The plaintiff sued the defendant as Register of the United
States Land Office in Ohio for damages for having refused to note
in his books applications made by him for the purchase of land
within his district. The declaration charged the register with this
refusal, the lands had never been applied for nor sold, and were at
the time of the application liable to be so applied for and sold.
The statute of limitations is a good plea, to the suit.
It is a well settled principle that a statute of limitations is
the law of the forum, and operates upon all who submit themselves
to its jurisdiction.
Under the thirty-fourth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
the acts of limitation of the several states, where no special
provision has been made by Congress, form a rule of decision in the
courts of the United States, and the same effect is given to them
as is given in the state courts.
Construction of the statute of limitations of the State of
Ohio.
Where the statute of limitations is not restricted to particular
causes of action, but provides that the action, by its technical
denomination, shall be barred if not brought within a limited time,
every cause for which such action may be prosecuted is within the
statute.
In giving a construction to the statute of limitations of Ohio,
the action being barred by its denomination, the Court cannot look
into the cause of action. They may do this in those cases where
actions are barred for causes specified in the statute, for the
statute only operates against such actions when prosecuted on the
grounds stated. [278]
Of late years, the courts in England and in this country have
considered statutes of limitations more favorably than formerly.
They rest upon sound policy, and tend to the peace and welfare of
society. The courts do not now, unless compelled by the force of
former decisions, give a strained construction to evade the effect
of those statutes. By requiring those who complain of injuries to
seek redress by action at law within a reasonable time, a salutary
vigilance is imposed and an end is put to litigation.
In the Circuit Court of Ohio, the plaintiff in error instituted
a suit on 15 December, 1823, against the defendant, who was
Register of the United States land office at Zanesville, to recover
damages for having, as register, refused to enter an application in
the books of his office, for certain lands in his district; the
entry having been required to be made according to the provisions
of the tenth section of the Act of Congress passed 18 May, 1796,
entitled
"An
Page 28 U. S. 271
act providing for the sale of the lands of the United States, in
the territory northwest of the River Ohio, and above the mouth of
the Kentucky River."
The declaration charges that the register, on 2 August, 1810,
refused to enter the application, although the lands had never been
legally applied for or sold, and were then liable to be applied for
and sold.
The defendant pleaded not guilty, and not guilty within six
years before the commencement of the suit. To the latter plea there
was a demurrer, and joinder in demurrer. The circuit court
overruled the demurrer, and sustained the plea of the statute of
limitations. The plaintiff prosecuted this writ of error, and
sought to reverse the judgment on the grounds:
1. That the statute of limitations does not apply to an action
upon the case brought for an act of nonfeasance or misfeasance in
office.
2. That no statute of limitations of the State of Ohio, then in
force, is pleadable to an action upon the case brought by a citizen
of one state against a citizen of another, in the circuit court of
the United States for malfeasance or nonfeasance in office, in a
ministerial officer of the general government, and especially where
the plaintiff's rights accrued to him under a law of Congress.
Page 28 U. S. 275
MR. JUSTICE McLEAN delivered the opinion of the Court:
This suit was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, as
Register of the United States Land Office at Zanesville, in the
District of Ohio. The declaration charges that on 2 August in the
year 1810, the plaintiff produced to the defendant, in his office
of register, the receipts of the receiver of public moneys at that
office as follows,
viz., one number 3,255, and another
number 3,256, amounting together to he sum of $190.89 of moneys
paid by the plaintiff to the receiver for the purchase of public
lands in the said district, being the one-twentieth part of the
purchase money for section number six, in township number twelve,
and range number thirteen, and fraction number five, in the same
township and range adjoining the said section, and for section
number twelve, and fraction number one, adjoining in township
number thirteen, and range number fourteen of public lands within
that district, and that the plaintiff then and there applied to the
defendant for the purchase of the said lands -- that is, each of
the said sections with the fractions attached according to law, and
requested that his
Page 28 U. S. 276
application should be entered on the books of the defendant's
office, upon which application, the defendant informed the
plaintiff that the said lands had been sold at Marietta, before the
establishment of the land office at Zanesville, and if not so sold
there, that they had not been offered at public sale at Zanesville,
whereupon the plaintiff insisted on his applications, and requested
to have them entered, according to the provisions of the tenth
section of the Act of Congress approved 18 May, 1796, entitled "an
act providing for the sale of the lands of the United States, in
the territory northwest of the River Ohio and above the mouth of
Kentucky River." The declaration then charges that the register
refused to enter the application although the lands had never been
legally applied for nor sold and were then liable to be applied for
and sold. The damages are laid at $50,000.
To this declaration the defendant pleaded not guilty, whereupon
issue is joined, and not guilty within six years before the
commencement of the suit. To the latter plea there is a general
demurrer, and joinder in demurrer. The Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of Ohio overruled this demurrer and
sustained the plea of the statute of limitations, and this writ of
error is brought to reverse that decision.
For the plaintiff in error it is contended:
1. That the statute of limitations does not apply to an action
upon the case brought for an act of nonfeasance or malfeasance in
office.
2. That no statute of limitations of the State of Ohio then in
force is pleadable to an action upon the case brought by a citizen
of one state against a citizen of another in the circuit court of
the United States for malfeasance or nonfeasance in office in a
ministerial officer of the general government, and especially where
the plaintiff's rights accrued to him under a law of Congress.
The decision in this cause depends upon the construction of the
statute of Ohio which prescribes the time within which certain
actions must be brought. It is a well settled
Page 28 U. S. 277
principle that a statute of limitations is the law of the forum,
and operates upon all who submit themselves to its
jurisdiction.
In the thirty-fourth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, it is
provided
"That the laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States
in cases where they apply."
Under this statute, the acts of limitations of the several
states, where no special provision has been made by Congress, form
a rule of decision in the courts of the United States, and the same
effect is given to them as is given in the state courts. The act in
question provides
"That all actions hereinafter mentioned, shall be sued or
brought within the time hereinafter limited; all actions of
trespass for assault, menace, battery and wounding, actions of
slander for words spoken or libel, and for false imprisonment,
within one year next after the cause of such actions or suits; and
all actions of book accounts, or for forcible entry and detainer,
or forcible detainer, within four years after the cause of such
action or suits; and all actions of trespass upon real property,
trespass, detinue, trover and conversion and replevin, all actions
upon the case, and of debt for rent, shall be sued or brought
within six years next after the cause of such actions or
suits."
It is contended that this statute cannot be so construed as to
interpose a bar to any remedy sought against an officer of the
United States for a failure in the performance of his duty; that
such a case could not have been contemplated by the legislature;
that the language of the statute does not necessarily embrace it;
and consequently the statute can only apply, in cases of
nonfeasance or malfeasance in office, to persons who act under the
authority of the state and are amenable to it.
It is not probable that the Legislature of Ohio, in the passage
of this statute, had any reference to the misconduct of an officer
of the United States. Nor does it seem to have been their intention
to restrict the provision of the statute
Page 28 U. S. 278
to any particular causes for which the action on the case will
lie. In the actions of trespass, debt, and covenant specified, the
particular causes of action barred by the statute are stated, but
this is not done in the action on the case, nor is it done in the
action of detinue, trover, and conversion, and replevin.
Where the statute is not restricted to particular causes of
action, but provides that the action, by its technical
denomination, shall be barred, if not brought within a limited
time, every cause for which the action may be prosecuted is within
the statute.
If the statute required the action of debt for rent to be
brought within six years from the time the cause of action arose,
the bar could extend to no other action of debt. But if the statute
provided that all actions of debt should be prosecuted within six
years, then it would operate against the action, for whatever cause
it was brought.
The action on the case must be brought within six years from the
time the cause of action arose, and it is immaterial what that
cause may be; the statute bars the remedy, by this form of action,
if it be not prosecuted within the time.
In giving a construction to this statute, where the action is
barred by its denomination, the court cannot look into the cause of
action. They may do this in those cases where actions are barred
when brought for causes specified in the statute, for the statute
only operates against such actions when prosecuted on the grounds
stated.
By bringing his action on the case, the plaintiff has selected
the appropriate remedy for the injury complained of. This remedy
the statute bars. Can the court then, by referring to the ground of
the action, take the case out of the statute?
The demurrer admits the plea of the statute, and as it declares
in express terms that the action is barred, the court can give no
other effect to it by construction.
Of late years, the courts in England and in this country have
considered statutes of limitations more favorably than formerly.
They rest upon sound policy, and tend to the peace and welfare of
society. The courts do not now, unless
Page 28 U. S. 279
compelled by the force of former decisions, give a strained
construction, to evade the effect of those statutes. By requiring
those who complain of injuries to seek redress, by action at law,
within a reasonable time, a salutary vigilance is imposed, and an
end is put to litigation.
The judgment in this case must be
Affirmed.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Ohio and was argued by counsel, on consideration whereof it is
ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said
circuit court in this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed with
costs.
