1. Under Art. III of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the
federal courts is limited to cases and controversies presented in
such form, with adverse litigants, that the judicial power is
capable of acting upon them and of pronouncing and carrying into
effect a judgment between the parties, and does not extend to the
determination of abstract questions or issues framed for the
purpose of invoking the advice of the court without real parties or
a real case. P.
273 U. S.
73.
2. So
held of a proceeding in the district court
brought under the Declaratory Judgment Law of Kentucky against a
prosecuting attorney for the purpose of obtaining a declaration
concerning the construction and validity of an act of the state
regulating sales of leaf tobacco at public auction, in which there
was no allegation that the plaintiffs had done or were
contemplating any of the things forbidden by and punishable under
the Act, or that the defendant threatened proceedings against them,
or any prayer for relief against him.
3. The federal Conformity Act relates only to "practice,
pleadings, and forms and modes of procedure," and neither purports
to nor can extend the jurisdiction of the district courts beyond
the constitutional limitations. P.
273 U. S.
76.
Page 273 U. S. 71
4. Section 274a of the Judicial Code relate merely to a case in
which the objection is to the side of the court on which the suit
is brought, and not to the entire lack of jurisdiction in the
court. P.
273 U. S.
76.
Affirmed.
Error to a judgment of the district court dismissing for want of
jurisdiction an action brought under the Declaratory Judgment Law
of Kentucky.
MR. JUSTICE SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This proceeding was commenced by a petition filed by the
plaintiffs in error on the law side of the Federal District Court
for Eastern Kentucky seeking to obtain a judgment declaring their
rights under an Act of the Kentucky Legislature.
The Declaratory Judgment Law of Kentucky, Acts of 1922, ch. 83,
provides that, in any action in a court of record of that
commonwealth having general jurisdiction wherein it is made to
appear that an actual controversy exists, the plaintiff may, by
means of a petition on the law or equity side of the court, as the
nature of the case may require, ask for and obtain
"a declaration of rights, either alone or with other relief, and
the court may make a binding declaration of rights, whether or not
consequential relief is or could be asked,"
and that further relief, based on such declaratory judgment, may
be granted by the court whenever necessary or proper, either in the
same proceeding or in an independent action, upon notice to any
adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory
judgment.
Page 273 U. S. 72
The petition alleged that the plaintiffs, a Kentucky corporation
and a citizen of North Carolina, were engaged in operating a
looseleaf tobacco warehouse in Kentucky, in which they sold leaf
tobacco at public auction for their customers and patrons; that
their rights were materially and seriously affected by chapter 10
of the Kentucky Acts of 1924, regulating the sales of leaf tobacco
at public auction; that this Act was invalid and repugnant to the
Bill of Rights and Constitution of Kentucky, the commerce clause of
the Constitution of the United States, the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Sherman
Anti-Trust Law; that an actual controversy existed with respect
thereto in that the plaintiffs had been threatened with various
civil and criminal punishments and penalties for the violation of
the Act which were about to be enforced thereunder; that, in
conducting their business, it was necessary for them to know
whether the Act was valid or invalid, and whether they were liable
for the crimes therein denounced and subject to the fines and
penalties it prescribed, and they could not continue their business
without a financial loss amounting to confiscation of their rights,
business, and property, unless the court made a declaration of
their rights and duties under the Act; that they made this
application to the court in accordance with the Federal Conformity
Statute and the Declaratory Judgment Law of Kentucky "for the
purpose of securing a declaration of their rights and duties" under
the Act of 1924, and having the "court determine whether, in the
conduct of their business, it will be necessary for them to comply"
with the provisions of the Act, or whether it is "invalid in whole
or in part, and if so, in what part;" and that the Commonwealth
Attorney was made a party defendant as the representative of the
Commonwealth charged with the duty of enforcing the Act, and who,
as such, "prepared the indictments referred to herein." No
Page 273 U. S. 73
other reference, however, was made to any such indictments in
the petition.
The plaintiffs prayed the court
"by its judgment to declare what their rights and duties under
said Act of 1924 are, and that a judgment be rendered declaring
said Act of 1924 invalid, and for all proper relief."
The defendant demurred to the petition on the ground, among
others, that the court had no jurisdiction of the cause of action
set forth, having no power or authority as a federal court to
entertain a proceeding for a declaration of the rights of parties
or to act under the provisions of the Declaratory Judgment Law of
Kentucky. This demurrer was sustained. Twelve days later, a final
judgment was entered reciting that, the plaintiffs having failed to
amend their petition and the court being of opinion that it had no
jurisdiction of the action, the same was dismissed. This direct
writ of error was allowed upon the question of jurisdiction under §
238 of the Judicial Code before the amendment made by the
Jurisdictional Act of 1925 became effective.
The sole purpose of the petition, as shown by its express
allegations, is to obtain a declaration from the district court of
the rights and duties of the plaintiffs under the Act of 1924, and
a determination of the extent to which they must comply with its
provisions in the conduct of their business. This is its entire
scope. While the Commonwealth Attorney is made a defendant as a
representative of the Commonwealth, there is no semblance of any
adverse litigation with him individually, there being neither any
allegation that the plaintiffs have done or contemplate doing any
of the things forbidden by the Act before being advised by the
court as to their rights nor any allegation that the Commonwealth
Attorney has threatened to take or contemplates taking any action
against them for any violation of the Act, either past or
prospective. And no relief of any kind is prayed against him, by
restraining action on his part or otherwise.
Page 273 U. S. 74
The question whether the district court has jurisdiction to
entertain such a petition for a declaration of rights admits of but
one answer under the prior decisions of this Court.
We need not review these at length. It suffices to say that, in
the light of the decisions in
Muskrat v. United States,
219 U. S. 346,
219 U. S. 357;
Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126,
258 U. S. 129;
Texas v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 258 U.
S. 158,
258 U. S. 162;
Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U.
S. 428,
261 U. S. 444;
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447,
262 U. S. 488;
New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U. S. 328,
269 U. S. 330,
and
Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co.,
272 U. S. 693, in
which the principles stated in earlier cases are considered and
applied, it is not open to question that the judicial power vested
by Article III of the Constitution in this Court and the inferior
courts of the United States established by Congress thereunder
extends only to "cases" and "controversies" in which the claims of
litigants are brought before them for determination by such regular
proceedings as are established for the protection and enforcement
of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs, and
that their jurisdiction is limited to cases and controversies
presented in such form, with adverse litigants, that the judicial
power is capable of acting upon them, and pronouncing and carrying
into effect a judgment between the parties, and does not extend to
the determination of abstract questions or issues framed for the
purpose of invoking the advice of the court without real parties or
a real case.
In the
Muskrat case,
supra, in which it was
held that it was not within the constitutional authority of this
Court to entertain an appeal from the Court of Claims in a suit
brought, under a permissive act of Congress, by members of the
Cherokee Tribe of Indians to determine the constitutional validity
of certain congressional enactments, the Court, in an extended
opinion reviewing the earlier
Page 273 U. S. 75
cases, said:
"As we have already seen by the express terms of the
Constitution, the exercise of the judicial power is limited to
'cases' and 'controversies.' Beyond this it does not extend, and
unless it is asserted in a case or controversy within the meaning
of the Constitution, the power to exercise it is nowhere conferred.
. . . It is . . . evident that there is neither more nor less in
this procedure than an attempt to provide for a judicial
determination . . . of the constitutional validity of an act of
Congress. Is such a determination within the judicial power
conferred by the Constitution, as the same has been interpreted and
defined in the authoritative decisions to which we have referred?
We think it is not. That judicial power, as we have seen, is the
right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse
litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction. . . .
This attempt to obtain a judicial declaration of the validity of
the act of Congress is not presented in a 'case' or 'controversy'
to which, under the Constitution of the United States, the judicial
power alone extends. . . . The whole purpose of the law is to
determine the constitutional validity of this class of legislation
in a suit not arising between parties concerning a property right
necessarily involved in the decision in question, but in a
proceeding against the government in its sovereign capacity and
concerning which the only judgment required is to settle the
doubtful character of the legislation in question. Such judgment
will not conclude private parties when actual litigation brings to
the court the question of the constitutionality of such
legislation. In a legal sense, the judgment could not be executed,
and amounts in fact to no more than an expression of opinion upon
the validity of the acts in question."
And in
New Jersey v. Sargent, supra, it was held that
this Court could not entertain a bill for an injunction against
federal officers charged with the administration
Page 273 U. S. 76
of a federal statute which did not show that any justiciable
right of the state was being, or about to be, affected
prejudicially by the application of the statute, but, in effect,
sought merely to obtain an abstract judicial declaration that, in
certain features, the statute exceeded the authority of Congress
and encroached upon that of the state.
It follows necessarily from these decisions that the district
court, as a court of the United States established under Article
III of the Constitution, had no jurisdiction to entertain the
petition for the declaratory judgment.
Manifestly the Federal Conformity Statute, R.S. § 914 (U.S.Code,
Tit. 28, § 724) conferred upon the court no jurisdiction to proceed
in accordance with the Declaratory Judgment Law of Kentucky. This
statute relates only to "practice, pleadings, and forms and modes
of proceeding," and neither purports to nor can extend the
jurisdiction of the district courts beyond the constitutional
limitations.
See Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton,
146 U. S. 202,
146 U. S. 209;
Mexican Central Ry. v. Pinkney, 149 U.
S. 194,
149 U. S.
206.
The plaintiffs in error also rely in argument here upon § 274a
of the Judicial Code (U.S.C.ode, Tit. 28, § 397), which provides
that, on finding that a suit at law should have been brought in
equity, or vice versa, the court shall order any amendments to the
pleadings which may be necessary to conform to the proper practice,
and that any party may amend his pleadings so as to obviate the
objection that his suit was not brought on the right side of the
court. This statute relates merely to a case in which the objection
is to the side of the court on which the suit is brought, and not
to the entire lack of jurisdiction in the court. It is plain that
it has no application here, where the court was without
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for a declaratory judgment
either upon the equity or the law side.
Page 273 U. S. 77
The judgment dismissing the petition for want of jurisdiction is
accordingly
Affirmed.