1. Where the record does not disclose the federal grounds on
which a state statute was challenged in the state court, review
will be
Page 280 U. S. 118
limited to those which were considered in the state court's
opinion. P.
280 U. S.
122.
2. The Constitution doe not forbid the abolition of old rights
recognized by the common law to attain a permissible legislative
object. P.
280 U. S.
122.
3. A state statute providing that no person carried gratuitously
as a guest in an automobile may recover from the owner or operator
for injuries caused by its negligent operation is not in conflict
with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because of the distinction it makes between passengers so carried
in automobiles and those in other classes of vehicles. P.
280 U. S.
122.
4. A statutory classification may not be declared forbidden as
arbitrary unless grounds for the distinction are plainly absent. P.
280 U. S.
123.
5. Conspicuous abuses, such as the multiplicity of suits growing
out of the gratuitous carriage of passenger in automobiles, may be
regulated by the legislature without regulating other like, but
less conspicuous, examples. P.
280 U. S.
123.
108 Conn. 371 affirmed.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut affirming a judgment for the defendant in an action to
recover for injuries caused by negligence in the operation of an
automobile.
Page 280 U. S. 121
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal under ยง 237 of the Judicial Code, as amended
by Act of February 13, 1925, from a judgment of the Supreme Court
of Connecticut upholding the constitutionality of a state statute.
Chapter 308 of the Public Acts of Connecticut of 1927 (printed in
the margin
*)
Page 280 U. S. 122
provides that no person carried gratuitously as a guest in an
automobile may recover from the owner or operator for injuries
caused by its negligent operation. The appellant brought suit in
the Superior Court of New Haven county against appellee, her
husband, for injuries so sustained. Judgment for the defendant was
affirmed by the Supreme Court. Both courts ruled that the statute
barred appellant, a guest carried gratuitously, from recovery for
injuries caused by ordinary negligence in the operation of the car,
and the Supreme Court, by divided bench, held that the statute did
not deny to appellant the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 108 Conn. 371, 143 A. 240.
As the record does not disclose the constitutional grounds on
which the appellant challenged the validity of the statute, our
review will be limited to the single question arising under the
federal Constitution which was considered in the opinion of the
court below.
Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U.
S. 260. We need not, therefore, elaborate the rule that
the Constitution does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the
abolition of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a
permissible legislative object.
See Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co.
v. Yeldell, 274 U. S. 112,
274 U. S. 116;
New York Central Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U.
S. 188;
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington,
243 U. S. 219;
Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U. S.
60,
205 U. S.
74.
The use of the automobile as an instrument of transportation is
peculiarly the subject of regulation. We cannot assume that there
are no evils to be corrected or permissible social objects to be
gained by the present statute. We are not unaware of the increasing
frequency of litigation in which passengers carried gratuitously in
automobiles, often casual guests or licensees, have sought the
recovery of large sums for injuries alleged to have
Page 280 U. S. 123
been due to negligent operation. In some jurisdictions, it has
been judicially determined that a lower standard of care should be
exacted where the carriage in any type of vehicle is gratuitous.
See Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487;
Marcienowski
v. Sanders, 252 Mass. 65;
Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga.App.
399. Whether there has been a serious increase in the evils of
vexatious litigation in this class of cases where the carriage is
by automobile is for legislative determination, and, if found, may
well be the basis of legislative action further restricting the
liability. Its wisdom is not the concern of courts.
It is said that the vice in the statute is not that it
distinguishes between passengers who pay and those who do not, but
between gratuitous passengers in automobiles and those in other
classes of vehicles. But it is not so evident that no grounds exist
for the distinction that we can say
a priori that the
classification is one forbidden as without basis and arbitrary.
See Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.
S. 392,
274 U. S.
397.
Granted that the liability to be imposed upon those who operate
any kind of vehicle for the benefit of a mere guest or licensee is
an appropriate subject of legislative restriction, there is no
constitutional requirement that a regulation, in other respects
permissible, must reach every class to which it might be applied --
that the legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of
regulating all or none.
Patsone v. Pennsylvania,
232 U. S. 138,
232 U. S. 144;
Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373,
236 U. S.
382-384;
International Harvester Co. v.
Missouri, 234 U. S. 200,
234 U. S. 215;
Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26,
229 U. S. 29. In
this day of almost universal highway transportation by motorcar, we
cannot say that abuses originating in the multiplicity of suits
growing out of the gratuitous carriage of passengers in automobiles
do not present so conspicuous an example of what the legislature
may regard as an evil as to justify
Page 280 U. S. 124
legislation aimed at it, even though some abuses may not be hit.
Carroll v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 199 U.
S. 401,
199 U. S. 411;
New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S.
63,
278 U. S. 73. It
is enough that the present statute strikes at the evil where it is
felt and reaches the class of cases where it most frequently
occurs.
Affirmed.
*
"Chapter 308.
An Act Releasing Owners Of Motor Vehicles From
Responsibility For Injuries To Passengers Therein."
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in
General Assembly convened:"
"Section 1. No person transported by the owner or operator of a
motor vehicle as his guest without payment for such transportation
shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner or
operator for injury, death or loss, in case of accident unless such
accident shall have been intentional on the part of said owner or
operator or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of
the rights of others."
"Sec. 2. This act shall not relieve a public carrier or any
owner or operator of a motor vehicle while the same is being
demonstrated to a prospective purchaser of responsibility for any
injuries sustained by a passenger being transported by such public
carrier or by such owner or operator."