1. The Suits in Admiralty Act was intended to furnish the
exclusive remedy in admiralty against the United States and
corporations, such as the Fleet Corporation, of which the United
States or its representatives own the entire outstanding capital
stock, on all maritime causes of action arising (since April 6,
1917) out of the possession or operation of merchant vessels. And
nothing in its legislative history indicates a different purpose.
P.
276 U. S.
212.
2. As the libels in these cases were not brought against the
Fleet Corporation within the period prescribed by § 5, they were
barred. P.
276 U. S.
214.
3. The statute of limitations having been sufficiently pleaded
in exceptions to the libels, it was not necessary to plead it in
the answers. P.
276 U. S.
214.
4. Whether, in addition to furnishing an exclusive remedy in
admiralty, the Act also prevents resort to any concurrent remedies
against the United States or the corporation on like causes of
action in the Court of Claims or in courts of law is a question not
presented by these cases, and upon which no opinion is expressed.
P.
276 U. S.
214.
12 F.2d 721 reversed.
Certiorari, 273 U.S. 682-683, to decrees in admiralty rendered
by the circuit court of appeals reversing decrees of the district
court, 295 Fed. 372; 7 F.2d 893, in three consolidated cases in
admiralty by libels
in personam, brought against the Fleet
Corporation by the present respondents to recover the value of
goods shipped
Page 276 U. S. 203
by them on a vessel owned by the United States and operated by
the Corporation, which was wrecked and lost after a alleged
deviation from the agreed voyage.
Page 276 U. S. 208
MR. JUSTICE SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
These are consolidated libels
in personam, brought in
admiralty by the respondents against the Shipping Board Emergency
Fleet Corporation in the Federal District Court for Northern
California in October, 1922, and November, 1923, to recover the
value of goods shipped by them in December, 1919, and January,
1920, from San Francisco to ports in Wales and Holland, on the
West Aleta. a merchant vessel owned by the United States
and operated by the Fleet Corporation. [
Footnote 1] The libels alleged that the vessel deviated
from the agreed voyage, passing the destined ports without entering
and proceeding on a voyage to a port in Germany, and that, in the
course and by reason of such deviation, the vessel stranded upon an
island in the North Sea and became a total loss, with all
Page 276 U. S. 209
her cargo. The Fleet Corporation filed exceptions to the libels
on the ground, among others, that they were filed more than one
year after the Suits in Admiralty Act [
Footnote 2] had gone into effect, and that, by and under
the provisions of that Act, and particularly § 5 thereof, the
alleged causes of action were barred. These exceptions were
overruled. 295 F. 372. The Fleet Corporation then answered, relying
on the liberties clause in the bills of lading, denying that there
had been any deviation, and alleging that the loss was caused by
risks and perils for which it was not liable under the bills of
lading and the Harter Act. [
Footnote 3] The district court, on the hearing, finding
that there had been an unauthorized deviation and and that the
suits were not barred or affected by the Suits in Admiralty Act,
entered decrees in favor of the libelants for the value of the
goods, with interest at the rate of 7 percent. 7 F.2d 893. These
were affirmed by the circuit court of appeals, which held that
there had been an unwarranted deviation and that the Suits in
Admiralty Act was not applicable, since its purpose was to
substitute an action
in personam for one
in rem,
and no suit
in rem could have been brought, as the vessel
had been wrecked off the coast of a foreign country, and was a
total loss. 12 F.2d 721.
The first contention of the Fleet Corporation is that these
suits were barred by the limitation contained in § 5 of the Suits
in Admiralty Act.
That Act, whose main provisions are set forth in the margin,
[
Footnote 4] was approved and
went into effect on March 9,
Page 276 U. S. 210
1920 -- several months after the alleged causes of action had
arisen and more than a year before the libels were brought. It
provided that no vessel owned by the United States or any
corporation in which the United States or its representatives own
the entire outstanding capital stock, or in the possession of or
operated by or for the United States or such corporation, should be
subject to arrest or seizure by judicial process, § 1; that, where
such vessel was employed as a merchant vessel and a proceeding
Page 276 U. S. 211
in admiralty could be maintained if it were privately owned or
operated, a libel
in personam might be brought against the
United States or such corporation, as the case might be, § 2, and
that suits based on causes of action arising prior to the Act
should be brought within one year after it went into effect, §
5.
It is unquestioned that the Fleet Corporation is one which may
be sued by a libel
in personam under the provisions of the
Act. [
Footnote 5]
Page 276 U. S. 212
In
Eastern Transp. Co. v. United States, 272 U.
S. 675,
272 U. S.
689-692, we held that, while the main purpose of the Act
was to exempt from seizure and arrest merchant vessels of the
United States operated by it and its subordinate shipping
corporations and to substitute for a suit
in rem one
in personam attended with the incidents of a proceeding
in rem in which the personal liability of the United
States took the place of the vessel, the Act also had a wider
effect and created a broader personal obligation of the United
States, as the owner of an offending vessel, like that of a private
owner, which might be enforced in admiralty by a libel
in
personam in cases where there was no basis for an action
in rem.
In view of this decision, the libelants do not now contend, as
in the circuit court of appeals, that the Act merely authorized a
libel
in personam as a substitute for a proceeding
in
rem. And the question here presented as to the effect of the
Act is whether, as the Fleet Corporation contends, the remedy given
against it by a libel
in personam in admiralty under the
provisions of the Act is exclusive, or whether, as the libelants
contend, this remedy is not exclusive and the Fleet Corporation may
also, as a private corporation, be sued in admiralty by a libel
in personam, independently of the provisions of the
Act.
The Act not only authorizes libels
in personam to be
brought in admiralty against the United States or the designated
corporations on causes of action arising out of the possession or
operation of merchant vessels, §§ 1, 2, but fixes the venue in such
suits, § 2; requires service on the United States or the
corporation to be made upon the United States attorney, with notice
to the Attorney General, § 2; applies to the suits the principles
of law and rules of practice obtaining in like cases between
private parties, § 3; limits the rate of interest which may
Page 276 U. S. 213
be included in a money decree against the United States or the
corporation to 4 percent unless otherwise stipulated, § 3; exempts
the United States or the corporation from the giving of any bond or
admiralty stipulation, and provides that those previously given in
any admiralty cause shall be cancelled upon the assumption of
liability by the United States, § 3; requires suits based on causes
of action that had arisen before the Act to be brought within one
year after it goes into effect, and all other suits within two
years after the cause of action arises, § 5; directs that the final
judgments rendered in the suits, as well as those in previous
admiralty causes in which the United States assumes liability shall
be paid by the accounting officers of the United States out of
money in the Treasury, for which an appropriation is made, §§ 3, 8;
requires the Attorney General to report to each session of Congress
all final judgments rendered against the United States or the
corporation, and specifically repeals "the provisions of all other
Acts" inconsistent with the Act, § 13.
The Act plainly relates to causes of action which had previously
arisen, [
Footnote 6] as well as
to those subsequently arising. It provides a remedy in admiralty
for adjudicating and satisfying all maritime claims arising out of
the possession of operation of merchant vessels of the United
States and the corporations, in which the obligation of the United
States is substituted for that of the corporations. To that end, it
furnishes a complete system of administration, applying to the
United States and the corporations alike, by which uniformity is
established as to venue, service of process, rules of decision and
procedure, rate of interest, and periods of limitation, and not
only provides that the
Page 276 U. S. 214
judgments against the corporations, as well as those against the
United States, shall be paid out of money in the Treasury, but
repeals the inconsistent provisions of all other acts.
In view of these provisions of the Act, we cannot doubt that it
was intended to furnish the exclusive remedy in admiralty against
the United States and the corporations on all maritime causes of
action arising out of the possession or operation of merchant
vessels. And nothing in its legislative history indicates a
different purpose.
It follows that, after the passage of the Act, no libel in
admiralty could be maintained against the United States or the
corporations on such causes of action except in accordance with its
provisions, and that, as the libels in these cases were not brought
against the Fleet Corporation within the period prescribed by § 5,
they were barred. And although, as the libelants point out, this
was not "pleaded in any of the answers," it was aptly and
sufficiently pleaded in the exceptions to the libels, which
correspond to demurrers in actions at law.
Whether in addition to furnishing an exclusive remedy in
admiralty, the Act also prevents a resort to any concurrent
remedies against the United States or the corporations on like
causes of action in the Court of Claims or in courts of law is a
question not presented by these cases, and upon which, although
referred to in the argument, we express no opinion. And it is
unnecessary to determine other contentions of the Fleet Corporation
relating to the questions of deviation and laches.
The decree of the circuit court of appeals is reversed, and the
cause will be remanded to the district court with instructions to
dismiss the libels.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS is of opinion that the decree of the
circuit court of appeals should be affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
The process was served on the Fleet Corporation.
[
Footnote 2]
41 Stat. 525, c. 95, U.S.C. Tit. 46, § 741
et seq.
[
Footnote 3]
27 Stat. 445, c. 105.
[
Footnote 4]
The Act provides:
"That no vessel owned by the United States or by any corporation
in which the United States or its representatives shall own the
entire outstanding capital stock or in the possession of . . . or
operated by or for the United States or such corporation . . .
shall hereafter, in view of the provision herein made for a libel
in personam, be subject to arrest or seizure by judicial
process in the United States. . . ."
"Sec. 2. That, in cases where, if such vessel were privately
owned or operated . . . , a proceeding in admiralty could be
maintained at the time of the commencement of the action herein
provided for, a libel
in personam may be brought against
the United States or against such corporation, as the case may be,
provided that such vessel is employed as a merchant vessel. . . .
Such suits shall be brought in the district court of the United
States for the district in which the parties so suing . . . reside
or have their principal place of business . . . or in which the
vessel . . . charged with liability is found. The libelant shall
forthwith serve a copy of his libel on the United States attorney
for such district and mail a copy thereof by registered mail to the
Attorney General of the United States, and shall file a sworn
return of such service and mailing. Such service and mailing shall
constitute valid service on the United States and such corporation.
. . ."
"Sec. 3. That such suits shall proceed and shall be heard and
determined according to the principles of law and . . . rules of
practice obtaining in like cases between private parties. A decree
against the United States or such corporation may include costs of
suit, and when the decree is for a money judgment, interest at the
rate of 4 percentum per annum . . . or at any higher rate which
shall be stipulated. . . . If the libelant so elects in his libel,
the suit may proceed in accordance with the principles of libels
in rem wherever it shall appear that, had the vessel . . .
been privately owned and possessed, a libel
in rem might
have been maintained. Election so to proceed shall not preclude the
libelant in any proper case from seeking relief
in
personam in the same suit. Neither the United States nor such
corporation shall be required to give any bond or admiralty
stipulation on any proceeding brought hereunder. Any such bond or
stipulation heretofore given in admiralty causes by the United
States . . . or the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet
Corporation shall become void and be surrendered and cancelled upon
the filing of a suggestion by the Attorney General or other duly
authorized law officer that the United States is interested in such
cause, and assumes liability to satisfy any decree included within
said bond or stipulation, and thereafter any such decree shall be
paid as provided in § 8 of this Act. . . ."
"Sec. 5. That suits as herein authorized may be brought only on
causes of action arising since April 6, 1917, provided that suits
based on causes of action arising prior to the taking effect of
this Act shall be brought within one year after this Act goes into
effect, and all other suits hereunder shall be brought within two
years after the cause of action arises. . . ."
"Sec. 8. That any final judgment rendered in any suit herein
authorized . . . shall, upon the presentation of a duly
authenticated copy thereof, be paid by the proper accounting
officers of the United States out of any appropriation or . . .
fund especially available therefor; otherwise there is hereby
appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury of the United States
not otherwise appropriated, a sum sufficient to pay any such
judgment. . . ."
"Sec. 12. That the Attorney General shall report to the Congress
at each session thereof the suits under this Act in which final
judgment shall have been rendered . . . against the United States
and such aforesaid corporation. . . ."
"Sec. 13. That the provisions of all other Acts inconsistent
herewith are hereby repealed."
[
Footnote 5]
All of the capital stock of the Fleet Corporation is owned and
held by the United States Shipping Board on behalf of the United
States,
United States v. McCarl, 275 U. S.
1; in operating merchant vessels, it acts for and on
behalf of the United States,
Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 275 U. S. 415, and
it is referred to specifically in § 4 of the Act.
[
Footnote 6]
Except as to those that had arisen prior to April 6, 1917, §
5.