It is an undoubted principle of law fully recognized by this
Court that a tenant cannot dispute the title of his landlord either
by setting up a title in himself or a third person during the
existence of the lease or tenancy. The principle of estoppel
applies to the relation between them, and operates with full force
to prevent the tenant from violating that contract by which he
claimed and held the possession. He cannot change the character of
the tenure by his own act merely, so as to enable himself to hold
against his landlord, who reposes under the security of the
tenancy, believing the possession of the tenant to be his own, held
under his title, and ready to be surrendered by its termination, by
the lapse of time or demand of possession.
The same principle applies to mortgagor and mortgagee, trustee
and
cestui que trust, and generally to all cases where one
man obtains possession of real estate belonging to another by a
recognition of his title.
In no instance has the principle of law which protects the
relations between landlord and tenant being carried so far as in
this case, which presents a disclaimer by a tenant with the
knowledge of his landlord and an unbroken possession afterwards for
such a length of time that the act of limitations has run out four
times before he has done any act to assert his right to the
land.
When a tenant disclaims to hold under his lease, he becomes a
trespasser and his possession is adverse, and as open to the action
of his landlord as a possession acquired originally by wrong. The
act is conclusive on the tenant.
He cannot revoke his disclaimer and adverse claim so as to
protect himself during the unexpired time of the lease. He is a
trespasser on him who has the legal title. The relation of landlord
and tenant is dissolved, and each party is to stand upon his
right.
If the tenant disclaims the tenure, claims the fee adversely in
right of a third person or in his own right, or attorns to another,
his possession then becomes a tortious one by the forfeiture of his
right, and the landlord's right of entry is complete, and he may
sue at any time within the period of limitation, but he must lay
his demise of a day subsequent to the termination of the tenancy,
for before that he had no right of entry. By bringing his
ejectment, he disclaims the tenancy and goes for the forfeiture. It
shall not be permitted to the landlord to thus admit that there is
no tenure subsisting between him, and the tenant which can protect
his possession from this adversary suit, and at the same time
recover on the ground of there being a tenure so strong as that he
cannot set up his adversary possession.
A mortgagee or direct purchaser from a tenant, or one who buys
his right at a sheriff's sale, assumes his relation to the
landlord, with all its legal consequences, and is as much estopped
from denying the tenancy.
If no length of time would protect a possession originally
acquired under a lease, it would be productive of evils truly
alarming, and we must be convinced beyond a doubt that the law is
so settled before we would give our sanction to such a doctrine,
and this is not the case upon authorities.
Page 28 U. S. 44
The relation between tenants in common is in principle very
similar to that between lessor and lessee. The possession of one is
the possession of the
other, while ever the tenure is acknowledged. But if one ousts
the other, or denies the tenure, and receives the rents and profits
to his exclusive use, his possession becomes adverse, and the act
of limitations begins to run, so of a trustee, so of a
mortgagee.
In relation to the limitations of actions for the recovery of
real property, the Court thinks it proper to apply the remarks of
the learned judge who delivered the opinion of the Court in the
case of
Bell v.
Morrison, 1 Pet. 360, and to say the statute ought
to receive such a construction as will effectuate the beneficent
objects which it intended to accomplish, the security of titles,
and the quieting of possessions. That which has been given to it in
the present case is, we think, conformable to its true spirit and
intention without impairing any principle heretofore
established.
An action of trespass to try titles was brought in the circuit
Court of South Carolina on 20 April, 1822, by the defendant in
error against the plaintiff in this Court for the recovery of six
hundred acres of land situated on the Savannah River. The title
claimed by the plaintiff below and the evidence are fully stated in
the opinion of the Court.
On the trial in the circuit court, the defendant proved that
Samuel Willison, his father, had possession of the land in 1789,
and cultivated it till the period of his death in 1802, from which
time his widow and family possessed it until the death of his widow
in 1815, and that from 1815 until this action was brought, the
children retained possession by their tenants. That in the lifetime
of Samuel Willison, Bordeaux, through whom the plaintiff claimed,
was apprised that he claimed to hold the land by an adverse title.
That the widow in 1802, on demand made, refused to give possession
to Ralph S. Phillips, who claimed the land, and set up a title in
herself, and was sued as a trespasser. That in 1793, Bordeaux and
Willison were in treaty for the sale of this land, Bordeaux wishing
to sell and Willison to purchase. The plaintiff then offered in
evidence a power of attorney from Bordeaux to Willison dated
February, 1792, authorizing him to take possession of the land, and
sue trespassers, and that Willison was then a tenant of Bordeaux.
The defendant having pleaded the statute of limitations (five years
adverse
Page 28 U. S. 45
possession giving a title under it) relied upon the foregoing
facts. But the presiding judge overruled the plea and instructed
the jury that, when a tenancy had been proved to have once existed,
the tenancy must not only be abandoned, but possession given up,
before an adverse possession can be alleged. To this decision the
defendant excepted.
The defendant brought this writ of error.
In the argument of the cause, the counsel for the plaintiff in
error presented for the consideration of the court other exceptions
besides that upon which the judgment of the circuit court was
reversed. The decision of the court is exclusively upon the law
arising on that which is stated.
MR. JUSTICE BALDWIN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an action of trespass to try titles, brought in 1822 in
the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of South
Carolina, by Watkins against Willison, for a tract of land
containing six hundred acres on the Savannah River. This land was
originally granted to James Parsons, who conveyed to Ralph
Phillips, whose estate was confiscated by an act of assembly of
South Carolina and vested in five commissioners appointed by the
legislature of that state. The five commissioners acted in
execution of the law, but before any conveyance was made of the
land in question, one of them had died, and two of the others had
ceased to act or resigned in 1783. The two remaining commissioners
in 1788 conveyed this land to Daniel Bordeaux and R. Newman, who in
the same year executed to the treasurer of the state, a bond and
mortgage to secure the payment of the purchase money, which,
pursuant to an act of assembly passed for that purpose in 1801, was
transferred and delivered to Ralph S. Phillips, the son of Ralph
Phillips, to be disposed of as he should think proper, and by the
same law the confiscation act, so far as respected Ralph Phillips,
was repealed. A suit was brought on this bond in the name of the
treasurer of the state
Page 28 U. S. 46
in 1803, against Daniel Bordeaux, and prosecuted to final
judgment against his administrators in 1817, when an execution
issued, on which the land was sold and conveyed by deed, from the
sheriff to Anderson Watkins, the plaintiff in the circuit court,
who claims by virtue of the sheriff's deed, and as standing in the
relation of landlord to the defendant.
Samuel Willison, the father of the defendant, entered into
possession of the premises in question in 1789, and cultivated them
till his death in 1802, from which time his widow and children
possessed them, till her death in 1815, since which time the
children have retained possession by their tenants, till the
commencement of this suit.
In 1802, Ralph S. Phillips, who was then the assignee of the
bond and mortgage, made a demand of the possession from the widow,
who refused to give it up, and set up a title in herself. He
brought an action of trespass against her to try titles in January,
1803, in which he was nonsuited in November, 1805, and in March,
1808, he brought another action of the same nature against her, in
which no proceedings were had after 1812, which, by the law and
practice of South Carolina operates as a discontinuance of the
action.
In 1792 Bordeaux, the mortgagor, executed to Willison a power of
attorney authorizing him to take possession of the land and sue
trespassers. Willison was then a tenant of Bordeaux.
In 1793, they were in treaty for the sale of the land, Bordeaux
wanting to sell and Willison to purchase. But during the lifetime
of Willison, Bordeaux was apprised that he claimed to hold the land
by an adverse title. The defendant exhibited no title other than
what is derived from the possession of his father and the
family.
The first question which arose at the trial was on the admission
in evidence of the deed from the two commissioners to Bordeaux and
Newman, the defendant alleging that no title passed by it because
it was not signed by the other two commissioners. The circuit court
overruled the objection, the deed was read, and this becomes the
subject of the first error assigned in this Court.
As the court has been unable to procure the confiscation
Page 28 U. S. 47
act of South Carolina, we are unwilling to express any opinion
on this exception without examining its provisions, which are very
imperfectly set out in the record, and as the merits of the case
can be decided on another exception, we do not think it necessary
to postpone our judgment.
The remaining exception is that the circuit court erred in
charging the jury that the claim of the plaintiff was not barred by
the act of limitations of South Carolina, which protects a
possession of five years from an adverse title.
It appears from the record that the defendant and his family
have been in possession of this land for thirty-three years next
before this suit was brought, but whether that possession has been
adverse to the title of the plaintiff during the whole of that
time, or such part of it as will bring him within the protection of
this law, becomes a very important inquiry.
The plaintiff contended at the trial that by becoming the tenant
of Bordeaux, Willison the elder and his heirs, so long as they
remain in possession, are prevented from setting up any title in
themselves, or denying that of Bordeaux, without first surrendering
to him the possession, and then bringing their suit. That the
possession of the tenant being the possession of the landlord, he
could do no act by which it could become adverse, so that the
statute of limitations would begin to run in his favor or operate
to bar his claim, by any lapse of time, however long.
The defendant, on the other hand, contended that from the time
of the disclaimer of the tenancy by Willison and the setting up of
a title adverse to Bordeaux and with his knowledge, his possession
became adverse, and that he could avail himself of the act of
limitations if no suit was brought within five years
thereafter.
It is an undoubted principle of law fully recognized by this
Court that a tenant cannot dispute the title of his landlord either
by setting up a title in himself or a third person during the
existence of the lease or tenancy. The principle of estoppel
applies to the relation between them, and operates in its full
force to prevent the tenant from violating that contract by which
he obtained and holds possession.
20 U. S. 7 Wheat.
535.
Page 28 U. S. 48
He cannot change the character of the tenure by his own act
merely, so as to enable himself to hold against his landlord, who
reposes under the security of the tenancy, believing the possession
of the tenant to be his own, held under his title, and ready to be
surrendered by its termination by the lapse of time or demand of
possession. The same principle applies to mortgagor and mortgagee,
trustee and
cestui que trust, and generally to all cases
where one man obtains possession of real estate belonging to
another, by a recognition of his title. On all these subjects the
law is too well settled to require illustration or reasoning or to
admit of a doubt. But we do not think that in any of these
relations it has been adopted to the extent contended for in this
case, which presents a disclaimer by a tenant with the knowledge of
his landlord, and an unbroken possession afterwards for such a
length of time that the act of limitations has run out four times
before he has done any act to assert his right to the land. Few
stronger cases than this can occur, and if the plaintiff can
recover without any other evidence of title than a tenancy existing
thirty years before suit brought, it must be conceded that no
length of time, no disclaimer of tenancy by the tenant, and no
implied acquiescence of the landlord can protect a possession
originally acquired under such a tenure.
If there is any case which could clearly illustrate the sound
policy of acts of repose and quieting titles and possessions by the
limitation of actions, it is in this. Here was no secret
disclaimer, no undiscovered fraud; it was known to Bordeaux, and
was notice to him that Willison meant to hold from that time by his
own title and on adverse possession. This terminated the tenancy as
to him, and from that time Bordeaux had a right to eject him as a
trespasser. Adams on Eject. 118. Bull.N.P. 96; 6 Johns. 272.
Had there been a formal lease for a term not then expired, the
lessee forfeited it by this act of hostility; had it been a lease
at will from year to year, he was entitled to no notice to quit
before an ejectment. The landlord's action would be as against a
trespasser, as much so as if no relation had ever existed between
them.
Page 28 U. S. 49
Having thus a right to consider the lessee as a wrongdoer,
holding adversely, we think that under the circumstances of this
case, the lessor was bound so to do. It would be an anomalous
possession, which as to the rights of one party was adverse, and as
to the other fiduciary, if after a disclaimer with the knowledge of
the landlord and attornment to a third person, or setting up a
title in himself, the tenant forfeits his possession and all the
benefits of the lease he ought to be entitled to, such as result
from his known adverse possession. No injury can be done the
landlord unless by his own laches. If he sues within the period of
the act of limitations, he must recover; if he suffers the time to
pass without suit, it is but the common case of any other party who
loses his right by negligence and loss of time.
As to the assertion of his claim, the possession is as adverse
and as open to his action as one acquired originally by wrong, and
we cannot assent to the proposition that the possession shall
assume such character as one party alone may choose to give it. The
act is conclusive on the tenant. He cannot make his disclaimer and
adverse claim, so as to protect himself during the unexpired term
of the lease; he is a trespasser on him who has the legal title.
The relation of landlord and tenant is dissolved, and each party is
to stand upon his right.
It is on this principle alone that the plaintiff could claim to
recover in this action. If there was between him and the defendant
an existing tenancy at the time it was brought, he had no right of
entry. The lessee cannot be a trespasser during the existence of
the lease, and cannot be turned out till its termination. At the
end of a definite term, the lessor has his election to consider the
lessee a trespasser and to enter on him by ejectment; but if he
suffers him to remain in possession, he becomes a tenant at will,
or from year to year, and in either case is entitled to a notice to
quit before the lessor can eject him. The notice terminates the
term, and thenceforth the lessee is a wrongdoer and holds at his
peril. Woodfall's Land. & Ten. 218, 220; 2 Serg. & R.
49.
If the tenant disclaims the tenure, claims the fee adversely in
right of a third person or his own, or attorns to another, his
Page 28 U. S. 50
possession then becomes a tortious one, by the forfeiture of his
right. The landlord's right of entry is complete, and he may sue at
any time within the period of limitation; but he must lay his
demise of a day subsequent to the termination of the tenancy, for
before that he had no right of entry. By bringing his ejectment, he
also affirms the tenancy and goes for the forfeiture. It shall not
be permitted to the landlord to thus admit that there is no tenure
subsisting between him and defendant which can protect his
possession from his adversary suit, and at the same time recover on
the ground of there being a tenure so strong that he cannot set up
his own adversary possession.
The plaintiff claims without showing any title in himself or any
right of possession except what exists from the consequences of a
tenancy, the existence of which he denies in the most solemn
manner, by asserting its termination before suit brought.
The principle here asserted is not new in this Court. In the
case of
Blight's Lessee v.
Rochester, 7 Wheat. 535,
20 U. S. 549,
the plaintiff's lessors claimed as heirs of John Dunlap; the
defendant claimed by purchase from one Hunter, who professed to
have purchased from Dunlap. The defendant acknowledged the title of
Dunlap as the one under which he held. Dunlap had in fact no title;
but the plaintiffs insisted that the defendant could not deny his
title. THE CHIEF JUSTICE, in giving the opinion of the Court,
observes:
"If he holds under an adversary title to Dunlap, his right to
contest his title is admitted. If he claims under a sale from
Dunlap, and Dunlap himself is compelled to aver that he does, then
the plaintiffs themselves assert a title against this contract.
Unless they show that it was conditional and that the condition is
broken, they cannot, in the very act of disregarding it themselves,
insist that it binds the defendant in good faith to acknowledge a
title which has no real existence."
We are not aware that in applying this doctrine to the case now
before the Court we shall violate any settled principle of the
common law.
If a different rule was established, the consequences would be
very serious. A mortgagee, a direct purchaser from a
Page 28 U. S. 51
tenant, or one who buys his right at a sheriff's sale, assumes
his relations to the landlord with all their legal consequences,
and they are as much estopped from denying the tenancy. If no
length of time would protect a possession originally acquired under
a lease, it would be productive of evils truly alarming, and we
must be convinced beyond a doubt that the law is so settled before
we could give our sanction to such a doctrine.
An examination of the authorities on this point relieves our
minds from all such apprehensions by finding our opinion supported
to its full extent by judicial decisions entitled to the highest
respect, and which we may safely adopt as evidence of the common
law.
The case of
Hovenden v. Lord Annesley was that of a
tenant who had attorned to one claiming adversely to his lessor
with his knowledge. In delivering his opinion, Lord Redesdale
entered into a detailed view of the decisions on the application of
the act of limitations to trusts of real and personal estate in
courts of law and chancery, and to fiduciary possessions generally.
On the point directly before us he observes:
"That the attornment will not affect the title of the lessor so
long as he has a right to consider the person holding possession as
his tenant. But as he has a right to punish the acts of his tenant
in disavowing the tenure by proceeding to eject him,
notwithstanding his lease, if he will not proceed for the
forfeiture, he has no right to affect the rights of third persons
on the ground that the possession was destroyed, and there must be
a limitation to this as well as every other demand. The intention
of the act of limitations being to quiet the possession of lands,
it would be curious if a tenant for ninety-nine years, attorning to
a person insisting he was entitled, and disavowing tenure to the
knowledge of his former landlord, should protect the title of the
original lessor for the term of ninety-nine years. That would, I
think, be too strong to hold on the ground of the possession being
in the lessor, after the tenure had been disavowed to the knowledge
of the lessor."
The relation between tenants in common is, in principle, very
similar to that between lessor and lessee; the possession
Page 28 U. S. 52
of one is the possession of the other, while ever the tenure is
acknowledged. Cowp. 217. But if one ousts the other or denies the
tenure and receives the rents and profits to his exclusive use, his
possession becomes adverse, and the act of limitations begins to
run. 2 Scho. & Lef. 628, and cases cited. 4 Serg. & R. 570.
The possession of a trustee is the possession of the
cestui que
trust, so long as the trust is acknowledged, but from the time
of known disavowal it becomes adverse. So of a mortgagee, while he
admits himself to be in as mortgagee, and therefore liable to
redemption. 7 Johns.Ch. 114, and cases cited. But if the right of
redemption is not foreclosed within twenty years, the statute may
be pleaded, and so in every case of an equitable title, not being
the case of a trustee, whose possession is consistent with the
title of the claimant. 7 Johns.Ch. 122.
After elaborately reviewing the English decisions on these and
other analogous subjects, Chancellor Kent remarks it is easy to
perceive that the doctrines here laid down are the same that govern
courts of law in analogous cases, and the statute of limitations
receives the same construction and application at law and in
equity.
Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 Johns.Ch. 90, 122. It is
equally said that fraud as well as trust are not within the
statute, and it is well settled that the statute does not run until
the discovery of the fraud, for the title to avoid it does not
arise until then, and pending the concealment of it, the statute
ought not to run. But after the discovery of the fact imputed as
fraud, the statute runs as in other cases, and he cites in support
of this position 1 Browne's Parliament.Cases, 455; 3 P.Wms. 143; 2
Scho. & Lef. 607, 628, 636, and the cases cited.
In the case of
Hughes v.
Edwards, 9 Wheat. 490,
22 U. S. 497,
it was settled that the right of a mortgagor to redeem is barred
after twenty years possession by the mortgagee after forfeiture, no
interest having been paid in the meantime, and no circumstance
appearing to account for the neglect. 7 Johns.Ch. 122; 2 Sch. &
Lef. 636. The court in that case said that in respect to the
mortgagee, who is seeking to foreclose the equity of redemption,
the general rule is that where the mortgagor has been
Page 28 U. S. 535
permitted to remain in possession, the mortgage will, after a
length of time, be presumed to have been discharged by payment of
the money or a release unless circumstances can be shown
sufficiently strong to repel the presumption, as payment of
interest, a promise to pay, an acknowledgement by the mortgagor
that the mortgage is still existing, or the like.
All these principles bear directly on the case now before us,
they are well settled and unquestioned rules in all courts of law
and equity, and necessarily lead to the same conclusion to which
this Court has arrived. The relations created by a lease are not
more sacred than those of a trust or a mortgage. By setting up or
attorning to a title adverse to his landlord, the tenant commits a
fraud as much as by the breach of any other trust. Why then should
not the statute protect him, as well as any other fraudulent
trustee, from the time the fraud is discovered or known to the
landlord? If he suffers the tenant to retain possession twenty
years after a tenancy is disavowed, and cannot account for his
delay in bringing his suit, why should he be exempted from the
operation of the statute more than the mortgagor or the mortgagee?
We can perceive no good reasons for allowing this peculiar and
exclusive privilege to a lessor; we can find no rule of law or
equity which makes it a matter of duty to do it, and have no
hesitation in deciding that in this case the statute of limitations
is a bar to the plaintiff's action.
In doing this, we do not intend to dispute the principle of any
case adjudged by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. Of those
which have been cited in the argument, there is none which in our
opinion controverts any of the principles here laid down or profess
to be founded on any local usage, common law, or construction of
the statute of limitations of that state. One has been much pressed
upon us as establishing a doctrine which would support the position
of the plaintiff, which deserves some notice. In the case in 1 Nott
& McCord, 374, the court decide that where a defendant enters
under a plaintiff, he shall not dispute his title while he remains
in possession, and that he must first give up his possession and
bring his suit to try titles. To the correctness of this principle
we yield our assent not as one professing to be peculiar to
South
Page 28 U. S. 54
Carolina, but as a rule of the common law applicable to the
cases of fiduciary possession before noticed. It is laid down as a
general rule, embracing in terms tenants in common, trustees,
mortgagees, and lessees, but disallowing none of the exceptions or
limitations which qualify it and exclude from its operation all
cases where the possession has become adverse, where the party
entitled to it does not enter or sue within the time of the statute
of limitations, or give any good reason for his delay, leaving the
rule in full force wherever the suit is brought within the time
prescribed by law. To this extent and this only, the decision would
reach. To carry it further would be giving a more universal
application than the courts of South Carolina would seem to have
intended, and further than we should be warranted by the rules of
law. To extend it to cases of vendor and vendee would be in direct
contradiction to the solemn decision in
20 U. S. 7
Wheat. 525.
In relation to the limitation of actions for the recovery of
real property, we think it proper to apply the remarks of the
learned judge who delivered the opinion of this Court in the case
of
Bell v.
Morrison, 1 Pet. 351, and to say that the statute
ought to receive such a construction as will effectuate the
beneficent objects which it intended to accomplish -- the security
of titles, and the quieting of possessions. That which has been
given to it in the present case is we think favorable to its true
spirit and intention without impairing any legal principle
heretofore established.
It is therefore the opinion of the Court that the plaintiff in
error has sustained his fourth exception, and that the judgment of
the circuit court must be
Reversed. The cause is remanded to the circuit court with
directions to award a venire de novo.
MR. JUSTICE JOHNSON.
Had I felt myself at liberty in the court below to act upon my
own impressions as to the general doctrine respecting the defense
which a tenant might legally set up in ejectment brought against
him by his landlord, I certainly should have left it to the jury to
inquire whether the possession of Willison ever was hostile to that
of Bordeaux, a fact the evidence
Page 28 U. S. 55
to prove which was very trifling, as appears even in this bill
of exceptions. But there were produced to me official reports of
adjudged cases in that state by the courts of the last resort which
appeared fully to establish that when, once a tenancy was proved,
the tenant could make no defense, but must restore possession, and
then alone could he avail himself of a title derived from any
source whatever, inconsistent with the relation of tenant. Now it
ought not to be controverted that, as to what are the laws of real
estate in the respective states, the decisions of every other state
in the union or in the universe are worth nothing against the
decisions of the state where the land lies. On such a subject we
have just as much right to repeal their statutes as to overrule
their decisions.
I will repeat a few extracts from one of their decisions to show
that they will at least afford an apology for the opinion expressed
in the bill of exceptions upon the law of South Carolina, for I
placed it expressly on their decisions, not my own ideas of the
general doctrine.
The case of
Wilson v. Weatherby, 1 Nott & McCord
373, was an action to try title, just such as the present, and
heard before Cheves, Justice, in July, 1815. The defendant offered
to go into evidence to show a title in himself, to which it was
objected that as he had gone into possession under the plaintiff,
he could not dispute his title. The objection was sustained, and a
verdict given for the plaintiff. The cause was then carried up to
the appellate court, and the judgment below sustained, that court
unanimously agreeing the law to be as laid down by the judge who
delivered the opinion in these terms:
"The evidence offered by the defendant was of a title acquired
by him after he went into possession under the plaintiff, and
before he gave up possession. If he was at any time the tenant of
the plaintiff, he continues so all the time, unless he had given up
the possession. The attempt to evade the rule of law by going out
of possession a moment, and then returning into possession, did not
change his situation at all, and especially as he left another
person in possession, so that his possession was altogether
unbroken. A distinct and
bona fide abandonment of the
possession
Page 28 U. S. 56
at least was necessary to have put him in a situation to dispute
the plaintiff's title. On the last ground, that the defendant was
not at any time the tenant of the plaintiff, the defendant was not
indeed a tenant under a lease rendering rent, but he nevertheless
held under the plaintiff. This ground is founded on a misconception
of the principle, which is not confined to the cases of tenants in
the common acceptation of the term. These cases have only furnished
examples of the application of the principle, which is that
wherever a defendant has entered into possession under the
plaintiff, he shall not be permitted, while he remains in
possession, to dispute the plaintiff's title. He has a right to
purchase any title he pleases, but he is bound,
bona fide,
to give up possession and to bring his action on his title and
recover by the strength of his own title."
This is the leading case upon this doctrine in that state, and
it is fully settled there that the wife, the executor, the heir, or
the purchaser at sheriff's sale is identified in interest with the
previous possessor, as also that a statutory title is acquired by
possession, under which one subsequently going out of possession,
may recover.
Understanding such to be the law of that state, I certainly did
not hold myself bound or at liberty to inquire whether it accorded
with the rules of decision in any other state. In principle, I am
under the impression there is not much difference, or at least not
more than that court was at large to disregard if they thought
proper.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
South Carolina, and was argued by counsel, on consideration
whereof, it is ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment
of the said circuit court in this cause be, and the same is hereby
reversed, and that this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded
to the said circuit court, with directions to award a
venire
facias de novo.