In a sale of cloth by the government, a description,
accompanying the advertisement for bids and giving the weight per
yard, is not a warranty when bidder are invited to inspect the
goods before bidding and notified that bids subject to inspection
will not be received. P.
273 U. S.
69.
59 Ct.Cls. 675 affirmed.
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing a claim
based on an alleged breach of warranty upon the part of the
government in a sale of surplus water-proof duck.
MR. JUSTICE SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Maguire Company filed its petition, under the Tucker Act to
recover from the United States for the alleged breach of a contract
made by the Surplus Property Division of the War Department for the
sale of a certain quantity of waterproof duck. The Court of Claims,
on its findings of fact, dismissed the petition. 59 Ct.Cls. 575.
And the case was brought here by appeal under ยง 242 of the Judicial
Code prior to the Jurisdictional Act of 1925.
The basis of the Company's contention is that it purchased,
pursuant to an advertisement by the Surplus Property Division,
certain material listed as olive drab waterproof duck weighing 12.4
oz. per yard; that this description, according to commercial usage,
referred to
Page 273 U. S. 68
the weight of the duck before it had been waterproofed, and
indicated that it had weighed 12.4 oz. in that condition, but that
the duck delivered under the contract, although then weighing 12.4
oz. or more, had weighed only 10.5 oz. before being waterproofed,
and was of less value than the 12.4 oz. duck which it had
purchased.
The findings of fact show that the Zone Supply Officer at
Jeffersonville, Indiana, advertised for sale a list of surplus
textiles containing an item No. 20, described as 121,964 yards of
waterproof duck, "width, 29 inches; color, O.D.; weight, 12.4."
Attached to this list was a letter stating that the inspection of
the textiles was invited, and might be made at the Supply Depot at
Jeffersonville, where the material was stored, but that "bids
subject to inspection" would not be received. The Company, a New
York corporation, after seeing this list and the accompanying
letter, submitted, through an authorized agent, a bid for the
material listed as item No. 20 at 36 1/2 cents per yard. This was
accepted by a letter in which the materials were described as
"Duck, W. P. 29 , O.D. 12.4 oz." The Company paid the purchase
price, and the government delivered to it all the material listed
in item No. 20.
The Court of Claims also found that samples taken from this
duck, both before and after delivery, weighed 13.4 oz., or more,
per yard; that there were no recognized commercial standard weights
of waterproof duck, the increased weight caused by waterproofing
varying according to the process and ingredients used, and that it
was the commercial practice to sell waterproof duck on samples
without mentioning weight, and that the government delivered to the
Company "the actual material offered and described in item No. 20"
of the surplus textile list and sold by the letter of
acceptance.
In support of the judgment dismissing the petition, the Court of
Claims in its opinion said:
"Neither the plaintiff
Page 273 U. S. 69
nor its agent inspected the material before bidding or before
consummating the sale. Inspection was invited by the government,
and it was expressly stated that no bids would be received subject
to inspection after the bidding. The advertisement of sale and the
letter accompanying it, which the plaintiff saw before bidding, put
purchasers upon notice and charged them with the duty of seeing
what they were buying before they bought. Purchasers were told in
effect that, if they bought something other than they thought they
were buying, they could not afterwards assert a claim upon the
ground that they were mistaken in the character and quality of the
materials. . . . If the plaintiff received from the government a
different material from that which it thought it had bought, it is
not the fault of the government, and the plaintiff cannot recover
for its own negligence."
And, "[a]s a matter of fact, the government delivered to the
plaintiff exactly the material which it advertised for sale."
We think that the construction and effect of the advertisement
and accompanying letter were correctly stated by the Court of
Claims. In view of the specific statements in the letter that
inspection of the materials was invited, and that they would not be
sold subject to inspection, the description of the weight of the
duck cannot be regarded as in the nature of a warranty. In this
aspect, the present case is analogous to
Lipshitz & Cohen
v. United States, 269 U. S. 90,
269 U. S. 92.
There, an agent of the United States having listed junk for sale at
several forts, setting forth the weights and kinds of each,
accompanied by a statement that the weights shown were approximate,
and must be accepted as correct by the bidder, the plaintiffs,
without inspection or other information, bid a lump sum for the
material, "as is where is." And, although the quantities turned out
to be much less than that shown in the list, it was held that the
plaintiffs
Page 273 U. S. 70
had no cause of action, since the naming of quantities
"cannot be regarded as in the nature of a warranty, but merely
as an estimate of the probable amounts in reference to which good
faith only could be required of the party marking it."
This principle is conclusive of the present case. And for this
reason, if no other, a motion made by the Maguire Company to remand
the cause to the Court of Claims for a further finding of fact as
to the weight of the duck before waterproofing must be denied.
The judgment is
Affirmed.