1. Judicial notice is taken of proceedings in the trial court
shown by the record of the case in this Court at all earlier
stages. P.
279 U. S.
555.
2. Under the Expediting Act of Feb. 11, 1903, in suits in equity
under the Anti-Trust Act "in which the United States is
complainant," appeal must be direct to this Court from the final
decree of the trial court. P.
279 U. S.
558.
3. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia had no
jurisdiction over an appeal by a private person from an order of
the Supreme Court of the District refusing leave to intervene in a
suit brought by the United States under the Anti-Trust Act. P.
279 U. S.
559.
299 F. 908 reversed.
Certiorari, 278 U.S. 592, to review an order of the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia refusing to set aside its
earlier one, which reversed an order of the Supreme Court of the
District denying a petition to intervene in a suit under the
Anti-Trust Act.
See Swift & Co. v. United States,
276 U. S. 311.
Page 279 U. S. 555
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is a sequel to
Swift & Co. v. United
States, 276 U. S. 311. It
is here by writ of certiorari for the determination of a question
which arose upon the going down of the mandate in the
Swift case.
The suit was commenced by the government in the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia on February 27, 1920, against the leading
packers to prevent a long feared monopoly in meat and other food
products. On that day, a consent decree was entered. Nearly five
years later, two of the defendants, Swift & Co. and Armour
& Co., filed in the cause motions to vacate that decree. From
the denial of those motions, appeals were taken to the Court of
Appeals for the District. That court certified questions to us. We
ordered the entire record sent here, and then held that, because
the Expediting Act of February 11, 1903, c. 544, § 2, 32 Stat. 823,
provides for a direct appeal to this Court in suits in equity
brought by the United States under the Anti-Trust Act, the court of
appeals was without jurisdiction. We also held that the Supreme
Court of the District had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of
the parties, and that the consent decree entered by it was in all
respects valid and enforceable. Its order denying the motions to
vacate the consent decree was therefore affirmed.
An obstacle to the enforcement of the consent decree remains. An
order of the Supreme Court of the District, entered May 1, 1925,
suspends the operation of the consent decree as a whole "until
further order of the court to be made, if at all, after a full
hearing on the merits according to the usual course of chancery
proceedings." That order (as we know judicially from our own
records,
Aspen Mining & Smelting Co. v. Billings,
150 U. S. 31,
150 U. S. 38) was
made upon motion of the California Cooperative
Page 279 U. S. 556
Canneries, which, long after the entry of the consent decree was
allowed to intervene under the following circumstances.
On April 29, 1922, the Canneries made a motion for leave to file
an intervening petition. The petition accompanying the motion
alleged that the consent decree interferes with the performance by
Armour & Co. of a contract theretofore made with it by which
Armour agreed to buy large quantities of California canned fruit.
The petition charged that the decree is void because the Supreme
Court of the District lacked jurisdiction, and it prayed that the
decree be vacated. The Supreme Court denied leave to intervene. The
Canneries appealed to the court of appeals. That court, so far as
appears, did not consider the question whether, in view of the
Expediting Act, it had jurisdiction on appeal. It did not refer to
the decisions which hold that an order denying leave to intervene
is not appealable,
In re Cutting, 94 U.
S. 15;
Credits Commutation Co. v. United
States, 177 U. S. 311;
Ex parte Leaf Tobacco Board of Trade, 222 U.
S. 578,
222 U. S. 581;
In re Engelhard, 231 U. S. 646;
City of New York v. Consolidated Gas Co., 253 U.
S. 219;
New York v. New York Telephone Co.,
261 U. S. 312,
except where he who seeks to intervene has a direct and immediate
interest in a
res which is the subject of the suit,
compare French v. Gapen, 105 U. S. 509,
105 U. S.
524-526;
Smith v. Gale, 144 U.
S. 509;
Leary v. United States, 224 U.
S. 567;
Swift v. Black Panther Oil & Gas
Co., 244 F. 20, 30. Nor did it refer to the settled rule of
practice that intervention will not be allowed for the purpose of
impeaching a decree already made. [
Footnote 1] On June 2, 1924, it reversed the order of
the
Page 279 U. S. 557
Supreme Court, directed that leave to intervene be granted, and
ordered that "such further proceedings thereupon be had as are
necessary to determine the issues raised."
California
Cooperative Canneries v. United States, 299 F. 908. No such
proceedings were ever taken.
So far as appears, the Supreme Court of the District has not
been requested by the government since our decision in the
Swift case to rescind the order of suspension. Instead,
the government, upon the coming down of our mandate, moved in the
court of appeals that its judgment of June 2, 1924, directing that
the Canneries have leave to intervene and ordering further
proceedings, be vacated. That motion the court of appeals denied
without either an opinion or a statement of any reason therefor.
This writ of certiorari was then granted to review its refusal. 278
U.S. 592. In support of the refusal, the Canneries contends that
the court of appeals had jurisdiction of the appeal from the order
denying leave to intervene. It argues that the appeal was not
within the purview of § 2 of the Expediting Act [
Footnote 2] because it was not "an appeal
from the final decree," because the Canneries was not at the
Page 279 U. S. 558
time of its appeal a party to a suit in which the United States
was the "complainant," and because, under § 226 of the District of
Columbia Code, the court of appeals has, in its discretion,
jurisdiction of an appeal from interlocutory orders. The contention
is unsound.
Congress sought by the Expediting Act to insure speedy
disposition of suits in equity brought by the United States under
the Anti-Trust Act. Before the passage of the Expediting Act, the
opportunities for delay were many. From a final decree in the trial
court under the Anti-Trust Act, an appeal lay to the circuit court
of appeals, and six months were allowed for taking the appeal. From
the judgment of the court of appeals, an appeal lay to this Court,
and one year was allowed for taking that appeal. Act of March 3,
1891, c. 517, §§ 6, 11, 26; Stat. 826, 828, 829.
See United
States v. E. C. Knight Co., 60 F. 306; 60 F. 934;
156 U. S. 156 U.S.
1;
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 53
F. 440; 58 F. 58;
166 U. S. 166 U.S.
290. Moreover, there might be an appeal to the circuit court of
appeals from a decree granting or denying an interlocutory
injunction, Act of June 6, 1900, c. 803, 31 Stat. 660. These
provisions governing appeals in general were amended by the
Expediting Act so that, in suits in equity under the Anti-Trust Act
"in which the United States is complainant," the appeal should be
direct to this Court from the final decree in the trial court.
Thus, Congress limited the right of review to an appeal from the
decree which disposed of all matters,
see Collins v.
Miller, 252 U. S. 364, and
it precluded the possibility of an appeal to either court from an
interlocutory decree. The time for taking the appeal from the final
decree was shortened to 60 days.
For the enforcement of the Anti-Trust Act within the District of
Columbia, its supreme court has jurisdiction
Page 279 U. S. 559
corresponding to that which is exercised by the federal district
courts in the several districts, and the appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals of the District corresponds to that of the
several circuit courts of appeals.
Compare Federal Trade
Commission v. Klesner, 274 U. S. 145. In
suits in equity brought by the United States under the Anti-Trust
Act, an appeal by one who was permitted to intervene, like an
appeal by one of the original parties, must be taken direct to this
Court.
Continental Insurance Co. v. United States,
259 U. S. 156.
Compare Buckeye Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co.,
269 U. S. 42,
269 U. S. 48.
The purpose of Congress to expedite such suits would obviously be
defeated if, in the District of Columbia, an appeal lay to the
court of appeals from a denial of a motion for leave to intervene.
Compare Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird,
194 U. S. 25,
194 U. S. 38-39.
Even under the Act of 1891, c. 517, in cases where the appeal was
taken direct to this Court from the final decree in the trial
court, every appeal thereafter taken in the cause was necessarily
also to this Court.
Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis
Southwestern Ry. Co., 249 U. S. 134,
249 U. S.
140-142;
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry.
Co. v. J. F. Hasty & Sons, 255 U.
S. 252,
255 U. S. 254.
Compare St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v.
McKnight, 244 U. S. 368.
The order of the Supreme Court of the District suspending the
enforcement of the consent decree was made pursuant to the judgment
of the court of appeals of June 2, 1924. When our opinion in the
Swift case settled that, by reason of the Expediting Act,
the court of appeals was without jurisdiction of an appeal in a
suit in equity under the Anti-Trust Act in which the United States
is the complainant, and that the consent decree is valid, all
obstacles to the enforcement of the consent decree should have been
promptly removed. In refusing to vacate its
Page 279 U. S. 560
judgment and mandate, the court of appeals departed from the
limits of admissible discretion.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND and MR. JUSTICE STONE took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
See Forbes v. Railroad, Fed.Cas. No. 4,926;
Coffin
v. Chattanooga Water & Power Co., 44 F. 533;
Lombard
Investment Co. v. Seaboard Mfg. Co., 74 F. 325, 327;
Land
Title & Trust Co. v. Asphalt Co. of America, 114 F. 484;
State Trust Co. v. Kansas City, etc., Co., 120 F. 398,
407-408. This rule of practice is embodied in Equity Rule 37.
See Hutchinson v. Philadelphia & G. S.S. Co., 216 F.
795;
Hopkins v. Lancaster, 254 F. 190;
Cauffiel
v.Lawrence, 256 F. 714;
King v. Barr, 262 F. 56;
Mueller v. Adler, 292 F. 138;
In re Veach, 4 F.2d
334;
Union Trust Co. v. Jones, 16 F.2d 236;
Board of
Drainage Comm'rs v. Lafayette Bank, 27 F.2d 286.
Compare
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Kansas City R. Co., 53 F.
182, 186;
United States v. Northern Securities Co., 128 F.
808; Horn v. Pere Marquette R. Co.,
151 F. 626, 634;
United States v. McGee,
171 F. 209; Jennings v. Smith, 242
F. 561, 564;
Adler v. Seaman, 266 F. 828.
[
Footnote 2]
Section 2.
"That in every suit in equity pending or hereafter brought in
any Circuit [District] Court of the United States under . . . [the
Anti-Trust Act] wherein the United States is complainant, . . . an
appeal from the final decree of the Circuit [District] Court will
lie only to the Supreme Court and must be taken within sixty days
from the entry thereof. . . ."