Proof that a building close to a railway track took fire soon
after the passing of a train does not suffice to show that the fire
was caused by sparks from the engine and to raise a presumption of
negligence against the railway company in an action for damages
caused by the fire. So
held in accordance both with
rulings of the Supreme Court of the Washington, where the fire
occurred and the action was brought, and with rulings of the
federal courts. P.
280 U. S.
76.
28 F.2d 574 affirmed.
Certiorari, 279 U.S. 827, to review a judgment of the circuit
court of appeals which affirmed a judgment of the district court
granting a nonsuit against the plaintiff, the present petitioner,
in an action for damages caused by fire alleged to have resulted
from negligence of the defendant railway company.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court.
The General Insurance Company of America, a Washington
corporation, issued to Peter Agor, a citizen and resident of the
State of Washington, two policies for $12,000 each, insuring him
against loss or damage by fire
Page 280 U. S. 73
to wool and sacks contained in a warehouse situated in Benton
County, Washington. While the policies were in full force, the
warehouse and the wool and sacks contained therein were destroyed
by a fire which started on the 2d of May, 1926, some time between 7
and 10 o'clock in the evening.
Thereafter, the insurance company made two payments to Agor,
totaling $20,481.90, in discharge of its liability to him under the
policies. May 14, 1926, Agor executed "subrogation receipts" to the
insurance company in which he acknowledged receipt of the sum above
mentioned in full settlement of his claims against the company for
loss and damage caused by the fire, and by which he assigned and
transferred to the insurance company his claims against any person
or corporation which might arise, due to the loss and damage
sustained by him, and by which the company was subrogated to the
extent of the amount paid to him.
Then the insurance company brought this action in the United
States district court for the Western District of Washington
alleging, in its amended complaint, a cause of action against the
railway company under each policy and subrogation receipt for the
amount paid to Agor, with interest, on the ground that the loss was
due to the negligence of the railway company in operating its
railroad.
The railway company denied that it was responsible for the fire
or was guilty of negligence in respect to it.
Trial was had; four witnesses were sworn and examined for the
plaintiff, and the plaintiff rested. The counsel for the defendant
moved for a nonsuit. The motion was granted and a judgment of
dismissal entered. This was on the ground that the plaintiff had
failed to indicate any facts sufficient to show negligence on the
part of the defendant as alleged, or at all. The circuit court of
appeals affirmed the judgment.
Page 280 U. S. 74
The facts were that the fire occurred at Badger, in the State of
Washington. Badger was a small station on the Northern Pacific
Railway southeast of Seattle, on the main line of the company. The
warehouse which burned was 40 or 50 feet from the main tracks. The
warehouse was possibly 50 feet wide and 200 feet long. The country
about was sand and sagebrush. There was no blowing of the wind
testified to, except at noon of the day of the fire. The fire was
between half past 7 and 10 in the evening. There was no wind in the
evening. A freight train of 70 cars passed going south between
those hours. It was a double-header. Between Badger and the
previous station, 7 miles away, there was a stiff upgrade from
north to south, and there was a good deal of puffing and smoke
between the two stations. The evidence is quite clear, however,
that, for a measurable distance before the train reached Badger,
the grade was either on the level or downhill. There was no
evidence of the presence of sparks from the engine at the time of
the fire or during the evening. About 20 minutes after the train
had passed Badger, the fireman looked back and remarked to the
engineer that there seemed to be a fire burning up all Badger.
Badger was a lonely station. There was no stationhouse there. There
were only three employees of the railway company there, and only
three or four shacks beside the warehouse. The fire occurred Sunday
evening.
The chief witness called by the insurance company testified he
went to bed about 8 o'clock; that he was waked by the section
foreman about 10 o'clock. The fire had begun at the southwest
corner of the warehouse, some 50 feet away from the track, and,
when he saw it, it was climbing from the ground up. The two or
three men who were present were not able to do anything to put the
fire out, and the building continued to burn until the next day.
There is no other evidence of the circumstances
Page 280 U. S. 75
under which the fire took place. The warehouse was one which
could be opened by a key that was usually left in the lock or in a
hole near the door. There was evidence that there were people who
resorted to the warehouse and slept there at times -- sheep
shearers and others -- but no testimony shows that, at the time of
the fire, there was any blowing of tumbleweeds or other things
which would convey fire. This is a case in which, if negligence is
to be presumed, it must arise from the mere passing of the train
followed by a fire. Nothing shows negligence by the engineer, the
fireman, or the employees of the railway company. No one is able to
suggest what it was that started the fire. There were many rats in
the warehouse. There had been vagrants around it. At times, people
had seen tumbleweeds blown about in a wind, but nothing of this
kind indicates an occasion for a fire at the time when it took
place.
Counsel differ as to the law which should govern the decision in
this case, whether Washington or federal (so-called). In our
judgment, it makes no difference.
A leading case in Washington is that of
Thorgrimson v.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co, 64 Wash. 500. That was an action for
damages by the owner of a roofing plant situated about 80 feet
south of the main line of the railway company, and the theory of
the suit was that the railway company had negligently operated its
train past the plant and caused the fire which destroyed the
property of the plaintiff.
The supreme court of the state said [p. 502]:
"The rule putting the burden on the railway company to explain
the cause of a fire following a passing engine, to which this Court
is probably committed (
Overacker v. Northern Pacific Ry.
Co., [64 Wash.] p. 491, 117 P. 403) and which counsel relied
on to carry the case to the jury on the questions of equipment and
operation, is one of
Page 280 U. S. 76
necessity, and is applied so that justice may not be defeated.
But we know of no cases going to the extent to which counsel would
have us go to sustain their contention -- that is, to presume
negligence from the mere passing of the train followed by a fire.
It is the proof of setting the fire, and not the fact that a
building adjacent to a railroad right of way was burned, that
raises the inference of negligence and shifts the burden of proof.
In all the cases we have examined, including those from our own
court, where the burden has been shifted from plaintiff to
defendant, there has been some evidence from which the jury might
infer with reasonable certainty that the fire would not have
occurred unless set by the passing train. Counsel admitted on the
trial, and appellants now admit, that they have no evidence other
than circumstantial evidence."
The facts of the case before us do not show anything more than
the passing of the train and the existence of fire 15 or 20 minutes
afterwards. No connection is shown between the fire and the passing
of the train except that of sequence. The principles of the
Washington case cited would require a nonsuit in this case.
Nor are the federal cases any more favorable to the petitioner.
In
McCullen v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 101 F.
66, the action was to recover the value of property said to have
been set on fire by sparks from the passing train on the
defendant's road. The evidence was conflicting, and the effect of
the decision was that, where there was conflicting evidence as to
whether the fire was set by sparks from a passing train, the case
should be held to be one for a jury, and one in which a presumption
would arise from the fact of causing the fire that there was
negligence to be charged to the company. But that case differs from
the one at bar for the reason that there
Page 280 U. S. 77
was evidence there that the fire was occasioned by sparks from
the engine. No such evidence appears here. There is entire absence
of evidence here that the fire was created by the presence of any
sparks.
Another federal case is that of
Garrett v. Sourthern R.
Co., 101 F. 102. It was there held by the Circuit Court of
Appeals of the Sixth Circuit that, in an action by a railroad
company for damages from fire alleged to have been set by sparks
from the defendant's locomotive, the burden was on the plaintiff to
prove not only that the fire was caused by sparks from the
defendant's engine, but that the emission of such sparks was due to
defendant's negligence.
In the present case, we need not go so far. Both the
circumstances that sparks caused the fire and that their presence
was due to the negligence of the railroad company are absent. The
case comes exactly within the rule laid down by this Court in the
Nitroglycerine
Case, 15 Wall. 524, where Mr. Justice Field
said:
"Outside of these cases, in which a positive obligation is cast
upon the carrier to perform safely a special service, the
presumption is that the party has exercised such care as men of
ordinary prudence and caution would exercise under similar
circumstances, and, if he has not, the plaintiff must prove it.
Here, no such proof was made, and the case stands as one of
unavoidable accident, for the consequences of which the defendants
are not responsible. The consequences of all such accidents must be
borne by the sufferer as his misfortune."
We think the trial judge was right in granting a nonsuit and the
circuit court of appeals in affirming it.
Judgment affirmed.