2. Rev.Stats. § 102, prescribing punishment for refusal to
answer before congressional committees, includes witnesses who
voluntarily appear without being summoned. P.
279 U. S.
291.
3. While the power of inquiry of the respective houses of
Congress is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function, it must be exerted with due regard for the
rights of witnesses; a witness may rightfully refuse to answer
where the bounds of the power are exceeded or where the questions
asked are not pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135. P.
279 U. S.
291.
4. A naval petroleum reserve, in charge of the Secretary of the
Navy under the Act of June 4, 1920, 41 Stat. 12, was made the
subject of an executive order purporting to give the administration
and conservation of all oil and gas lands therein to the Secretary
of the Interior under the supervision of the President. The two
Secretaries, at the procurement of the defendant, leased lands in
the reserve to a company of which he owned all the shares.
Questions having arisen as to the legality and good faith of the
lease and an attendant contract, and of others similar, and also as
to the future policy of the government regarding such matters, the
Senate, by resolutions, directed its committee to investigate the
entire subject of such leases, with particular reference to the
protection of the rights and equities of the United States and the
preservation of its natural resources, to ascertain what, if any,
other, or additional legislation might be advisable, and to report
its findings and recommendations to the Senate. Congress, also, by
joint resolution, reciting that the lease and contract were illegal
and apparently fraudulent, directed the President to cause suit to
be instituted for their cancellation, and to prosecute such other
actions, civil or criminal, as were warranted. After suit had been
begun against
Page 279 U. S. 264
his company pursuant to this resolution, and while criminal
action was impending against himself, the defendant appeared before
the committee and was asked a question which sought the facts
within his knowledge concerning a contract executed by him for his
company to pay certain persons for a release of rights in lands
embraced in his company's lease. Defendant refused to answer, not
upon the ground of self-incrimination, but for the reason that the
investigation and the question were unauthorized. He was prosecuted
for contumacy, under Rev.Stats. § 102, and convicted.
Held:
(1) Neither the investigation authorized by the Senate's
resolutions nor the question put by the committee related merely to
the defendant's private affairs. P.
279 U. S.
294.
(2) Under Art. IV, § 3 of the Constitution, Congress had plenary
powers to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations
respecting the naval reserves, and the Senate had power to delegate
authority to its committee to investigate and report what had been
and was being done by executive departments under the leasing Act,
the Naval Oil Reserve Act, and the President's order in respect of
the reserves, and to make any other inquiry concerning the public
domain. P.
279 U. S.
294.
(3) The validity of the lease and the means by which it had been
obtained under existing law were subjects that properly might be
investigated in order to determine what, if any, legislation was
necessary or desirable in order to recover the leased lands or to
safeguard other parts of the domain. P.
279 U. S.
294.
(4) Neither the joint resolution directing legal proceedings nor
the action taken under it operated to divest the Senate or the
committee of further power to investigate the actual administration
of the land laws; the authority of Congress, directly or through
its committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own
constitutional power is not abridged because the information sought
to be elicited may also be of use in such suits. P.
279 U. S.
295.
(5) A refusal of the committee to pass a motion that the
examination of defendant should not relate to controversies pending
in court, and the statement of one of the members that there was
nothing else to examine him about, were not enough to show that the
committee intended to depart from the purpose to ascertain whether
additional legislation might be advisable. Investigation of the
matters involved in suits brought, or to be brought, under the
joint resolution might directly aid legislative action. P.
279 U. S.
295.
(6) A resolution of the Senate, the purpose of which, as plainly
shown by the context and circumstances, was to keep in force
Page 279 U. S. 265
through the next session of Congress an earlier resolution
empowering the committee to summon and swear witnesses, should not
be denied that effect because of mistakes in its reference to the
date and number of the earlier resolution. P.
279 U. S.
295.
(7) The question propounded by the committee was pertinent to
matters it was authorized to investigate, relating (a) to the right
and equities of the United States as owner of the land leased to
the defendant, and (b) to the effect of existing laws concerning
oil and other mineral lands and the need for further legislation.
P.
279 U. S.
297.
5. In a prosecution for the offence of refusing to answer a
question put to the accused as a witness before a committee of the
Senate (R.S. § 102), the burden is upon the United States to show
that the question was pertinent to a matter under investigation;
any presumption of regularity in that regard is overcome by the
presumption of innocence attending the accused at the trial. P.
279 U. S.
296.
6. In a prosecution for refusal to answer a question before a
committee of the Senate, it is the province of the court, and not
of the jury, to decide whether the question was pertinent to the
subjects covered by the Senate resolutions authorizing the
committee's investigation. P.
279 U. S.
298.
7. In such a prosecution, the fact that the accused acted in
good faith on the advice of competent counsel in refusing to answer
a question put by the committee is not a defense. P.
279 U. S.
299.
8. A judgment imposing a single sentence on several counts of an
indictment may be affirmed under one count without considering the
others if the conviction as to that count be sustained and if the
maximum punishment authorized for the offense charged in that count
be not exceeded by the sentence. P.
279 U. S.
299.
Affirmed.
Review of a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia sentencing the defendant, under Rev.Stats. § 102, for
refusing to answer questions before a committee of the Senate. The
case was appealed from the trial court to the Court of Appeals of
the District. That court certified certain questions for
instruction, and this Court, by order, brought up the entire
record.
Page 279 U. S. 284
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant was found guilty of violating R.S. § 102, U.S.C. Tit.
2, § 192. He was sentenced to jail for three months and to pay a
fine of $500. The case was taken to the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia; that court certified to this Court certain
questions of law upon which it desired instruction for the proper
decision of the case. We directed the entire record to be sent up.
Judicial Code, § 239, U.S.C. Tit. 28, § 346.
Section 102 follows:
"Every person who, having been summoned as a witness by the
authority of either house of Congress, to give testimony or to
produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either house,
or any
Page 279 U. S. 285
committee of either house of Congress, willfully makes default,
or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent
to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less
than $100, and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one
month nor more than twelve months."
By way of inducement, the indictment set forth the circumstances
leading up to the offense which in brief substance are as
follows:
For many years, there had been progressive diminution of
petroleum necessary for the operation of naval vessels;
consequently, the government was interested to conserve the supply
and especially that in the public domain.
Pursuant to the Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 847, the
President, by executive orders dated September 2, 1912, December
13, 1912, and April 30, 1915, ordered that certain oil and
gas-bearing lands in California and Wyoming be held for the
exclusive use of the Navy. These areas were designated Naval
Petroleum Reserves 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
The Act of February 25, 1920, 41 Stat. 437, provided for the
leasing of public lands containing oil and other minerals. And the
Act of June 4, 1920, 41 Stat. 812, 813, directed the Secretary of
the Navy of take possession of all properties in the naval reserves
"on which there are no pending claims or applications for permits
or leases under the" Leasing Act of February 25, 1920 "or pending
applications for United States patent under any law," to conserve,
develop, use, and operate the same by contract, lease, or
otherwise, and to use, store, exchange or sell the oil and gas
products thereof for the benefit of the United States. And it was
declared that the rights of any claimants under the Leasing Act
were not thereby adversely affected.
Page 279 U. S. 286
May 31, 1921, the President promulgated an executive order
purporting to give the administration and conservation of all oil
and gas bearing lands in the naval reserves to the Secretary of the
Interior subject to supervision by the President.
April 7, 1922, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of
the Interior made a lease of lands in Reserve No. 3 to the Mammoth
Oil Company. This was done by the procurement of the appellant
action as the president of the company. The lease purported to
grant to the company the right to take oil and gas and contained a
provision selling royalty oils to the company. And February 9,
1923, a supplemental contract was made by which the company agreed
to furnish storage facilities for the Navy.
Mammoth Oil Co. v.
United States, 275 U. S. 13.
April 25, 1922, the same Secretaries made a contract with the
Pan-American Petroleum & Transport Company for the sale to it
of royalty oils from Reserves 1 and 2. December 11, 1922, another
contract was made by them. The purpose of these agreements was to
arrange that the company furnish storage facilities for the Navy in
exchange for royalty oils to be received by the United States under
leases then in force and thereafter to be made. December 11, 1922,
the same Secretaries made a lease to the Pan American Petroleum
Company purporting to grant to it the right to take oil and gas
from Reserve No. 1.
Pan American Co. v. United States,
273 U. S. 456.
The lease to the Mammoth Company and the contract with the
Transport Company came to the attention of the Senate, and it was
charged that there had been fraud and bad faith in the making of
them. Questions arose as to their legality, the future policy of
the government as to them, and similar leases and contracts, and as
to the necessity and desirability of legislation upon the
subject.
Page 279 U. S. 287
April 29, 1922, the Senate adopted Resolution 282, calling upon
the Secretary of the Interior for information and containing the
following:
"That the committee on public lands and surveys be authorized to
investigate this entire subject of leases upon naval oil reserves
with particular reference to the protection of the rights and
equities of the government of the United States and the
preservation of its natural resources, and to report its findings
and recommendations to the Senate."
June 5, 1922, Resolution 282 was amended by Resolution 294 by
adding a provision that the committee
"is hereby authorized . . . to require the attendance of
witnesses by subpoenas or otherwise; to require the production of
books, papers and documents. . . . The chairman of the committee,
or any member thereof, may administer oaths to witnesses and sign
subpoenas for witnesses."
February 5, 1923, the Senate passed Resolution 434, which
continued in force and effect until the end of the Sixty-Eighth
Congress and until otherwise ordered, "Senate Resolution 282 agreed
to April 21 [29], 1922, and Senate Resolution 292, agreed to May
15, 1922." (The government suggests that, instead of the resolution
last mentioned, there was meant Resolution 294 adopted June 5,
1922.)
February 7, 1924, the Senate passed Resolution 147, directing in
substance the same as it had theretofore done by the two
resolutions first above mentioned and also that the committee
"ascertain what, if any, other or additional legislation may be
advisable and to report its findings and recommendations to the
Senate."
The committee proceeded to exercise the authority conferred upon
it, and, for that purpose, held hearings at which witnesses were
examined and documents produced. Appellant was summoned, appeared
and was sworn December 4, 1923.
Page 279 U. S. 288
And the indictment charges that, on March 22, 1924, the matters
referred to in these resolutions being under inquiry, and appellant
having been summoned to give testimony and having been sworn as
aforesaid, did appear before the committee as a witness. The first
count alleges that Senator Walsh, a member of the committee,
propounded to him a question which appellant knew was pertinent to
the matters under inquiry:
"Mr. Sinclair, I desire to interrogate you about a matter
concerning which the committee had no knowledge or reliable
information at any time when you had heretofore appeared before the
committee, and with respect to which you must then have had
knowledge. I refer to the testimony given by Mr. Bonfils concerning
a contract that you made with him touching the Teapot Dome. I wish
you would tell us about that."
And, to explain that question, the indictment states:
"Said Hon. Thomas J. Walsh thereby meaning and intending, as
said Harry F. Sinclair then and there well knew and understood, to
elicit from him the said Harry F. Sinclair, facts, which then were
within his knowledge, touching the execution and delivery of a
certain contract bearing date September 25, 1922, made and executed
by the between said Mammoth Oil Company, one F. G. Bonfils, and one
John Leo Stack, which was executed on behalf of said Mammoth Oil
Company by said Harry F. Sinclair as President of said Mammoth Oil
Company, and which, among other things, provided for the payment,
by said Mammoth Oil Company, unto said F. G. Bonfils and said John
Leo Stack, of the sum of $250,000, on or before October 15, 1922,
in consideration of the release, by said F. G. Bonfils and said
John Leo Stack, of rights to lands described in said Executive
Order of April 30, 1915, and embraced in the aforesaid lease of
April 7, 1922."
And that count concluded: "And that said Harry
Page 279 U. S. 289
F. Sinclair then and there unlawfully did refuse to answer said
question. . . ."
Senate Joint Resolution 54 was approved February 8, 1924. 43
Stat. 5. It recited that the leases and contracts above mentioned
were executed under circumstances indicating fraud and corruption,
that they were without authority, contrary to law, and in defiance
of the settled policy of the government, and the resolution
declared that the lands embraced therein should be recovered and
held for the purposes to which they were dedicated. It directed the
President to cause suit to be instituted for the cancellation of
the leases and contracts, to prosecute such other actions or
proceedings, civil and criminal, as were warranted by the facts,
and authorized the appointment of special counsel to have charge of
the matter.
Prior to March 22, 1924, appellant, at the request of the
committee, appeared five times before it, and was sworn as alleged.
March 19, 1924, a United States marshal at New York served upon him
a telegram, which was in form a subpoena signed by the chairman of
the committee, requiring him to appear as a witness, and he did
appear on March 22. Before any questions were put, he submitted a
statement.
He disclaimed any purpose to invoke protection against
self-incrimination, and asserted there was nothing in the
transaction which could incriminate him. He emphasized his earlier
appearances, testimony, production of papers, and discharge from
further attendance. He called attention to Joint Resolution 54,
discussed its provisions, and stated that a suit charging
conspiracy and fraud had been commenced against the Mammoth Company
and others and that the government's motion for injunction and
receivers had been granted, and that application had been made for
a special grand jury to investigate the making
Page 279 U. S. 290
of the lease. He asserted that the committee could not then
investigate the matters covered by the authorization because the
Senate, by the adoption of the joint resolution, had exhausted its
power, and Congress and the President had made the whole matter a
judicial question which was determinable only in the courts. The
statement concluded:
"I shall reserve any evidence I may be able to give for those
courts to which you and your colleagues have deliberately referred
all questions of which you had any jurisdiction and shall
respectfully decline to answer any questions propounded by your
committee."
After appellant's statement, his counsel asked the privilege of
presenting to the committee reasons why it did not have authority
further to take testimony of appellant. In the course of his
remarks, he said:
"Mr. Sinclair is already under oath before the committee. . . .
He is on the stand now in every sense of the word, and the
objection really is to any further examination of him on the
subjects involved in this resolution."
Discussion followed, and a motion was made:
"That, in the examination, the inquiry shall not relate to
pending controversies before any of the federal courts in which Mr.
Sinclair is a defendant, and which questions would involve his
defense."
During a colloquy that followed, one of the members said: "Of
course, we will vote it [the motion] down. . . . If we do not
examine Mr. Sinclair about those matters, there is not anything
else to examine him about." The motion was voted down. Then the
appellant was asked the question set forth in the first count, and
he said: "I decline to answer on the advice of counsel on the same
ground."
Appellant contends that his demurrer to the several counts of
the indictment should have been sustained, and that a verdict of
not guilty should have been directed. To support that contention,
he argues that the questions related to his private affairs and to
matters cognizable only in the courts wherein they were pending,
and that
Page 279 U. S. 291
the committee avowedly had departed from any inquiry in aid of
legislation.
He maintains that there was no proof of any authorized inquiry
by the committee, or that he was legally summoned or sworn, or that
the questions propounded were pertinent to any inquiry it was
authorized to make, and that, because of such failure, he was
entitled to have a verdict directed in his favor.
He insists that the court erred in holding that the question of
pertinency was one of law for the court and in not submitting it to
the jury, and also erred in excluding evidence offered to sustain
his refusal to answer.
1. The committee on public lands and surveys is one of the
standing committees of the Senate. No question is raised as to the
validity of its organization and existence. Under § 101 of the
Revised Statutes, U.S.C. Tit. 2, § 191, its chairman and any of its
members are empowered to administer oaths to witnesses before it.
Section 102 plainly extends to a case where a person voluntarily
appears as a witness without being summoned, as well as to the case
of one required to attend.
By our opinion in
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.
S. 135,
273 U. S. 173,
decided since the indictment now before us was found, two
propositions are definitely laid down:
"One, that the two houses of Congress, in their separate
relations, possess not only such powers as are expressly granted to
them by the Constitution, but such auxiliary powers as are
necessary and appropriate to make the express powers effective;
and, the other, that neither house is invested with 'general' power
to inquire into private affairs and compel disclosures, but only
with such limited power of inquiry as is shown to exist when the
rule of constitutional interpretation just stated is rightly
applied."
And that case shows that, while the power of inquiry is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function, it
must be exerted with due regard
Page 279 U. S. 292
for the rights of witnesses, and that a witness rightfully may
refuse to answer where the bounds of the power are exceeded or
where the questions asked are not pertinent to the matter under
inquiry.
It has always been recognized in this country, and it is well to
remember, that few if any of the rights of the people guarded by
fundamental law are of greater importance to their happiness and
safety than the right to be exempt from all unauthorized, arbitrary
or unreasonable inquiries and disclosures in respect of their
personal and private affairs. In order to illustrate the purpose of
the courts well to uphold the right of privacy, we quote from some
of their decisions.
In
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.
S. 168, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller,
said (p.
103 U. S.
190):
". . . We are sure that no person can be punished for contumacy
as a witness before either house unless his testimony is required
in a matter into which that house has jurisdiction to inquire, and
we feel equally sure that neither of these bodies possesses the
general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the
citizen."
And, referring to the failure of the authorizing resolution
there under consideration to state the purpose of the inquiry (p.
103 U. S.
195):
"Was it to be simply a fruitless investigation into the personal
affairs of individuals? If so, the House of Representatives had no
power or authority in the matter more than any other equal number
of gentlemen interested for the government of their country. By
'fruitless,' we mean that it could result in no valid legislation
on the subject to which the inquiry referred."
In
Re Pacific Railway Commission (Circuit Court, N.D.,
California), 32 F. 241, Mr. Justice Field, announcing the opinion
of the court, said (p. 250):
"Of all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance
or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of
personal security, and that involves not merely protection
Page 279 U. S. 293
of his person from assault, but exemption of his private
affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of
others. Without the enjoyment of this right, all other rights would
lose half their value."
And the learned Justice, referring to
Kilbourn v. Thompson,
supra, said (p. 253):
"This case will stand for all time as a bulwark against the
invasion of the right of the citizen to protection in his private
affairs against the unlimited scrutiny of investigation by a
congressional committee."
And see concurring opinions of Circuit Judge Sawyer, p.
259 at 263, and of District Judge Sabin, p. 268 at p. 269.
In
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson,
154 U. S. 447, Mr.
Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court said (p.
154 U. S.
478):
"We do not overlook these constitutional limitations which, for
the protection of personal rights, must necessarily attend all
investigations conducted under the authority of Congress. Neither
branch of the legislative department, still less any merely
administrative body established by Congress, possesses or can be
invested with a general power of making inquiry into the private
affairs of the citizen. . . . We said in
Boyd v. United
States, 116 U. S. 616,
116 U. S.
630 -- and it cannot be too often repeated -- that the
principles that embody the essence of constitutional liberty and
security forbid all invasions on the part of the government and its
employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of his
life."
Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
211 U. S. 407,
illustrates the unwillingness of this Court to construe an Act of
Congress to authorize any examination of witnesses in respect of
their personal affairs.
And see United States v. Louisville
& Nashville R. Co., 236 U. S. 318,
236 U. S.
335.
In
Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co.,
264 U. S. 298,
this Court said (pp.
264 U. S.
305-306):
"Any one who respects the spirit as well as the letter of the
Fourth
Page 279 U. S. 294
Amendment would be loath to believe that Congress intended to
authorize one of its subordinate agencies to sweep all our
traditions into the fire (
Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Brimson, 154 U. S. 447,
154 U. S.
479), and to direct fishing expeditions into private
papers on the possibility that they may disclose evidence of crime.
We do not discuss the question whether it could do so if it tried,
as nothing short of the most explicit language would induce us to
attribute to Congress that intent. . . . It is contrary to the
first principles of justice to allow a search through all the
respondents' records, relevant or irrelevant, in the hope that
something will turn up."
2. But it is clear that neither the investigation authorized by
the Senate resolutions above mentioned nor the question under
consideration related merely to appellant's private or personal
affairs. Under the Constitution (Art. IV, § 3), Congress has
plenary power to dispose of and to make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the naval oil reserves, other public lands,
and property of the United States. And undoubtedly the Senate had
power to delegate authority to its committee to investigate and
report what had been and was being done by executive departments
under the Leasing Act, the Naval Oil Reserve Act, and the
President's order in respect of the reserves and to make any other
inquiry concerning the public domain.
While appellant caused the Mammoth Oil Company to be organized
and owned all its shares, the transaction purporting to lease to it
the lands within the reserve cannot be said to be merely or
principally the personal or private affair of appellant. It was a
matter of concern to the United States. The title to valuable
government lands was involved. The validity of the lease and the
means by which it had been obtained under existing law were
subjects that properly might be investigated in order
Page 279 U. S. 295
to determine what if any legislation was necessary or desirable
in order to recover the leased lands or to safeguard other parts of
the public domain.
Neither Senate Joint Resolution 54 nor the action taken under it
operated to divest the Senate or the committee of power further to
investigate the actual administration of the land laws. It may be
conceded that Congress is without authority to compel disclosures
for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending suits; but the
authority of that body, directly or through its committees, to
require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitutional
power is not abridged because the information sought to be elicited
may also be of use in such suits.
The record does not sustain appellant's contention that the
investigation was avowedly not in aid of legislation. He relies on
the refusal of the committee to pass the motion directing that the
inquiry should not relate to controversies pending in court and the
statement of one of the members that there was nothing else to
examine appellant about. But these are not enough to show that the
committee intended to depart from the purpose to ascertain whether
additional legislation might be advisable. It is plain that
investigation of the matters involved in suits brought or to be
commenced under Senate Joint Resolution 54 might directly aid in
respect of legislative action.
3. There is no merit in appellant's contention that a verdict
should have been directed for him because the evidence failed to
show that the committee was authorized to make the inquiry, summon
witnesses, and administer oaths. Resolutions 282 and 294 were
sufficient until the expiration of the Sixty-Seventh Congress
during which they were adopted, but it is argued that Resolution
434 was not effective to extend the power of the committee. As set
out in the indictment and shown by the record,
Page 279 U. S. 296
Resolution 434 does not mention 294 or refer to the date of its
adoption. The former, so far as material, follows:
"Resolved, that Senate Resolution 282, agreed to April 21, 1922,
and Senate Resolution 292, agreed to May 15, 1922, authorizing and
directing the committee on public lands and surveys to investigate
the entire subject of leases upon naval oil reserves, with
particular reference to the protection of the rights and equities
of the government of the United States and the preservation of its
natural resources, and to report its findings and recommendations
to the Senate . . . be . . . continued in full force and effect
until the end of the Sixty-Eighth Congress. The committee . . . is
authorized to sit . . . after the expiration of the present
Congress until the assembling of the Sixty-Eighth Congress and
until otherwise ordered by the Senate."
There is enough in that resolution to show that, where "292"
appears, 294 was meant. The subject of the investigation is
specifically mentioned. That is the only matter dealt with. The
sole purpose was to authorize the committee to carry on the
inquiry. It would be quite unreasonable, if not indeed absurd, for
the Senate to direct investigation by the committee and to allow
its power to summon and swear witnesses to lapse. The context and
circumstances show that Resolution 294 was intended to be kept in
force.
See School District No. 11 v. Chapman, 152 F. 887,
893, 894.
4. Appellant earnestly maintains that the question was not shown
to be pertinent to any inquiry the committee was authorized to
make. The United States suggests that the presumption of regularity
is sufficient without proof. But, without determining whether that
presumption is applicable to such a matter, it is enough to say
that the stronger presumption of innocence attended the accused at
the trial. It was therefore incumbent upon the United States to
plead and show that the question
Page 279 U. S. 297
pertained to some matter under investigation. Appellant makes no
claim that the evidence was not sufficient to establish the
innuendo alleged in respect of the question; the record discloses
that the proof on that point was ample.
Congress, in addition to its general legislative power over the
public domain, had all the powers of a proprietor, and was
authorized to deal with it as a private individual may deal with
lands owned by him.
United States v. Midwest Oil Co.,
236 U. S. 459,
236 U. S. 474.
The committee's authority to investigate extended to matters
affecting the interest of the United States as owner as well as to
those having relation to the legislative function.
Before the hearing at which appellant refused to answer, the
committee had discovered and reported facts tending to warrant the
passage of Senate Joint Resolution 54 and the institution of suits
for the cancellation of the naval oil reserve leases. Undoubtedly
it had authority further to investigate concerning the validity of
such leases, and to discover whether persons, other than those who
had been made defendants in the suit against the Mammoth Oil
Company, had or might assert a right or claim in respect of the
lands covered by the lease to that company.
The contract and release made and given by Bonfils and Stack
related directly to the title to the lands covered by the lease
which had been reported by the committee as unauthorized and
fraudulent. The United States proposed to recover and hold such
lands as a source of supply of oil for the Navy. S.J.Res. 54. It is
clear that the question so propounded to appellant was pertinent to
the committee's investigation touching the rights and equities of
the United States as owner.
Moreover, it was pertinent for the Senate to ascertain the
practical effect of recent changes that had been made
Page 279 U. S. 298
in the laws relating to oil and other mineral lands in the
public domain. The leases and contracts charged to have been
unauthorized and fraudulent were made soon after the executive
order of May 31, 1921. The title to the lands in the reserves could
not be cleared without ascertaining whether there were outstanding
any claims or applications for permits, leases, or patents under
the Leasing Act or other laws. It was necessary for the government
to take into account the rights, if any there were, of such
claimants. The reference in the testimony of Bonfils to the
contract referred to in the question propounded was sufficient to
put the committee on inquiry concerning outstanding claims possibly
adverse and superior to the Mammoth Oil Company's lease. The
question propounded was within the authorization of the committee
and the legitimate scope of investigation to enable the Senate to
determine whether the powers granted to or assumed by the Secretary
of the Interior and the Secretary of the Navy should be withdrawn,
limited, or allowed to remain unchanged.
5. The question of pertinency under § 102 was rightly decided by
the court as one of law. It did not depend upon the probative value
of evidence. That question may be likened to those concerning
relevancy at the trial of issues in court, and it is not
essentially different from the question as to materiality of false
testimony charged as perjury in prosecutions for that crime. Upon
reasons so well known that their repetition is unnecessary, it is
uniformly held that relevancy is a question of law. Greenleaf on
Evidence (13th ed.) § 49; Wigmore on Evidence, §§ 2549, 2550. And
the materiality of what is falsely sworn, when an element in the
crime of perjury, is one for the court.
Carroll v. United
States, 16 F.2d 951;
United States v. Singleton, 54
F. 488;
Cothran v. State, 39 Miss. 541, 547.
Page 279 U. S. 299
The reasons for holding relevancy and materiality to be
questions of law in cases such as those above referred to apply
with equal force to the determination of pertinency arising under §
102. The matter for determination in this case was whether the
facts called for by the question were so related to the subjects
covered by the Senate's resolutions that such facts reasonably
could be said to be "pertinent to the question under inquiry." It
would be incongruous and contrary to well established principles to
leave the determination of such a matter to a jury.
Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Brimson, supra, p.
154 U. S. 489;
Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.
S. 135.
6. There is no merit in appellant's contention that he is
entitled to a new trial because the court excluded evidence that,
in refusing to answer, he acted in good faith on the advice of
competent counsel. The gist of the offense is refusal to answer
pertinent questions. No moral turpitude is involved. Intentional
violation is sufficient to constitute guilt. There was no
misapprehension as to what was called for. The refusal to answer
was deliberate. The facts sought were pertinent as a matter of law,
and § 102 made it appellant's duty to answer. He was bound rightly
to construe the statute. His mistaken view of the law is no
defense.
Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S.
56,
209 U. S. 85;
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S.
20,
226 U. S.
49.
7. The conviction on the first count must be affirmed. There
were ten counts, demurrer was sustained as to four,
nolle
prosequi was entered in respect of two, and conviction was had
on the first, fourth, fifth and ninth counts. As the sentence does
not exceed the maximum authorized as punishment for the offense
charged in the first count, we need not consider any other count.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616,
250 U. S.
619.
Judgment affirmed.