1. A suit in equity for an injunction to eject state officials
from land of which they have taken exclusive possession under claim
of right pursuant to a state expropriation statute will not lie in
a
Page 280 U. S. 501
federal district court, even though the validity of the statute
under the federal Constitution be challenged by the bill. The
remedy at law is adequate. P.
280 U. S.
510.
2. Section 274a of the Judicial Code (U.S.C. Title 28, § 397)
and Equity Rule 22, providing for transfer to the law side of the
court of actions at law erroneously begun as suits in equity, refer
only to cases of which the Court would have jurisdiction if they
were brought on the law side, and if the case be one which, if
brought as an action at law, would not be within the jurisdiction
of the federal court, then the bill must be dismissed, but without
prejudice to an action in a court of competent jurisdiction. P.
280 U. S.
512.
3. In the absence of diversity of citizenship, the federal
district court has no jurisdiction of an action in ejectment if the
complaint, confined to an orderly statement of the cause of action,
without anticipating possible defences, does not present a case
arising under the Constitution, or a treaty or law, of the United
States. P.
280 U. S.
512.
Reversed.
Appeal from a decree of a district court of three judges
granting an interlocutory injunction against the appellants to
restrain them from continuing in possession of certain real
property.
Page 280 U. S. 506
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is form is a suit in equity against the members of the
board of commissioners of the Palisades Interstate Park, appointed
pursuant to a statute of the state of New York, the Attorney
General, and the Commissioner of the Conservation Department of the
state. The bill was filed March 19, 1929, and alleges that the
Sparkill Realty Corporation is the owner in fee of lands lying
within the southern district of New York of which the Standard Trap
Rock Corporation is lessee. The lands contain valuable deposits of
"trap rock," and the Standard Trap Rock Corporation, in preparing
to develop the deposits, contracted for the erection and equipment
of a plant, not adapted for use elsewhere, thereby subjecting
itself to liabilities exceeding $1,000,000.
While this work was in progress, estimates and maps, as required
by state law, for the acquisition of these and other lands for a
state park were approved by the board and certain state officers.
Notice was served on appellees
Page 280 U. S. 507
that a description of the lands, certified as correct, has been
filed with the secretary of state, and that the lands had been
appropriated by the people of the state for public and state park
purposes pursuant to the state statutes. Thereupon, the bill
alleges, the board of commissioners, on October 11, 1928,
"wrongfully entered upon the said real property of plaintiffs
[appellees] and converted the personal property thereon to their
own use, and have since remained in possession of said real and
personal property and prevented its use, enjoyment, occupation, and
operation by plaintiffs for any purpose to plaintiffs' great and
continuing damage."
It is further averred that the sum of $500,000 was allocated to
the acquisition of the property, but that the value of the property
exceeds $3,000,000; that appellees are suffering daily loss from
the "continued unlawful occupation of their property," the
aggregate sum of which will be such that the damage will be
irreparable and destructive of appellees' property, and that
therefore they are without adequate remedy at law.
The prayer is that the acts of the board and state officers, and
the statutes of the state purporting to authorize them, be declared
invalid as violating the Fourteenth Amendment and other provisions
of the federal Constitution, as well as a provision of the state
constitution, and that appellants be enjoined from attempting to
enforce the provisions of the statute, notice, description, or
certificate, or proceeding against appellees at law or in equity to
compel compliance with, or inflicting or recovering any penalty,
forfeiture, or damage for noncompliance by appellees with the
statute, notice, description, or certificate, or "from continuing
in possession of plaintiffs' said property."
The statutory provisions assailed as unconstitutional are found
in §§ 59 and 761 of the New York Conservation
Page 280 U. S. 508
Law, L. 1928, chap. 242. Section 761 confers upon the
commissioners of the Palisades Interstate Park power to acquire
lands by entry and appropriation in the manner provided for in §
59. Section 59 authorizes the conservation department to enter upon
and take possession of lands, etc., which, in the judgment of the
department, shall be necessary for public park purposes or for the
protection and conservation of the lands, forests, and waters
within the state. A description of the property to be entered upon
must be made and certified, which, together with a notice indorsed
thereon that the property described is appropriated by the people
of the state, shall be filed in the office of the secretary of
state. A duplicate must be served on the owner or owners of the
lands, etc., and "thereupon such property shall become, and be, the
property of the people of the state." Provision is made for an
adjustment of compensation for the property and legal damages, and
the issue of a certificate stating the amount due, which amount
shall be paid out of the state treasury upon the audit and warrant
of the Comptroller. It is further provided that any owner may
present to the state Court of Claims a claim for the value of the
land and damages, and the court is authorized to hear and determine
such claim and render judgment thereon. The Comptroller is directed
to issue his warrant for the payment of the amount, with interest
from the date of the judgment until the 30th day after the entry of
final judgment, and such amount shall be paid out of the state
treasury.
Upon filing the bill it, was ordered that appellants show cause
before a court of three judges, constituted under § 266 of the
Judicial Code (U.S.C. Tit. 28, § 380), why an interlocutory
injunction should not issue. A hearing was had upon affidavits
submitted by both parties. The affidavit of James G. Shaw, on
behalf of appellees, contains
Page 280 U. S. 509
the statement that, acting under the statutory provisions above
set forth, the property in question was "appropriated by the people
of the state of New York for public and state park purposes with
the approval of the Governor," and that the commissioners
"thereafter entered upon the took possession of said property, of
which they have since retained possession to the exclusion of the
plaintiffs." The affidavit of J. Du Pratt White, president of the
Board of Commissioners of the Palisades Interstate Park, sets forth
that, after the appropriation papers were served, appellees ceased
doing any work on the property; that the contractors and other
persons engaged in doing work left, taking their machinery and
tools with them, and certain movable property and equipment used or
for use in connection therewith was likewise removed from the
premises, and that the state, through the commission, had, since
October 11, 1928, been in exclusive possession of the property as a
state park. These excerpts from the affidavits are not
controverted.
Appellants submitted a motion to dismiss the bill on the ground,
among others, that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute
a valid cause of action in equity against the defendants. The court
below denied the motion to dismiss, and granted an interlocutory
injunction in accordance with the prayer of the bill. The state
statute was held invalid for the reason that it authorized the
taking of private property for public use without just
compensation, or making adequate provision for payment thereof. In
respect of its denial of the motion to dismiss, the court simply
said that the action was not one for ejectment, and cited
Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.
S. 636;
United States Freehold Land & Emigration
Co. v. Gallegos, 89 F. 769.
We do not consider the question of the constitutionality of the
state legislation, because it is apparent from the
Page 280 U. S. 510
bill and affidavits that the bill should have been dismissed on
the ground that appellees had an adequate remedy at law.
The board of commissioners, acting for the state, entered upon
the lands and had been in the exclusive possession thereof for
several months before the filing of the bill, effectively
preventing appellees from using, enjoying, or occupying the
property. The relief sought was to enjoin appellants "from
continuing in possession" -- that is to say, to oust appellants so
as to restore the lands to the possession of appellees. It is plain
that this is not the office of an injunction. Entry and possession
of the lands by appellants and all alleged wrongful acts and
proceedings preliminary thereto and in aid thereof had been
consummated long before suit was brought, and preventive relief by
injunction consequently had ceased to be appropriate.
Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.
S. 146, was a suit in equity to quiet title to real
property. Plaintiff was the owner in fee, holding title as trustee.
Defendants claimed title and were in possession, openly and
adversely. Plaintiff averred that defendants' claim of title was
made in fraud of his right; that the patent under which they
claimed was fraudulently made, the land not being subject to entry
and patent. Upon these facts, this Court held that plaintiff had an
adequate remedy at law, and that a suit in equity could not be
sustained, saying (p. ):
". . . where an action is simply for the recovery and possession
of specific real or personal property, or for the recovery of a
money judgment, the action is one at law. An action for the
recovery of real property, including damages for withholding it,
has always been of that class. The right which in this case the
plaintiff wishes to assert is his title to certain real property;
the remedy which he wishes to obtain is its possession and
enjoyment, and, in a
Page 280 U. S. 511
contest over the title, both parties have a constitutional right
to call for a jury."
In
Lacassagne v. Chapuis, 144 U.
S. 119,
144 U. S. 124,
this Court said:
"The plaintiff was out of possession when he instituted this
suit, and by the prayer of this bill he attempts to regain
possession by means of the injunction asked for. In other words,
the effort is to restore the plaintiff, by injunction, to rights of
which he had been deprived. The function of an injunction is to
afford preventive relief, not to redress alleged wrongs which have
been committed already. An injunction will not be used to take
property out of the possession of one party and put it into that of
another. I High on Injunctions (2d ed.) § 355."
To the same effect is
United States v. Wilson,
118 U. S. 86,
118 U. S. 89;
Black v. Jackson, 177 U. S. 349,
177 U. S. 361.
In the latter case the rule was applied, notwithstanding the
financial inability of the defendant to respond in damages.
The two cases cited by the court below are not in point. In
Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, supra, plaintiff
sued for damages caused by erection of a dike on one side of a
river, which had the effect of submerging his lands lying wholly
upon the other side. The injury was "continuous from day to day and
year to year." The prayer was for damages, and abatement and
removal of the dike. The injury was in the nature of a continuing
trespass; possession was neither involved nor sought.
In
United States Freehold Land & Emigration Co. v.
Gallegos, supra, the bill was to enjoin the diversion of water
to the injury of complainant's lands, constituting a continuing
trespass. The ownership or possession of the lands was not in
controversy.
The present case is entirely different. Here, the purpose of the
suit is to eject appellants from lands which for five months had
been and still were in their exclusive
Page 280 U. S. 512
possession, under claim of right and in pursuance of a statute
which gives color of title, notwithstanding the challenge to its
constitutionality.
See Doe ex dem. Trustees, etc. v. Trustees
of Newbern Academy, 9 N.C. 233. That challenge does not
require resort to a suit in equity. It will be open for
determination in an action at law which is the appropriate
remedy.
The decree below must be reversed and the cause remanded with
instructions to dismiss the bill, but without prejudice to an
action at law in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Section 274a of the Judicial Code, U.S.C. Tit. 28, § 397, and
rule 22 of the Equity Rules, 226 U.S. appendix 6, contemplate that,
where what is really an action at law is erroneously begun as a
suit in equity, the same may be transferred to the law side of the
court and after appropriate amendments may be prosecuted to a
judgment as if originally begun on the law side.
See Liberty
Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank, 260 U.
S. 235;
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis,
273 U. S. 70,
273 U. S. 76;
Twist v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 274 U.
S. 684,
274 U. S. 689,
274 U. S. 692.
But both the statute and the equity rule refer, and can only refer,
to cases of which the court would have jurisdiction if they were
brought on its law side. This is not such a case. The parties are
citizens, not of different states, but of the same state. And if
the plaintiffs were suing at law in ejectment, their complaint, if
confined to an orderly statement of such a cause of action, without
anticipating possible defenses, would not present a case arising
under the Constitution, or a treaty or law of the United States.
Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U. S. 74. Thus,
the case, if brought as an action at law, would be one of which a
federal district court would not have jurisdiction. In this
situation, no other course is open than to direct that the bill be
dismissed and leave the plaintiffs free to sue in a state court, if
they be so advised.
Decree reversed.