1. Section 1(6) of the Act to Regulate Commerce, requiring
carriers to establish and enforce just and reasonable regulations
affecting "the issuance, form and substance" of bills of lading,
applies to provisions in bills of lading affecting liability of
railroads for loss of property received by them for transportation
over an interstate inland route to a seaport for delivery to a
foreign vessel for ocean carriage to a nonadjacent foreign country.
P.
273 U. S.
343.
2. This is a general regulation by Congress broad enough to
include stipulations in bills of lading exempting carriers from
liability for loss of such shipments by fire not due to the
carriers' negligence. P.
273 U. S.
345.
3. A state law forbidding such stipulations is therefore as
applied to such shipments invalid in view of the occupation of the
field by Congress. P.
273 U. S. 346.
168 Ark. 22 reversed.
Error to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas which
affirmed a judgment against the railroad for loss of goods by fire
in favor of Porter and other shippers.
Page 273 U. S. 342
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
October 21, 1920 at Earle, Arkansas, defendants in error
delivered to plaintiff in error 75 bales of cotton for
transportation to Liverpool, England. The carrier issued to the
shippers an export bill of lading in two parts. The first covered
the inland haul from Earle to Brunswick, Georgia, designated as
port A, and the second covered the ocean carriage from Brunswick to
Liverpool, designated as port B. The inland route specified was
over the lines of railroad of plaintiff in error, the Mobile &
Ohio, and the Atlanta, Birmingham & Atlantic. The inland rate
for the railroads named was 98.5 cents per 100 pounds. The ocean
transportation was to be by the Leyland Line for the rate of $1.95.
The bill of lading contained, as applicable in respect of the
service and delivery at Brunswick, a provision that: "No carrier or
party in possession of . . . the property, herein described, shall
be liable for any loss thereof . . . by fire. . . ." After the bill
of lading was issued, while the cotton was on the cars of the
carrier and before they were moved from Earle, it was destroyed by
a fire originating at the compress and which was not set by
plaintiff in error. Sections 843 and 844, Crawford & Moses'
Digest of the Statutes of Arkansas declare that it is unlawful for
any railroad to enter into an agreement with any shipper for the
purpose of limiting or abrogating its statutory and common law
duties or liability as a common carrier; that all agreements made
for that purpose and any rule or regulation limiting the common law
rights of shippers are void. Defendants in error brought this
Page 273 U. S. 343
action in the Circuit Court of Pulaski County, Arkansas, to
recover the value of the cotton. Plaintiff in error contended, as
it here insists, that these provisions of the Arkansas statute do
not apply to the shipment in question, and that, if held to be
applicable, they contravene the laws of the United States
regulating interstate and foreign commerce. The circuit court
applied the statute and gave judgment for the shippers. The carrier
took the case to the supreme court of the state, and there it was
held that the acts of Congress regulating bills of lading apply
only to interstate commerce and to shipments from a point in the
United States to an adjacent foreign country, and do not evince an
intention to regulate bills of lading for shipments from a point in
the United States to nonadjacent foreign countries. 168 Ark. 22.
The case is here on writ of error allowed by the chief justice of
that court. § 237, Judicial Code.
There is no claim that the loss was caused by any fault or
negligence of the carrier, and, if the Arkansas statute does not
apply to the shipment, the clause in the bill of lading exempting
the carrier from liability is valid.
Cau v. Texas & Pacific
Ry. Co., 194 U. S. 427. The
power of Congress under the commerce clause to regulate bills of
lading in respect of such shipments is not questioned, and if it
has entered the field of such regulation, the state statute is
thereby superseded. The Interstate Commerce Act extends to the
plaintiff in error and to the other railroads named in the bill of
lading over which the cotton was to have been transported from
Earle, Arkansas, to the port of Brunswick, Georgia, and it also
extends to the interstate transportation over the inland route
constituting a part of the movement in foreign commerce. Section
1(1), (2) and (3), 41 Stat. 474. Among other things, the Act
requires all carriers subject to it to establish and enforce just
and reasonable regulations affecting the issuance, form, and
Page 273 U. S. 344
substance of bills of lading. § 1, (6), 41 Stat. 475. It directs
the Interstate Commerce Commission to keep informed as to the
manner and method in which the business of carriers is conducted
and "to execute and enforce the provisions of" the Act. § 12, 25
Stat. 858. It provides that whenever, after hearing, the commission
shall be of opinion that any "regulation or practice whatsoever" of
the carriers is unjust or unreasonable, it may determine and
prescribe what is just, fair, and reasonable, and may make an order
requiring the carriers to observe the regulation or practice
prescribed. § 15, 41 Stat. 484. The Act requires a carrier
receiving property for transportation from a point in one state to
a point in another state or from a point in the United States to a
point in an adjacent foreign country to issue bills of lading
therefor, and, to some extent, it regulates their provisions
affecting the liability of carriers. § 20(11) -- Carmack and
Cummins Amendments, 38 Stat. 1197. Section 25, added by the
amendment of February 28, 1920, 41 Stat. 497, § 441, was enacted to
promote the business of common carriers by water in foreign
commerce whose vessels are registered under the laws of the United
States; it applies to shipments from points in the United States to
nonadjacent foreign countries, and requires the commission to do
certain things in furtherance and regulation thereof. Subdivision 4
of that section requires a railroad carrier receiving a shipment to
be delivered to such a vessel for further transportation to issue a
through bill of lading which shall state separately the amount to
be paid for railroad transportation, for water transportation and
in addition, if any, for port charges. It requires the railroad, as
a part of its undertaking, to deliver the shipment to the vessel,
and provides that it will not be liable after such delivery. The
commission is expressly empowered, in such manner as will preserve
for the carrier by water the protection of limited liability
provided by law, to prescribe
Page 273 U. S. 345
the form of such bills of lading. The section does not apply to
shipments in such commerce where the ocean carriage is by a foreign
vessel. The record does not disclose whether the vessel on which
the cotton was to have been carried was registered under the laws
of the United States, and, in favor of the shippers, we assume it
was a foreign vessel.
The question is whether Congress has entered upon the regulation
of provisions in bills of lading affecting liability of railroads
for loss of property received by them for transportation over an
interstate inland route to a seaport for delivery to a foreign
vessel for ocean carriage to a nonadjacent foreign country. All of
the provisions referred to were in force when the cotton was
delivered to plaintiff in error. No Act of Congress or order of the
commission prescribed a form of bill of lading for this shipment.
Cf. In the Matter of Bills of Lading, 64 I.C.C. 347
et
seq.; Alaska S.S. Co. v. United States, 259 F. 713;
United
States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U. S. 113. The
defendants in error rightly say that the Carmack Amendment, the
Cummins Amendment, or § 25 does not apply to such a shipment. But
that does not sustain their contention that Congress has not
evinced an intention to regulate bills of lading for transportation
such as is here involved. Section 1(6) extends to all carriers and
to all transportation subject to the Act; it prescribes a general
rule applicable to all regulations and practices affecting the form
or substance of bills of lading in order that they may be just and
reasonable. And the commission is empowered and directed to enforce
the rule.
The general regulation of the "issuance, form, and substance" of
bills of lading is broad enough to cover contractual provisions
like the one involved in this case, exempting railroads from
liability for loss of shippers' property by fire. Congress must be
deemed to have determined that the rule laid down and the means
provided
Page 273 U. S. 346
to enforce it are sufficient, and that no other regulation is
necessary. Its power to regulate such commerce and all its
instrumentalities is supreme, and, as that power has been exerted,
state laws have no application. They cannot be applied in
coincidence with, as complementary to, or as in opposition to
federal enactments which disclose the intention of Congress to
enter a field of regulation that is within its jurisdiction.
Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 272 U.
S. 605;
Oregon-Washington Co. v. Washington,
270 U. S. 87,
270 U. S. 102;
Penna. R. Co. v.Pub. Service Comm'n, 250 U.
S. 566;
Charleston & Car. R. Co. v. Varnville
Co., 237 U. S. 597,
237 U. S. 604;
Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.
S. 491,
226 U. S. 505;
Nor. Pac. Ry. v. Washington, 222 U.
S. 370,
222 U. S. 378;
Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539,
41 U. S.
617-618;
Houston v.
Moore, 5 Wheat. 1,
18 U. S.
21-22.
Judgment reversed.