A state statute which, upon the mere fact of a collision between
a railway train and a vehicle at a highway grade crossing and
resulting death, raises a presumption that the railway company and
it employees were negligent in the particulars alleged in the
complaint (even where the allegations are conflicting), and that
every act or omission so alleged was the proximate cause of the
death; which makes the company liable unless it shows due care in
respect of every matter alleged against it, and permits the jury to
consider and weigh the presumption as evidence against the
testimony of the company's witnesses tending affirmatively to prove
due care, is unreasonable and arbitrary, and violates the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mobile, etc. R. Co.
v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35,
distinguished.
167 Ga. 22 reversed.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia
sustaining a recovery in an action for wrongful death. The case was
twice before the Court of Appeals of Georgia, 35 Ga.App. 353; 36
id. 679. The appeal here was at first dismissed for want
of a federal question, but a rehearing was granted, 278 U.S.
577.
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellee, Mary E. Henderson, sued to recover damages for the
death of her husband. He was killed near Tunnell
Page 279 U. S. 640
Hill, Georgia, at a grade crossing of a public highway and
appellant's railroad, in a collision between a motor truck that he
was driving and one of appellant's railway trains. The jury
returned a verdict for her, and the judgment entered thereon was
affirmed in the court of appeals and in the supreme court of the
state.
The question presented is whether the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is violated by § 2780 of the Georgia Civil
Code. It follows:
"A railroad company shall be liable for any damages done to
persons, stock, or other property by the running of the
locomotives, or cars, or other machinery of such company, or for
damage done by any person in the employment and service of such
company, unless the company shall make it appear that their agents
have exercised all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence, the
presumption in all cases being against the company."
Plaintiff's declaration charges that the collision and death
were caused by negligence of defendant and its employees: in
leaving the crossing in a dangerous condition; in failing to sound
the whistle to give warning or to keep a lookout ahead as the train
approached the crossing; in that defendant's employees, after they
saw the truck upon the crossing, failed to stop the train, but
accelerated its speed; in running at a dangerous speed; in not
having the train under control when approaching the crossing; in
operating the train by a "practically blind engineer." The answer
denied that defendant or any of its employees was guilty of
negligence, and alleged that deceased came to his death as a result
of his own fault.
Plaintiff proved that her husband was killed in the collision.
She also offered some evidence of negligent maintenance and a
dangerous condition of the crossing. And it necessarily appeared
that the train failed to stop in time to avoid the collision.
Plaintiff offered no evidence, and there was none in the case, to
support her other allegations
Page 279 U. S. 641
of negligence. Defendant offered much evidence tending to show
that it and its employees exercised due care for the proper
maintenance of the track and crossing and in the operation of the
train, and that neither it nor any employee was guilty of any
negligence charged.
The court's charge included the following:
"When it has been made to appear that injury or damage has
occurred by reason of the operation of the locomotive and train of
cars of a railroad company, the presumption arises that the
railroad company and its employees were negligent in each of the
particulars specified in the plaintiff's petition, and the burden
thereupon shifts to the railroad company to show that its employees
exercised ordinary care and diligence in the particulars wherein
they are alleged to have been negligent, and, unless it does so,
the fact of the injury or damage having been made to appear, the
plaintiff, suing for recovery of damages by reason of such injury,
would be entitled to recover. . . . The burden is upon the
plaintiff in this case to establish her contentions by a
preponderance of the evidence. That is subject to the
qualification, already given you, that, when the fact of the
killing has been made to appear, the presumption arises that the
defendant company was negligent in each of the particulars
specified in the petition, and the burden thereupon shifts to the
defendant company to show that its employees exercised ordinary
care and diligence in such particulars."
Upon the mere fact of collision and resulting death, the statute
is held to raise a presumption that defendant and its employees
were negligent in each of the particulars alleged, and that every
act or omission in plaintiff's specifications of negligence was the
proximate cause of the death, and it makes defendant liable unless
it showed due care in respect of every matter alleged against it.
And, by authorizing the jury, in the absence of evidence, to find
negligence in the operation of the engine and train, the
Page 279 U. S. 642
court necessarily permitted the presumption to be considered and
weighed as evidence against the testimony of defendant's witnesses
tending affirmatively to prove such operation was not negligent in
any respect.
*
Appellee insists that § 2780 is valid, and argues that the
presumption, being one established by statute, has the effect of
evidence, and that it is for the jury to decide whether the
company's evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption; that
"it should not as a matter of law be dissipated the instant any
testimony is taken against it," and that the issue is to be
determined on a consideration of all the evidence including the
presumption.
Legislation declaring that proof of one fact of group of facts
shall constitute
prima facie evidence of an ultimate fact
in issue is valid if there is a rational connection between what is
proved and what is to be inferred. A
prima facie
presumption casts upon the person against whom it is applied the
duty of going forward with his evidence on the particular point to
which the presumption relates. A statute creating a presumption
that is arbitrary, or that operates to deny a fair opportunity to
repel it, violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Legislative fiat may not take the place of fact in the
judicial determination of issues involving life, liberty, or
property.
Manley v. Georgia, 279 U. S.
1, and cases cited.
The mere fact of collision between a railway train and a vehicle
at a highway grade crossing furnishes no basis
Page 279 U. S. 643
for any inference as to whether the accident was caused by
negligence of the railway company, or of the traveler on the
highway, or of both, or without fault of anyone. Reasoning does not
lead from the occurrence back to its cause. And the presumption was
used to support conflicting allegations of negligence. Plaintiff
claimed that the engineer failed to keep a lookout ahead, that he
did not stop the train after he saw the truck on the crossing, and
that his eyesight was so bad that he could not see the truck in
time to stop the train.
Appellee relies principally upon
Mobile, J. & K.C. R.
Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35. That
was an action in a court of Mississippi to recover damages for the
death of a section foreman accidentally killed in that state. While
engaged about his work, he stood by the track to let a train pass;
a derailment occurred, and a car fell upon him. A statute of the
state provided:
". . . Proof of injury inflicted by the running of the
locomotives or cars of such [railroad] company shall be
prima
facie evidence of the want of reasonable skill and care on the
part of the servants of the company in reference to such
injury."
That provision was assailed as arbitrary, and in violation of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court held
it valid, and said (p.
219 U. S.
43):
"The only legal effect of this inference is to cast upon the
railroad company the duty of producing some evidence to the
contrary. When that is done, the inference is at end, and the
question of negligence is one for the jury upon all of the
evidence. . . . The statute does not . . . fail in due process of
law, because it creates a presumption of liability, since its
operation is only to supply an inference of liability in the
absence of other evidence contradicting such inference."
That case is essentially different from this one. Each of the
state enactments raises a presumption from the fact of injury
caused by the running of locomotives or cars. The Mississippi
statute created
Page 279 U. S. 644
merely a temporary inference of fact that vanished upon the
introduction of opposing evidence.
Gulf, M. & N. R. Co. v.
Brown, 138 Miss. 39, 66;
Columbus & G. Ry. Co. v.
Fondren, 145 Miss. 679. That of Georgia, as construed in this
case, creates an inference that is given effect of evidence to be
weighed against opposing testimony, and is to prevail unless such
testimony is found by the jury to preponderate.
The presumption raised by § 2780 is unreasonable and arbitrary,
and violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Manley v. Georgia, supra; McFarland v. American Sugar Co.,
241 U. S. 79;
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219.
Judgment reversed.
* The construction of § 2780 by the trial court is in harmony
with that given it in the higher courts of the state.
Western
& Atlantic R. Co. v. Thompson, 38 Ga.App. 599;
Western
& Atlantic R. Co. v. Dobbs, 36 Ga.App. 516;
Central of
Georgia Ry. Co. v. Barnett, 35 Ga.App. 528;
Payne, Agent
v. Wells, 28 Ga.App. 29;
Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v.
Hartley, 25 Ga.App. 110;
Georgia Ry. & Electric Co. v.
Bailey, 9 Ga.App. 106;
Ellenberg v. Southern R. Co.,
5 Ga.App. 389.
And see Georgia Southern & Florida Ry. Co.
v. Thornton, 144 Ga. 481.