A conveyance of securities made before the testator's death and
not in contemplation of it, in trust to accumulate the income until
a distant date specified, and then to divide the fund among his
children, designated by name as the beneficiaries, vested the
interests of his children when it was executed, and was not
"intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his
death" within the meaning of § 402(c), Revenue Act of 1918. P.
273 U. S.
547.
6 F.2d 551 reversed.
Certiorari (269 U.S. 543) to a judgment of the circuit court of
appeals which affirmed a judgment of the district
Page 273 U. S. 546
court (300 F. 754) directing a verdict for the collector in an
action to recover money paid under protest as a federal estate
tax.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit to recover the amount of a federal estate tax
paid by the plaintiffs, petitioners, under duress. The district
court directed a verdict for the defendant, the collector (300 F.
754), the judgment upon which was affirmed by the circuit court of
appeals (6 F.2d 551). A writ of certiorari was granted by this
Court. 269 U.S. 543.
The tax was levied under the Revenue Act of 1918, Act Feb. 24,
1919, c. 18, § 402(c), 40 Stat. 1057, 1097, which provides that the
value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by
including all property
"to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has
at any time made a transfer, or with respect to which he has . . .
created a trust, in contemplation of or intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after his death,"
etc. By § 401, the tax is laid upon the transfer of the net
estate. The transfer taxed in this case was made by the testator on
May 5, 1921, and was a conveyance to the United States Trust
Company of Omaha of notes and bonds valued at $225,000, par, in
trust to accumulate the income (subject to certain small
deductions
Page 273 U. S. 547
in case of the extreme destitution of the testator's wife or of
any of the beneficiaries named) until February 1, 1951, unless the
last of the beneficiaries should have died more than twenty-one
years before that date, etc., and then to divide the principal and
undistributed income among his three children by name. The testator
died on September 29, 1921, a few months after creating this trust,
but it is not argued that he created it in contemplation of death
as a device to escape taxes. The only question is whether the trust
was one intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment after
his death, as was ruled below.
The transfer was immediate and out and out, leaving no interest
remaining in the testator. The trust, in its terms, has no
reference to his death, but is the same and unaffected whether he
lives or dies. Although the circuit court of appeals seems to have
thought otherwise, the interest of the children respectively was
vested as soon as the instrument was executed, even though it might
have been divested as to any one of them in favor of his issue if
any, or of the surviving beneficiaries, if he died before the
termination of the trust.
See Gray, The Rule Against
Perpetuities, § 108(3). It seems plain from the little evidence
that was put in that the testator was not acting in contemplation
of death as a motive for his act, or otherwise, except in the sense
that he was creating a fund intended to secure his children from
want in their old age, whoever might dissipate the considerable
property that he retained and left at his death, and that, being
fifty-six years old, if he thought about it, he would have
contemplated the possibility or probability of his being dead
before the emergency might arise. Of course, it was not argued that
every vested interest that manifestly would take effect in actual
enjoyment after the grantor's death was within the statute. There
certainly is no transfer taking effect after his death to be taxed
under § 401.
Page 273 U. S. 548
It is not necessary to consider whether the petitioner goes too
far in contending that § 402(c) should be construed to refer only
to transfers of property the possession or enjoyment of which does
not pass from the grantor until his death. But it seems to us
tolerably plain that, when the grantor parts with all his interest
in the property to other persons in trust, with no thought of
avoiding taxes, the fact that the income vested in the
beneficiaries was to be accumulated for them, instead of being
handed to them to spend, does not make the trust one intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the grantor's
death.
Judgment reversed.