised
of the danger. It also employed a member of one of the gangs to
give the company advance information of projected robberies. In
a
Page 284 U. S. 461
raid by the gang, of which the accomplice knew beforehand, and
at which he was present, but of which he did not warn the company,
the guard was killed.
Held that the guard, even if he knew
of the company's arrangement with the accomplice, assumed the risk
that warning would not be given. P.
284 U. S. 463.
328 Mo. 437; 41 S.W.2d 179, reversed.
Certiorari to review a judgment affirming a recovery in an
action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
While employed by petitioner railroad company and charged with
the duty of protecting its trains against robbers, James Lee David
was murdered in the night of May 17, 1923. His administratrix sued
for damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in the
Circuit Court, Jackson county, Missouri, and obtained a favorable
verdict. Judgment thereon was affirmed by the supreme court. The
cause is here upon writ of certiorari.
Often during the months prior to April, 1923, the petitioner
suffered losses through depredations by organized bands of robbers
upon freight trains in and near Kansas City, Missouri. It
determined to make special efforts to frustrate further attacks by
the culprits, and, if possible, cause their apprehension. To this
end, on April 1, 1923, it employed David to act as a "train rider"
or guard for its cars. He had had experience in similar
undertakings.
Page 284 U. S. 462
Also he was carefully advised concerning the probable danger. He
was told that the robbers were desperate men who "would shoot him
just as quick as they saw him." He carried a pistol and sawed-off
shot gun "for the purpose of defending himself and the company's
property." When asked "Whether you will fight these fellows or
not?" he replied, "I will fight them until I die."
Subsequent to David's employment, in order to strengthen its
efforts towards frustration and to secure arrests, petitioner
employed McCarthy, known to be associated with one of the criminal
bands, who agreed, when possible, to furnish advance information of
intended depredations, aid in locating stolen goods, etc.
"His instructions were that he was to get us word before the
robbery was committed [through the telephone], if he could, if not,
to give us information as soon as he could after the robbery had
been committed."
The theory upon which respondent recovered below is that, while
acting for petitioner, McCarthy knew of a plan to rob the train to
which David was assigned on May 17th, and, in violation of his
duty, negligently failed to notify his superior officer; that,
because of such negligence, David received no notice of the plan,
although he had the right to rely upon being supplied with such
information in order to prepare to cope with the brigands on equal
terms. As a consequence, he failed to take the necessary
precautions, and exposed himself to being shot.
The established rule is that, in proceedings under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, assumption of the risk is an adequate
defense.
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 233 U.
S. 492;
Boldt v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
245 U. S. 441,
245 U. S. 445;
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Nixon, 271 U.
S. 218;
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v.
Mills, 271 U. S. 344;
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Southwell, 275 U. S.
64;
Toledo, St. Louis & Western R. Co. v.
Allen, 276 U. S. 165.
Page 284 U. S. 463
Under the circumstances disclosed by the record, clearly we
think David assumed the risk of the default which, it is said,
resulted in his death. He understood the nature of his employment
and the incident dangers. He well knew that he was subjecting
himself to murderous attacks by desperadoes. There was no promise
to give him special warning or protection. Even if he had knowledge
of McCarthy's employment (and this is far from certain), he must
have appreciated the utter unreliability of the man and the
probable inability of the master to obtain timely information
through such a medium. He could not properly expect to be protected
against criminals whom he was employed to fight through treachery
by one of their associates. The common employer, notwithstanding
efforts to obtain warning, actually knew nothing of the criminal
plan. If we accept respondent's view of the facts, David assumed
the risk of the negligent action of which complaint is now
made.
We need not consider any other point advanced in behalf of the
petitioner.
The judgment of the court below must be reversed. The cause will
be remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
Reversed.