1. The business of buying oysters and preparing them for
marketing is one upon which the state may impose a reasonable
privilege or license tax. P.
279 U. S.
396.
2. As a part of such tax, the state may require that the
licensee turn over to it a portion (in this case 10%) of the empty
oyster shells resulting from the operations of his business, or, at
the election of the state, pay the equivalent of their market value
in money, the shells being but ordinary articles of commerce and
desired by the state for use in supporting and maintaining the
producing oyster beds within her limits and preventing their
exhaustion. P.
279 U. S.
396.
3. The exaction of the tax in shells is not a taking of private
property for public use without compensation, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. P.
279 U. S.
397.
4. Nor is it a violation of the commerce clause, though some of
the oysters come from other states. P.
279 U. S.
397.
5. Placing oyster packers in a separate class for taxation
purposes does not deny them the equal protection of the laws. P.
279 U. S. 398.
Page 279 U. S. 393
6. A requirement that the quota of empty shell exacted be
retained by the licensee for a reasonable time until removed by the
state s not an unconstitutional deprivation of the use of his
premises. P.
279 U. S. 398.
7. An action in mandamus to compel a state officer to license
plaintiff's business for the next ensuing year without his
complying with statutory condition which he deemed unconstitutional
held not to have become moot with the expiration of that
year in view of the nature of the controversy and of a stipulation
of the parties showing plaintiff's purpose to continue in business.
P.
279 U. S. 398.
155 Md. 252 affirmed.
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland which
affirmed a judgment of the Baltimore City Court dismissing a
petition for mandamus.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Maryland, the business of oyster packing is important, and
for many years has been licensed and taxed as a privilege. Most of
the live oysters having been taken by tongs or dredges from bottoms
in Maryland -- a small percent come from Virginia and New Jersey --
are sold to packers. At some convenient place on shore, they are
shucked; the edible portion is placed in containers and shipped to
points throughout the Union. Formerly, the detached shells had no
commercial value, and often were disposed of by dumping into the
bay. Later, they came into demand and were commonly sold for use in
roadmaking, manufacture of fertilizer, chicken feed, etc.
Investigation disclosed that the producing beds were being
rapidly exhausted. A committee of experts reported
Page 279 U. S. 394
to the legislature that the only practicable method of
preventing their destruction was to place empty shells upon them,
and thus furnish the support and lime essential to growth of
spat.
Thereupon, Chap. 119, Act of 1927 -- the statute here in
question and printed below
* -- was enacted.
This requires
Page 279 U. S. 395
those who buy oysters and prepare them for market at a fixed
place to take out a license "in the nature and form of a contract
between the State of Maryland and the applicant," which shall
provide for payment of $25; also that the "licensee must turn over
to the State of Maryland at least ten percent of the shells from
the oysters shucked in his establishment for the current season,"
to be removed by August 20th, or, at the discretion of the
Conservation Department, to pay their equivalent in money.
Appellants own land and buildings in Dorchester County used by
them in the packing business "for several years last past," and
they intend to continue in the business. During the season of 1926,
they packed 50,000 bushels. At the proper time -- August 30, 1927
-- they duly applied to defendant for a license to conduct
operations during the season following, and offered to pay the
designated fee of $25.50. But they refused to agree to deliver to
the state 10 percent of the empty shells, or to pay their market
value, upon the ground that the statutory
Page 279 U. S. 396
provision requiring this was contrary to state and federal
constitutions. Upon refusal of the application, they asked the
state court for an appropriate writ of mandamus. Judgment went
against them, and was affirmed by the court of appeals.
Here, appellants do not deny the power of the state to declare
their business a privilege and to demand therefor reasonable
payment of money. Their main insistence is that exaction of 10
percent of the empty shells, or equivalent market value at the
election of the Commission, would be a taking of their property for
public use without compensation. They also suggest that this would
unduly burden interstate commerce, would deny them equal protection
of the laws, and, finally, that to compel storage of the shells
until taken by the state would unlawfully deprive them of the use
of their premises.
We find no reason to doubt the power of the state to exact of
each oyster packer a privilege tax equal to 10 percent of the
market value of the empty shells resulting from his operations.
This, we understand, is not questioned by counsel. And, as the
packer lawfully could be required to pay that sum in money, we
think nothing in the federal Constitution prevents the state from
demanding that he give up the same percent of such shells. The
result to him is not materially different. From the packer's
standpoint, empty shells are but ordinary articles of commerce,
desirable because convertible into money. Their value is not large,
and the part taken by the state will be so used as greatly to
advantage the business of packing. The purpose in view is highly
beneficent, and the means adopted are neither arbitrary nor
oppressive. The federal Constitution may not be successfully
invoked by selfish packers who seek to escape an entirely
reasonable contribution, and thereby to thwart a great conservation
measure generally approved.
Page 279 U. S. 397
In
Lane County v.
Oregon, 7 Wall. 71,
74 U. S. 77, this
Court, through Mr. Chief Justice Chase, said:
"The extent to which it [the power to tax] shall be exercised,
the subjects upon which it shall be exercised, and the mode in
which it shall be exercised are all equally within the discretion
of the legislatures to which the states commit the exercise of the
power. . . . If, therefore, the condition of any state, in the
judgment of its legislature, requires the collection of taxes in
kind -- that is to say, by the delivery to the proper officers of a
certain proportion of products, or in gold and silver bullion, or
in gold and silver coin -- it is not easy to see upon what
principle the national legislature can interfere with the exercise,
to that end, of this power, original in the states and never as yet
surrendered."
Cooley on Taxation (4th ed.) vol. 1, § 23, p. 92:
"Taxes are generally demanded in money, and any tax law will be
understood to require money when a different intent is not
expressed. But if the condition of any state, in the judgment of
its legislature, shall require the collection of taxes in kind --
that is to say, by the delivery to the proper officers of a certain
proportion of products -- or in gold or silver bullion, or in
anything different from the legal tender currency of the country,
the right to make the requirement is unquestionable, being in
conflict with no principle of government and with no provision of
the federal Constitution. Instances of taxes in kind occurred in
the colonial period."
And see French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co.,
181 U. S. 324,
181 U. S.
329.
Appellants' business is local in character, and has no such
intimate connection with interstate commerce as to exempt it from
control by the state. The mere fact that some of the live oysters
come from other states does not change the character of the
enterprise.
Browning v.
Waycross,
Page 279 U. S. 398
233 U. S. 16;
Askren v. Continental Oil Co., 252 U.
S. 444,
252 U. S. 449;
Wagner v. City of Covington, 251 U. S.
95,
251 U. S.
102.
There was abundant reason for placing oyster packers in a
separate class for taxation purposes. Appellants' claim that equal
protection of the laws will be denied them is groundless.
The requirement concerning storage for a limited time of 10
percent of the empty shells imposes no serious burden, is but part
of the general scheme for taxing the privilege, and is no heavier
than demands to which taxpayers are often subjected. It is neither
oppressive nor arbitrary.
Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hopkins,
264 U. S. 137,
264 U. S.
139.
Considering the nature of the controversy and the agreement
between the parties touching appellants' purpose to continue in the
packing business, it cannot be said that the cause has become moot.
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association,
166 U. S. 290,
166 U. S.
307-308;
Southern Pacific Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 219 U. S. 433,
219 U. S. 452;
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 219 U. S. 498,
219 U. S.
514-516;
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.
S. 135,
273 U. S. 182.
The judgment of the court of appeals is
Affirmed.
*
"Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland
that § 91 of Article 72 of the Code of Public General Laws of
Maryland, title 'Oysters,' subtitle 'Packing Oysters,' providing
for licensing of oyster packers, be and is hereby repealed and
reenacted with amendments, to read as follows:"
"91. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation
having a fixed place of business, buying oysters and employing
labor to prepare them for market to engage in the business of
buying, selling, marketing, packing or canning oysters without
first taking out a license to engage in such business by
application to the Conservation Department of Maryland. Where any
such person, firm, or corporation operates more than one house for
the buying, selling, marketing, packing, or canning of oysters, a
separate license shall be obtained for each house in which oysters
are shucked or otherwise prepared for market, such license to be in
the nature and form of a contract between the State of Maryland and
the applicant, and shall provide for the payment of a license fee
of twenty-five dollars, and shall further provide that the licensee
must turn over to the State of Maryland at least ten percent of the
shells from the oysters shucked in his establishment for the
current season, said shells to be removed on or before the
twentieth day of August of said season, or, at the discretion of
the Conservation Department, its equivalent in money, the value
thereof being determined at the market value of shells as of the
first day of May following the close of the season. The
Conservation Department shall notify each packer or canner on or
before the said first day of May whether it is its intention to
take the ten percentum of the shells from oysters shucked as
aforesaid or its equivalent in money. Said license shall have
effect from the first day of September in the year in which it may
have been obtained until the twenty-fifth day of April, inclusive,
next succeeding."
"Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, that a new section to be
known as 91-a be added to Article 72 of the Code of Public General
Laws of Maryland, title 'Oysters,' to follow immediately after § 91
of said Article, be and is hereby added to read as follows:"
"91-a. All moneys derived from said license fee of twenty-five
dollars shall be paid over to the comptroller to be credited to the
conservation fund, and one-half of the shells received by the
conversation department shall be transplanted upon such natural
beds or bars as may be reserved by the conservation commissioner as
provided for elsewhere in this Article, and the other one-half of
said shells shall be planted on such seed areas as may be set aside
by the Conservation Commissioner for seed oysters. I n case money
is paid in lieu of the ten percent of shells, the Conservation
Commissioner shall convert same into shells or seed oysters to be
transplanted in like manner."
"Sec. 3. And be it further enacted that all laws or parts of
laws of the State of Maryland, general or local, inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act be, and the same are hereby, repealed to
the extent of such inconsistency."
"Sec. 4. And be it further enacted that this Act shall take
effect June 1st, 1927."