1. The penalties of the Safety Appliance Acts are imposed upon
the carrier only, and cannot be enforced by action against the
carrier's officers and agents. P.
282 U. S.
29.
2. The state Belt Railroad, a waterfront line in the City of San
Francisco connecting many industrial plants and the line of the
Southern Pacific Railroad with wharves belonging to the State of
California and, through the wharves, with other common carriers
engaged in interstate commerce by railroad, belongs to the state
and is operated by it through the Board of State Harbor
Commissioners, without profit, for the purpose of facilitating the
commerce of the port. Charges for haulage are collected by the
state, and go to expense of operation and to the credit of the San
Francisco Harbor Improvement Fund. In a prosecution of the
individual members of the Board for alleged breaches of the Federal
Safety Appliance Act, as amended, in the operation of the line,
held that the action could not be maintained, since,
assuming that the work done by the line was interstate commerce,
the statute, if it applied to anyone, could apply only to the
state, and not the defendants, who were merely its agents. It was
therefore unnecessary to decide whether the statute should be
construed to embrace the state. P.
282 U. S. 30.
District court reversed.
Upon a certificate of questions arising in the circuit court of
appeals upon consideration of a judgment of the district court
inflicting penalties under the Safety Appliance Act. The whole
record was brought up here by certiorari.
Page 282 U. S. 28
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case comes here on a certificate of questions of law from
the judges of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Subsequently the entire record was brought up, but the facts
sufficiently appear in the certificate, and both they and the
questions may be abbreviated here. The suit is brought by the
United States against the appellants by name, described as
"constituting the Board of State Harbor Commissioners of the State
of California, operating The State Belt Railroad," to recover
penalties for alleged breaches of the Safety Appliance Acts. Acts
March 2, 1893, c.196, 27 Stat. 531, April 1, 1896, c. 87, 29 Stat.
85, March 2, 1903, c. 976, 32 Stat. 943, and April 14, 1910, c.
Page 282 U. S. 29
160, 36 Stat. 298 (U.S.Code, Tit. 45, §§ 1, 2, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13,
16). The penalties are imposed upon "any common carrier engaged in
interstate commerce by railroad," and the broad question is whether
the defendants are liable under the Acts.
The matters complained of occurred upon what is known as the
State Belt Railroad. The road is about five miles long, within the
City of San Francisco, runs nearly parallel with the waterfront of
the harbor, and connects many industrial plants and the line of the
Southern Pacific Railroad Company with wharves belonging to the
state and, through the wharves, with other common carriers engaged
in interstate commerce by railroad. It may be assumed that the work
done upon the Belt Line was interstate commerce. But the line
belongs to and is operated by the state; the work is done without
profit, for the purpose of facilitating the commerce of the port,
and the funds received after paying expenses go to the treasury of
the state to the credit of the San Francisco Harbor Improvement
Fund. California has not gone into business generally as a common
carrier, but simply has constructed the Belt Line as an incident of
its control of the harbor -- a state prerogative. Cal.Political
Code, § 2524. The defendants are officers of the state charged with
the administration of the Harbor of San Francisco and of the State
Belt Railroad in connection therewith. They had no hand in or
knowledge of the alleged violations of law, the immediate
supervision being the duty of an inspector appointed by them, and
his subordinates being civil service employees of the state.
On these facts, in our opinion, the statute, if it applies to
anyone, can apply only to the state. The suit is not to recover
damages for a tort, which, if a wrong on the part of the master, is
at least equally a wrong on the part of the servant who personally
is guilty of the act or omission that caused the harm. Here, the
suit is for a penalty attached to an offence -- and the only party
on whom the
Page 282 U. S. 30
liability is imposed is the common carrier. The statute is not
like the Hours of Service Act of March 4, 1907, c. 2939, § 3, 34
Stat. 1415 (U.S.Code, Title 45, § 63); that, in terms, extends the
liability to officers and agents. It seems to us plain that, as
between the Board of Harbor Commissioners and California, the
carrier here is the state, by which it is agreed that the Road was
owned and operated, which received such pay as was required for the
work that was done, and which did the work for the purpose of
facilitating the commerce of its principal port. The principal and
its agents cannot both be the common carriers aimed at. One is, and
the other is not, subjected to the penalty. One is superior, the
other inferior. The superior is the one that operated the road, and
the one whose commands the others were bound to obey.
The suit is brought against the appellants individually. This is
conceded by the government, and sufficiently appears from the
declaration and from the judgment against them by name, entered
after they had ceased to be members of the Board. Manifestly, if we
are right in what we have said, the judgment is wrong, and we are
relieved from the duty of considering whether the Safety Appliance
Act should be construed to embrace the state.
An answer to other questions proposed is unnecessary because of
our conclusion that the judgment against the defendants cannot be
sustained.
Judgment reversed.
