2. A provision in an interstate bill of lading attempting to
restrict the institution of damage suits to two years and one day
after delivery of the property is bad under Transportation Act,
1920,
Page 273 U. S. 281
which declares unlawful any limitation shorter than two year
from the day when notice in writing is given by the carrier to the
claimant that the carrier has disallowed the claim or any part or
parts thereof specified in the notice. P.
273 U. S. 284.
3. Neither the Cummins Amendment nor the Transportation Act
operates, itself, as a statute of limitation upon a suit by a
shipper against a carrier for damage to goods. P.
273 U. S. 284.
4. In the absence of a federal statute of limitations, the local
one is applicable to such actions. P.
273 U. S. 284.
Reversed.
Certiorari to a judgment of the Court of Appeal of Louisiana
which affirmed with a modification a judgment against the railroad
recovered by Gardiner for damage to freight. The supreme court of
the state refused certiorari.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
After the record came here under writ of error, the railroad
company presented a petition for certiorari. The cause is
reviewable by certiorari, and the application therefor is granted.
The writ of error will be dismissed.
April 3, 1920, the petitioner received from respondent Gardiner
at Crowley, Louisiana, various articles consigned to himself at
Murray, Kentucky, and issued to him two bills of lading which
contained this clause: "Suits for loss, damage or delay shall be
instituted only within two years and one day after delivery of the
property." The goods were delivered at Murray in bad condition
April 15, 1920. He sued to recover for the damage in a Louisiana
state court, April 12, 1922. The company successfully
Page 273 U. S. 282
relied upon the local statute of limitation: "All actions for
loss of or damage to shipments of freight shall be prescribed by
two years, said prescription to run from the date of shipment." Act
No. 223 of 1914.
The Court of Appeal declared:
"The liability sought to be enforced is the 'liability' of an
interstate carrier for loss or damages under an interstate contract
of shipment. . . . The validity of any stipulation in such a
contract which involves the construction of the statute and the
validity of the limitation thereby imposed, is a federal question,
to be determined under the general law, and as such is withdrawn
from the field of state law or legislation. . . . State laws
limiting time for bringing suit on interstate shipments are
superseded by Carmack Amendment."
And it accordingly held the plea of prescription insufficient,
reversed the judgment of the trial court, and remanded the cause
for further proceedings.
On the second trial, judgment went for respondent for the full
amount claimed. The Court of Appeal reduced this by the amount of
the company's claim for an undercharge and the war tax. The Supreme
Court refused a writ of certiorari.
Petitioner maintains that the federal statutes prescribe no
limitation, and that the state law controls. We think this is the
correct view. The court below wrongly construed the federal
statutes.
The Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906, c.
3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 584, 595, added the following provision to §
20, Act to Regulate Commerce Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379,
386:
"That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company
receiving property for transportation from a point in one state to
a point in another state shall issue a receipt or bill of lading
therefor and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any
loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any
common carrier,
Page 273 U. S. 283
railroad, or transportation company to which such property may
be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass,
and no contract, receipt, rule, or regulation shall exempt such
common carrier, railroad, or transportation company from the
liability hereby imposed:
Provided, that nothing in this
section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading
of any remedy or right of action which he has under existing
law."
This Court held that bills of lading for interstates shipments
issued after the Carmack Amendment must be construed according to
rules approved by the federal courts and upheld provisions therein
which required claims to be filed within any specified time if
reasonable.
Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.
S. 491,
226 U. S. 505;
Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. Co. v. Harriman,
227 U. S. 657,
227 U. S. 672;
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Harris, 234 U.
S. 412,
234 U. S. 420;
Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co. v. Harold, 241 U.
S. 371,
241 U. S.
377-378;
St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v.
Starbird, 243 U. S. 592,
243 U. S. 604;
Erie R. Co. v. Shuart, 250 U. S. 465,
250 U. S. 467;
American Ry. Exp. Co. v. Levee, 263 U. S.
19,
263 U. S.
21.
The Cummins Amendment of March 4, 1915, c. 176, 38 Stat. 1196,
1197, modified the Carmack Amendment and directed:
"That it shall be unlawful for any such common carrier to
provide by rule, contract, regulation, or otherwise a shorter
period for giving notice of claims than ninety days and for the
filing of claims for a shorter period than four months, and for the
institution of suits than two years."
The Transportation Act 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 494,
provides:
"That it shall be unlawful for any such common carrier to
provide by rule, contract, regulation, or otherwise a shorter
period for giving notice of claims than ninety days, for the filing
of claims than four months, and for the institution of suits than
two years, such period for institution of suits to be computed from
the day when notice in writing is given by the carrier to the
claimant
Page 273 U. S. 284
that the carrier has disallowed the claim or any part or parts
thereof specified in the notice."
The bills of lading issued by petitioner undertook to restrict
the institution of suits for loss to two years and one day after
delivery of the property. This restriction does not accord with the
Transportation Act, which declared unlawful any limitation shorter
than two years from the time notice is given of the disallowance of
the claim, and is therefore ineffective.
See Chicago & N.W.
R. Co. v. Bewsher, 6 F.2d 947. But neither the above-quoted
provision from the Cummins Amendment nor the one from the
Transportation Act was intended to operate as a statute of
limitation. They restricted the freedom of carriers to fix the
period within which suit could be brought -- prohibited contracts
for any shorter period than the one specified.
Here, although the rights of the parties depended upon
instruments the meaning and effect of which must be determined
according to rules approved by the federal courts, there was no
federal statute of limitations, and the local one applied.
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610,
155 U. S. 613;
Chattanooga Foundry, etc. v. Atlanta, 203 U.
S. 390,
203 U. S. 397;
Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U.
S. 412,
236 U. S.
423.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal must be reversed, and the
cause will be remanded there for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.