2. Failure to perform the annual labor (Rev.Stats. § 2324;
U.S.C. Title 30, § 28) renders the claim subject to loss through
relocation by another claimant, but it does not
ipso facto
forfeit the claim, and no relocation can be made if work be resumed
by the owner after default and before such relocation. P.
280 U. S.
317
Page 280 U. S. 307
3. So far as the government is concerned, failure to perform
labor in any year is without effect, and whenever $500 worth of
labor in the aggregate has been performed, and the other
requirements, including the payment of the purchase price, have
been complied with, the owner is entitled to a patent, even though,
in some years, annual assessment labor has been omitted. P.
280 U. S.
317.
4. Under the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, which, in
respect of lands containing oil shale and other deposits therein
specified, substituted a policy of leasing for that of location and
acquisition of title, but which, by § 37, saves valid claims
existent at the date of the Act and "thereafter maintained in
compliance with the laws under which instituted," and declares that
they may be perfected under such laws, the owner of an oil shale
placer claim which was valid at the date of the Act but upon which
no labor was performed for the assessment year in which the Act was
passed, "maintains" the claim by resuming work thereon in a
subsequent year, unless at least some form of challenge on behalf
of the United States to the valid existence of the claim has
intervened. P.
280 U. S.
317.
5. Where the Secretary of the Interior, in declining to issue a
patent for a mining claim, interprets and applies a statute in a
way contrary to its explicit terms, he departs from a plain
official duty, and the error may be corrected by mandamus in the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. P.
280 U. S.
318.
6. The writ of mandamus in this case should direct a disposal of
the application for patent on its merits, unaffected by the
temporary default in performance of assessment labor for the year
1920, and that further proceedings be in conformity with the views
expressed in this opinion as to the proper interpretation and
application of the excepting clause in the Leasing Act, and of
Rev.Stats. § 2324. P.
280 U. S.
319.
30 F.2d 742 affirmed with modification.
Certiorari, 279 U.S. 831, to review a judgment of the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia which reversed a judgment of
the Supreme Court of the District dismissing a petition for
mandamus.
Page 280 U. S. 314
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
The disposition of this case depends upon the construction and
application of § 2324 R.S. (U.S.C. Title 30, § 28), and the effect
upon its provisions of § 37 of the Mineral Leasing Act of February
25, 1920, c. 85, 41 Stat. 437, 451 (U.S.C. Title 30, § 193).
Section 2324 R.S., which has its origin in § 5 of the Mining Act of
1872 (c. 152, 17 Stat. 91, 92), provides:
"On each claim located after the 10th day of May, 1872, and
until a patent has been issued therefor, not less than $100 worth
of labor shall be performed or improvements made during each year.
. . , and upon a failure to comply with these conditions, the claim
or mine upon which such failure occurred shall be open to
relocation in the same manner as if no location of the same had
ever been made, provided that the original locators, their heirs,
assigns, or legal representatives, have not resumed work upon the
claim after failure and before such location."
By § 2325, R.S. (U.S.C. Title 30, § 29), provision is made for
issuing patents for claims located under the mining laws. One of
the prerequisites, and the only one in respect of labor, is that
the claimant must show "that $500 worth of labor has been expended
or improvements made upon the claim by himself or grantors."
The Leasing Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 437) effected a complete
change of policy in respect of the disposition of lands containing
deposits of coal, phosphate, sodium, oil, oil shale, and gas. Such
lands were no longer to be open to location and acquisition of
title, but only to lease. But § 37 (U.S.C. Title 30, § 193)
contains a saving clause protecting "valid claims existent at date
of the passage of this Act and
Page 280 U. S. 315
thereafter maintained in compliance with the laws under which
initiated," and declaring that they "may be perfected under such
laws, including discovery."
On October 1, 1919, respondent and seven associates, all
qualified under the law, located a tract of land in Garfield
county, Colorado, under the name of Spad No. 3 placer claim. The
land contained valuable deposits of oil shale, and was open to
appropriation under the mining laws of the United States. Spad No.
3 placer claim formed one of a group of six oil placer claims,
numbered Spad No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, respectively, all located
and owned by the same persons, and lying adjacent to each other.
The assessment year 1920, by act of Congress, was extended until
July 1, 1921. Prior to that date, annual labor amounting in value,
it was asserted, to more than $600 was performed on claims numbered
4, 5, and 6, with the intention that said labor should apply to the
entire group.
Subsequently, respondent acquired the interest of his colocators
in the Spad No. 3, and, during and for the assessment year 1921,
performed thereon assessment labor of an admitted value of more
than $100, and continued to perform labor and make improvements on
the claim until the aggregate value exceeded $500. On September 25,
1922, he applied for a patent, and, having complied with the
statutory requirements and paid the purchase price, obtained final
receiver's receipt on December 16, 1922. No relocation of the claim
was ever attempted, nor was the valid existence or maintenance of
the claim ever challenged in any wise by the United States or by
anyone prior to the issue of the receiver's receipt. Thereafter, a
proceeding against the entry was instituted by the Commissioner of
the General Land Office, and that officer, after consideration,
held the claim null and void upon the sole ground of insufficient
assessment labor for the year 1920. This holding was affirmed by
the Secretary of the Interior.
Page 280 U. S. 316
In all the proceedings before the land officers and the
Secretary, it was conceded, as it is here conceded, that the claim
was valid and existent when the Leasing Act was passed, and that no
reason existed, or now exists, for withholding a patent save the
alleged failure of assessment labor for the assessment year 1920.
The Secretary held that, by such failure, all rights to the claim
became extinguished, and could not be saved or revived by a
resumption of work.
Thereupon, respondent applied by petition to the Supreme Court
of the District of Columbia for a writ of mandamus to compel the
Secretary to issue a patent to the claim. After a hearing on rule
to show cause, that court discharged the rule and dismissed the
petition. Upon appeal, this judgment was reversed by the Court of
Appeals for the District. 30 F.2d 742.
Two questions are presented for determination: (1) Did the
Leasing Act of 1920 have the effect of extinguishing the right of
the locator, under § 2324, to save his claim under the original
location by resuming work after failure to perform annual
assessment labor? (2) Is the case a proper one for the writ of
mandamus?
1. The rule is established by innumerable decisions of this
Court, and of state and lower federal courts, that, when the
location of a mining claim is perfected under the law, it has the
effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present and
exclusive possession. The claim is property in the fullest sense of
that term, and may be sold, transferred, mortgaged, and inherited
without infringing any right or title of the United States. The
right of the owner is taxable by the state, and is "real property,"
subject to the lien of a judgment recovered against the owner in a
state or territorial court.
Belk v. Meagher, 104 U.
S. 279,
104 U. S. 283;
Manuel v. Wulff, 152 U. S. 505,
152 U. S.
510-511;
Elder v. Wood, 208 U.
S. 226,
Page 280 U. S. 317
208 U. S. 232;
Bradford v. Morrison, 212 U. S. 389. The
owner is not required to purchase the claim or secure patent from
the United States; but, so long as he complies with the provisions
of the mining laws, his possessory right, for all practical
purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent.
While he is required to perform labor of the value of $100
annually, a failure to do so does not
ipso facto forfeit
the claim, but only renders it subject to loss by relocation. And
the law is clear that no relocation can be made if work be resumed
after default and before such relocation.
Prior to the passage of the Leasing Act, annual performance of
labor was not necessary to preserve the possessory right, with all
the incidents of ownership above stated, as against the United
States, but only as against subsequent relocators. So far as the
government was concerned, failure to do assessment work for any
year was without effect. Whenever $500 worth of labor in the
aggregate had been performed, other requirements aside, the owner
became entitled to a patent, even though. in some years. annual
assessment labor had been omitted. P. Wolenberg
et al., 29
L.D. 302, 304;
Nielson v. Champagne Mining and Milling
Co., 29 L.D. 491, 493.
It being conceded that the Spad No. 3 "was a valid claim
existent on February 25, 1920," the only question is whether,
within the terms of the excepting clause of § 37, the claim was
"thereafter maintained in compliance with the laws under which
initiated." These words are plain and explicit, and we have only to
expound them according to their obvious and natural sense.
It is not doubted that a claim initiated under § 2324, R.S.,
could be maintained by the performance of annual assessment work of
the value of $100, and we think it is no less clear that, after
failure to do assessment work, the owner equally maintains his
claim, within the meaning
Page 280 U. S. 318
of the Leasing Act, by a resumption of work, unless at least
some form of challenge on behalf of the United States to the valid
existence of the claim has intervened; for, as this Court said in
Belk v. Meagher, supra at
104 U. S.
283:
"His rights after resumption were precisely what they would have
been if no default [that is, no default in the doing of assessment
labor] and occurred."
Resumption of work by the owner, unlike a relocation by him, is
an act not in derogation, but in affirmance, of the original
location, and thereby the claim is "maintained" no less than it is
by performance of the annual assessment labor. Such resumption does
not
restore a
lost estate (
see Knutson v.
Fredlund, 56 Wash. 634, 639, 106 P. 200); it
preserves an
existing estate. We are of opinion
that the Secretary's decision to the contrary violates the plain
words of the excepting clause of the Leasing Act.
2. While the decisions of this Court exhibit a reluctance to
direct a writ of mandamus against an executive officer, they
recognize the duty to do so by settled principles of law in some
cases.
Lane v. Hoglund, 244 U. S. 174,
244 U. S. 181,
and cases cited. In
Roberts v. United States, 176 U.
S. 221,
176 U. S. 231,
referred to and quoted in the
Hoglund case, this Court
said:
"Every statute to some extent requires construction by the
public officer whose duties may be defined therein. Such officer
must read of law, and he must therefore, in a certain sense,
construe it, in order to form a judgment from its language what
duty he is directed by the statute to perform. But that does not
necessarily and in all cases make the duty of the officer anything
other than a purely ministerial one. If the law direct him to
perform an act in regard to which no discretion is committed to
him, and which, upon the facts existing, he is bound to perform,
then that act is ministerial, although depending upon a statute
which requires, in some degree,
Page 280 U. S. 319
a construction of its language by the officer. Unless this be
so, the value of this writ is very greatly impaired. Every
executive officer whose duty is plainly devolved upon him by
statute might refuse to perform it, and, when his refusal is
brought before the court, he might successfully plead that the
performance of the duty involved the construction of a statute by
him, and therefore it was not ministerial, and the court would on
that account be powerless to give relief. Such a limitation of the
powers of the court, we think, would be most unfortunate, as it
would relieve from judicial supervision all executive officers in
the performance of their duties, whenever they should plead that
the duty required of them arose upon the construction of a statute,
no matter how plain its language, nor how plainly they violated
their duty in refusing to perform the act required."
See also Ballinger v. United States ex rel. Frost,
216 U. S. 240,
216 U. S.
250.
In this case, the Secretary interpreted and applied a statute in
a way contrary to its explicit terms, and in so doing departed from
a plain official duty. A writ of mandamus should issue directing a
disposal of the application for patent on its merits, unaffected by
the temporary default in the performance of assessment labor for
the assessment year 1920, and that further proceedings be in
conformity with the views expressed in this opinion as to the
proper interpretation and application of the excepting clause of
the Leasing Act of February 25, 1920 and of § 2324, Revised
Statutes of the United States. A writ in that form follows the
precedent established by this Court in respect of the writ of
injunction in
Payne v. Central P. Ry. Co., 255 U.
S. 228,
255 U. S. 238,
and
Payne v. New Mexico, 255 U. S. 367,
255 U. S. 373, as
being better suited to the occasion than that indicated by the
district court of appeals. As so modified, the judgment of that
court is
Affirmed.