1. A party challenging a judgment of a state court must show
that its enforcement would deprive him, not another, of some right
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States
properly asserted below. P.
276 U. S.
88.
2. The power lodged in state courts to conform their proceedings
to reasonable requirements of local law was not abused in this case
by an order striking a part of the answer, based apparently upon
the Kentucky Declaratory Judgment Law, asking the court to
determine the validity of the statute here in question and to
declare defendant's rights and duties, and advancing a
counterclaim. P.
276 U. S.
88.
3.
Semble that the Kentucky Declaratory Judgment Law
does not authorize a defendant to ask judgment by counterclaim. P.
276 U. S.
88.
Page 276 U. S. 72
4. This Court has no jurisdiction to review a mere declaratory
judgment. P.
276 U. S.
89.
5. An answer alleging that the plaintiff is a trust or
combination organized for the purpose of creating and carrying out
restrictions of trade unlawfully and contrary to the common law,
without mentioning the Constitution or any statute of the United
States, does not raise a federal question.
Id.
6. A corporation does not possess the privileges and immunities
of a citizen of the United States within the meaning of the
Constitution.
Id.
7. The Cooperative Marketing Act of Kentucky, aiming, in the
public interest, to assist agricultural producers in the orderly
marketing of their products and to protect them and consumers from
manipulation of prices by middlemen, authorizes the incorporation
of nonprofit associations, with membership confined to such
producers and with power to contract with their respective members
only for the sale to the corporation of their respective crops of
the products dealt in, during a period of not more than ten years,
and for marketing thereof by the corporation and disposition of the
proceeds, less expenses, among the members according to the
quantity and quality of their deliveries. It declares that such an
association shall not be deemed a conspiracy, illegal combination,
or monopoly; that such contracts shall not be illegal; that any
person knowingly inducing a breach of such a contract by a member
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, subject to fine and liable to the
association in a civil suit in the penal sum of $500 for each
offense, and that any warehouseman shall be liable to the
association in the same penalty who, having knowledge or notice of
such a contract, persuades or permits the member who made it to
break it by accepting or receiving his products for sale or auction
contrary to the terms of such contract.
Held:
(1) No right of a warehouse company guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment is impaired by merely authorizing corporations, with
membership limited to agriculturalists, and permitting contracts
for purchase and resale of farm products. P.
276 U. S.
89.
(2) This is also true of the declaration that such associations
shall not be deemed monopolies, combinations, etc., in restraint of
trade, and that contracts with members shall be deemed legal. The
state may declare its own policy in such matters.
Id.
(3) There is nothing to show that, in Kentucky, since the
passage of the Act, other producers may not form voluntary
associations and make and enforce contracts like those which the
Act expressly authorizes. P.
276 U. S.
90.
Page 276 U. S. 73
(4) As the statute does not prescribe more rigorous penalties
for warehousemen than for others who willingly solicit, persuade,
or induce a member to break his marketing contract with his
association, a claim that the provision in that regard deprives
warehousemen of the equal protection of the laws is without
substantial basis.
Connolly v. Union Pipe Co.,
184 U. S. 540,
distinguished. P.
276 U. S.
91.
(5)
Qaere whether the liberty protected by the
Constitution includes the right to induce a breach of contract
between others for the aggrandizement of the intermeddler. P.
276 U. S.
91.
(6) The statute is of a kind that promotes the common interest,
and provision for protecting the marketing contracts between an
association and its members is essential to its plan; the
legislature was within its powers in providing against probable
interference, and to that extent limiting the liberty of contract
previously enjoyed by warehousemen. Pp.
276 U. S. 92,
276 U. S.
96.
8. The liberty of contract guaranteed by the Constitution is
freedom from arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable
regulation to safeguard the public interest. The question is
whether the restrictions of the statute have reasonable relation to
a proper purpose. P.
276 U. S. 97.
9. A provision for a penalty to be received by the aggrieved
party as punishment for the violation of a statute does not
invalidate it.
Id.,
10. The pleadings in this case allege no burden upon interstate
commerce amounting to regulation, nor do they properly and
definitely advance any claim under a federal statute. P.
276 U. S.
89.
208 Ky. 643 affirmed.
Error to a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the Kentucky
which affirmed a judgment for a penalty and attorney's fees
recovered by the above-named defendant in error from the plaintiff
in error in an action by the former under the Kentucky Cooperative
Marketing Act.
Page 276 U. S. 83
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Liberty Warehouse Company, a Kentucky corporation, operates
a warehouse at Maysville in that state, and there receives and
sells loose-leaf tobacco for the accounts of growers. The Burley
Tobacco Growers' Cooperative Marketing Association, incorporated
under the Bingham Cooperative Marketing Act (Ch. 1, Acts of
Kentucky,1922), commenced this proceeding against the warehouse
company in the Mason County Circuit Court. It charged the warehouse
company with willful violation of the Act by selling pledged
tobacco, and asked judgment for the prescribed penalty ($500) and
attorney's fees.
The Bingham Act (32 sections) authorizes the incorporation of
nonprofit cooperative associations for the
Page 276 U. S. 84
orderly marketing of agricultural products, and provides only
producers may become members and that the corporation may contract
only with them for marketing such products. It declares that these
contracts shall not be illegal, prescribes penalties for
interfering therewith, and further provides that the association
shall not be deemed a conspiracy, illegal combination, or monopoly.
Three pertinent sections follow:
"Sec. 26.
Misdemeanor to Induce Breach of Marketing Contract
of Cooperative Association -- Spreading False Reports about the
Finances or Management Thereof."
"Any person or persons or any corporation whose officers or
employees knowingly induce or attempt to induce any member or
stockholder of an association organized hereunder to breach his
marketing contract with the association, or who maliciously and
knowingly spreads false reports about the finances or management
thereof, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and be subject to a fine
of not less than one hundred ($100.00) dollars and not more than
one thousand ($1,000) dollars for each such offense, and shall be
liable to the association aggrieve in a civil suit in the penal sum
of five hundred ($500) dollars for each such offense."
"Sec. 27.
Warehousemen Liable for Damage for Encouraging or
Permitting Delivery of Products in Violation of Marketing
Agreements."
"Any person, firm, or corporation conducting a warehouse within
the state of Kentucky who solicits or persuades or permits any
member of any association organized hereunder to breach his
marketing contract with the association by accepting or receiving
such member's products for sale or for auction or for display for
sale, contrary to the terms of any marketing agreement of which
said person or any member of the said firm or any active officer or
manager of the said corporation has knowledge or notice, shall be
liable to the association aggrieved in a civil
Page 276 U. S. 85
suit in the penal sum of five hundred ($500) dollars for each
such offense, and such association shall be entitled to an
injunction against such warehouseman to prevent further breaches
and a multiplicity of actions thereon. In addition, said
warehouseman shall pay to the association a reasonable attorney's
fee and all costs involved in any such litigation or proceedings at
law."
"This section is enacted in order to prevent a recurrence or
outbreak of violence and to give marketing associations an adequate
remedy in the courts against those who encourage violations of
cooperative contracts."
"Sec. 28.
Associations are Not in Restraint of
Trade."
"Any association organized hereunder shall be deemed not to be a
conspiracy nor a combination in restraint of trade nor an illegal
monopoly, nor an attempt to lessen competition or to fix prices
arbitrarily or to create a combination or pool in violation of any
law of this state, and the marketing contracts and agreements
between the association and its members and any agreements
authorized in this act shall be considered not to be illegal nor in
restraint of trade nor contrary to the provisions of any statute
enacted against pooling or combinations."
The petition (filed Dec. 14, 1923) alleges:
That the association was organized to provide means for orderly
marketing of tobacco grown or acquired by members and no others.
Identical contracts (the standard form is exhibited) with many
growers obligate them to deliver to it all of their tobacco during
five years. Tobacco received under these contracts is sold to
manufacturers and dealers as market conditions permit and the
proceeds less expenses are distributed among the members, according
to quality and quantity of their deliveries.
That one Mike Kielman joined the association and executed the
standard contract. Notwithstanding this, he delivered two thousand
pounds of the 1923 crop to the warehouse company, and it sold the
same, with full
Page 276 U. S. 86
knowledge of the circumstances. Before the sale, the association
notified the warehouse company of Kielman's membership and of his
marketing contract, requested it not to sell his tobacco, and
called attention to the prescribed penalties.
"Plaintiff says that, after service of said notice and with the
full knowledge that said tobacco had been sold to this plaintiff,
the defendant knowingly persuaded and permitted the said Mike
Kielman to breach his marketing contract with the plaintiff
association by accepting and receiving the said member's product
for sale and for auction and selling same contrary to the terms of
said marketing agreement, contrary to the provisions of § 27 of the
Bingham Cooperative Marketing Act."
The standard contract provides:
"The Association agrees to buy and the grower agrees to sell and
deliver to the association all of the tobacco produced by or for
him or acquired by him as landlord or lessor, during the years
1922, 1923, 1924, 1925 and 1926. . . . The Association agrees to
resell such tobacco, together with tobacco of like type, grade, and
quality delivered by other growers under similar contracts, at the
best prices obtainable by it under market conditions, and to pay
over the net amount receive therefrom (less freight, insurance and
interest) as payment in full to the grower and growers named in
contracts similar hereto, according to the tobacco delivered by
each of them,"
etc.
"Inasmuch as the remedy at law would be inadequate, and inasmuch
as it is now and ever will be impracticable and extremely difficult
to determine the actual damage resulting to the association should
the grower fail so to sell and deliver all of his tobacco, the
grower hereby agrees to pay to the association for all tobacco
delivered, consigned, or marketed or withheld by or for him, other
than in accordance with the terms hereof, the sum of five cents per
pound as liquidated damages averaged for all types
Page 276 U. S. 87
and grades of tobacco for the breach of this contract, all
parties agreeing that this contract is one of a series dependent
for its true value upon the adherence of each and all of the
growers to each and all of the said contracts."
"The grower agrees that, in the event of a breach or threatened
breach by him of any provision regarding delivery of tobacco, the
association shall be entitled to an injunction to prevent breach or
further breach thereof and to a decree for specific performance and
sale of personal property under special circumstances and
conditions, and that the buyer cannot go to the open markets and
buy tobacco and replace any which the grower may fail to
deliver."
The warehouse company presented an amended answer and
counterclaim in three sections.
The first sets up "in estoppel and in bar" of the alleged action
that the Association, since January 13, 1922, has been a trust or
combination of the capital, skill, and acts of divers persons and
corporations doing commercial business in Kentucky and between that
state and other states and foreign countries "organized and
conducted for the express purpose of unlawfully and contrary to the
common law, creating and carrying out restrictions in trade" under
the guise of stabilizing prices.
The second asserts that §§ 26 and 27, Bingham Act, conflict with
the Fourteenth Amendment, abridge defendant's privileges and
immunities as a citizen of the United States, deprive it of
corporate life, liberty, and property without due process of law,
and deny it equal protection of the laws.
The third seems to be based upon the Kentucky Declaratory
Judgment Law. It advances a counterclaim; also asks the court to
determine whether the Bingham Act is valid and for a declaration of
rights and duties.
The trial court struck § 3 "from the records" and sustained
demurrers to §§ 1 and 2. The
Page 276 U. S. 88
warehouse company elected to plead no further. Trial by jury was
waived, "the petition being submitted to the court on the law and
facts." Judgment for $500 -- the prescribed penalty -- and $100
attorney's fees went for the Association, and was affirmed by the
court of appeals.
In order to prevail here, the warehouse company must show that
enforcement of the challenged judgment would deprive it -- not
another -- of some right arising under the Constitution or laws of
the United States properly asserted below.
Southern Railway Co.
v. King, 217 U. S. 524;
Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U.
S. 540;
Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.
S. 610,
235 U. S. 621;
Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.
S. 571,
235 U. S. 576;
Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.
S. 282,
257 U. S.
289.
No federal right was impaired by striking § 3 from the amended
answer and counterclaim. Proceedings in state courts must conform
to the reasonable requirements of local law. Whether they do is
primarily for those courts to determine. Here, we find no abuse of
that power.
Section 3 asserts:
"Defendant now makes its application to this Court, upon its
counterclaim, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 83 of
the acts of 1922 of the General Assembly of Kentucky, known as the
Declaratory Judgment Law, for the purpose of securing a declaration
of its rights and duties under said Bingham Cooperative Marketing
Act, in relation to the common law and the state and federal
Constitutions, as well as the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, and for the
purpose of having this Court determine whether, in the conduct of
its business, it will be necessary for it to comply with the
provisions of said Bingham Cooperative Marketing Act, or whether it
is invalid in whole or part, and, if so, in what part."
Apparently the declaratory judgment statute authorizes
plaintiffs only to ask for judgments. It also provides:
Page 276 U. S. 89
"The court may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights,
duties, or other legal relations in any case where a decision under
it would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave
rise to the action, or in any case where the declaration or
construction is not necessary or proper at the time under all the
circumstances."
This Court has no jurisdiction to review a mere declaratory
judgment.
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S.
70.
Section one presents no federal question. It does not mention
the Constitution or any statute of the United States, but claims
that the Association is an unlawful trust or combination under
common law rules. But the present controversy concerns a statute,
and a state may freely alter, amend, or abolish the common law
within its jurisdiction.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v.
Baugh, 149 U. S. 368,
149 U. S.
378.
Section two challenges §§ 26 and 27 of the Bingham Act because
they offend the Fourteenth Amendment
"in that said sections and each of them abridges defendant's
privileges and immunities as a citizen of the United States and
deprives defendant of its corporate life, liberty, and property
without due process of law and denies to it the equal protection of
the laws."
This suggests the only federal questions open for our
consideration. The pleadings allege no burden upon interstate
commerce amounting to regulation, nor do they property and
definitely advance any claim under a federal statute.
A corporation does not possess the privileges and immunities of
a citizen of the United States within the meaning of the
Constitution.
Western Turf Assn. v. Greenberg,
204 U. S. 359,
204 U. S. 363;
Selover v. Walsh, 226 U. S. 112. The
allegation concerning deprivations of corporate life is
unimportant.
Certainly the statute impaired no right of the warehouse company
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
Page 276 U. S. 90
by merely authorizing corporations with membership limited to
agriculturists and permitting contracts for purchase and resale of
farm products. This also is true of the declaration that such
associations shall not be deemed monopolies, combinations, or
conspiracies in restraint of trade, and that contracts with members
shall not be illegal. The state may declare its own policy as to
such matters.
Sections 26 and 27 prohibit interference with contracts
permitted by local law and not alleged to conflict with federal
law. Section 26 declares any person or corporation who knowingly
induces a member to break his marketing contract guilty of a
misdemeanor, and subjects him to a fine; also to suit for the penal
sum of $500. Section 27 hits warehousemen who solicit, persuade, or
permit a member to break his marketing contract by accepting or
receiving pledged products for sale and subjects them to penalties.
It was under the latter section that judgment went against the
warehouse company.
The court below affirmed:
"there is no statute at present in this state, nor was there any
when the cause of action herein arose, against pools, trusts, and
monopolies. Considering this and further declarations in the same
opinion, we cannot say that any common law rule recognized in the
State of Kentucky forbade associations or contracts similar to
those before us when intended to promote orderly marketing.
Undoubtedly the state had power to authorize formation of
corporations by farmers for the purpose of dealing in their own
products. And there is nothing to show that, since the Bingham Act
producers may not form voluntary associations and through them make
and enforce contracts like those expressly authorized."
Do the provisions of the Bingham Act which afford peculiar
protection to marketing contracts with members of the Association
deprive the warehouse company of
Page 276 U. S. 91
equal protection of the laws, or conflict with the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because without reasonable
basis and purely arbitrary? These questions may be fairly said to
arise upon the present record.
The statute penalizes all who wittingly solicit, persuade, or
induce an association member to break his marketing contract. It
does not prescribed more rigorous penalties for warehousemen than
for other offenders. Nobody is permitted to do what is denied to
warehousemen. There is no substantial basis upon which to invoke
the equal protection clause.
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.
S. 540, is much relied upon. But there, the
circumstances differed radically from those here presented, and
always, to determine whether equal protection is denied, there must
be consideration of the peculiar facts.
Connolly resisted
judgment for the purchase price of pipe upon the ground that the
Union Company, the vendor, belonged to a combination or trust
forbidden by an Illinois statute. The statute defined a trust, made
participation therein criminal, and directed that those who
purchased articles from an offending member should not be held
liable for the price. Section 9 declared: "The provisions of this
act shall not apply to agricultural products or livestock while in
the hands of the producer or raiser." This Court held that, because
of the exemption, the Union Company was denied the equal protection
of the law. It was forbidden to do what others could do with
impunity. Here, the situation is very different. The questioned
statute undertakes to protect sanctioned contracts against any
interference -- no one could lawfully do what the warehouse company
did.
Counsel maintain that the Bingham Act takes from the warehouse
company the right to carry on business in the usual way by
accepting and selling the tobacco of those
Page 276 U. S. 92
who voluntarily seek its services, and thus unduly abridges its
liberty. Undoubtedly the statute does prohibit and penalize action
not theretofore so restricted, and to that extent interferes with
freedom. But this is done to protect certain contracts which the
legislature deemed of great importance to the public and peculiarly
subject to invasion. We need not determine whether the liberty
protected by the Constitution includes the right to induce a breach
of contract between others for the aggrandizement of the
intermeddler -- to violate the nice sense of right which honorable
traders ought to observe.
In
Minnesota, etc., Marketing Association v. Radke
(1925), 163 Minn. 403, provisions of the Cooperative Marketing Act
of Minnesota substantially like § 27 were declared invalid. The
supreme court said:
"It seems clear to us that it is beyond the power of the
legislature to make it a tort to purchase, in the ordinary course
of a legitimate business, from the true owner a wholesome staple
commodity upon which there is no lien and which is not under any
ban or regulation because of inherent qualities or use. Liberty of
contract is assured by both state and federal Constitutions."
On the other hand, in
Commonwealth v. Hodges (1910),
137 Ky. 233, the Kentucky Court of Appeals sustained a statute
which made it a criminal offense knowingly to purchase a crop
pledged to an unincorporated marketing association. The same
doctrine is accepted by the opinion below.
It is stated without contradiction that cooperative marketing
statutes substantially like the one under review have been enacted
by 42 states. Congress has recognized the utility of cooperative
association among farmers in the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, the
Capper-Volstead Act, 42 Stat. 388, and the Cooperative Marketing
Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 802. These statutes reveal widespread
legislative approval of the plan for protection
Page 276 U. S. 93
scattered producers and advancing the public interest. Although
frequently challenged, we do not find that any court has condemned
an essential feature of the plan, with the single exception of the
Supreme Court of Minnesota in the above-cited case.
In the court below it was said:
"We take judicial knowledge of the history of the country and of
current events, and from that source we know that conditions at the
time of the enactment of the Bingham Act were such that the
agricultural producers was at the mercy of speculators and others
who fixed the price of the selling producer and . . . the final
consumer through combinations and other arrangements, whether valid
or invalid, and that, by reason thereof, the former obtained a
grossly inadequate price for his products. So much so was that the
case that the intermediate handlers between the producer and the
final consumer injuriously operated upon both classes and fattened
and flourished at their expense. It was and is also a well known
fact that, without the agricultural producer, society could not
exist, and the oppression brought about in the manner indicated was
driving him from his farm, thereby creating a condition fully
justifying an exception in his case from any provision of the
common law, and likewise justifying legislative action in the
exercise of its police power."
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared in
Warren v. Alabama
Farm Bureau Cotton Association (1925), 213 Ala. 61:
"So far as we are advised, no American court has condemned a
cooperative marketing contract of the character of this complainant
association as injurious to the public interest or in any way
violative of public policy. On the contrary, such contracts have
been everywhere upheld as valid, if not positively beneficial to
the public interest. "
Page 276 U. S. 94
In
Arkansas Cotton Growers' Co-op. Assn. v. Brown
(1925), 168 Ark. 504, the court sustained a Cooperative Marketing
Act:
"The statute seems to be in a form which has become standard,
and has been enacted in many of the states, the enactment of such
legislation being manifestly prompted by the universal urge to
promote prosperity in agricultural pursuits. There has been much
discussion of the plan in the decisions of the courts of the
various states where it has been adopted, and the general view
expressed is that the statute should be liberally construed in
order to carry out the design in its broadest scope."
In
Manchester Dairy System, Inc. v. Hayward (1926), 82
N.H. 193, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire said:
"Cooperative marketing agreements containing the essential
features of the contract here considered have been recognized in
many of our states as a legitimate means of protecting its members
against oppression, of avoiding the waste incident to the dumping
of produce upon the market with the consequent wide fluctuations in
prices, and of securing to the producer a larger share of the price
paid by the consumer for his products. Associations of the
character here exist in practically all of our states, and deal in
nearly every form of agricultural product. From year to year, the
cooperative idea in marketing has been assuming wider scope and
greater economic importance. Public approval of such cooperative
organizations is evidenced by the adoption of enabling legislation
in more than two-thirds of the states, including our own. . . .
Such legislation has received liberal construction by the courts.
Minn. Wheat Growers' Assn. v. Huggins, 203 N.W. 420
et
seq. . . . No sufficient ground appears from the record for
holding that the contract here under consideration is contrary to
public policy. "
Page 276 U. S. 95
Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Assn. v. Jones, 185 N.C.
265:
"In view of the necessity of protecting those engaged in raising
tobacco against the combination of those who buy the raw product at
their own figures and sell it to the public at prices also fixed by
themselves, this movements has been organized. By a careful
examination of all the provisions of the act under which the
association is acting, it will be seen that every precaution has
been taken to insure that it will not be used for private gain, and
can operate only for the protection of the producers."
Northern Wisconsin Cooperative Tobacco Pool v.
Bekkedal, 182 Wis. 571:
"The reasons for promoting such legislation are generally
understood. It sprang from a general, if not well nigh universal,
belief that the present system of marketing is expensive and
wasteful, and results in an unconscionable spread between what is
paid the producer and that charged the consumer. It was for the
purpose of encouraging efforts to bring about more direct marketing
methods, thus benefiting both producer and consumer, and thereby
promoting the general interest and the public welfare, that the
legislation was enacted."
The purpose of the penalty clause (Section 27) was pointed out
by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in
Dark Tobacco Growers'
Co-op. Assn. v. Dunn (1924), 150 Tenn. 614:
"The complainant could not do business without tobacco. When it
contracts to sell, it must fill its contracts with tobacco
delivered by its members. It cannot replace defendant's tobacco by
purchasing upon the open market. Its charter prohibits it from so
doing. For each pound of tobacco which is not delivered to the
Association by a member, there is a
pro rata increase in
the operating costs of the association, and that increase cannot be
estimated in terms of money with definite exactness. For every
deflection of one member, there is a certain amount
Page 276 U. S. 96
of dissatisfaction engendered among other members; indeed, other
members are encouraged not to deliver their tobacco, and the normal
increase of the association's members is prevented. All of these
things result in damage, but the amount of damage cannot possibly
be computed."
Other pertinent cases are assembled in margin.
*
The opinion generally accepted -- and upon reasonable grounds,
we think -- is that the cooperative marketing statutes promote the
common interest. The provisions for protecting the fundamental
contracts against interference by outsiders are essential to the
plan. This Court has recognized as permissible some discrimination
intended to encourage agriculture.
American Sugar Refining Co.
v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89,
179 U. S. 95;
Cox v. Texas, 202 U. S. 446.
And, in many cases, it has affirmed the general power of the states
so to legislate as to meet a definitely threatened
Page 276 U. S. 97
evil.
International Harvester Co. v. Missouri,
234 U. S. 199;
Jones v. Union Guano Co., 264 U.
S. 171. Viewing all the circumstances, it is impossible
for us to say that the Legislature of Kentucky could not treat
marketing contracts between the Association and its members as of a
separate class, provide against probable interference therewith,
and to that extent limit the sometime action of warehousemen.
The liberty of contract guaranteed by the Constitution is
freedom from arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable
regulation to safeguard the public interest. The question is
whether the restrictions of the statute have reasonable relation to
a proper purpose.
Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.
S. 373,
236 U. S. 380;
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S.
61,
220 U. S. 78. A
provision for a penalty to be received by the aggrieved party as
punishment for the violation of a statute does not invalidate it.
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Williams et
al., 251 U. S. 63,
251 U. S.
66.
Affirmed.
*
Owen County Burley Tobacco Society v. Brumback, 128
Ky. 137;
Burley Tobacco Society v. Gillaspy, 51 Ind.App.
583;
Bullville Milk Producers Assn. v. Armstrong, 178
N.Y.S. 612;
Anaheim Citrus Fruit Assn. v. Yeoman, 51 Cal.
App. 759;
Washington Cranberry Growers' Assn. v. Moore,
117 Wash. 430;
Poultry Producers of Southern California v.
Barlow, 189 Cal. 278;
Kansas Wheat Growers' Assn. v.
Schulte, 113 Kan. 672;
Brown v. Staple Cotton Co-op.
Assn., 132 Miss. 859;
Oregon Growers' Co-op. Assn. v.
Lentz, 107 Or. 561;
Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Assn. v.
Stovall, 113 Tex. 273;
Potter v. Dark Tobacco Growers'
Ass'n, 201 Ky. 441;
Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Assn. v.
Jones, 185 N.C. 265;
Milk Producers' Marketing Co. v.
Bell, 234 Ill.App. 222;
Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Assn.
v. Mason, 150 Tenn. 228;
Rifle Potato Growers v.
Smith, 78 Colo. 171;
Clear Lake Co-op. Live Stock
Shippers' Assn. v. Weir, 200 Iowa, 1293;
Minnesota Wheat
Growers' Co-op. Assn. v. Huggins, 162 Minn. 471;
Nebraska
Wheat Growers' Assn. v. Norquest, 113 Neb. 731;
Harrell v.
Cane Growers' Co-op. Assn., 160 Ga. 30;
California Bean
Growers' Assn. v. Rindge Land & Navigation Co., 199 Cal.
168;
Louisiana Farm Bureau Cotton Growers' Co-op. Assn. v.
Clark, 160 La. 294;
List v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op.
Assn., 114 Ohio St. 361;
South Carolina Cotton Growers'
Co-op. Assn. v. English, 135 S.C.19;
Tobacco Growers'
Co-op. Assn. v. Danville Warehouse Co., 144 Va. 456.