1. A judgment of an intermediate state court upholding he
constitutionality of a state statute over objections based on the
federal Constitution, and as to which the supreme court of the
state dismissed an application for a writ of error "for want of
jurisdiction,"
Page 282 U. S. 500
held reviewable here, it appearing that, under the
local law, the effect (though not the form) of the action of the
supreme court was to affirm the judgment of the intermediate court
on the constitutional question. P.
282 U. S.
500.
2. A state law allowing suits to be brought against private
corporations in any county in which the cause of action arose, but
against individuals, in like cases, only in the counties where they
reside,
held not repugnant to the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. P.
282 U. S.
501.
19 S.W.2d 203 affirmed.
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas
affirming recovery by Pinson and Guyger from the Peanut Company in
an action on a contract. For earlier phases of the litigation,
see 273 S.W. 655; 287
id. 87; 292
id.
204, and 294
id. 536. After the argument here, the appeal
was ordered dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
See post,
p. 811. It now appearing from an explanatory statement by the
Supreme Court of Texas that its jurisdiction over the
constitutional question was in fact exercised, the dismissal is set
aside, but the judgment is affirmed upon the merits.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Bain Peanut Company, a corporation of Texas, was sued in
Comanche County of that state, being the county in which the cause
of action arose. Its principal office was in Tarrant County, Texas.
In due form, it raised the question whether the statute of Texas
(subdivision 24, Article 1830, R.S.1911, now subdivision 23,
Article 1995, R.S.1925) that allowed suits against private
corporations to be brought in any county in which the cause of
action arose was valid under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution when unincorporated individuals are assumed not to be
"subject to suit outside their domiciliary counties in a similar
situation." We understand the supreme court of the state to have
upheld the constitutionality of the statute, although at first we
were misled by the form of the order dismissing the application for
a writ of error "for want of jurisdiction." A certificate from the
court executed since the question of our jurisdiction was before us
satisfies us that the form was adopted in compliance with the
court's interpretation of a statute, and that, while the court was
of opinion that the judgment sought to be brought up was correct in
upholding the statute, yet, since it also regarded the
Page 282 U. S. 501
opinion as incorrect in its declaration of the law, its duty was
to adopt the above quoted form. The judgment below stood affirmed
in fact against the fully stated objection of the appellant, and
justice requires that the objection should be dealt with, although
at first it seemed as if the supreme court was acting upon local
grounds of procedure with which we have nothing to do, except when
used as a cloak, which was not the case here.
Coming, then, to the merits, we are of opinion that the judgment
was right. The interpretation of constitutional principles must not
be too literal. We must remember that the machinery of government
would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints.
In deciding whether a corporation is denied the equal protection of
the laws when its creator establishes a more extensive venue for
actions against it than are fixed for private citizens, we have to
consider not a geometrical equation between a corporation and a
man, but whether the difference does injustice to the class
generally, even though it bear hard in some particular case, which
is not alleged or proved here.
Louisville & Nashville R.
Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.
S. 430,
197 U. S. 434;
Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138,
232 U. S. 144.
This it is for the corporation to make out. The range of the
state's discretion is large.
Armour & Co. v. North
Dakota, 240 U. S. 510,
240 U. S.
516-517. The question seems to be answered by
Cincinnati Street Ry. Co. v. Snell, 193 U. S.
30,
193 U. S. 36-37,
which lays down that, if the protection of fundamental rights by
equal laws equally administered is enjoyed, the Constitution does
not forbid allowing one person to seek a forum from which another
in the same class is excluded. But, without asserting a universal
proposition, it is obvious that there is likely to be such a
difference between the business done by a corporation and that done
by a private person that the state well may take it into account
when it permits a corporation to be formed. That
Page 282 U. S. 502
the provision in question is reasonable is made more probable by
the fact that it had been adopted and sustained not only in Texas,
but in other states.
Grayburg Oil Co. v. Powell, 118 Tex.
354, 15 S.W.2d 542;
Lewis v. South Pacific Coast R. Co.,
66 Cal. 209, 5 P. 79;
Cook v. W. S. Ray Mfg. Co., 159 Cal.
694, 115 P. 318;
Central Georgia Power Co. v. Stubbs, 141
Ga. 172, 80 S.E. 636;
Begley v. Mississippi Valley Trust
Co., 252 S.W. 84;
Morrimac Vencer Co. v. McCalip, 129
Miss. 671, 683. We cannot say that it is not.
Order dismissing writ of error vacated, and judgment
affirmed.
