Under a Special Jurisdictional Act approved March 3, 1927 (44
Stat. 1807), which referred back to the Court of Claims for
rendition of a judgment certain findings of fact theretofore made
by it and reported to Congress, and provided for an "appeal" to
this Court by either party "upon or from any conclusion of law or
judgment, from which appeals now lie in other cases," the review
intended was the usual method of review at the date of the Special
Act, which was and is by application for a writ of certiorari, and
not a technical appeal. P.
280 U. S. 45.
Appeal under a Special Jurisdictional Act from a judgment for
the government rendered by the Court of Claims on a claim against
the United States for alleged patent infringement. A petition for
certiorari had been denied.
See post, p. 553.
Page 280 U. S. 44
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court.
The judgment of the Court of Claims now under consideration was
given on a claim against the United States for alleged patent
infringement, and was entered on February 4, 1929. A petition for
certiorari seeking review in this Court was filed May 1, 1929, and
was denied on October 14, 1929. The government contends that both
methods of review, either by appeal or certiorari, in this Court
are now without avail.
The claim was referred by the Senate to the Court of Claims for
an advisory finding and report of the material facts. A hearing was
had in the Court of Claims, and it reported its findings on the
questions of fact. Thereafter, the Court of Claims reheard the case
under a Special Jurisdictional Act of Congress approved March 3,
1927 (44 Stat. c. 408, Part. 3, p. 1807), which read as
follows:
"That the findings of fact made by the Court of Claims in the
case of Arthur E. Colgate, administrator of the estate of Clinton
G. Colgate, deceased, against the United States, Congressional,
Numbered 6063, Senate Document Numbered 703, Sixty-fourth Congress,
second session, be, and they are hereby, referred back to the Court
of Claims with jurisdiction to render such judgment as the findings
of fact heretofore found and the law require:
Provided,
That either party hereto may appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States upon or from any conclusion of law or judgment, from
which appeals now lie in other cases at any time within ninety days
after the rendition of judgment:
Provided further, That
the amount of any
Page 280 U. S. 45
such judgment shall not exceed the sum of $50,000:
And
provided further, That such notice hereof shall be given to
the Attorney General of the United States as may be provided by
orders of said court, and it shall be the duty of the Attorney
General to cause one of his assistants to appear and defend for the
United States."
Judgment for the government in the reheard case was given by the
Court of Claims on February 4, 1929, based on a letter to the
Commissioner of Patents under date of January 15, 1851, from
Simpson, the then owner, specifically abandoning the application
for the patent.
On April 23, 1929, Arthur Colgate, as administrator of Clinton
Colgate, in pursuance of the Special Act, filed an application in
the Court of Claims for the allowance of an appeal to this Court
from the adverse judgment, and appeal was allowed by the Court of
Claims on April 26, 1929. The appeal was docketed in this Court May
1, 1929, and on the same day a petition for a writ of certiorari
was filed on the record in the appeal case. The petition for
certiorari, as already said, was denied by us October 14th last.
The case is now before us for consideration of the question of our
jurisdiction upon the appeal.
We think the proper construction to be put upon this Special Act
is that the review provided for was a petition for certiorari. One
of the chief purposes of the general act of February 13, 1925, ch.
229, 43 Stat. 936 (ยง 3) was to abolish appeals from the Court of
Claims to this Court and substitute therefor applications for writs
of certiorari. The language of the Special Act is that
"either party hereto may appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States upon or from any conclusion of law or judgment,
from which appeals now lie in other cases."
At the time of the passage of that Act, no appeals generally
"lay in other cases" from the Court of Claims to this Court, and do
not now. It was evidently intended by the Act of 1925 to make the
method of review by this Court of judgments
Page 280 U. S. 46
of the Court of Claims, uniform. It was intended by the Act of
1925 to give this Court an opportunity to determine in advance
whether the case was one worthy of review here. To hold that the
case may come here only by certiorari is to make it conform to the
general purpose of the Act of February 13, 1925, in enlarging the
use of certiorari as a method of review in this Court. To describe
appeals as from judgments "from which appeals now lie in other
cases" is a mistake, unless one gives to the meaning of the word
"appeals" something more than a mere technical meaning. If what was
intended was an appeal in its technical significance, as
distinguished from a certiorari, different words should have been
used to indicate it. Therefore the Special Act must be construed to
require that the review intended was the usual method of review at
the date of the Special Act, which is and was by application for a
writ of certiorari.
The case of
Sisseton & Wahpeton Band of Sioux Indians v.
United States, 277 U. S. 424,
does not control the present case. That case had reference to
another special act, granting the appellants one year from the date
of the act within which to appeal, and it was held to confer the
right of appeal, as distinguished from the right to petition for
certiorari. That special act was approved March 4, 1927 (c. 522, 44
Stat., Part 3, p. 1847), and its purpose was to revive a right to
appeal to this Court given to the same appellants by the Act of
April 11, 1916 (39 Stat. 47, c. 63), but of which appellants had
failed to avail themselves within the time limited therefor. Since
Congress, by the 1927 Act, was merely extending the period for the
exercise of a right conferred in 1916, the term "appeal," contained
in the statute, was naturally construed with reference to its
meaning at the time the right to it was originally granted. That
was granted nearly nine years before the Act of February 13, 1925,
changed the mode of
Page 280 U. S. 47
appellate review of judgments of the Court of Claims from a
technical "appeal" to a petition for writ of certiorari.
These provisions with respect to special review of cases from
the Court of Claims should be carefully construed. They are
generally embodied in exceptional legislation considered by other
committees than the judiciary committees not especially advised as
to the importance of uniformity in respect to such exceptions. It
should therefore be clear, if a departure from the ordinary methods
of limitation of review is intended by Congress, that the language
should leave no doubt about it.
The history of the legislation and the language used show that
the reference to appeals in the Special Act now before us finds its
counterpart in other acts having the same purpose. The language is
that
"either party hereto may appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States upon or from any conclusion of law or judgment from
which appeals now lie in other cases."
Acts of this kind, although speaking of "appeals," show what is
intended by the phrase, "as in other cases." The list of the later
acts in legislation of this kind, after the passage of the Act of
February 13, 1925, is as follows:
Act of March 3, 1925 (c. 459, 43 Stat. 1133, 1134), Kansas or
Kaw Indians:
From the decision of the Court of Claims an appeal may be taken
by either party
as in other cases to the Supreme Court of
the United States.
Act of May 14, 1926 (c. 300, 44 Stat. 555), Chippewas of
Minnesota:
With right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States
by either party
as in other cases.
Act of July 2, 1926 (c. 724, 44 Stat. 801), Citizen Band of
Pottawatomies:
"With the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States by either party
as in other cases. "
Page 280 U. S. 48
Act of December 17, 1928 (c. 36, 45 Stat. 1027), Winnebago
tribe:
"With the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States by either party
as in other cases."
Act of February 28, 1929 (c. 377, 45 Stat. 1407), Shosone
tribe:
"That from the decision of the Court of Claims in any suit
prosecuted under the authority of this act an appeal may be taken
by either party,
as in other cases, to the Supreme Court
of the United States."
Act of July 3, 1926 (c. 734, 44 Stat. 807), Crow Indians:
"With right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States
by either party."
Act of March 2, 1927 (c. 250, 44 Stat. 1263), Assiniboine
Indians:
"With right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States
by either party."
Act of March 3, 1927 (c. 302, 44 Stat. 1349), Shoshone
Indians:
"With right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States
by either party."
Act of May 18, 1928 (c. 624, 45 Stat. 602), Indians of
California:
"With the right of either party to appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States."
Act of February 20, 1929 (c. 275, 45 Stat. 1249), Nez Perce
tribe:
"With the right of appeal by either party to the Supreme Court
of the United States."
Act of February 23, 1929 (c. 300, 45 Stat. 1256), Coos (Kowes)
Bay, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw tribes:
"And the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States is hereby granted to both parties."
Here are included five instances in which the expression used
describing the appeal is as one which would "lie in
Page 280 U. S. 49
other cases," and the whole course of the legislation indicates
a desire that the same appellate review should be given as in other
cases. We think that this customary language requires the uniform
use of the writ of certiorari in order to secure that which a
certiorari gives -- a preliminary examination of proceedings by
this Court before review. Unless a special reason in the Act
providing for appellate review indicates that the review is to be
by technical appeal, rather than by the ordinary method of
certiorari, the latter method is the right one. This must lead to
the dismissal of the present appeal.