While a longshoreman, employed in the unloading of a vessel at
dock, was standing upon a stage that rested solely upon the wharf
and projected a few feet over the water to or near the vessel, he
was struck by a sling loaded with cargo, which was being lowered
over her side, and was knocked into the water, where some time
later he was found dead.
Page 276 U. S. 180
Held, that the right of action for his death was
controlled by the state, and not by the maritime, law, since,
though the death occurred in the water, the occurrence which was
the sole, immediate, and proximate cause of it and gave rise to the
cause of action, was on the wharf, which was to be deemed an
extension of the land. P.
276 U. S.
181.
5 La.Ct.App. 284 affirmed.
Error to a judgment of the Court of Appeal of Louisiana
affirming a recovery under the state workmen's compensation law.
The supreme court of the state denied a writ of certiorari.
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
March 12, 1925, plaintiff in error, a stevedoring corporation,
was unloading a vessel lying in the Mississippi at a dock in New
Orleans. George Taylor was in its employ as a longshoreman, and
came to his death while engaged in that work. Defendant in error is
his widow, and brought this suit in the Civil District Court of
Orleans Parish under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law
* to recover
compensation for herself and children. The district court gave
judgment for them; the court of appeal affirmed, and its presiding
judge, after the state supreme court had denied a writ of
certiorari, allowed the writ of error that brings the case
here.
Plaintiff in error maintained below, and here insists, that this
is a case exclusively within the admiralty and maritime
Page 276 U. S. 181
jurisdiction, and that, while the state compensation law is
broad enough to apply to longshoremen unloading vessels, its
application in this case violates § 2 of Article III of the
Constitution, which extends the judicial power of the United States
"to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction," and also
that clause of § 8 of Article I, which authorizes Congress to make
laws for carrying into effect the powers granted by the
Constitution.
At the time of the accident, cargo was being hoisted out of the
hold to deck skids and thence swung to trucks operated upon a stage
that rested solely upon the wharf and projected a few feet over the
water to or near the side of the vessel. The petition of defendant
in error alleged, and she introduced evidence to show, that
deceased was standing on the stage when a sling, loaded with five
sacks of soda weighing 200 pounds each, was being lowered over the
side by means of a winch on the vessel; that the sling was swinging
back and forth, and, while deceased was trying to catch and steady
it, the sling struck him and knocked him off the stage into the
water, where some time later he was found dead. At the trial,
plaintiff in error maintained that deceased was not struck, but
accidentally fell into the river. The issues were decided in favor
of defendant in error, and the evidence is amply sufficient to
sustain the finding.
Deceased was engaged in maritime work under a maritime contract.
If the cause of action arose upon the river, the rights of the
parties are controlled by maritime law, the case is within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and the application of the
Louisiana Compensation Law violated § 2 of Article III. But if the
cause of action arose upon the land, the state law is applicable.
The Plymouth, 3
Wall. 20,
70 U. S. 33;
Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S.
52,
234 U. S. 59;
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.
S. 205;
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,
253 U. S. 149;
Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.
S. 219. Plaintiff
Page 276 U. S. 182
in error concedes that the stage and wharf on which deceased was
working are to be deemed an extension of the land (
Cleveland
Terminal R. Co. v. Steamship Co., 208 U.
S. 316,
208 U. S. 321;
Industrial Comm'n v. Nordenholt Co., 259 U.
S. 263,
259 U. S.
275), and that the state law would apply if he had been
injured or killed by falling on the landing place. It argues that
as no claim was made for injuries sustained while deceased was on
land, and, as the suit was solely for death that occurred in the
river, the case is exclusively within the admiralty jurisdiction.
But this is a partial view that cannot be sustained. The blow by
the sling was what gave rise to the cause of action. It was given
and took effect while deceased was upon the land. It was the sole,
immediate, and proximate cause of his death.
The G. R.
Booth, 171 U. S. 450,
171 U. S. 460.
The substance and consummation of the occurrence which gave rise to
the cause of action took place on land.
The Plymouth,
supra. This case cannot be distinguished from
Johnson v.
Chicago Elevator Co., 119 U. S. 388,
119 U. S. 397,
or
Martin v. West, 222 U. S. 191,
222 U. S. 196.
The contention of plaintiff in error is without merit.
Judgment affirmed.
* Act 20 of 1914 as amended by Act 243 of 1916, Act 38 of 1918,
Acts 234, 244, and 247 of 1920, Act 43 of 1922, and Acts 21 and 216
of 1924.