1. The boundary line between Virginia and the District of
Columbia is at high water mark on the Virginia side of the Potomac.
Maryland
Page 283 U. S. 349
v. West Virginia, 217 U. S. 577, and
Marine Railway v. United States, 257 U. S.
47,
257 U. S. 64,
considered. P.
283 U. S.
350.
2. The compact of 1785 between Maryland and Virginia gave
citizens of each state rights in the shores, but did not affect the
boundary in this case. P.
283 U. S.
351.
44 F.2d 343 reversed.
Certiorari
post, p. 812, to review a decree which
reversed a decree of the District Court dismissing the suit for
want of jurisdiction. The suit was brought by the Airport Co. in a
Virginia court and was removed to the federal court. It sought to
enjoin the present petitioner (which was operating under a
government contract) from excavating, filling, constructing a wall,
etc., on lands claimed by the airport on the south shore of the
Potomac.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was brought by the respondent for an injunction
against alleged trespasses on land between high and low water mark
on the Virginia side of the Potomac River opposite the District of
Columbia. It was brought originally in the Circuit Court of
Arlington County, Virginia, and on the petition of the defendant
the Smoot Sand and Gravel Company was removed to the District
Page 283 U. S. 350
Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia.
That court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, but the
decree was reversed by the circuit court of appeals. 44 F.2d 342. A
writ of certiorari was granted by this Court.
The circuit court of appeals states that the sole question
presented is whether the boundary line between Virginia and the
District of Columbia is at high or at low water mark on the
Virginia side of the Potomac, and that is the only question argued
here. In view of the previous decisions and intimations of this
Court, it does not need extended discussion now.
It must be assumed, notwithstanding some suggestion of ancient
controversies, that the title of Maryland was that conveyed to Lord
Baltimore by the charter of Charles I, and ran to and along the
farther bank of the Potomac River.
Marine Railway & Coal
Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 47,
257 U. S. 63.
This means that the boundary was the usual high water mark,
Oklahoma v. Texas, 260 U. S. 606,
260 U. S. 626
et seq., so that the only question is whether anything has
happened since to change the original line. At the present stage of
this old discussion, the most important inquiry is raised by the
supposed contradiction between the language of this Court in
settling the decree in
Maryland v. West Virginia,
217 U. S. 577, and
that in the later case of
Marine Railway & Coal Co. v.
United States, 257 U. S. 47. With
regard to that, it is to be noticed that Mr. Justice Day, who wrote
the earlier decision, took part also in the later, and seems to
have agreed with it. There was no adequate reason why he should not
have agreed.
Maryland v. West Virginia was a suit to
settle a portion of the boundary line between those states. The
decision could not affect the District of Columbia. It relied
primarily upon an arbitration upon the issue in 1877, in which it
was admitted that the original boundary was
Page 283 U. S. 351
high water mark on the Virginia side, but held that the low
water mark was established by prescription. The arbitration also
relied upon a Compact of 1785, 1 Dorsey, Maryland Laws, 1692-1839,
p. 187; 12 Hening, Virginia Statutes, p. 50, giving it a
construction to which we cannot agree. Prescription was a
sufficient reason for the decision, and could not be invoked
against the District. The compact is seen in a different light in
Marine Railway & Coal Co. v. United States. As stated
in
257 U. S. 257
U.S. 64, Article 7 gave the citizens of each state full property in
the shores of the river adjoining their lands, and the privilege of
carrying out wharves etc., but left the question of boundary open
to long-continued disputes. The rights of private citizens
established by Article 7 were further cared for by Article 12,
giving citizens of each state having lands in the other liberty to
transport to their own state the produce of such lands or to remove
their effects, free of any charge or tax. But private ownership
does not affect state boundaries. Some argument is based on the
word "shores." But that is merely a topographical indication, and
imports nothing as to the sovereignty over them. We adhere to the
opinion that the compact has no bearing on the present case.
Decree reversed.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS, dissenting.
Twenty years ago (1910), in
Maryland v. West Virginia,
217 U. S. 577, it
was definitely ruled by this Court (and rightly so) that, under the
Compact of 1785 between Virginia and Maryland, the uniform southern
boundary of the latter state was low water mark on the right bank
of the Potomac. Proper solution of the present controversy depends
upon the precise question there decided. Fair consistency and
proper regard for titles along the
Page 283 U. S. 352
ten-mile riverfront in the District of Columbia, I think, demand
that we follow what was thus solemnly declared.
Marine Ry. Co. v. United States, 257 U. S.
47, was a proceeding begun by them to recover land on
the Potomac River front at Alexandria originally below low water
mark. Notwithstanding the essential point there was distinct from
the one upon which
Maryland v. West Virginia turned, the
opinion carefully affirmed that "the former decisions of the Court
must be followed so far as they go" -- a truism, I submit, still
worthy of acceptation. And the further observation that "the
compact between Virginia and Maryland in 1785 also seems to us to
have no bearing upon the case" is plainly correct, whether relevant
or not.
As
Marine Ry. Co. v. United States related only to land
below low water mark, the compact of 1785, of course, was
inapplicable to the controversy. That compact did not undertake to
settle titles to lands so located. No more did it apply to lands in
Baltimore City.
In such circumstances, the suggestion that the writer of the
opinion in
Maryland v. West Virginia, by assenting to
Marine Ry. Co. v. United States, gave his approval to a
doctrine directly opposed to the one he had definitely expressed
for the Court seems to me without substance. The Court, through
him, had ruled that the Maryland boundary extended to low water
mark on the south side. Why should he object to an opinion which,
after expressly accepting former decisions, held that land lying in
the river north of that line had been part of Maryland?
The challenged decree should be affirmed.