1. A continuing order for naval supplies made during the late
war by direction of the President, under Acts of March 4 and June
15, 1917, examined and
held to be not an offer to
purchase, but a command, acceptance of which "subject to
conditions" specified, did
Page 274 U. S. 216
not make a contract; therefore, the property delivered under it
was taken by eminent domain. P.
274 U. S. 220.
2. For property not paid for when taken, just compensation
includes the value at that time, with enough more, measurable by
interest, to produce the equivalent of full value paid at the
taking.
Id.
61 Ct.Cls. 693 reversed.
Certiorari to a judgment of the Court of Claims allowing a
recovery less than the petitioner's claim, for tobacco products
furnished the government during the war.
Page 274 U. S. 218
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff brought this action to recover a balance claimed for
tobacco products obtained from it for the Navy and Marine Corps
between September 8 and November 23, 1918. The Court of Claims
found the value to be $483,504.30, and that in the same period, the
United States paid on account $423,893.96, and gave judgment for
the difference, $59,610.34, without more. The plaintiff contends
that the products were taken under the power of eminent domain, and
that it is entitled to such additional sum as will produce the
equivalent of their value paid at the time of the taking, and that
interest at a reasonable rate is the measure of the amount required
to be added in order to make just compensation.
The sole question is whether the facts found constitute a taking
by eminent domain. Plaintiff was engaged in the manufacture and
sale of tobacco products. August 26, 1918, the Bureau of Supplies
and Accounts of the Navy issued and delivered to it Navy order
N-4128, stating that, pursuant to the Act of March 4, 1917 (39
Stat. 1168, 1193), and the Act of June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. 182), and
under the direction of the President, an order thereby was placed
to furnish specified tobacco products for which provisional prices
were named; that compliance was obligatory; that no commercial
orders should be allowed to interfere with the delivery called for;
that, as it was impracticable then to
"determine a reasonable and just compensation for the material
to be delivered, the fixing of the price will be subject
Page 274 U. S. 219
to later determination. You are assured of a reasonable profit
under this order, and, as an advance payment, you will be paid the
unit prices stated hereon, with the understanding that such advance
payment will not be considered as having any bearing upon the price
to be subsequently fixed. Any difference between the amount of such
advance payment and the amount finally determined upon as being
just and reasonable will be paid to you or refunded by you, as the
case may be."
The document stated that the order must be accepted and filled
in any event; that it was to be signed and returned by plaintiff;
that deliveries were to be made as directed by a designated
officer, and bills sent to him bearing a certificate that the
prices were those stated in the order, and that the conditions
appearing on the reverse side of the order were made a part of it.
These included printed portions of the above-mentioned Acts of
Congress empowering the President, in time of war, to place an
order with any person for war material, of a kind and quantity
being produced by him, as the necessities of the government might
require; declaring that "compliance with all such orders shall be
obligatory," and that, whenever the United States shall requisition
any war material, "it shall make just compensation therefor," and
authorizing the President to exercise this power through agencies
to be determined by him. September 9, 1918, the Paymaster General
of the Navy directed that any orders issued by the Quartermaster
General of the Marine Corps should be executed and billed at the
prices specified in order N-4128. And, October 14 and November 22
following, the order was further modified so as to call for
additional tobacco products. Upon receipt of the order and each of
the modifications, plaintiff signed a statement thereon that it was
"accepted subject to the conditions" specified. The President had
authorized the Secretary of the Navy, either directly or through
any officer who, acting under the Secretary, had
Page 274 U. S. 220
authority to make contracts on behalf of the government, to
exercise all the power and authority vested in the President
applicable to the production, purchase, and requisitioning of war
material.
Navy order N-4128 did not purport to be an offer to purchase; it
commanded delivery of specified merchandise. Plaintiff's consent
was not sought; it was not consulted as to quantity, price, time or
place of delivery. The Navy relied upon the compulsory provisions
of the Acts of Congress and commanded compliance with the order.
These Acts authorized the requisition of plaintiff's property for
public use. The President was empowered to take immediate
possession of its plant to manufacture the tobacco products called
for. Act of June 3, 1916, 39 Stat. 166, 213. And it is to be
presumed that the plant would have been taken if plaintiff had
refused compliance. The acceptance was not the closing of a
contract; it was the expression of purpose to obey. And the order
was a continuing one, and operated to require delivery of the
specified articles, whether then on hand or thereafter to be
produced.
The findings show that plaintiff's property was taken by eminent
domain, and its just compensation includes the additional amount
claimed.
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States,
261 U. S. 299,
261 U. S. 304;
Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.
S. 106,
265 U. S.
123.
Judgment reversed.